OF  THE 

NIVERSITY 


BY  THEODORE  ROOSEVELT 


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The  Naval  War  of  1812;  or,  The  History  of  the  United  States 
Navy  during  the  Last  War  with  Great  Britain ;  to  which  is  appended 
an  account  of  the  Battle  of  New  Orleans. 

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G.  P.  PUTNAM'S   SONS,  PUBLISHERS 

NEW    YORK    AND    LONDON 


THE 


NAVAL    WAR    OF    l8l2 


OR  THE 

HISTORY    OF    THE    UNITED    STATES    NAVY   DURING 
THE    LAST  WAR  WITH   GREAT   BRITAIN; 

TO   WHICH    IS    APPENDED    AN   ACCOUNT   OF 

THE  BATTLE  OF  NEW  ORLEANS 


BY 


THEODORE    ROOSEVELT 


FIFTH  EDITION 


NEW    YORK 
G.    P.    PUTNAM'S    SONS 

27   &   29  WEST    23D   STREET 
1894 


c  36 


COPYRIGHT  BY 
G.  P.  PUTNAM'S  SONS 

1882 


Electrotyped,  Printed,  and  Bound  by 

Ube  -fcnfcfcerbocfeer  press,  Hew  Jgorfc 
G.  P.  PUTNAM'S  SONS 


PREFACE. 


THE  history  of  the  naval  events  of  the  War  of 
1812  has  been  repeatedly  presented  both  to  the 
American  and  the  English  reader.  Historical 
writers  have  treated  it  either  in  connection  with  a 
general  account  of  the  contest  on  land  and  sea,  or 
as  forming  a  part  of  the  complete  record  of  the 
navies  of  the  two  nations.  A  few  monographs, 
which  confine  themselves  strictly  to  the  naval  occur 
rences,  have  also  appeared.  But  none  of  these  works 
can  be  regarded  as  giving  a  satisfactorily  full  or 
impartial  account  of  the  war — some  of  them  being 
of  the  "  popular "  and  loosely-constructed  order, 
while  others  treat  it  from  a  purely  partisan  stand 
point.  No  single  book  can  be  quoted  which  would 
be  accepted  by  the  modern  reader  as  doing  justice 
to  both  sides,  or,  indeed,  as  telling  the  whole  story. 
Any  one  specially  interested  in  the  subject  must 
read  all ;  and  then  it  will  seem  almost  a  hopeless 
task  to  reconcile  the  many  and  widely  contradictory 
statements  he  will  meet  with. 

There  appear  to  be  three  works  which,  taken  in 
combination,  give  the  best  satisfaction  on  the  subject. 
First,  in  James*  "  Naval  History  of  Great  Britain  " 

iii 

213011 


IV  PREFACE. 

(which  supplies  both  the  material  and  the  opinions 
of  almost  every  subsequent  English  or  Canadian  his 
torian)  can  be  found  the  British  view  of  the  case. 
It  is  an  invaluable  work,  written  with  fulness  and 
care ;  on  the  other  hand  it  is  also  a  piece  of  special 
pleading  by  a  bitter  and  not  over-scrupulous  parti 
san.  This,  in  the  second  place,  can  be  partially 
supplemented  by  Fenimore  Cooper's  "  Naval  His 
tory  of  the  United  States."  The  latter  gives  the 
American  view  of  the  cruises  and  battles ;  but  it  is 
much  less  of  an  authority  than  James',  both  because 
it  is  written  without  great  regard  for  exactness,  and 
because  all  figures  for  the  American  side  need  to  be 
supplied  from  Lieutenant  (now  Admiral)  George  E. 
Emmons'  statistical  "  History  of  the  United  States 
Navy,"  which  is  the  third  of  the  works  in  question. 
But  even  after  comparing  these  three  authors, 
many  contradictions  remain  unexplained,  and  the 
truth  can  only  be  reached  in  such  cases  by  a  careful 
examination  of  the  navy  "  Records,"  the  London 
"  Naval  Chronicle,"  "  Niles'  Register,"  and  other 
similar  documentary  publications.  Almost  the 
only  good  criticisms  on  the  actions  are  those  inci 
dentally  given  in  standard  works  on  other  subjects, 
such  as  Lord  Howard  Douglass'  "  Naval  Gunnery," 
and  Admiral  Jurien  de  la  Gravi£re's  "  Guerres  Mari- 
times."  Much  of  the  material  in  our  Navy  Depart 
ment  has  never  been  touched  at  all.  In  short,  no 
full,  accurate,  and  unprejudiced  history  of  the  war 
has  ever  been  written. 


PREFACE.  V 

The  subject  merits  a  closer  scrutiny  than  it  has 
received.  At  present  people  are  beginning  to  real 
ize  that  it  is  folly  for  the  great  English-speaking 
Republic  to  rely  for  defence  upon  a  navy  composed 
partly  of  antiquated  hulks,  and  partly  of  new  ves 
sels  rather  more  worthless  than  the  old.  It  is 
worth  while  to  study  with  some  care  that  period 
of  our  history  during  which  our  navy  stood  at  the 
highest  pitch  of  its  fame  ;  and  to  learn  any  thing  from 
the  past  it  is  necessary  to  know,  as  near  as  may  be, 
the  exact  truth.  Accordingly  the  work  should  be 
written  impartially,  if  only  from  the  narrowest  mo 
tives.  Without  abating  a  jot  from  one's  devotion 
to  his  country  and  flag,  I  think  a  history  can  be 
made  just  enough  to  warrant  its  being  received  as 
an  authority  equally  among  Americans  and  English 
men.  I  have  endeavored  to  supply  such  a  work. 
It  is  impossible  that  errors,  both  of  fact  and  opinion, 
should  not  have  crept  into  it ;  and  although  I  have 
sought  to  make  it  in  character  as  non-partisan  as 
possible,  these  errors  will  probably  be  in  favor  of 
the  American  side. 

As  my  only  object  is  to  give  an  accurate 
narrative  of  events,  I  shall  esteem  it  a  particular 
favor  if  any  one  will  furnish  me  with  the  means  of 
rectifying  such  mistakes  ;  and  if  I  have  done  injus 
tice  to  any  commander,  or  officer  of  any  grade, 
whether  American  or  British,  I  shall  consider  my 
self  under  great  obligations  to  those  who  will  set 
me  right. 


vi  PREFACE. 

I  have  been  unable  to  get  access  to  the  original 
.reports  of  the  British  commanders,  the  logs  of  the 
British  ships,  or  their  muster-rolls,  and  so  have  been 
obliged  to  take  them  at  second  hand  from  the 
"  Gazette,"  or  "  Naval  Chronicle,"  or  some  standard 
history.  The  American  official  letters,  log-books, 
original  contracts,  muster-rolls,  etc.,  however,  being 
preserved  in  the  Archives  at  Washington,  I  have 
been  able,  thanks  to  the  courtesy  of  the  Hon.  Wm. 
H.  Hunt,  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  to  look  them  over. 
The  set  of  letters  from  the  officers  is  very  complete, 
in  three  series, — "  Captains'  Letters,"  "  Masters' 
Commandant  Letters,"  and  "  Officers'  Letters," 
there  being  several  volumes  for  each  year.  The 
books  of  contracts  contain  valuable  information  as 
to  the  size  and  build  of  some  of  the  vessels.  The 
log-books  are  rather  exasperating,  often  being  very 
incomplete.  Thus  when  I  turned  from  Decatur's 
extremely  vague  official  letter  describing  the  cap* 
ture  of  the  Macedonian  to  the  log-book  of  the 
Frigate  United  States,  not  a  fact  about  the  fight 
could  be  gleaned.  The  last  entry  in  the  log  on  the 
day  of  the  fight  is  "  strange  sail  discovered  to  be  a 
frigate  under  English  colors,"  and  the  next  entry 
(on  the  following  day)  relates  to  the  removal  of  the 
prisoners.  The  log  of  the  Enterprise  is  very  full 
indeed,  for  most  of  the  time,  but  is  a  perfect  blank 
for  the  period  during  which  she  was  commanded  by 
Lieutenant  Burrows,  and  in  which  she  fought  the 


PREFACE.  Vtl 

Boxer.  I  have  not  been  able  to  find  the  Peacoc&j 
log  at  all,  though  there  is  a  very  full  set  of  lettei 
from  her  commander.  Probably  the  fire  of  1837 
destroyed  a  great  deal  of  valuable  material.  When 
ever  it  was  possible  I  have  referred  to  printed 
matter  in  preference  to  manuscript,  and  my  au 
thorities  can  thus,  in  most  cases,  be  easily  consulted. 
In  conclusion  I  desire  to  express  my  sincerest 
thanks  to  Captain  James  D.  Bulloch,  formerly  of 
the  United  States  Navy,  and  Commander  Adolf 
Mensing,  formerly  of  the  German  Navy,  without 
whose  advice  and  sympathy  this  work  would  prob 
ably  never  have  been  written  or  even  begun. 

New  York  City,  1882. 


PREFACE  TO  THIRD  EDITION. 


I  ORIGINALLY  intended  to  write  a  companion 
volume  to  this,  which  should  deal  with  the  opera 
tions  on  land.  But  a  short  examination  showed 
that  these  operations  were  hardly  worth  serious 
study.  They  teach  nothing  new  ;  it  is  the  old,  old 
lesson,  that  a  miserly  economy  in  preparation  may 
in  the  end  involve  a  lavish  outlay  of  men  and 
money,  which,  after  all,  comes  too  late  to  more  than 
partially  offset  the  evils  produced  by  the  original 
short-sighted  parsimony.  This  might  be  a  lesson 
worth  dwelling  on  did  it  have  any  practical  bearing 
on  the  issues  of  the  present  day  ;  but  it  has  none,  as 
far  as  the  army  is  concerned.  It  was  criminal  folly 
for  Jefferson,  and  his  follower  Madison,  to  neglect 
to  give  us  a  force  either  of  regulars  or  of  well- 
trained  volunteers  during  the  twelve  years  they  had 
in  which  to  prepare  for  the  struggle  that  any  one 
might  see  was  inevitable ;  but  there  is  now  far  less 
need  of  an  army  than  there  was  then.  Circum 
stances  have  altered  widely  since  1812.  Instead  of 
the  decaying  might  of  Spain  on  our  southern 
frontier,  we  have  the  still  weaker  power  of  Mexico. 
Instead  of  the  great  Indian  nations  of  the  interior, 


X  PREFACE. 

able  to  keep  civilization  at  bay,  to  hold  in  check 
strong  armies,  to  ravage  large  stretches  of  territory, 
and  needing  formidable  military  expeditions  to 
overcome  them,  there  are  now  only  left  broken  and 
scattered  bands,  which  are  sources  of  annoyance 
merely.  To  the  north  we  are  still  hemmed  in  by  the 
Canadian  possessions  of  Great  Britain ;  but  since 
1812  our  strength  has  increased  so  prodigiously, 
both  absolutely  and  relatively,  while  England's 
military  power  has  remained  almost  stationary,  that 
we  need  now  be  under  no  apprehensions  from  her 
land-forces  ;  for,  even  if  checked  in  the  beginning, 
we  could  not  help  conquering  in  the  end  by  sheer 
weight  of  numbers,  if  by  nothing  else.  So  that 
there  is  now  no  cause  for  our  keeping  up  a  large 
army  ;  while,  on  the  contrary,  the  necessity  for  an 
efficient  navy  is  so  evident  that  only  our  almost 
incredible  short-sightedness  prevents  our  at  once 
preparing  one. 

Not  only  do  the  events  of  the  war  on  land  teach 
very  little  to  the  statesman  who  studies  history  in 
order  to  avoid  in  the  present  the  mistakes  of  the 
past,  but  besides  this,  the  battles  and  campaigns 
are  of  very  little  interest  to  the  student  of  military 
matters.  The  British  regulars,  trained  in  many 
wars,  thrashed  the  raw  troops  opposed  to  them 
whenever  they  had  any  thing  like  a  fair  chance ; 
but  this  is  not  to  be  wondered  at,  for  the  same 
thing  has  always  happened  the  world  over  under 


PREFACE.  xi 

similar  conditions.  Our  defeats  were  exactly  such 
as  any  man  might  have  foreseen,  and  there  is 
nothing  to  be  learned  from  the  follies  committed 
by  incompetent  commanders  and  untrained  troops 
when  in  the  presence  of  skilled  officers  having 
under  them  disciplined  soldiers.  The  humiliating 
surrenders,  abortive  attacks,  and  panic  routs  of  our 
armies  can  all  be  paralleled  in  the  campaigns  waged 
by  Napoleon's  marshals  against  the  Spaniards  and 
Portuguese  in  the  years  immediately  preceding  the 
outbreak  of  our  own  war.  The  Peninsular  troops 
were  as  little  able  to  withstand  the  French  veter 
ans  as  were  our  militia  to  hold  their  own  against 
the  British  regulars.  But  it  must  always  be  re 
membered,  to  our  credit,  that  while  seven  years 
of  fighting  failed  to  make  the  Spaniards  able  to 
face  the  French, l  two  years  of  warfare  gave  us 
soldiers  who  could  stand  against  the  best  men  of 
Britain.  On  the  northern  frontier  we  never  devel 
oped  a  great  general, — Brown's  claim  to  the  title 
rests  only  on  his  not  having  committed  the  phe 
nomenal  follies  of  his  predecessors, — but  by  1814 
our  soldiers  had  become  seasoned,  and  we  had 
acquired  some  good  brigade  commanders,  notably 
Scott,  so  that  in  that  year  we  played  on  even  terms 
with  the  British.  But  the  battles,  though  marked 

1  At  the  closing  battle  of  Toulouse,  fought  between  the  allies  and 
the  French,  the  flight  of  the  Spaniards  was  so  rapid  and  universal  as 
to  draw  from  the  Duke  of  Wellington  the  bitter  observation,  that 
"  though  he  had  seen  a  good  many  remarkable  things  in  the  course  of 
his  life,  yet  this  was  the  first  time  he  had  ever  seen  ten  thousand  men 
running  a  race." 


Xll  PREFACE. 

by  as  bloody  and  obstinate  fighting  as  ever  took 
place,  were  waged  between  small  bodies  of  men, 
and  were  not  distinguished  by  any  feats  of  general 
ship,  so  that  they  are  not  of  any  special  interest  to 
the  historian.  In  fact,  the  only  really  noteworthy 
feat  of  arms  of  the  war  took  place  at  New  Orleans, 
and  the  only  military  genius  that  the  struggle 
developed  was  Andrew  Jackson.  His  deeds  are 
worthy  of  all  praise,  and  the  battle  he  won  was  in 
many  ways  so  peculiar  as  to  make  it  well  worth  a 
much  closer  study  than  it  has  yet  received.  It  was 
by  far  the  most  prominent  event  of  the  war;  it  was 
a  victory  which  reflected  high  honor  on  the  general 
and  soldiers  who  won  it,  and  it  was  in  its  way  as 
remarkable  as  any  of  the  great  battles  that  took 
place  about  the  same  time  in  Europe.  Such  being 
the  case,  I  have  devoted  a  chapter  to  its  consider 
ation  at  the  conclusion  of  the  chapters  devoted  to 
the  naval  operations. 

As  before  said,  the  other  campaigns  on  land  do 
not  deserve  very  minute  attention ;  but,  for  the 
sake  of  rendering  the  account  of  the  battle  of  New 
Orleans  more  intelligible,  I  will  give  a  hasty  sketch 
of  the  principal  engagements  that  took  place  else 
where. 

The  war  opened  in  mid-summer  of  1812,  by  the 
campaign  of  General  Hull  on  the  Michigan  frontier. 
With  two  or  three  thousand  raw  troops  he  invaded 


PREFACE,  xiij 

Canada.  About  the  same  time  Fort  Mackinaw  was 
surrendered  by  its  garrison  of  60  Americans  to  a 
British  and  Indian  force  of  600.  Hull's  campaign 
was  unfortunate  from  the  beginning.  Near  Browns- 
town  the  American  Colonel  Van  Home,  with  some 
200  men,  was  ambushed  and  routed  by  Tecumseh 
and  his  Indians.  In  revenge  Col.  Miller,  with  600 
Americans,  at  Maguaga  attacked  150  British  and 
Canadians  under  Capt.  Muir,  and  250  Indians  under 
Tecumseh,  and  whipped  them, — Tecumseh's  Indians 
standing  their  ground  longest.  The  Americans 
lost  75,  their  foes  180  men.  At  Chicago  the  small 
force  of  66  Americans  was  surprised  and  massacred 
by  the  Indians.  Meanwhile,  General  Brock,  the 
British  commander,  advanced  against  Hull  with  a 
rapidity  and  decision  that  seemed  to  paralyze  his 
senile  and  irresolute  opponent.  The  latter  retreated 
to  Detroit,  where,  without  striking  a  blow,  he  sur 
rendered  1,400  men  to  Brock's  nearly  equal  force, 
which  consisted  nearly  one  half  of  Indians  under 
Tecumseh.  On  the  Niagara  frontier,  an  estimable 
and  honest  old  gentleman  and  worthy  citizen,  who 
knew  nothing  of  military  matters,  Gen.  Van  Rens- 
selaer,  tried  to  cross  over  and  attack  the  British  at 
Queenstown  ;  1,100  Americans  got  across  and  were 
almost  all  killed  or  captured  by  a  nearly  equal  num 
ber  of  British,  Canadians,  and  Indians,  while  on  the 
opposite  side  a  larger  number  of  their  countrymen 
looked  on,  and  with  abject  cowardice  refused  to 


XIV  PREFACE, 

cross  to  their  assistance.  The  command  of  the 
army  was  then  handed  over  to  a  ridiculous  person 
age  named  Smythe,  who  issued  proclamations  so 
bombastic  that  they  really  must  have  come  from  an 
unsound  mind,  and  then  made  a  ludicrously  abortive 
effort  at  invasion,  which  failed  almost  of  its  own 
accord.  A  British  and  Canadian  force  of  less  than 
400  men  was  foiled  in  an  assault  on  Ogdensburg, 
after  a  slight  skirmish,  by  about  1,000  Americans 
under  Brown  ;  and  with  this  trifling  success  the 
military  operations  of  the  year  came  to  an  end. 

Early  in  1813,  Ogdensburg  was  again  attacked, 
this  time  by  between  500  and  600  British,  who  took 
it  after  a  brisk  resistance  from  some  300  militia ;  the 
British  lost  60  and  the  Americans  20,  in  killed  and 
wounded.  General  Harrison,  meanwhile,  had  be 
gun  the  campaign  in  the  Northwest.  At  French- 
town,  on  the  river  Raisin,  Winchester's  command  of 
about  900  Western  troops  was  surprised  by  a  force 
of  1,100  men,  half  of  them  Indians,  under  the 
British  Colonel  Proctor.  The  right  division,  taken 
by  surprise,  gave  up  at  once ;  the  left  division, 
mainly  Kentucky  riflemen,  and  strongly  posted  in 
houses  and  stockaded  enclosures,  made  a  stout  re 
sistance,  and  only  surrendered  after  a  bloody  fight, 
in  which  180  British  and  about  half  as  many  In 
dians  were  killed  or  wounded.  Over  300  Ameri 
cans  were  slain,  some  in  the  battle,  but  most  in  the 
bloody  massacre  that  followed.  After  this,  General 


PREFACE.  XV 

Harrison  went  into  camp  at  Fort  Meigs,  where, 
with  about  1,100  men,  he  was  besieged  by  1,000 
British  and  Canadians  under  Proctor  and  1,200 
Indians  under  Tecumseh.  A  force  of  1,200  Ken 
tucky  militia  advanced  to  his  relief  and  tried  to  cut 
its  way  into  the  fort  while  the  garrison  made  a 
sortie.  The  sortie  was  fairly  successful,  but  the 
Kentuckians  were  scattered  like  chaff  by  the  British 
regulars  in  the  open,  and  when  broken  were  cut  to 
pieces  by  the  Indians  in  the  woods.  Nearly  two 
thirds  of  the  relieving  troops  were  killed  or  capt 
ured  ;  about  400  got  into  the  fort.  Soon  after 
ward  Proctor  abandoned  the  siege.  Fort  Stephen- 
son,  garrisoned  by  Major  Croghan  and  160  men, 
was  attacked  by  a  force  of  391  British  regulars,  who 
tried  to  carry  it  by  assault,  and  were  repulsed  with 
the  loss  of  a  fourth  of  their  number.  Some  four 
thousand  Indians  joined  Proctor,  but  most  of  them 
left  him  after  Perry's  victory  on  Lake  Erie. 
Then  Harrison,  having  received  large  reinforce 
ments,  invaded  Canada.  At  the  River  Thames  his 
army  of  3,500  men  encountered  and  routed  between 
600  and  700  British  under  Proctor,  and  about  1,000 
Indians  under  Tecumseh.  The  battle  was  decided 
at  once  by  a  charge  of  the  Kentucky  mounted  rifle 
men,  who  broke  through  the  regulars,  took  them  in 
rear,  and  captured  them,  and  then  dismounting 
attacked  the  flank  of  the  Indians,  who  were  also 
assailed  by  the  infantry.  Proctor  escaped  by  the 


'XVI  PREFACE. 

skin  of  his  teeth  and  Tecumseh  died  fighting,  like 
the  hero  that  he  was.  This  battle  ended  the  cam 
paign  in  the  Northwest.  In  this  quarter  it  must  be 
remembered  that  the  war  was,  on  the  part  of  the 
Americans,  mainly  one  against  Indians  ;  the  latter 
always  forming  over  half  of  the  British  forces.  Many 
of  the  remainder  were  French  Canadians,  and  the 
others  were  regulars.  The  American  armies,  on  the 
contrary,  were  composed  of  the  armed  settlers  of 
Kentucky  and  Ohio,  native  Americans,  of  English 
speech  and  blood,  who  were  battling  for  lands  that 
were  to  form  the  heritage  of  their  children.  In  the 
West  the  war  was  only  the  closing  act  of  the 
struggle  that  for  many  years  had  been  waged  by  the 
hardy  and  restless  pioneers  of  our  race,  as  with  rifle 
and  axe  they  carved  out  the  mighty  empire  that  we 
their  children  inherit ;  it  was  but  the  final  effort 
with  which  they  wrested  from  the  Indian  lords  of 
the  soil  the  wide  and  fair  domain  that  now  forms 
the  heart  of  our  great  Republic.  It  was  the  break 
ing  down  of  the  last  barrier  that  stayed  the  flood  of 
our  civilization  ;  it  settled,  once  and  for  ever,  that 
henceforth  the  law,  the  tongue,  and  the  blood  of 
the  land  should  be  neither  Indian,  nor  yet  French, 
but  English.  The  few  French  of  the  West  were 
fighting  against  a  race  that  was  to  leave  as  little 
trace  of  them  as  of  the  doomed  Indian  peoples  with 
whom  they  made  common  cause.  The  presence  of 
the  British  mercenaries  did  not  alter  the  character 


PREFACE.  XV  ii 

of  the  contest  ;  it  merely  served  to  show  the  bitter 
and  narrow  hatred  with  which  the  Mother-Island 
regarded  her  greater  daughter,  predestined  as  the 
latter  was  to  be  queen  of  the  lands  that  lay  beyond 
the  Atlantic. 

Meanwhile,  on  Lake  Ontario,  the  Americans 
made  successful  descents  on  York  and  Fort  George, 
scattering  or  capturing  their  comparatively  small 
garrisons  ;  while  a  counter  descent  by  the  British  on 
Sackett's  Harbor  failed,  the  attacking  force  being  too 
small.  After  the  capture  of  Fort  George,  the 
Americans  invaded  Canada;  but  their  advance 
guard,  1,400  strong,  under  Generals  Chandler  and 
Winder,  was  surprised  in  the  night  by  800  British, 
who,  advancing  with  the  bayonet,  broke  up  the 
camp,  capturing  both  the  generals  and  half  the  artil 
lery.  Though  the  assailants,  who  lost  220  of  their 
small  number,  suffered  much  more  than  the  Amer 
icans,  yet  the  latter  were  completely  demoralized, 
and  at  once  retreated  to  Fort  George.  Soon  after 
ward,  Col.  Boerstler  with  about  600  men  surrendered 
with  shamefully  brief  resistance  to  a  somewhat 
smaller  force  of  British  and  Indians.  Then  about 
300  British  crossed  the  Niagara  to  attack  Black 
Rock,  which  they  took,  but  were  afterward  driven 
off  by  a  large  body  of  militia  with  the  loss  of  40 
men.  Later  in  the  season  the  American  General 
McClure  wantonly  burned  the  village  of  Newark,  and 
then  retreated  in  panic  flight  across  the  Niagara. 


XVlll  PREFACE. 

In  retaliation  the  British  in  turn  crossed  the  river  ; 
600  regulars  surprised  and  captured  in  the  night 
Fort  Niagara,  with  its  garrison  of  400  men  ;  two 
thousand  troops  attacked  Black  Rock,  and,  after 
losing  over  a  hundred  men  in  a  smart  engagement 
with  somewhat  over  1,500  militia  whom  they  easily 
dispersed,  captured  and  burned  both  it  and  Buffalo. 
Before  these  last  events  took  place  another  invasion 
of  Canada  had  been  attempted,  this  time  under 
General  Wilkinson,  "  an  unprincipled  imbecile,"  as 
Scott  very  properly  styled  him.  It  was  misman 
aged  in  every  possible  way,  and  was  a  total  failure  ; 
it  was  attended  with  but  one  battle,  that  of  Chryst- 
ler's  Farm,  in  which  1,000  British,  with  the  loss  of 
less  than  200  men,  beat  back  double  their  number 
of  Americans,  who  lost  nearly  500  men  and  also  one 
piece  of  artillery.  The  American  army  near  Lake 
Champlain  had  done  nothing,  its  commander,  Gen 
eral  Wade  Hampton,  being,  if  possible,  even  more 
incompetent  than  Wilkinson.  He  remained  sta 
tionary  while  a  small  force  of  British  plundered 
Plattsburg  and  Burlington  ;  then,  with  5,000  men  he 
crossed  into  Canada,  but  returned  almost  immedi 
ately,  after  a  small  skirmish  at  Chauteaugay  be 
tween  his  advance  guard  and  some  500  Canadians, 
in  which  the  former  lost  41  and  the  latter  22  men. 
This  affair,  in  which  hardly  a  tenth  of  the  American 
force  was  engaged,  has  been,  absurdly  enough, 
designated  a  "  battle  "  by  most  British  and  Canadian 


PREFACE.  xix 

historians.  In  reality  it  was  the  incompetency  of 
their  general  and  not  the  valor  of  their  foes  that 
caused  the  retreat  of  the  Americans.  The  same 
comment,  by  the  way,  applies  to  the  so-called 
"  Battle  "  of  Plattsburg,  in  the  following  year,  which 
may  have  been  lost  by  Sir  George  Prevost,  but  was 
certainly  not  won  by  the  Americans.  And,  again, 
a  similar  criticism  should  be  passed  on  General 
Wilkinson's  attack  on  La  Colle  Mill,  near  the  head 
of  the  same  lake.  Neither  one  of  the  three  affairs 
was  a  stand-up  fight ;  in  each  a  greatly  superior 
force,  led  by  an  utterly  incapable  general,  retreated 
after  a  slight  skirmish  with  an  enemy  whose  rout 
would  have  been  a  matter  of  certainty  had  the 
engagement  been  permitted  to  grow  serious. 

In  the  early  spring  of  1814  a  small  force  of  160 
American  regulars,  under  Captain  Holmes,  fighting 
from  behind  felled  logs,  routed  200  British  with  a  loss 
of  65  men,  they  themselves  losing  but  8.  On  Lake 
Ontario  the  British  made  a  descent  on  Oswego  and 
took  it  by  fair  assault  ;  and  afterward  lost  180  men 
who  tried  to  cut  out  some  American  transports,  and 
were  killed  or  captured  to  a  man.  All  through  the 
spring  and  early  summer  the  army  on  the  Niagara 
frontier  was  carefully  drilled  by  Brown,  and  more 
especially  by  Scott,  and  the  results  of  this  drilling 
were  seen  in  the  immensely  improved  effectiveness 
of  the  soldiers  in  the  campaign  that  opened  in  July. 
Fort  Erie  was  captured  with  little  resistance,  and  on 


XX  PREFACE. 

the  4th  of  July,  at  the  river  Chippeway,  Brown,  with 
two  brigades  of  regulars,  each  about  1,200  strong, 
under  Scott  and  Ripley,  and  a  brigade  of  800  militia 
and  Indians  under  Porter,  making  a  total  of  about 
3,200  men,  won  a  stand-up  fight  against  the  British 
General  Riall,  who  had  nearly  2,500  men,  1,800  of 
them  regulars.  Porter's  brigade  opened  by  driving  in 
the  Canadian  militia  and  the  Indians;  but  was  itself 
checked  by  the  British  light-troops.  Ripley's  bri 
gade  took  very  little  part  in  the  battle,  three  of  the 
regiments  not  being  engaged  at  all,  and  the  fourth 
so  slightly  as  to  lose  but  five  men.  The  entire  brunt 
of  the  action  was  born  by  Scott's  brigade,  which  was 
fiercely  attacked  by  the  bulk  of  the  British  regulars 
under  Riall.  The  latter  advanced  with  great  bra 
very,  but  were  terribly  cut  up  by  the  fire  of  Scott's 
regulars  ;  and  when  they  had  come  nearly  up  to  him, 
Scott  charged  with  the  bayonet  and  drove  them 
clean  off  the  field.  The  American  loss  was  322,  in 
cluding  23  Indians;  the  British  loss  was  515,  exclud 
ing  that  of  the  Indians.  The  number  of  Americans 
actually  engaged  did  not  exceed  that  of  the  British  ; 
and  Scott's  brigade,  in  fair  fight,  closed  by  a  bayonet 
charge,  defeated  an  equal  force  of  British  regulars. 

On  July  25th  occurred  the  Battle  of  Niagara,  or 
Lundy's  Lane,  fought  between  General  Brown  with 
3,100'  Americans  and  General  Drummond  with 

1  As  near  as  can  be  found  out  ;  most  American  authorities  make  it 
much  less  ;  Lossing,  for  example,  says  only  2,400. 


PREFACE.  xxi 

3,500  '  British.  It  was  brought  on  by  accident  in 
the  evening,  and  was  waged  with  obstinate  courage 
and  savage  slaughter  till  midnight.  On  both  sides 
the  forces  straggled  into  action  by  detachments. 
The  Americans  formed  the  attacking  party.  As  be 
fore,  Scott's  brigade  bore  the  brunt  of  the  fight,  and 
over  half  of  his  men  were  killed  or  wounded  ;  he 
himself  was  disabled  and  borne  from  the  field.  The 
struggle  was  of  the  most  desperate  character,  the 
combatants  showing  a  stubborn  courage  that  could 
not  be  surpassed.2  Charge  after  charge  was  made 
with  the  bayonet,  and  the  artillery  was  taken  and 
retaken  once  and  again.  The  loss  was  nearly  equal : 
on  the  side  of  the  Americans,  854  men  (including 
Generals  Brown  and  Scott,  wounded)  and  two  guns ; 
on  that  of  the  British,  8/8  men  (including  General 
Riall  captured)  and  one  gun.  Each  side  claimed  it 
as  a  victory  over  superior  numbers.  The  truth  is 
beyond  question  that  the  British  had  the  advantage 
in  numbers,  and  a  still  greater  advantage  in  position  ; 
while  it  is  equally  beyond  question  that  it  was  a  de 
feat  and  not  a  victory  for  the  Americans.  They 
left  the  field  and  retired  in  perfect  order  to  Fort 

1  General    Drummond   in  his   official   letter  makes  it  but  2,800; 
James,  who  gives  the  details,  makes  it  3,000  rank  and  file  ;  adding  13 
percent,   for  the  officers,  sergeants,  and  drummers,  brings  it   up   to 
3,400  ;  and  we  still  have  to  count  in  the  artillery  drivers,  etc. 

2  General   Drummond  writes  :  "  In  so  determined  a  manner  were 
their  attacks  directed  against  our  guns  that  our  artillerymen  were 
bayoneted  while  in  the  act  of  loading,  and  the  muzzle  of  the  enemy's 
guns  were  advanced  within  a  few  yards  of  ours."     Even  James  says  : 
"  Upon  the   whole,  however,  the  American  troops   fought   bravely  ; 
and  the  conduct  of  many  of  the  officers,  of   the  artillery  corps  es 
pecially,  would  have  done  honor  to  any  service." 


xxil  PREFACE. 

Erie,  while  the  British  held  the  field   and   the   next 
day  pursued  their  foes. 

Having  received  some  reinforcements  General 
Drummond,  now  with  about  3,600  men,  pushed  for 
ward  to  besiege  Fort  Erie,  in  which  was  the  Amer 
ican  army,  some  2,400  strong,  under  General  Gaines. 
Col.  Tucker  with  500  British  regulars  was  sent 
across  the  Niagara  to  destroy  the  batteries  at  Black 
Rock,  but  was  defeated  by  300  American  regulars 
under  Major  Morgan,  fighting  from  behind  a  strong 
breastwork  of  felled  trees,  with  a  creek  in  front. 
On  the  night  of  the  I5th  of  August,  the  British  in 
three  columns  advanced  to  storm  the  American 
works,  but  after  making  a  most  determined  assault 
were  beaten  off.  The  assailants  lost  900  men,  the 
assailed  about  80.  After  this  nothing  was  done  till 
Sept.  i/th,  when  General  Brown,  who  had  resumed 
command  of  the  American  forces,  determined  upon 
and  executed  a  sortie.  Each  side  had  received  rein 
forcements  ;  the  Americans  numbered  over  3,000, 
the  British  nearly  4,000.  The  fighting  was  severe, 
the  Americans  losing  500  men  ;  but  their  opponents 
lost  600  men,  and  most  of  their  batteries  were  de 
stroyed.  Each  side,  as  usual,  claimed  the  victory  ; 
but,  exactly  as  Lundy's  Lane  must  be  accounted  an 
American  defeat,  as  our  forces  retreated  from  the 
ground,  so  this  must  be  considered  an  American  vic 
tory,  for  after  it  the  British  broke  up  camp  and 
drew  off  to  Chippeway.  Nothing  more  was  done, 


PREFACE.  xxiii 

and  on  November  5th  the  American  army  recrossed 
the  Niagara.     Though    marked    by   some    brilliant 
feats  of  arms  this  four  months'  invasion   of  Canada, 
like  those  that  had  preceded  it,  thus  came  to  noth 
ing.     But  at  the  same  time  a  British  invasion  of  the 
United  States  was  repulsed  far  more  disgracefully. 
Sir  George  Prevost,  with  an  army  of  13,000  veteran 
troops,  marched   south   along   the   shores    of  Lake 
Champlain  to  Plattsburg,  which  was  held  by  Gen 
eral    Macomb    with    2,000    regulars,    and    perhaps 
double  that  number  of  nearly  worthless  militia  ; — a 
force  that  the  British  could  have  scattered  to  the 
winds,  though,  as   they  were   strongly   posted,  not 
without  severe  loss.     But  the  British  fleet  was  capt 
ured  by  Commodore  MacDonough   in  the  fight  on 
the  lake ;   and  then  Sir    George,  after  some  heavy 
skirmishing  between  the  outposts  of  the  armies,  in 
which   the  Americans  had  the  advantage,  fled  pre 
cipitately  back  to  Canada. 

All  through  the  war  the  sea-coasts  of  the  United 
States  had  been  harried  by  small  predatory  excur 
sions  ;  a  part  of  what  is  now  the  State  of  Maine  was 
conquered  with  little  resistance,  and  kept  until  the 
close  of  hostilities  ;  and  some  of  the  towns  on  the 
shores  of  Chesapeake  Bay  had  been  plundered  or 
burnt.  In  August,  1814,  a  more  serious  invasion 
was  planned,  and  some  5,000  troops — regulars, 
sailors,  and  marines — were  landed,  under  the  com 
mand  of  General  Ross.  So  utterly  helpless  was  the 


xxiv  PREFACE. 

Democratic  Administration  at  Washington,  that 
during  the  two  years  of  warfare  hardly  any  steps 
had  been  taken  to  protect  the  Capitol,  or  the  country 
round  about ;  what  little  was  done,  was  done  entirely 
too  late,  and  bungled  badly  in  addition.  History 
has  not  yet  done  justice  to  the  ludicrous  and  painful 
folly  and  stupidity  of  which  the  government  founded 
by  Jefferson,  and  carried  on  by  Madison,  was  guilty, 
both  in  its  preparations  for,  and  in  its  way  of  carry 
ing  on,  this  war  ;  nor  is  it  yet  realized  that  the  men 
just  mentioned,  and  their  associates,  are  primarily 
responsible  for  the  loss  we  suffered  in  it,  and  the 
bitter  humiliation  some  of  its  incidents  caused  us. 
The  small  British  army  marched  at  will  through 
Virginia  and  Maryland,  burned  Washington,  and 
finally  retreated  from  before  Baltimore  and  re- 
embarked  to  take  part  in  the  expedition  against 
New  Orleans.  Twice,  at  Bladensburg  and  North 
Point,  it  came  in  contact  with  superior  numbers  of 
militia  in  fairly  good  position.  In  each  case  the  re 
sult  was  the  same.  After  some  preliminary  skir 
mishing,  manoeuvring,  and  volley  firing,  the  British 
charged  with  the  bayonet.  The  rawest  regiments 
among  the  American  militia  then  broke  at  once  ;  the 
others  kept  pretty  steady,  pouring  in  quite  a  destruc 
tive  fire,  until  the  regulars  had  come  up  close  to  them, 
when  they  also  fled.  The  British  regulars  were  too 
heavily  loaded  to  pursue,  and,  owing  to  their  mode 
of  attack,  and  the  rapidity  with  which  their  oppo- 


PREFACE.  XXV 

nents  ran  away,  the  loss  of  the  latter  was  in  each 
case  very  slight.  At  North  Point,  however,  the 
militia,  being  more  experienced,  behaved  better 
than  at  Bladensburg.  In  neither  case  were  the  Brit 
ish  put  to  any  trouble  to  win  their  victory. 

The  above  is  a  brief  sketch  of  the  campaigns  of 
the  war.  It  is  not  cheerful  reading  for  an  Amer 
ican,  nor  yet  of  interest  to  a  military  student  ;  and 
its  lessons  have  been  taught  so  often  by  similar  oc 
currences  in  other  lands  under  like  circumstances, 
and,  moreover,  teach  such  self-evident  truths,  that 
they  scarcely  need  to  be  brought  to  the  notice  of  an 
historian.  But  the  crowning  event  of  the  war  was 
the  Battle  of  New  Orleans;  remarkable  in  its  mili 
tary  aspect,  and  a  source  of  pride  to  every  American. 
It  is  well  worth  a  more  careful  study,  and  to  it  I 
have  devoted  the  last  chapter  of  this  work. 

New  York  City,  1883. 


o 


u 


FIG.  3. — Section  of  flush-decked  corvette  or  sloop,  carrying  long  guns. 
Such  was  the  armament  of  the  Pike  and  'Adams,  but  most  flush-decked 
ships  mounted  carronades. 


FIG.  4. — Section  of  frigate-built  ship,  with  long  gun  on  main- 
deck  and  carronade  on  spar-deck.  Taken  from  the  "American 
Artillerist's  Companion,"  by  Louis  de  Toussard  (Philadelphia, 
1811). 


PRINCIPAL  AUTHORITIES  REFERRED  TO. 

(SEE    ALSO    IN    ALPHABETICAL    PLACE   IN    INDEX.) 

American  State  Papers. 

Brenton,  E.  P.  Naval  History  of  Great  Britain,  1783  to  1836.  2 
vols.,  octavo.  London,  1837. 

Broke,  Adm.,  Memoir  of,  by  Rev.  J.  G.  Brighton.  Octavo. 
London,  1866. 

"  Captains'  Letters  "  in  Archives  at  Washington. 

Codrington,  Adm.  Sir  E.  Memoirs,  edited  by  his  daughter.  2 
vols.,  octavo.  London,  1873. 

Coggeshall,  George.  History  of  American  Privateers.  New  York, 
1876. 

Cooper,  J.  F.  Naval  History  of  the  United  States.  New  York, 
1856. 

Dundonald,  Earl.     Autobiography  of  a  Seaman.      London,  1860. 

Douglass,  Lord  Howard.  Naval  Gunnery.  Octavo.  London, 
1860. 

Emmons,  Lieut.  G.  E.  Statistical  History  of  United  States 
Navy,  1853. 

Farragut,  Adm.  D.  G.,  Life  of,  by  his  son,  Loyall  Farragut. 
Octavo.  New  York,  1878. 

Graviere,  Adm.,  J.  de  la.  Guerres  Maritimes.  2  vols.,  octavo. 
Paris,  1881. 

James,  William.  Naval  History  of  Great  Britain.  6  vols.,  octavo, 
London,  1837. 

James,  William.  Naval  Occurrences  with  the  Americans.  Octavo, 
London,  1817. 

Lossing,  Benson  J.  Field-book  of  the  War  of  1812.  Octavo. 
New  York,  1869. 

Low,  C.  R.  History  of  the  Indian  Navy,  1613  to  1863.  2  vols.» 
octavo.  London,  1877. 

London  Naval  Chronicle. 

Marshall.  Royal  Naval  Biography.  12  vols.,  octavo.  London, 
1825. 


XXXll      PRINCIPAL   AUTHORITIES   REFERRED   TO. 

"  Masters-Commandant  Letters  "  in  the  Archives  at  Washington. 

Morris,  Com.  Charles.     Autobiography.     Annapolis,  1880. 

Naval  Archives  at  Washington. 

Niles.      Weekly  Register. 

Pielat,  B.  La  Vie  et  les  Actions  Memorables  du  St.  Michel  de 
Ruyter.  Amsterdam,  1677. 

Riviere,  Lieut  H.  La  Marine  Fran£aise  sous  le  Regime  de  Louis 
XV.  Paris,  1859. 

Tatnall,  Commod.,  Life,  by  C.  C.  Jones,  Jr.     Savannah,  1878. 

Toussard,  L.  de.  American  Artillerists'  Companion.  Phila., 
1811. 

Troude,  O.     Batailles  Navales  de  la  France.     Paris,  1868. 

Ward,  Com.  J.  H.     Manual  of  Naval  Tactics.     1859. 

Yonge,  Charles  Duke.  History  of  the  British  Navy  3  vols., 
octavo,  London,  1866. 


AUTHORITIES   REFERRED   TO    IN   CHAPTER    X. 

Alison,  Sir  A.  History  of  Europe.  Ninth  edition.  20  vols. 
London,  1852.  Pages  472,  477,  483,  485. 

Butler,  Adjutant-General  Robert.  Official  Report  for  the  Morning 
of  Jan.  8,  1815.  Page  476. 

Codrington,  Admiral  Sir  Edward.  Memoir  of,  by  lady  Bourchier. 
London,  1873.  Pages  472,  475,  476,  484. 

Cole,  John  William.  Memoirs  of  British  Generals  Distinguished 
during  the  Peninsular  War.  London,  1856.  Pages  476,  490. 

Court  of  Inquiry  on  Conduct  of  General  Morgan.  Official  Report. 
Page  484. 

Gleig,  Ensign  H.  R.  Narrative  of  the  Campaigns  of  the  British 
Army  at  Washington,  Baltimore,  and  New  Orleans.  Philadelphia, 
1821.  Pages  466,  469,  470,  471,  472,  473,  477,  488. 

Jackson,  Andrew.  As  a  Public  Man.  A  sketch  by  W.  G.  Sum- 
ner.  Boston,  1882.  Page  490. 

Jackson,  General  Andrew.     Official  Letters.      Pages  465,  487. 

James,  William.  Military  Occurrences  of  the  Late  War.  2  vols. 
London,  1818.  Pages  464,  471,  476,  484,  490. 

Keane,  Major-General  John.  Letter,  December  26,  1814. 
Pages  460,  466,  468. 

Lambert,   General.      Letters,    January    10   and    28,    1815.      Pages 

485,  487- 

Latour,  Major  A.  Lacarriex.  Historical  Memoir  of  the  War  in 
West  Florida  and  Louisiana.  Translated  from  the  French  by  H.  P. 
Nugent.  Philadelphia,  1816.  Pages  461,  462,  469,  470,  471,  477, 
478,  479-  483- 

Lossing,  Benson  J.  Field-Book  of  the  War  of  1812.  New  York, 
1859.  Page  470. 

Patterson,  Com.  Daniel  G.  Letters,  Dec.  20,  1814,  and  Jan.  13, 
1815.  Pages  462,  485. 

Monroe,  James.  Sketch  of  his  Life,  by  Daniel  C.  Gilman.  i6mo. 
Boston,  1883.  Page  456. 

Napier,  Maj.-Gen.  Sir  W.  F.  P.  History  of  the  War  in  the 
Peninsula.  5  vols.  New  York,  1882.  Pages  459,  464,  474,  475, 
480,  490. 

Scott,  Lieut. -Gen.  W.  Memoirs,  by  himself.  2  vols.  New  York, 
1364.  Page  4  56. 

Thornton.  Col.  W.     Letter,  Jan.  8,  1815.      Page  485. 


CONTENTS. 


PAGE. 

PREFACE  iii 


CHAPTER  I. 

INTRODUCTORY. 

Causes  of  the  war  of  1812 — Conflicting  views  of  America  and 
Britain  as  regards  neutral  rights — Those  of  the  former  power  right — 
Impossibility  of  avoiding  hostilities — Declaration  of  war  June  18, 
1812 — Slight  preparations  made — General  features  of  the  contest — 
Race  identity  of  combatants — The  treaty  of  peace  nominally  leaves 
the  situation  unchanged — But  practically  settles  the  dispute  in  our 
favor  in  respect  to  maritime  rights — The  British  navy  and  its  reputa 
tion  prior  to  1812 — Comparison  with  other  European  navies — British 
and  American  authorities  consulted  in  the  present  work  .  .  i 

CHAPTER  II. 

Overwhelming  naval  supremacy  of  England  when  America  de 
clared  war  against  her — Race  identity  of  the  combatants — American 
navy  at  the  beginning  of  the  war — Officers  well  trained — Causes 
tending  to  make  our  seamen  especially  efficient — Close  similarity  be 
tween  British  and  American  sailors — Our  ships  manned  chiefly  by 
native  Americans,  many  of  whom  had  formerly  been  impressed  into 
the  British  navy — Quotas  of  seamen  contributed  by  the  different 
States — Navy  yards — Lists  of  officers  and  men — List  of  vessels — 
Tonnage — Different  ways  of  estimating  it  in  Britain  and  America — 
Ratings — American  ships  properly  rated — Armaments  of  the  frig 
ates  and  corvettes — Three  styles  of  guns  used — Difference  between 
long  guns  and  carronades — Short  weight  of  American  shot — Com 
parison  of.  British  frigates  rating  38  and  American  frigates  rating 
44  guns — Compared  with  a  74  .  .  .  .  .  .22 


xxxvi  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  III. 
1812. 

ON     THE     OCEAN. 

Commodore  Rodgers'  cruise  and  unsuccessful  chase  of  the  Belvi- 
dera — Engagement  between  Belvidera  and  President — Hornet  capt 
ures  a  privateer — Cruise  of  the  Essex — Captain  Hull's  cruise  and 
escape  from  the  squadron  of  Commodore  Broke — Constitution  capt 
ures  Guerriere — Marked  superiority  shown  by  the  Americans —  Wasp 
captures  Frolic — Disproportionate  loss  on  British  side — Both  after 
ward  captured  by  Poictiers — Second  unsuccessful  cruise  of  Commo 
dore  Rodgers — United  States  captures  Macedonian — Constitution 
captures  Java — Cruise  of  Essex — Summary.  .  .  .  .72 

CHAPTER  IV. 


ON   THE   LAKES. 

PRELIMINARY. — The  combatants  starting  nearly  on  an  equality — 
Difficulties  of  creating  a  naval  force — Difficulty  of  comparing  the 
force  of  the  rival  squadrons — Meagreness  of  the  published  accounts — 
Unreliability  of  authorities,  especially  James. — ONTARIO — Extraordi 
nary  nature  of  the  American  squadron — Canadian  squadron  a  kind 
of  water  militia — Sackett's  Harbor  feebly  attacked  by  Commodore 
Earle — Commodore  Chauncy  attacks  the  Royal  George — And  bom 
bards  York. — ERIE — Lieutenant  Elliot  captures  the  Detroit and  Cale 
donia — Lieutenant  Angus'  unsuccessful  attack  on  Red  House  bar 
racks  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  'jy 

CHAPTER  V. 
1813. 

ON    THE    OCEAN. 

Blockade  of  the  American  coast — Commodere  Porter's  campaign 
with  the  Essex  in  the  South  Pacific — Hornet  blockades  Bonne  Citoy- 
enne — Hornet  captures  Resolution — Hornet  captures  Peacock — Gen 
erous  treatment  shown  to  the  conquered —  Viper  captured  by  Narcis 
sus — American  privateeers  cut  out  by  British  boats — Third  cruise  of 
Commodore  Rodgers — United  States,  Macedonian,  and  Wasp  block 
aded  in  New  London — Broke's  challenge  to  Lawrence — The  Chesa 
peake  captured  by  the  Shannon — Comments  and  criticisms  by  various 
authorities — Surveyor  captured  by  boats  of  Narcissus — Futile  gun- 


CONTENTS.  xxx  vi  1 

boat  actions — British  attack  on  Craney  Island  repulsed — Cutting  out 
expeditions — The  Argus  captured  by  the  Pelican — The  Enterprise 
captures  the  Boxer — Ocean  warfare  of  1813  in  favor  of  British — 
Summary  ..........  160 

CHAPTER  VI. 

1813. 

ON    THE    LAKES. 

ONTARIO — Comparison  of  the  rival  squadrons — Chauncy's  superior 
in  strength — Chauncy  takes  York  and  Fort  George — Yeo  is  repulsed 
at  Sackett's  Harbor,  but  keeps  command  of  the  lake — The  Lady 
of  the  Lake  captures  Lady  Murray — Hamilton  and  Scourge  founder 
in  a  squall — Yeo's  partial  victory  off  Niagara — Indecisive  action  off 
the  Genesee — Chauncy's  partial  victory  off  Burlington,  which  gives 
him  the  command  of  the  lake — Yeo  and  Chruncy  compared — Reasons 
for  American  success. — ERIE — Perry's  success  in  creating  a  fleet — 
His  victory — "  Glory  "  of  it  overestimated — Cause  of  his  success — 
CHAMFLAIN — The  Growler  and  Eagle  captured  by  gun-boats — Sum 
mary  of  year's  campaign  .  .  .  .  .  .  .221 

CHAPTER  VII. 
1814. 

ON   THE   OCEAN. 

Strictness  of  the  blockade — Cruise  of  Rodgers — Cruise  of  the  Con 
stitution — Chased  into  Marblehead — Attempt  to  cut-out  the  Alligator 
— The  Essex  captured  after  engagement  with  Phcebe  and  Cherub — 
The  Frolic  captured — The  Peacock  captures  the  Epervier — Commo 
dore  Barney's  flotilla  afloat — The  British  in  the  Chesapeake — Capture 
of  Washington,  and  burning  of  the  public  buildings — The  Wasp  capt 
ures  the  Reindeer — The  Wasp  sinks  the  Avon — Cruise  and  loss  of  the 
Adams — The  privateer  General  Armstrong — The  privateer  Prince  de 
Neufchatel — Loss  of  the  gun-boats  on  Lake  Borgne — Fighting  near 
New  Orleans — Summary  .......  284 

/ 

CHAPTER  VIII. 

1814. 

ON    THE    LAKES. 

ONTARIO — The  contest  one  of  ship-building  merely — Statistics  of 
the  two  squadrons — Serious  sickness  among  the  Americans — Extreme 


XXXVlll  CONTENTS. 

caution  of  the  commanders,  verging  on  timidity — Yeo  takes  Oswego 
and  blockades  Sackett's  Harbor — British  gun-boats  captured — Chaun- 
cy  blockades  Kingston. — ERIE — Captain  Sinclair  burns  St.  Joseph — 
Makes  unsuccessful  expedition  against  Mackinaw — Daring  and  suc 
cessful  cutting-out  expeditions  of  the  British — Capture  of  the  Ohio 
andSemers. — CHAMPLAIN — Macdonough's  and  Downie's  squadrons — 
James'  erroneous  statements  concerning  them — Gallant  engagement 
and  splendid  victory  of  Macdonough — Macdonough  one  of  the  great 
est  of  American  sea-captains 353 

CHAPTER    IX. 
1815. 

CONCLUDING    OPERATIONS. 

The  President  captured  by  Captain  Hayes'  squadron — Successful 
cutting-out  expedition  of  the  Americans — American  privateer  Chas 
seur  captures  St.  Lawrence — The  Constitution  engages  the  Cyane  and 
the  Levant  and  captures  both — Escapes  from  a  British  squadron — The 
Hornet  captures  the  Penguin  and  escapes  from  pursuit  of  the  Corn- 
wallis — The  Peacock's  wanton  attack  on  the  Nautilus — Wanton  at 
tack  on  American  gun-boat  after  treaty  of  peace — Summary  of  events 
in  1815 — Remarks  on  the  war — Tables  of  comparative  loss,  etc. — 
Compared  with  results  of  Anglo-French  struggle  .  .  .  400 

APPENDIX 454 

CHAPTER  X. 

1815. 

THE  BATTLE  OF  NEW  ORLEANS. 

The  war  on  land  generally  disastrous — British  send  great  expedi 
tion  against  New  Orleans — Jackson  prepares  for  the  defence  of 
the  city— Night  attack  on  the  British  advance  guard— Artillery  duels 
— Great  Battle  of  Jan.  8th,  1815 — Slaughtering  repulse  of  the  main 
attack— Rout  of  the  Americans  on  the  right  bank  of  the  river— Final 
retreat  of  the  British— Observations  on  the  character  of  the  troops  and 
commanders  engaged 455 

APPENDIX  495 


CHAPTER    I. 

INTRODUCTORY. 

Causes  of  the  War  of  1812 — Conflicting  views  of  America  and  Britain  as  re 
gards  neutral  rights — Those  of  the  former  power  right — Impossibility  of  avoid 
ing  hostilities — Declaration  of  war — General  features  of  the  contest — Racial 
identity  of  the  contestants — The  treaty  of  peace  nominally  leaves  the  situation 
unchanged — But  practically  settles  the  dispute  in  our  favor  in  respect  to  mari 
time  rights— The  British  navy  and  its  reputation  prior  to  1812— Comparison 
with  other  European  navies— British  and  American  authorities  consulted  in  the 
present  work. 

THE  view  professed  by  Great  Britain  in  1812 
respecting  the  rights  of  belligerents  and  neu 
trals  was  diametrically  opposite  to  that  held  by  the 
United  States.  "  Between  England  and  the  United 
States  of  America,"  writes  a  British  author,  "a 
spirit  of  animosity,  caused  chiefly  by  the  impress 
ment  of  British  seamen,  or  of  seamen  asserted  to  be 
such,  from  on  board  of  American  merchant  vessels, 
had  unhappily  subsisted  for  a  long  time  "  prior  to 
the  war.  "It  is,  we  believe,"  he  continues,  "an  ac 
knowledged  maxim  of  public  law,  as  well  that  no 
nation  but  the  one  he  belongs  to  can  release  a  sub 
ject  from  his  natural  allegiance,  as  that,  provided  the 
jurisdiction  of  another  independent  state  be  not  in 
fringed,  every  nation  has  a  right  to  enforce  the  ser 
vices  of  her  subjects  wherever  they  may  be  found. 
Nor  has  any  neutral  nation  such  a  jurisdiction  over 
her  merchant  vessels  upon  the  high  seas  as  to  ex 
clude  a  belligerent  nation  from  the  right  of  search 
ing  them  for  contraband  of  war  or  for  the  property 


2  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

or  persons  of  her  enemies.  And  if,  in  the  exercise 
of  that  right,  the  belligerent  should  discover  on 
board  of  the  neutral  vessel  a  subject  who  has  with 
drawn  himself  from  his  lawful  allegiance,  the  neu 
tral  can  have  no  fair  ground  for  refusing  to  deliver 
him  up  ;  more  especially  if  that  subject  is  proved  to 
be  a  deserter  from  the  sea  or  land  service  of  the  for 
mer." 

Great  Britain's  doctrine  was  "  once  a  subject  al 
ways  a  subject."  On  the  other  hand,  the  United 
States  maintained  that  any  foreigner,  after  five 
years'  residence  within  her  territory,  and  after  having 
complied  with  certain  forms,  became  one  of  her  citi 
zens  as  completely  as  if  he  was  native  born.  Great 
Britain  contended  that  her  war  ships  possessed  the 
right  of  searching  all  neutral  vessels  for  the  proper 
ty  and  persons  of  her  foes.  The  United  States,  re 
sisting  this  claim,  asserted  that  "  free  bottoms  made 
free  goods,"  and  that  consequently  her  ships  when 
on  the  high  seas  should  not  be  molested  on  any  pre 
text  whatever.  Finally,  Great  Britain's  system  of 
impressment,2  by  which  men  could  be  forcibly  seized 
and  made  to  serve  in  her  navy,  no  matter  at  what 
cost  to  themselves,  was  repugnant  to  every  Ameri 
can  idea. 

Such  wide  differences  in  the  views  of  the  two  na 
tions  produced  endless  difficulties.  To  escape  the 
press-gang,  or  for  other  reasons,  many  British  sea 
men  took  service  under  the  American  flag  ;  and  if 
they  were  demanded  back,  it  is  not  likely  that  they 
or  their  American  shipmates  had  much  hesitation 

1  "  The  Naval  History  of  Great  Britain,"  by  William  James,  vol.  iv, 
p.  324.  (New  edition  by  Captain  Chamier,  R.  N.,  London,  1837.) 

a  The  best  idea  of  which  can  be  gained  by  reading  Marryatt's 
novels. 


INTRODUCTION.  3 

in  swearing  either  that  they  were  not  British  at  all, 
or  else  that  they  had  been  naturalized  as  Americans. 
Equally  probable  is  it  that  the  American  blockade- 
runners  were  guilty  of  a  great  deal  of  fraud  and 
more  or  less  thinly  veiled  perjury.  But  the  wrongs 
done  by  the  Americans  were  insignificant  compared 
with  those  they  received.  Any  innocent  merchant 
vessel  was  liable  to  seizure  at  any  moment  ;  and 
when  overhauled  by  a  British  cruiser  short  of  men 
was  sure  to  be  stripped  of  most  of  her  crew.  The 
British  officers  were  themselves  the  judges  as  to 
whether  a  seaman  should  be  pronounced  a  native  of 
America  or  of  Britain,  and  there  was  no  appeal  from 
their  judgment.  If  a  captain  lacked  his  full  comple 
ment  there  was  little  doubt  as  to  the  view  he  would 
take  of  any  man's  nationality.  The  wrongs  inflict 
ed  on  our  seafaring  countrymen  by  their  impress 
ment  into  foreign  ships  formed  the  main  cause  of  the 
war. 

There  were  still  other  grievances  which  are  thus 
presented  by  the  British  Admiral  Cochrane.1  "  Our 
treatment  of  its  (America's)  citizens  was  scarcely  in 
accordance  with  the  national  privileges  to  which 
the  young  Republic  had  become  entitled.  There 
were  no  doubt  many  individuals  among  the  Ameri 
can  people  who,  caring  little  for  the  Federal  Gov 
ernment,  considered  it  more  profitable  to  break 
than  to  keep  the  laws  of  nations  by  aiding  and  sup 
porting  our  enemy  (France),  and  it  was  against 
such  that  the  efforts  of  the  squadron  had  chiefly 
been  directed  ;  but  the  way  the  object  was  carried 
out  was  scarcely  less  an  infraction  of  those  national 

1 "  Autbiography  of  a  Seaman,"  by  Thomas,  tenth  Earl  of  Bun- 
donald,  Admiral  of  the  Red  ;  Rear-Admiral  of  the  Fleet,  London, 
1860,  vol.  i,  p.  24. 


4  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

laws  which  we  were  professedly  enforcing.  The  prac 
tice  of  taking  English  (and  American)  seamen  out 
of  American  ships  without  regard  to  the  safety  of 
navigating  them  when  thus  deprived  of  their  hands 
has  been  already  mentioned.  To  this  may  be 
added  the  detention  of  vessels  against  which  noth 
ing  contrary  to  international  neutrality  could  be  es 
tablished,  whereby  their  cargoes  became  damaged, 
the  compelling  them,  on  suspicion  only,  to  proceed 
to  ports  other  than  those  to  which  they  were  des 
tined  ;  and  generally  treating  them  as  though  they 
were  engaged  in  contraband  trade.  *  *  *  Amer 
ican  ships  were  not  permitted  to  quit  English  ports 
without  giving  security  for  the  discharge  of  their 
cargoes  in  some  other  British  or  neutral  port."  On 
the  same  subject  James1  writes  :  "  When,  by  the 
maritime  supremacy  of  England/  France  could  no 
longer  trade  for  herself,  America  proffered  her  ser 
vices,  as  a  neutral,  to  trade  for  her ;  and  American 
merchants  and  their  agents,  in  the  gains  that  flowed 
in,  soon  found  a  compensation  for  all  the  perjury 
and  fraud  necessary  to  cheat  the  former  out  of  her 
belligerent  rights.  The  high  commercial  impor 
tance  of  the  United  States  thus  obtained,  coupled 
with  a  similarity  of  language  and,  to  a  superficial 
observer,  a  resemblance  in  person  between  the 
natives  of  America  and  Great  Britain,  has  caused 
the  former  to  be  the  chief,  if  not  the  only  sufferers 
by  the  exercise  of  the  right  of  search.  Chiefly  in 
debted  for  their  growth  and  prosperity  to  emigra 
tion  from  Europe,  the  United  States  hold  out  every 
allurement  to  foreigners,  particularly  to  British 
seamen,  whom,  by  a  process  peculiarly  their  own, 

1  L.f.,  iv,  325. 


INTRODUCTION.  5 

they  can  naturalize  as  quickly  as  a  dollar  can  ex- 
change  masters  and  a  blank  form,  ready  signed  and 
sworn  to,  can  be  filled  up.1  It  is  the  knowledge  of 
this  fact  that  makes  British  naval  officers  when 
searching  for  deserters  from  their  service,  so  harsh' 
in  their  scrutiny,  and  so  sceptical  of  American 
oaths  and  asseverations." 

The  last  sentence  of  the  foregoing  from  James  is 
an  euphemistic  way  of  saying  that  whenever  a  Brit 
ish  commander  short  of  men  came  across  an  Amer 
ican  vessel  he  impressed  all  of  her  crew  that  he 
wanted,  whether  they  were  citizens  of  the  United 
States  or  not.  It  must  be  remembered,  however, 
that  the  only  reason  why  Great  Britain  did  us 
more  injury  than  any  other  power  was  because  she 
was  better  able  to  do  so.  None  of  her  acts  were 
more  offensive  than  Napoleon's  Milan  decree,  by 
which  it  was  declared  that  any  neutral  vessel  which 
permitted  itself  to  be  searched  by  a  British  cruiser 
should  be  considered  as  British,  and  as  the  lawful 
prize  of  any  French  vessel.  French  frigates  and 
privateers  were  very  apt  to  snap  up  any  American 
vessel  they  came  across,  and  were  only  withheld  at 
all  by  the  memory  of  the  sharp  dressing  they  had 
received  in  the  West  Indies  during  the  quasi-war  of 
1799-1800.  What  we  undoubtedly  ought  to  have 
done  was  to  have  adopted  the  measure  actually  pro 
posed  in  Congress,  and  declared  war  on  both  France 
and  England.  As  it  was,  we  chose  as  a  foe  the 
one  that  had  done,  and  could  still  do,  us  the  greatest 
injury. 

The  principles  lor  which  the  United  States  con 
tended  in  1812  are  now  universally  accepted,  and 

1  This  is  an  exaggeration. 


6  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

those  so  tenaciously  maintained  by  Great  Britain 
find  no  advocates  in  the  civilized  world.  That  Eng 
land  herself  was  afterward  completely  reconciled  to 
our  views  was  amply  shown  by  her  intense  indigna 
tion  when  Commodore  Wilkes,  in  the  exercise  of  the 
right  of  search  for  the  persons  of  the  foes  of  his 
country,  stopped  the  neutral  British  ship  Trent  ; 
while  the  applause  with  which  the  act  was  greeted 
in  America  proves  pretty  clearly  another  fact,  that 
we  had  warred  for  the  right,  not  because  it  was  the 
right,  but  because  it  agreed  with  our  self-interest  to 
do  so.  We  were  contending  for  "  Free  Trade  and 
Sailors'  Rights " :  meaning  by  the  former  expres 
sion,  freedom  to  trade  wherever  we  chose  without 
hindrance  save  from  the  power  with  whom  we  were 
trading  ;  and  by  the  latter,  that  a  man  who  happened 
to  be  on  the  sea  should  have  the  same  protection 
accorded  to  a  man  who  remained  on  land.  Nomi 
nally,  neither  of  these  questions  was  settled  by,  or 
even  alluded  to,  in  the  treaty  of  peace ;  but  the 
immense  increase  of  reputation  that  the  navy  ac 
quired  during  the  war  practically  decided  both 
points  in  our  favor.  Our  sailors  had  gained  too 
great  a  name  for  any  one  to  molest  them  with  im 
punity  again. 

Holding  views  on  these  maritime  subjects  so 
radically  different  from  each  other,  the  two  nations 
could  not  but  be  continually  dealing  with  causes  of 
quarrel.  Not  only  did  British  cruisers  molest  our 
merchant-men,  but  at  length  one  of  them,  the  50- 
gun  ship  Leopard,  attacked  an  American  frigate, 
the  Chesapeake,  when  the  latter  was  so -lumbered 
up  that  she  could  not  return  a  shot,  killed  or  dis 
abled  some  twenty  of  her  men  and  took  away  four 


INTRODUCTION.  7 

others,  one  Briton  and  three  Americans,  who  were 
claimed  as  deserters.  For  this  act  an  apology  was 
offered,  but  it  failed  to  restore  harmony  between  the 
two  nations.  Soon  afterward  another  action  was 
fought.  The  American  frigate  President^  Com-'' 
modore  Rodgers,  attacked  the  British  sloop  Little 
Belt,  Captain  Bingham,  and  exchanged  one  or  two 
broadsides  with  her, — the  frigate  escaping  scot-free 
while  the  sloop  was  nearly  knocked  to  pieces.  Mu 
tual  recriminations  followed,  each  side  insisting  that 
the  other  was  the  assailant. 

When  Great  Britain  issued  her  Orders  in  Council 
forbidding  our  trading  with  France,  we  retaliated 
by  passing  an  embargo  act,  which  prevented  us 
from  trading  at  all.  There  could  be  but  one  result 
to  such  a  succession  of  incidents,  and  that  was  war. 
Accordingly,  in  June,  1812,  war  was  declared  ;  and 
as  a  contest  for  the  rights  of  seamen,  it  was  largely 
waged  on  the  ocean.  We  also  had  not  a  little  fight 
ing  to  do  on  land,  in  which,  as  a  rule,  we  came  out 
second-best.  Few  or  no  preparations  for  the  war 
had  been  made,  and  the  result  was  such  as  might 
have  been  anticipated.  After  dragging  on  through 
three  dreary  and  uneventful  years  it  came  to  an 
end  in  1815,  by  a  peace  which  left  matters  in  almost 
precisely  the  state  in  which  the  war  had  found 
them.  On  land  and  water  the  contest  took  the 
form  of  a  succession  of  petty  actions,  in  which  the 
glory  acquired  by  the  victor  seldom  eclipsed  the 
disgrace  incurred  by  the  vanquished.  Neither  side 
succeeded  in  doing  what  it  intended.  Americans 
declared  that  Canada  must  and  should  be  conquered, 
but  the  conquering  came  quite  as  near  being  the 
other  way.  British  writers  insisted  that  the  Ameri- 


8  NAVAL    WAR    OF    l8l2. 

can    navy    should    be    swept    from    the    seas ;     and, 
during  the  sweeping  process  it  increased  fourfold. 

When  the  United  States  declared  war,  Great 
Britain  was  straining  every  nerve  and  muscle  in  a 
death  struggle  with  the  most  formidable  military 
despotism  of  modern  times,  and  was  obliged  to  en 
trust  the  defence  of  her  Canadian  colonies  to  a  mere 
handful  of  regulars,  aided  by  the  local  fencibles. 
But  Congress  had  provided  even  fewer  trained  sol 
diers,  and  relied  on  militia.  The  latter  chiefly  ex 
ercised  their  fighting  abilities  upon  one  another  in 
duelling,  and,  as  a  rule,  were  afflicted  with  conscien 
tious  scruples  whenever  it  was  necessary  to  cross  the 
frontier  and  attack  the  enemy.  Accordingly,  the 
campaign  opened  with  the  bloodless  surrender  of  an 
American  general  to  a  much  inferior  British  force, 
and  the  war  continued  much  as  it  had  begun  ;  we 
suffered  disgrace  after  disgrace,  while  the  losses  we 
inflicted,  in  turn,  on  Great  Britain  were  so  slight  as 
hardly  to  attract  her  attention.  At  last,  having 
crushed  her  greater  foe,  she  turned  to  crush  the 
lesser,  and,  in  her  turn,  suffered  ignominious  defeat. 
By  this  time  events  had  gradually  developed  a  small 
number  of  soldiers  on  our  northern  frontier,  who, 
commanded  by  Scott  and  Brown,  were  able  to  con 
tend  on  equal  terms  with  the  veteran  troops  to 
whom  they  were  opposed,  though  these  formed 
part  of  what  was  then  undoubtedly  the  most  for 
midable  fighting  infantry  any  European  nation  pos 
sessed.  The  battles  at  this  period  of  the  struggle 
were  remarkable  for  the  skill  and  stubborn  courage 
with  which  they  were  waged,  as  well  as  for  the 
heavy  loss  involved  ;  but  the  number  of  combatants 
was  so  small  that  in  Europe  they  would  have  been 


INTRODUCTION.  9 

regarded  as  mere  outpost  skirmishes,  and  they 
wholly  failed  to  attract  any  attention  abroad  in  that 
period  of  colossal  armies. 

When  Great  Britain  seriously  turned  her  attention 
to  her  transatlantic  foe,  and  assembled  in  Canada  an' 
army  of  14,000  men  at  the  head  of  Lake  Champlain, 
Congressional  forethought  enabled  it  to  be  opposed 
by  soldiers  who,  it  is  true,  were  as  well  disciplined, 
as  hardy,  and  as  well  commanded  as  any  in  the 
world,  but  who  were  only  a  few  hundred  strong, 
backed  by  more  or  less  incompetent  militia.  Only 
McDonough's  skill  and  Sir  George  Prevost's  inca 
pacity  saved  us  from  a  serious  disaster ;  the  sea- 
fight  reflected  high  honor  on  our  seamen,  but  the  re 
treat  of  the  British  land-forces  was  due  to  their 
commander  and  not  to  their  antagonists.  Mean 
while  a  large  British  fleet  in  the  Chesapeake  had 
not  achieved  much  glory  by  the  destruction  of  local 
oyster-boats  and  the  burning  of  a  few  farmers' 
houses,  so  an  army  was  landed  to  strike  a  decisive 
blow.  At  Bladensburg1  the  five  thousand  British 
regulars,  utterly  worn  out  by  heat  and  fatigue,  by 
their  mere  appearance,  frightened  into  a  panic  double 
their  number  of  American  militia  well  posted.  But 
the  only  success  attained  was  burning  the  public 
buildings  of  Washington,  and  that  result  was  of  dubi 
ous  value.  Baltimore  was  attacked  next,  and  the 
attack  repulsed,  after  the  forts  and  ships  had  shelled 
one  another  with  the  slight  results  that  usually  at 
tend  that  spectacular  and  harmless  species  of  warfare. 

The  close  of  the  contest  was   marked  by  the  ex 
traordinary  battle  of  New  Orleans.      It  was  a  per- 

1  See  the   "  Capture  of  Washington,"   by   Edward    D.    Ingraham 
(Philadelphia,  1849). 


IO  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

fectly  useless  shedding  of  blood,  since  peace  had 
already  been  declared.  There  is  hardly  another 
contest  of  modern  times  where  the  defeated  side 
suffered  such  frightful  carnage,  while  the  victors 
came  off  almost  scatheless.  It  is  quite  in  accord 
ance  with  the  rest  of  the  war  that  the  militia, 
hitherto  worse  than  useless,  should  on  this  occasion 
win  against  great  odds  in  point  of  numbers  ;  and, 
moreover,  that  their  splendid  victory  should  have 
been  of  little  consequence  in  its  effects  upon  the  re 
sult.  On  the  whole,  the  contest  by  land,  where  we 
certainly  ought  to  have  been  successful,  reflected 
greater  credit  on  our  antagonists  than  upon  us,  in 
spite  of  the  services  of  Scott,  Brown,  and  Jackson. 
Our  small  force  of  regulars  and  volunteers  did  ex 
cellently ;  as  for  the  militia,  New  Orleans  proved 
that  they  could  fight  superbly,  and  the  other  battles 
that  they  generally  would  not  fight  at  all. 

At  sea,  as  will  appear,  the  circumstances  were  wide 
ly  different.  Here  we  possessed  a  small  but  highly 
effective  force,  the  ships  well  built,  manned  by 
thoroughly  trained  men,  and  commanded  by  able 
and  experienced  officers.  The  deeds  of  our  navy 
form  a  part  of  history  over  which  any  American 
can  be  pardoned  for  lingering. 

Such  was  the  origin,  issue,  and  general  character 
of  the  war.  It  may  now  be  well  to  proceed  to  a 
comparison  of  the  authorities  on  the  subject.  Al 
lusion  has  already  been  made  to  them  in  the  pref 
ace,  but  a  fuller  reference  seems  to  be  necessary  in 
this  connection. 

At  the  close  of  the  contest,  the  large  majority  of 
historians  who  wrote  of  it  were  so  bitterly  rancorous 
that  their  statements  must  be  received  with  caution, 


INTRODUCTION.  II 

For  the  main  facts,  I  have  relied,  wherever  it  was 
practicable,  upon  the  official  letters  of  the  com 
manding  officers,  taking  each  as  authority  for  his 
own  force  and  loss.1  For  all  the  British  victories 
we  have  British  official  letters,  which  tally  almost 
exactly,  as  regards  matters  of  fact  and  not  of  opinion, 
with  the  corresponding  American  accounts.  For 
the  first  year  the  British  also  published  official  ac 
counts  of  their  defeats,  which  in  the  cases  of  the 
Guerrtire,  Macedonian  and  Frolic,  I  have  followed 
as  closely  as  the  accounts  of  the  American  vic 
tors.  The  last  British  official  letter  published  an 
nouncing  a  defeat  was  that  in  the  case  of  the  Java, 
and  it  is  the  only  letter  that  I  have  not  strictly 
accepted.  The  fact  that  no  more  were  published 
thereafter  is  of  itself  unfortunate ;  and  from  the 
various  contradictions  it  contains  it  would  appear  to 
have  been  tampered  with.  The  surgeon's  report 
accompanying  it  is  certainly  false.  Subsequent  to 
1812  no  letter  of  a  defeated  British  commander  was 
published,2  and  I  have  to  depend  upon  the  various 
British  historians,  especially  James,  of  whom  more 
anon. 

The  American  and  British  historians  from  whom 
we  are  thus  at  times  forced  to  draw  our  material 
regard  the  war  from  very  different  stand-points,  and 
their  accounts  generally  differ.  Each  writer  natu- 

1  As  where  Broke  states  his  own  force  at  330,  his  antagonists  at 
440,  and  the  American  court  of  inquiry  makes  the  numbers  396  and 
379,  I  have  taken  them  as  being  330  and  379  respectively.  This  is 
the  only  just  method  ;  I  take  it  for  granted  that  each  commander 
meant  to  tell  the  truth,  and  of  course  knew  his  own  force,  while  he 
might  very  naturally  and  in  perfect  good  faith  exaggerate  his  antago 
nist's. 

1  Except  about  the  battles  on  the  Lakes,  where  I  have  accordingly 
given  the  same  credit  to  the  accounts  both  of  the  British  and  of  the 
Americans. 


12  NAVAL    WAR    OF    l8l2. 

rally  so  colored  the  affair  as  to  have  it  appear  favor 
able  to  his  own  side.  Sometimes  this  was  done 
intentionally  and  sometimes  not.  Not  unfrequently 
errors  are  made  against  the  historian's  own  side  ;  as 
when  the  British  author,  Brenton,  says  that  the 
British  brig  Peacock  mounted  32*3  instead  of  24*3, 
while  Lossing  in  his  "  Field  Book  of  the  War  of 
1812"  makes  the  same  mistake  about  the  arma 
ment  of  the  American  brig  Argus.  Errors  of 
this  description  are,  of  course,  as  carefully  to  be 
guarded  against  as  any  others.  Mere  hearsay  re 
ports,  such  as  "  it  has  been  said,"  "  a  prisoner  on 
board  the  opposing  fleet  has  observed,"  "  an  Ameri 
can  (or  British)  newspaper  of  such  and  such  a 
date  has  remarked,"  are  of  course  to  be  rejected. 
There  is  a  curious  parallelism  in  the  errors  on  both 
sides.  For  example,  the  American,  Mr.  Low,  writ 
ing  in  1813,  tells  how  the  Constitution,  44,  cap 
tured  the  Guerriere  of  49  guns,  while  the  British 
Lieutenant  Low,  writing  in  1880,  tells  how  the 
Pelican,  18,  captured  the  Argus  of  20  guns.  Each 
records  the  truth  but  not  the  whole  truth,  for 
although  rating  44  and  1 8  the  victors  carried  respec 
tively  54  and  21  guns,  of  heavier  metal  than  those 
of  their  antagonists.  Such  errors  are  generally  in 
tentional.  Similarly,  most  American  writers  men 
tion  the  actions  in  which  the  privateers  were  vic 
torious,  but  do  not  mention  those  in  which  they 
were  defeated  ;  while  the  British,  in  turn,  record 
every  successful  "  cutting-out  "  expedition,  but  ig 
nore  entirely  those  which  terminated  unfavorably. 
Other  errors  arise  from  honest  ignorance.  Thus, 
James  in  speaking  of  the  repulse  of  the  Endymi- 
on  s  boats  by  the  Neufchatel  gives  the  latter 


INTRODUCTION.  1 3 

a  crew  of  120  men;  she  had  more  than  this  number 
originally,  but  only  40  were  in  her  at  the  time  of 
the  attack.  So  also  when  the  captain  of  the  Peli 
can  writes  that  the  officers  of  the  Argus  report 
her  loss  at  40,  when  they  really  reported  it  at  24 
or  when  Captain  Dacres  thought  the  Constitu 
tion  had  lost  about  20  men  instead  of  14.  The 
American  gun-boat  captains  in  recounting  their 
engagements  with  the  British  frigates  invariably 
greatly  overestimated  the  loss  of  the  latter.  So  that 
on  both  sides  there  were  some  intentional  misstate- 
ments  orgarblings,  and  a  much  more  numerous  class 
of  simple  blunders,  arising  largely  from  an  inca 
pacity  for  seeing  more  than  one  side  of  the  question. 
Among  the  early  British  writers  upon  this  war, 
the  ablest  was  James.  He  devoted  one  work,  his 
"Naval  Occurrences,"  entirely  to  it;  and  it  occupies 
the  largest  part  of  the  sixth  volume  of  his  more  ex 
tensive  "  History  of  the  British  Navy." '  Two  other 
British  writers,  Lieutenant  Marshall 2  and  Captain 
Brenton,3  wrote  histories  of  the  same  events,  about 
the  same  time  ;  but  neither  of  these  naval  officers 
produced  half  as  valuable  a  work  as  did  the  civilian 
James.  Marshall  wrote  a  dozen  volumes,  each  filled 
with  several  scores  of  dreary  panegyrics,  or  memoirs 
of  as  many  different  officers.  There  is  no  attempt 
at  order,  hardly  any  thing  about  the  ships,  guns,  or 
composition  of  the  crews  ;  and  not  even  the  pre 
tence  of  giving  both  sides,  the  object  being  to  make 
every  Englishman  appear  in  his  best  light.  The 
work  is  analogous  to  the  numerous  lives  of  Decatur, 

1  A  new  edition,  London,  1826. 

3  "Royal  Naval   Biography,"    by  John  Marshall  (London,    1823- 
1835). 

"Naval  History  of  Great  Britain,"  by   Edward  Pelham  Brenton 
(new  edition,  London,  1837). 


14  NAVAL   WAR   OF    1 8 12. 

Bainbridge,  Porter,  etc.,  that  appeared  in  the  United 
States  about  the  same  time,  and  is  quite  as  untrust 
worthy.  Brenton  made  a  far  better  and  very  inter 
esting  book,  written  on  a  good  and  well-connected 
plan,  and  apparently  with  a  sincere  desire  to  tell 
the  truth.  He  accepts  the  British  official  accounts 
as  needing  nothing  whatever  to  supplement  them, 
precisely  as  Cooper  accepts  the  American  officials'. 
A  more  serious  fault  is  his  inability  to  be  accurate. 
That  this  inaccuracy  is  not  intentional  is  proved  by 
the  fact  that  it  tells  as  often  against  his  own  side  as 
against  his  opponents.  He  says,  for  example,  that 
the  guns  of  Perry's  and  Barclay's  squadrons  "  were 
about  equal  in  number  and  weight,"  that  the  Pea 
cock  (British)  was  armed  with  32*3  instead  of  24/5, 
and  underestimates  the  force  of  the  second  Wasp. 
But  the  blunders  are  quite  as  bad  when  distributed 
as  when  confined  to  one  side  ;  in  addition,  Bren- 
ton's  disregard  of  all  details  makes  him  of  but  little 
use. 

James,  as  already  said,  is  by  far  the  most  valua 
ble  authority  on  the  war,  as  regards  purely  British 
affairs.  He  enters  minutely  into  details,  and  has 
evidently  laboriously  hunted  up  his  authorities.  He 
has  examined  the  ships'  logs,  the  Admiralty  reports, 
various  treatises,  all  the  Gazette  reports,  gives  very 
well-chosen  extracts,  has  arranged  his  work  in  chron 
ological  order,  discriminates  between  the  officers 
that  deserve  praise  and  those  that  deserve  blame, 
and  in  fact  writes  a  work  which  ought  to  be  con 
sulted  by  every  student  of  naval  affairs.  But  he  is 
unfortunately  afflicted  with  a  hatred  toward  the 
Americans  that  amounts  to  a  monomania.  He 
wishes  to  make  out  as  strong  a  case  as  possible 


INTRODUCTION.  15 

against  them.  The  animus  of  his  work  may  be 
gathered  from  the  not  over  complimentary  account 
of  the  education  of  the  youthful  seafaring  Amer 
ican,  which  can  be  found  in  vol.  vi,  p.  113,  of  his 
"History."  On  page  153  he  asserts  that  he  is  an' 
"  impartial  historian  "  ;  and  about  three  lines  before 
mentions  that  "  it  may  suit  the  Americans  to  invent 
any  falsehood,  no  matter  how  barefaced,  to  foist  a 
valiant  character  on  themselves."  On  page  419  he 
says  that  Captain  Porter  is  to  be  believed,  "  so  far 
as  is  borne  out  by  proof  (the  only  safe  way  where 
an  American  is  concerned),"  -  —  which  somewhat 
sweeping  denunciation  of  the  veracity  of  all  of 
Captain  Porter's  compatriots  would  seem  to  indi 
cate  that  James  was  not,  perhaps,  in  that  dispas 
sionate  frame  of  mind  best  suited  for  writing 
history.  That  he  should  be  biassed  against  indi 
vidual  captains  can  be  understood,  but  when  he 
makes  rabid  onslaughts  upon  the  American  people 
as  a  whole,  he  renders  it  difficult  for  an  American, 
at  any  rate,  to  put  implicit  credence  in  him.  His 
statements  are  all  the  harder  to  confute  when  they 
are  erroneous,  because  they  are  intentionally  so.  It 
is  not,  as  with  Brenton  and  Marshall,  because  he 
really  thinks  a  British  captain  cannot  be  beaten,  ex 
cept  by  some  kind  of  distorted  special  providence, 
for  no  man  says  worse  things  than  he  does  about 
certain  officers  and  crews.  A  writer  of  James'  un 
doubted  ability  must  have  known  perfectly  well  that 
his  statements  were  untrue  in  many  instances,  as 
where  he  garbles  Hilyar's  account  of  Porter's  loss, 
or  misstates  the  comparative  force  of  the  fleets  on 
Lake  Champlain. 

When   he   says  (p.  194)  that   Captain  Bainbridge 


1 6  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

wished  to  run  away  from  the  Java,  and  would 
have  done  so  if  he  had  not  been  withheld  by  the 
advice  of  his  first  lieutenant,  who  was  a  renegade 
Englishman,1  it  is  not  of  much  consequence  whether 
his  making  the  statement  was  due  to  excessive  cre 
dulity  or  petty  meanness,  for,  in  either  case,  whether 
the  defect  was  in  his  mind  or  his  morals,  it  is  enough 
to  greatly  impair  the  value  of  his  other  "  facts.' 
Again,  when  James  (p.  165)  states  that  Decatur  ran 
away  from  the  Macedonian  until,  by  some  mar- 
vellous  optical  delusion,  he  mistook  her  for  a  32,  he 
merely  detracts  a  good  deal  from  the  worth  of  his 
own  account.  When  the  Americans  adopt  boarding 
helmets,  he  considers  it  as  proving  conclusively 
that  they  are  suffering  from  an  acute  attack  of  cow 
ardice.  On  p.  122  he  says  that  "had  the  Presi 
dent,  when  she  fell  in  with  the  Belvidcra,  been 
cruising  alone  *  *  *  Commodore  Rodgers 
would  have  magnified  the  British  frigate  into  a  line- 
of-battle  ship,  and  have  done  his  utmost  to  avoid 
her,"  which  gives  an  excellent  idea  of  the  weight  to 
be  attached  to  the  various  other  anecdotes  he  relates 
of  the  much-abused  Commodore  Rodgers. 

But  it  must  always  be  remembered  that  untrust 
worthy  as  James  is  in  any  thing  referring  purely  to 
the  Americans,  he  is  no  worse  than  his  compeers  of 
both  nationalities.  The  misstatements  of  Niles  in 
his  "  Weekly  Register"  about  the  British  are  quite  as 
flagrant,  and  his  information  about  his  own  side 
even  more  valuable.2  Every  little  American  author 

1  Who,  by  the  way,  was  Mr.  Parker,  born  in  Virginia,  and  never  in 
England  in  his  life. 

a  In  Niles,  by  the  way,  can  be  found  excellent  examples  of  the  tra 
ditional  American  "  spread-eagle  "  style.  In  one  place  I  remember  his 
describing  "  The  Immortal  Rodgers,"  baulked  of  his  natural  prey,  the 


INTRODUCTION.  I/ 

crowed  over  Perry's  "  Nelsonic  victory  over  a 
greatly  superior  force."  The  Constitution  was  de 
clared  to  have  been  at  a  disadvantage  when  she 
fought  the  Guerriere,  and  so  on  ad  infinitum. 
But  these  writers  have  all  faded  into  oblivion,  and 
their  writings  are  not  even  referred  to,  much  less 
believed.  James,  on  the  contrary,  has  passed 
through  edition  after  edition,  is  considered  as  un 
questionable  authority  in  his  own  country,  and 
largely  throughout  Europe,  and  has  furnished  the 
basis  for  every  subsequent  account  by  British  au 
thors.  From  Alison  to  Lieutenant  Low,  almost 
every  English  work,  whether  of  a  popular  character 
or  not,  is,  in  so  far  as  it  touches  on  the  war,  simply 
a  "rehash  "of  the  works  written  by  James.  The 
consequence  is  that  the  British  and  American  ac 
counts  have  astonishingly  little  resemblance.  One 
ascribes  the  capture  of  the  British  frigates  simply  to 
the  fact  that  their  opponents  were  "  cut  down  line- 
of-battle  ships  "  ;  the  other  gives  all  the  glory  to 
the  "  undaunted  heroism,"  etc.,  of  the  Yankee 
sailors. 

One  not  very  creditable  trait  of  the  early  Amer 
ican  naval  historians  gave  their  rivals  a  great  ad 
vantage.  The  object  of  the  former  was  to  make 
out  that  the  Constitution,  for  example,  won  her 
victories  against  an  equal  foe,  and  an  exact  state 
ment  of  the  forces  showed  the  contrary  ;  so  they 
always  avoided  figures,  and  thus  left  the  ground 

British,  as  "soaring  about  like  the  bold  baldeagleof  his  native  land," 
seeking  whom  he  might  devour.  The  accounts  he  gives  of  British 
line-of-battle  ships  fleeing  from  American  44*5  quite  match  James* 
anecdotes  of  the  latter's  avoidance  of  British  38*5  and  36*5  for  fear 
they  might  mount  twenty-four-pounders.  The  two  works  taken  to- 
gether  give  a  very  good  idea  of  the  war ;  separately,  either  is  utterly 
unreliable,  especially  in  matters  of  opinion. 


1 8  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

clear  for  James'  careful  misstatements.  Even  when 
they  criticised  him  they  never  went  into  details, 
confining  themselves  to  some  remark  about  "  hurl 
ing  "  his  figures  in  his  face  with  "  loathing."  Even 
Cooper,  interesting  though  his  work  is,  has  gone 
far  less  into  figures  than  he  should,  and  seems  to 
have  paid  little  if  any  attention  to  the  British 
official  statements,  which  of  course  should  be  re 
ceived  as  of  equal  weight  with  the  American.  His 
comments  on  the  actions  are  generally  very  fair, 
the  book  never  being  disfigured  by  bitterness 
toward  the  British  ;  but  he  is  certainly  wrong,  for 
example,  in  ascribing  the  loss  of  the  Chesapeake 
solely  to  accident,  that  of  the  Argus  solely  to 
her  inferiority  in  force,  and  so  on.  His  disposition 
to  praise  all  the  American  commanders  maybe  gen 
erous,  but  is  nevertheless  unjust.  If  Decatur's 
surrender  of  the  President  is  at  least  impliedly 
praised,  then  Porter's  defence  of  the  Essex  can 
hardly  receive  its  just  award.  There  is  no  weight  in 
the  commendation  bestowed  upon  Hull,  if  commen 
dation,  the  same  in  kind  though  less  in  degree,  is  be 
stowed  upon  Rodgers.  It  is  a  great  pity  that 
Cooper  did  not  write  a  criticism  on  James,  for  no 
one  could  have  done  it  more  thoroughly.  But  he 
never  mentions  him,  except  once  in  speaking  of 
Barclay's  fleet.  In  all  probability  this  silence  arose 
from  sheer  contempt,  and  the  certainty  that  most  of 
James'  remarks  were  false  ;  but  the  effect  was  that 
very  many  foreigners  believe  him  to  have  shirked 
the  subject.  He  rarely  gives  any  data  by  which 
the  statements  of  James  can  be  disproved,  and  it  is 
for  this  reason  that  I  have  been  obliged  to  criticise 
the  latter's  work  very  fully.  Many  of  James'  re- 


INTRODUCTION.  19 

marks,  however,  defy  criticism  from  their  random 
nature,  as  when  he  states  that  American  midship 
men  were  chiefly  masters  and  mates  of  merchant 
men,  and  does  not  give  a  single  proof  to  support 
the  assertion.  It  would  be  nearly  as  true  to  assert 
that  the  British  midshipmen  were  for  the  most  part 
ex-members  of  the  prize-ring,  and  as  much  labor 
would  be  needed  to  disprove  it.  In  other  instances 
it  is  quite  enough  to  let  his  words  speak  for  them 
selves,  as  where  he  says  (p.  155)  that  of  the  Amer 
ican  sailors  one  third  in  number  and  one  half  in 
point  of  effectiveness  were  in  reality  British.  That 
is,  of  the  450  men  the  Constitution  had  when  she 
fought  the  Java  150  were  British,  and  the  re 
maining  300  could  have  been  as  effectively  re 
placed  by  150  more  British.  So  a  very  little  logic 
works  out  a  result  that  James  certainly  did  not  in 
tend  to  arrive  at  ;  namely,  that  300  British  led  by 
American  officers  could  beat,  with  ease  and  com 
parative  impunity,  400  British  led  by  their  own 
officers.  He  also  forgets  that  the  whole  consists  of 
the  sum  of  the  parts.  He  accounts  for  the  victories 
of  the  Americans  by  stating  (p.  280)  that  they  were 
lucky  enough  to  meet  with  frigates  and  brigs  who 
had  unskilful  gunners  or  worthless  crews  ;  he  also 
carefully  shows  that  the  Macedonian  was  incom 
petently  handled,  the  Peacock  commanded  by  a 
mere  martinet,  the  Avon's  crew  unpractised  at 
the  guns,  the  Epervier  s  mutinous  and  cowardly, 
the  Penguin  s  weak  and  unskilful,  the  Java  s  ex 
ceedingly  poor,  and  more  to  the  same  effect. 
Now  the  Americans  took  in  single  fight  three 
frigates  and  seven  sloops,  and  when  as  many 
as  ten  vessels  are  met  it  is  exceedingly  probable 


2O  NAVAL  WAR  OF    l8l2. 

that  they  represent  the  fair  average  ;  so  that  James' 
strictures,  so  far  as  true,  simply  show  that  the 
average  British  ship  was  very  apt  to  possess,  com 
paratively  speaking,  an  incompetent  captain  or  un 
skilful  crew.  These  disadvantages  were  not  felt 
when  opposed  to  navies  in  which  they  existed  to 
an  even  greater  extent,  but  became  very  apparent 
when  brought  into  contact  with  a  power  whose  few 
officers  knew  how  to  play  their  own  parts  very 
nearly  to  perfection,  and,  something  equally  im 
portant,  knew  how  to  make  first-rate  crews  out  of 
what  was  already  good  raw  material.  Finally,  a 
large  proportion  of  James'  abuse  of  the  Americans 
sufficiently  refutes  itself,  and  perhaps  Cooper's 
method  of  contemptuously  disregarding  him  was 
the  best  ;  but  no  harm  can  follow  from  devoting  a 
little  space  to  commenting  upon  him. 

Much  the  best  American  work  is  Lieutenant 
George  E.  Emmons'  statistical  "  History  of  the 
United  States  Navy."  Unfortunately  it  is  merely  a 
mass  of  excellently  arranged  and  classified  statistics, 
and  while  of  invaluable  importance  to  the  student, 
is  not  interesting  to  the  average  reader.  Almost 
all  the  statements  I  have  made  of  the  force,  ton 
nage,  and  armament  of  the  American  vessels,  though 
I  have  whenever  practicable  taken  them  from  the 
Navy  Records,  etc.,  yet  could  be  just  as  well 
quoted  from  Emmons.  Copies  of  most  of  the 
American  official  letters  which  I  have  quoted  can  be 
found  in  "  Niles'  Register,"  volumes  i  to  10,  and  all 
of  the  British  ones  in  the  "  London  Naval  Chronicle" 
for  the  same  years.  It  is  to  these  two  authorities 
that  I  am  most  indebted,  and  nearly  as  much  so  to 
the  "American  State  Papers,"  vol.  xiv.  Next  in  order 


INTRODUCTION.  21 

come  Emmons,  Cooper,  and  the  invaluable,  albeit 
somewhat  scurrilous,  James  ;  and  a  great  many 
others  whose  names  I  have  quoted  in  their  proper 
places.  In  commenting  upon  the  actions,  I  have, 
whenever  possible,  drawn  from  some  standard 
work,  such  as  Jurien  de  la  Graviere's  "  Guerres 
Maritimes,"  Lord  Howard  Douglass'  "Naval  Gun 
nery,"  or,  better  still,  from  the  lives  and  memoirs  of 
Admirals  Farragut,  Codrington,  Broke,  or  Durham. 
The  titles  of  the  various  works  will  be  found  given 
in  full  as  they  are  referred  to.1  In  a  few  cases, 
where  extreme  accuracy  was  necessary,  or  where,  as 
in  the  case  of  the  President's  capture,  it  was  de 
sirable  that  there  should  be  no  room  for  dispute  as 
to  the  facts,  I  have  given  the  authority  for  each 
sentence ;  but  in  general  this  would  be  too  cumber 
some,  and  so  I  have  confined  myself  to  referring,  at 
or  near  the  beginning  of  the  account  of  each  action, 
to  the  authorities  from  whom  I  have  taken  it.  For 
the  less  important  facts  on  which  every  one  is 
agreed  I  have  often  given  no  references. 

1  To  get  an  idea  of  the  American  seamen  of  that  time  Cooper's 
novels,  "  Miles  Wallingford,"  "  Home  as  Found,"  and  the  "  Pilot," 
are  far  better  than  any  history  ;  in  the  "  Two  Admirals"  the  descrip 
tion  of  the  fleet  manoeuvring  is  unrivalled.  His  view  of  Jack's  life  is 
rather  rose-colored  however.  "  Tom  Cringle's  log  "  ought  to  be  read 
for  the  information  it  gives.  Marryatt's  novels  will  show  some  of  the 
darker  aspects  of  sailor  life. 


CHAPTER  II. 

Overwhelming  naval  supremacy  of  England  when  America  declared  war 
against  her— Race  identity  of  the  combatants— The  American  navy  at  the  be 
ginning  of  the  war — Officers  well  trained — Causes  tending  to  make  our  seamen 
especially  efficient— Close  similarity  between  the  British  and  American  sailors 
—Our  ships  manned  chiefly  by  native  Americans,  many  of  whom  had 
formerly  been  impressed  into  the  British  navy — Quotas  of  seamen  contributed 
by  the  different  States — Navy-yards — Lists  of  officers  and  men — List  of  vessels 
— Tonnage — Different  ways  of  estimating  it  in  Britain  and  America — Ratings 
— American  ships  properly  rated — Armaments  of  the  frigates  and  corvettes — 
Three  styles  of  guns  used — Difference  between  long  guns  and  carronades — 
Short  weight  of  American  shot — Comparison  of  British  frigates  rating  38,  and 
American  frigates  rating  44  guns — Compared  with  a  74. 

DURING  the  early  years  of  this  century  Eng 
land's  naval  power  stood  at  a  height  never 
reached  before  or  since  by  that  of  any  other  nation. 
On  every  sea  her  navies  rode,  not  only  triumphant, 
but  with  none  to  dispute  their  sway.  The  island 
folk  had  long  claimed  the  mastery  of  the  ocean,  and 
they  had  certainly  succeeded  in  making  their  claim 
completely  good  during  the  time  of  bloody  warfare 
that  followed  the  breaking  out  of  the  French  Rev 
olution.  Since  the  year  1792  each  European 
nation,  in  turn,  had  learned  to  feel  bitter  dread  of 
the  weight  of  England's  hand.  In  the  Baltic,  Sir 
Samuel  Hood  had  taught  the  Russians  that  they 
must  needs  keep  in  port  when  the  English  cruisers 
were  in  the  offing.  The  descendants  of  the  Vikings 
had  seen  their  whole  navy  destroyed  at  Copenhagen. 
No  Dutch  fleet  ever  put  out  after  the  day  when, 
off  Camperdown,  Lord  Duncan  took  possession  of 
De  Winter's  shattered  ships.  But  a  few  years 


NAVAL    WAR    OF    l8l2.  23 

before  1812,  the  greatest  sea-fighter  of  all  time  had 
died  in  Trafalgar  Bay,  and  in  dying  had  crumbled 
to  pieces  the  navies  of  France  and  of  Spain. 

From  that  day  England's  task  was  but  to  keep  in 
port  such  of  her  foes'  vessels  as  she  had  not  de 
stroyed.  France  alone  still  possessed  fleets  that 
could  be  rendered  formidable,  and  so,  from  the 
Scheldt  to  Toulon,  her  harbors  were  watched  and 
her  coasts  harried  by  the  blockading  squadrons  of 
the  English.  Elsewhere  the  latter  had  no  fear  of 
their  power  being  seriously  assailed  ;  but  their  vast 
commerce  and  numerous  colonies  needed  ceaseless 
protection.  Accordingly  in  every  sea  their  cruisers 
could  be  found,  of  all  sizes,  from  the  stately  ship- 
of-the-line,  with  her  tiers  of  heavy  cannon  and  her 
many  hundreds  of  men,  down  to  the  little  cutter 
carrying  but  a  score  of  souls  and  a  couple  of  light 
guns.  All  these  cruisers,  but  especially  those  of 
the  lesser  rates,  were  continually  brought  into  con 
tact  with  such  of  the  hostile  vessels  as  had  run 
through  the  blockade,  or  were  too  small  to  be  af 
fected  by  it.  French  and  Italian  frigates  were  often 
fought  and  captured  when  they  were  skirting  their 
own  coasts,  or  had  started  off  on  a  plundering  cruise 
through  the  Atlantic,  or  to  the  Indian  Ocean  ;  and 
though  the  Danes  had  lost  their  larger  ships  they 
kept  up  a  spirited  warfare  with  brigs  and  gun-boats. 
So  the  English  marine  was  in  constant  exercise,  at 
tended  with  almost  invariable  success. 

Such  was  Great  Britain's  naval  power  when  the 
Congress  of  the  United  States  declared  war  upon 
her.  While  she  could  number  her  thousand  sail, 
the  American  navy  included  but  half  a  dozen  frig 
ates,  and  six  or  eight  sloops  and  brigs ;  and  it  is 


24  NAVAL   WAR    OF    l8l2. 

small  matter  for  surprise  that  the  British  officers 
should  have  regarded  their  new  foe  with  contemptu 
ous  indifference.  Hitherto  the  American  seamen 
had  never  been  heard  of  except  in  connection  with 
two  or  three  engagements  with  French  frigates, 
and  some  obscure  skirmishes  against  the  Moors  of 
Tripoli ;  none  of  which  could  possibly  attract  atten 
tion  in  the  years  that  saw  Aboukir,  Copenhagen, 
and  Trafalgar.  And  yet  these  same  petty  wars  were 
the  school  which  raised  our  marine  to  the  highest 
standard  of  excellence.  A  continuous  course  of 
victory,  won  mainly  by  seamanship,  had  made  the 
English  sailor  overweeningly  self-confident,  and 
caused  him  to  pay  but  little  regard  to  manoeuvring 
or  even  to  gunnery.  Meanwhile  the  American 
learned,  by  receiving  hard  knocks,  how  to  give  them, 
and  belonged  to  a  service  too  young  to  feel  an  over- 
confidence  in  itself.  One  side  had  let  its  training 
relax,  while  the  other  had  carried  it  to  the  highest 
possible  point.  Hence  our  ships  proved,  on  the 
whole,  victorious  in  the  apparently  unequal  struggle, 
and  the  men  who  had  conquered  the  best  seamen 
of  Europe  were  now  in  turn  obliged  to  succumb. 
Compared  with  the  great  naval  battles  of  the  pre 
ceding  few  years,  our  bloodiest  conflicts  were  mere 
skirmishes,  but  they  were  skirmishes  between  the 
hitherto  acknowledged  kings  of  the  ocean,  and  new 
men  who  yet  proved  to  be  more  than  their  equals.  For 
over  a  hundred  years,  or  since  the  time  when  they 
had  contended  on  equal  terms  with  the  great  Dutch 
admirals,  the  British  had  shown  a  decided  supe 
riority  to  their  various  foes,  and  during  the  latter 
quarter  of  the  time  this  superiority,  as  already  said, 
was  very  marked,  indeed  ;  in  consequence,  the  victo- 


NAVAL    WAR    OF    1 8 12.  2$ 

ries  of  the  new  enemy  attracted  an  amount  of  atten 
tion  altogether  disproportionate  to  their  material 
effects.  And  it  is  a  curious  fact  that  our  little  navy, 
in  which  the  art  of  handling  and  fighting  the  old, 
broadside,  sailing  frigate  in  single  conflict  was 
brought  to  the  highest  point  of  perfection  ever 
reached,  that  this  same  navy  should  have  contained 
the. first  representative  of  the  modern  war  steamer, 
and  also  the  torpedo — the  two  terrible  engines 
which  were  to  drive  from  the  ocean  the  very  white- 
winged  craft  that  had  first  won  honor  for  the  starry 
flag.  The  tactical  skill  of  Hull  or  Decatur  is  now  of 
merely  archaic  interest,  and  has  but  little  more 
bearing  on  the  manoeuvring  of  a  modern  fleet  than 
have  the  tactics  of  the  Athenian  gallies.  But  the 
war  still  conveys  some  most  practical  lessons  as  to 
the  value  of  efficient  ships  and,  above  all,  of  effi 
cient  men  in  them.  Had  we  only  possessed  the 
miserable  gun-boats,  our  men  could  have  done  noth 
ing;  had  we  not  possessed  good  men,  the  heavy 
frigates  would  have  availed  as  little.  Poor  ships 
and  impotent  artillery  had  lost  the  Dutch  almost 
their  entire  navy;  fine  ships  and  heavy  cannon  had 
not  saved  the  French  and  Spanish  from  the  like  fate. 
We  owed  our  success  to  putting  sailors  even  better 
than  the  Dutch  on  ships  even  finer  than  those  built 
by  the  two  Latin  seaboard  powers. 

The  first  point  to  be  remembered  in  order  to 
write  a  fair  account  of  this  war  is  that  the  difference 
in  fighting  skill,  which  certainly  existed  between  the 
two  parties,  was  due  mainly  to  training,  and  not  to 
the  nature  of  the  men.  It  seems  certain  that  the 
American  had  in  the  beginning  somewhat  the  ad 
vantage,  because  his  surroundings,  partly  physical 


26  NAVAL    WAR    OF    l8l2. 

and  partly  social  and  political,  had  forced   him  into 
habits   of   greater   self-reliance.     Therefore,    on    the 
average,  he  offered  rather  the  best  material  to  start 
with  ;  but  the  difference  was  very  slight,  and  totally 
disappeared  under  good  training.     The  combatants 
were  men  of  the  same  race,  differing  but  little  from 
one  another.     On  the  New  England  coast  the  Eng 
lish   blood   was   as   pure   as   in  any  part  of  Britain  ; 
in    New  York   and    New  Jersey  it   was   mixed  with 
that  of   the  Dutch  settlers — and   the  Dutch  are  by 
race   nearer   to  the  true  old   English  of  Alfred  and 
Harold  than  are,  for  example,  the  thoroughly  angli 
cized  Welsh    of   Cornwall.     Otherwise,  the  infusion 
of  new  blood  into  the  English  race  on  this  side  of 
the  Atlantic  has  been   chiefly  from  three  sources — 
German,  Irish,  and   Norse  ;  and  these  three  sources 
represent  the  elemental  parts  of  the  composite  Eng 
lish   stock   in   about   the  same  proportions  in  which 
they   were    originally   combined, — mainly  Teutonic, 
largely  Celtic,  and  with   a  Scandinavian  admixture. 
The  descendant  of  the  German  becomes  as  much  an 
Anglo-American    as   the    descendant    of   the  Strath- 
clyde    Celt     has   already   become    an   Anglo-Briton. 
Looking  through  names  of  the  combatants  it  would 
be  difficult  to  find  any  of  one  navy  that  could  not 
be  matched  in  the  other— Hull  or  Lawrence,  Allen, 
Perry,    or    Stewart.      And    among    all    the    English 
.names   on   both   sides   will   be  found   many  Scotch, 
Irish,    or   Welsh — McDonough,    O'Brien,    or   Jones. 
Still  stranger  ones  appear :  the  Huguenot  Tattnall  is 
one  among  the  American  defenders  of  the  Constella- 
tion,  and  another  Huguenot  Tattnall   is  among  the 
British  assailants  at   Lake  Borgne.     It  must  always 
be  kept  in  mind  that  the  Americans  and  the  British 


NAVAL    WAR    OF    l8l2.  2/ 

are  two  substantially  similar  branches  of  the  great 
English  race,  which  both  before  and  after  their 
separation  have  assimilated,  and  made  Englishmen 
of  many  other  peoples.1  The  lessons  taught  by  the> 
war  can  hardly  be  learned  unless  this  identity  is  kept 
in  mind.2 

To  understand  aright  the  efficiency  of  our  navy,  it 
is  necessary  to  take  a  brief  look  at  the  character  and 
antecedents  of  the  officers  and  men  who  served  in  it. 

When  war  broke  out  the  United  States  Navy  was 
but  a  few  years  old,  yet  it  already  had  a  far  from 
dishonorable  history.  The  captains  and  lieutenants 
of  1812  had  been  taught  their  duties  in  a  very  prac 
tical  school,  and  the  flag  under  which  they  fought 
was  endeared  to  them  already  by  not  a  few  glorious 
traditions — though  these,  perhaps,  like  others  of 
their  kind,  had  lost  none  of  their  glory  in  the  telling. 
A  few  of  the  older  men  had  served  in  the  war  of  the 
Revolution,  and  all  still  kept  fresh  in  mind  the 
doughty  deeds  of  the  old-time  privateering  war 
craft.  Men  still  talked  of  Biddle's  daring  cruises 
and  Barney's  stubborn  fights,  or  told  of  Scotch 
Paul  and  the  grim  work  they  had  who  followed  his 

1  The  inhabitants  of  Great   Britain   are  best  designated  as  "  Brit 
ish  " — English  being  either  too  narrow  or  too  broad  a  term,  in  one  case 
meaning  the  inhabitants  of  but  a  part  of  Britain,  and  in  the  other  the 
whole  Anglo-Saxon  people. 

2  It  was  practically  a  civil  war,  and  was  waged  with  much  harsh 
ness  and  bitterness  on  both  sides.      I   have  already  spoken  of  the 
numerous  grievances  of  the  Americans  ;  the  British,  in  turn,  looked 
upon  our  blockade-runners  which  entered  the  French  ports  exactly  as 
we  regarded,  at  a  later  date,  the  British  steamers  that  ran  into  Wil 
mington  and  Charleston.     It  is  curious  to  see  how  illogical  writers 
are.     The   careers   of    the   Argus  and    Alabama  for  example,  were 
strikingly  similar  in  many  ways,  yet  the  same  writer  who  speaks  of 
one  as  an  "heroic  little  brig,"  will  call  the  other  a  "  black  pirate." 
Of   course  there  can  be  no  possible  comparison  as  to  the  causes  for 
\vhich  the  two  vessels  were  fighting  ;  but  the  cruises  themselves  were 
very  much  alike,  both  in  character  and  history. 


28  NAVAL    WAR    OF    l8l2. 

fortunes.  Besides  these  memories  of  an  older  gen 
eration,  most  of  the  officers  had  themselves  taken 
part,  when  younger  in  years  and  rank,  in  deeds  not 
a  whit  less  glorious  Almost  every  man  had  had  a 
share  in  some  gallant  feat,  to  which  he,  in  part  at 
least,  owed  his  present  position.  The  captain  had 
perhaps  been  a  midshipman  under  Truxton  when 
he  took  the  Vengeance t  and  had  been  sent  aboard 
the  captured  French  frigate  with  the  prize-master  ; 
the  lieutenant  had  borne  a  part  in  the  various  attacks 
on  Tripoli,  and  had  led  his  men  in  the  desperate 
hand-to-hand  fights  in  which  the  Yankee  cutlass 
proved  an  overmatch  for  the  Turkish  and  Moorish 
scimitars.  Nearly  every  senior  officer  had  extri 
cated  himself  by  his  own  prowess  or  skill  from  the 
dangers  of  battle  or  storm  ;  he  owed  his  rank 
to  the  fact  that  he  had  proved  worthy  of  it. 
vThrown  upon  his  own  resources,  he  had  learned 
self-reliance  ;  he  was  a  first-rate  practical  seaman, 
and  prided  himself  on  the  way  his  vessel  was 
handled.  Having  reached  his  rank  by  hard  work, 
and  knowing  what  real  fighting  meant,  he  was  care 
ful  to  see  that  his  men  were  trained  in  the  essentials 
of  discipline,  and  that  they  knew  how  to  handle  the 
guns  in  battle  as  well  as  polish  them  in  peace.  Be 
yond  almost  any  of  his  countrymen,  he  wor 
shipped  the  "Gridiron  Flag,"  and,  having  been 
brought  up  in  the  Navy,  regarded  its  honor  as  his 
own.  It  was,  perhaps,  the  Navy  alone  that  thought 
itself  a  match,  ship  against  ship,  for  Great  Britain. 
The  remainder  of  the  nation  pinned  its  faith  to  the 
army,  or  rather  to  that  weakest  of  weak  reeds,  the 
militia.  The  officers  of  the  navy,  with  their  strong 
esprit  de  corps,  their  jealousy  of  their  own  name  and 


NAVAL    WAR    OF    I  Si  2.  .  29 

record,  and  the  knowledge,  by  actual  experience, 
that  the  British  ships  sailed  no  faster  and  were  no 
better  handled  than  their  own,  had  no  desire 
to  shirk  a  conflict  with  any  foe,  and  having  tried 
their  bravery  in  actual  service,  they  made  it  doubly 
formidable  by  cool,  wary  skill.  Even  the  younger 
men,  who  had  never  been  in  action,  had  been  so 
well  trained  by  the  tried  veterans  over  them  that  the 
lack  of  experience  was  not  sensibly  felt. 

The  sailors  comprising  the  crews  of  our  ships 
were  well  worthy  of  their  leaders.  There  was  no 
better  seaman  in  the  world  than  American  Jack  ;  he 
had  been  bred  to  his  work  from  infancy,  and  had 
been  off  in  a  fishing  dory  almost  as  soon  as  he 
could  walk.  When  he  grew  older,  he  shipped  on  a 
merchant-man  or  whaler,  and  in  those  warlike  times, 
when  our  large  merchant-marine  was  compelled  to 
rely  pretty  much  on  itself  for  protection,  each  craft 
had  to  be  well  handled  ;  all  who  were  not  were  soon 
weeded  out  by  a  process  of  natural  selection,  of 
which  the  agents  were  French  picaroons,  Spanish 
buccaneers,  and  IV^alay  pirates.  It  was  a  rough 
school,  but  it  taught  Jack  to  be  both  skilful  arid 
self-reliant ;  and  he  was  all  the  better  fitted  to  be 
come  a  man-of-war's  man,  because  he  knew  more 
about  fire-arms  than  most  of  his  kind  in  foreign 
lands.  At  home  he  had  used  his  ponderous  duck 
ing  gun  with  good  effect  on  the  flocks  of  canvas- 
backs  in  the  reedy  flats  of  the  Chesapeake,  or 
among  the  sea-coots  in  the  rough  water  off  the  New 
England  cliffs ;  and  when  he  went  on  a  sailing  voy 
age  the  chances  were  even  that  there  would  be 
some  use  for  the  long  guns  before  he  returned,  for 
the  American  merchant  sailor  could  trust  to  no 
armed  escort. 


30  NAVAL    WAR    OF    l8l2 

The  wonderful  effectiveness  of  our  seamen  at  the 
date  of  which  I  am  writing  as  well  as  long  subse 
quently  to  it  was  largely  due  to  the  curious  condition 
of  things  in  Europe.  For  thirty  years  all  the  Euro 
pean  nations  had  been  in  a  state  of  continuous  and 
very  complicated  warfare,  during  the  course  of 
which  each  nation  in  turn  fought  almost  every 
other,  England  being  usually  at  loggerheads  with 
all.  One  effect  of  this  was  to  force  an  enormous 
proportion  of  the  carrying  trade  of  the  world  into 
American  bottoms.  The  old  Massachusetts  town 
of  Salem  was  then  one  of  the  main  depots  of  the 
East  India  trade  ;  the  Baltimore  clippers  carried 
goods  into  the  French  and  German  ports  with  small 
regard  to  the  blockade ;  New  Bedford  and  Sag 
Harbor  fitted  out  whalers  for  the  Arctic  seas  as  well 
as  for  the  South  Pacific  ;  the  rich  merchants  of 
Philadelphia  and  New  York  sent  their  ships  to  all 
parts  of  the  world  ;  and  every  small  port  had  some 
craft  in  the  coasting  trade.  On  the  New  England 
seaboard  but  few  of  the  boys  would  reach  manhood 
without  having  made  at  least  one  voyage  to  the 
Newfoundland  Banks  after  codfish  ;  and  in  the 
whaling  towns  of  Long  Island  it  used  to  be  an  old 
saying  that  no  man  could  marry  till  he  struck  his 
whale.  The  wealthy  merchants  of  the  large  cities 
would  often  send  their  sons  on  a  voyage  or  two 
before  they  let  them  enter  their  counting-houses. 
Thus  it  came  about  that  a  large  portion  of  our 
population  was  engaged  in  seafaring  pursuits  of  a 
nature  strongly  tending  to  develop  a  resolute  and 
hardy  character  in  the  men  that  followed  them. 
The  British  merchant-men  sailed  in  huge  convoys, 
guarded  by  men-of-war,  while,  as  said  before,  our 


NAVAL    WAR    OF    l8l2.  31 

vessels  went  alone,  and  relied  for  protection  on 
themselves.  If  a  fishing  smack  went  to  the  Banks 
it  knew  that  it  ran  a  chance  of  falling  in  with  some 
not  over-scrupulous  Nova  Scotian  privateer.  The 
barques  that  sailed  from  Salem  to  the  Spice  Island^ 
kept  their  men  well  trained  both  at  great  guns  and 
musketry,  so  as  to  be  able  to  beat  off  either  Malay 
proas,  or  Chinese  junks.  The  New  York  ships, 
loaded  for  the  West  Indies,  were  prepared  to  do 
battle  with  the  picaroons  that  swarmed  in  the  Span 
ish  main  ;  while  the  fast  craft  from  Baltimore  could 
fight  as  well  as  they  could  run.  Wherever  an 
American  seaman  went,  he  not  only  had  to  contend 
with  all  the  legitimate  perils  of  the  sea,  but  he  had 
also  to  regard  almost  every  stranger  as  a  foe. 
Whether  this  foe  called  himself  pirate  or  privateer 
mattered  but  little.  French,  Spaniards,  Algerines, 
Malays,  from  all  alike  our  commerce  suffered,  and 
against  all,  our  merchants  were  forced  to  defend 
themselves.  The  effect  of  such  a  state  of  things, 
which  made  commerce  so  remunerative  that  the 
bolder  spirits  could  hardly  keep  out  of  it,  and  so 
hazardous  that  only  the  most  skilful  and  daring 
could  succeed  in  it,  was  to  raise  up  as  fine  a  set  of 
seamen  as  ever  manned  a  navy.  The  stern  school 
in  which  the  American  was  brought  up,  forced  him 
into  habits  of  independent  thought  and  action 
which  it  was  impossible  that  the  more  protected 
Briton  could  possess.  He  worked  more  intelligently 
and  less  from  routine,  and  while  perfectly  obedient 
and  amenable  to  discipline,  was  yet  able  to  judge 
for  himself  in  an  emergency.  He  was  more  easily 
managed  than  most  of  his  kind — being  shrewd, 
quiet,  and,  in  fact,  comparatively  speaking,  rather 


32  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

moral  than  otherwise ;  if  he  was  a  New  Englander, 
when  he  retired  from  a  sea  life  he  was  not  unapt  to 
end  his  days  as  a  deacon.  Altogether  there  could 
not  have  been  better  material  for  a  fighting  crew 
than  cool,  gritty  American  Jack.  Moreover,  there 
was  a  good  nucleus  of  veterans  to  begin  with,  who 
were  well  fitted  to  fill  the  more  responsible  positions, 
such  as  captains  of  guns,  etc.  These  were  men  who 
had  cruised  in  the  little  Enterprise  after  French 
privateers,  who  had  been  in  the  Constellation  in 
her  two  victorious  fights,  or  who,  perhaps,  had  fol 
lowed  Decatur  when  with  only  eighty  men  he  cut 
out  the  Philadelphia,  manned  by  fivefold  his  force 
and  surrounded  by  hostile  batteries  and  war  vessels, 
— one  of  the  boldest  expeditions  of  the  kind  on 
record. 

It  is  to  be  noted,  furthermore,  in  this  connection, 
that  by  a  singular  turn  of  fortune,  Great  Britain, 
whose  system  of  impressing  American  sailors  had 
been  one  of  the  chief  causes  of  the  war,  herself  be 
came,  in  consequence  of  that  very  system,  in  some 
sort,  a  nursery  for  the  seamen  of  the  young  Repub 
lican  navy.  The  American  sailor  feared  nothing 
more  than  being  impressed  on  a  British  ship — dread 
ing  beyond  measure  the  hard  life  and  cruel  disci 
pline  aboard  of  her  ;  but  once  there,  he  usually  did 
well  enough,  and  in  course  of  time  often  rose  to  be 
of  some  little  consequence.  For  years  before  1812, 
the  number  of  these  impressed  sailors  was  in  reality 
greater  than  the  entire  number  serving  in  the  Amer 
ican  navy,  from  which  it  will  readily  be  seen  that 
they  formed  a  good  stock  to  draw  .upon.  Very 
much  to  their  credit,  they  never  lost  their  devotion 
to  the  home  of  their  birth,  more  than  two  thousand 


NAVAL   WAR    OF    1 8 12.  33 

of  them  being  imprisoned  at  the  beginning  of  the 
war  because  they  refused  to  serve  against  their 
country.  When  Commodore  Decatur  captured  the 
Macedonian,  that  officer,  as  we  learn  from  Mar 
shall's  "  Naval  Biography"  (ii,  1019),  stated  that 
most  of  the  seamen  of  his  own  frigate,  the  United 
States,  had  served  in  British  war  vessels,  and  that 
some  had  been  with  Lord  Nelson  in  the  Victory, 
and  had  even  been  bargemen  to  the  great  Admiral, 
— a  pretty  sure  proof  that  the  American  sailors  did 
not  show  at  a  disadvantage  when  compared  with 
others.1 

Good  seaman  as  the  impressed  American  proved 
to  be,  yet  he  seldom  missed  an  opportunity  to  escape 
from  the  British  service,  by  desertion  or  otherwise. 
In  the  first  place,  the  life  was  very  hard,  and,  in  the 
second,  the  American  seaman  was  very  patriotic. 
He  had  an  honest  and  deep  affection  for  his  own 
flag  ;  while,  on  the  contrary,  he  felt  a  curiously  strong 
hatred  for  England,  as  distinguished  from  English 
men.  This  hatred  was  partly  an  abstract  feeling, 
cherished  through  a  vague  traditional  respect  for 
Bunker  Hill,  and  partly  something  very  real  and 
vivid,  owing  to  the  injuries  he,  and  others  like 

1  With  perfect  gravity,  James  and  his  followers  assume  Decatur's 
statement  to  be  equivalent  to  saying  that  he  had  chiefly  British  sea 
men  on  board  ;  whereas,  even  as  quoted  by  Marshall,  Decatur  merely 
said  that  "his  seamen  had  served  on  board  a  British  man-of-war," 
and  that  some  "had  served  under  Lord  Nelson."  Like  the  Con 
stitution,  the  United  States  had  rid  herself  of  most  of  the  British 
subjects  on  board,  before  sailing.  Decatur's  remark  simply  referred 
to  the  number  of  his  American  seamen  who  had  been  impressed 
on  board  British  ships.  Whenever  James  says  that  an  American 
ship  had  a  large  proportion  of  British  sailors  aboard,  the  explana 
tion  is  that  a  large  number  of  the  crew  were  Americans  who  had  been 
impressed  on  British  ships.  It  would  be  no  more  absurd  to  claim 
Trafalgar  as  an  American  victory  because  there  was  a  certain  number 
of  Americans  in  Nelson's  fleet,  than  it  is  to  assert  that  the  Americans 
were  victorious  in  1812,  because  there  were  a  few  renegade  British  on 
board  their  ships. 


34  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

him,  had  received.  Whether  he  lived  in  Mary- 
land  or  Massachusetts,  he  certainly  knew  men 
whose  ships  had  been  seized  by  British  cruisers, 
their  goods  confiscated,  and  the  vessels  condemned. 
Some  of  his  friends  had  fallen  victims  to  the  odious 
right  of  search,  and  had  never  been  heard  of  after 
ward.  He  had  suffered  many  an  injury  to  friend, 
fortune,  or  person,  and  some  day  he  hoped  to  re 
pay  them  all  ;  and  when  the  war  did  come,  he  fought 
all  the  better  because  he  knew  it  was  in  his  own 
quarrel.  But,  as  I  have  said,  this  hatred  was  against 
England,  not  against  Englishmen.  Then,  as  now, 
sailors  were  scattered  about  over  the  world  without 
any  great  regard  for  nationality;  and  the  resulting 
intermingling  of  natives  and  foreigners  in  every 
mercantile  marine  was  especially  great  in  those  of 
Britain  and  America,  whose  people  spoke  the  same 
tongue  and  wore  the  same  aspect.  When  chance 
drifted  the  American  into  Liverpool  or  London,  he 
was  ready  enough  to  ship  in  an  Indiaman  or  whaler, 
caring  little  for  the  fact  that  he  served  under  the 
British  flag;  and  the  Briton,  in  turn, who  found  him 
self  in  New  York  or  Philadelphia,  willingly  sailed  in 
one  of  the  clipper-built  barques,  whether  it  floated 
the  stars  and  stripes  or  not.  When  Captain  Porter 
wrought  such  havoc  among  the  British  whalers  in 
the  South  Seas,  he  found  that  no  inconsiderable 
portion  of  their  crews  consisted  of  Americans,  some 
of  whom  enlisted  on  board  his  own  vessel ;  and 
among  the  crews  of  the  American  whalers  were 
many  British.  In  fact,  though  the  skipper  of  each 
ship  might  brag  loudly  of  his  nationality,  yet  in 
practical  life  he  knew  well  enough  that  there  was 
very  little  to  choose  between  a  Yankee  and  a  Brit- 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    1 8 12.  35 

on.1  Both  were  bold  and  hardy,  cool  and  intelli 
gent,  quick  with  their  hands,  and  showing  at  their 
best  in  an  emergency.  They  looked  alike  and  spoke 
alike ;  when  they  took  the  trouble  to  think,  they 
thought  alike  ;  and  when  they  got  drunk,  which  was 
not  an  infrequent  occurrence,  they  quarrelled  alike. 
Mingled  with  them  were  a  few  seamen  of  other 

o 

nationalities.  The  Irishman,  if  he  came  from  the 
old  Dano-Irish  towns  of  Waterford,  Dublin,  and 
Wexford,  or  from  the  Ulster  coast,  was  very  much 
like  the  two  chief  combatants;  the  Celto-Turanian 
kern  of  the  west  did  not  often  appear  on  shipboard. 
The  French,  Danes,  and  Dutch  were  hemmed  in  at 
home  ;  they  had  enough  to  do  on  their  own  sea 
board,  and  could  not  send  men  into  foreign  fleets. 
A  few  Norse,  however,  did  come  in,  and  excellent 
sailors  and  fighters  they  made.  With  the  Portu 
guese  and  Italians,  of  whom  some  were  to  be  found 
serving  under  the  union-jack,  and  others  under  the 
stars  and  stripes,  it  was  different;  although  there  were 

1  \Vhat  choice  there  was,  was  in  favor  of  the  American.  In  point 
of  courage  there  was  no  difference  whatever.  The  Kssex  and  the 
Lawrence,  as  well  as  the  Frolic  and  the  Reindeer,  were  defended 
with  the  same  stubborn,  desperate,  cool  bravery  that  marks  the 
English  race  on  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic.  But  the  American  was  a 
free  citizen,  any  one's  equal,  a  voter  with  a  personal  interest  in  his 
country's  welfare,  and,  above  all,  without  having  perpetually  before 
his  eyes  the  degrading  fear  of  the  press-gang.  In  consequence,  he 
was  more  tractable  than  the  Englishman,  more  self-reliant,  and  pos 
sessed  greater  judgment.  In  the  fight  between  the  Wasp  and 
the  Frolic,  the  latter's  crew  had  apparently  been  well  trained  at  the 
guns,  for  they  aimed  well  ;  but  they  fired  at  the  wrong  time,  and 
never  corrected  the  error  ;  while  thejr  antagonists,  delivering  their 
broadsides  far  more  slowly,  by  intelligently  waiting  until  the  proper 
moment,  worked  frightful  havoc.  But  though  there  was  a  certain 
slight  difference  between  the  seamen  of  the  two  nations,  it  must  never 
be  forgotten  that  it  was  very  much  less  than  that  between  the  various 
individuals  of  the  same  nation  ;  and  when  the  British  had  been 
trained  for  a  few  years  by  such  commanders  as  Broke  and  Manners, 
it  was  impossible  to  surpass  them,  and  it  needed  our  best  men  to 
equal  them. 


36  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

many  excellent  exceptions  they  did  not,  as  a  rule, 
make  the  best  kind  of  seamen.  They  were  treach 
erous,  fond  of  the  knife,  less  ready  with  their  hands, 
and  likely  to  lose  either  their  wits  or  their  courage 
when  in  a  tight  place. 

In  the  American  navy,  unlike  the  British,  there 
was  no  impressment  ;  the  sailor  was  a  volunteer, 
and  he  shipped  in  whatever  craft  his  fancy  selected. 
Throughout  the  war  there  were  no  "  picked  crews  " 
on  the  American  side,1  excepting  on  the  last  two 
cruises  of  the  Constitution.  In  fact  (as  seen  by 
the  letter  of  Captains  Stewart  and  Bainbridge  to 
Secretary  Hamilton),  there  was  often  much  diffi 
culty  in  getting  enough  men.2  Many  sailors  pre 
ferred  to  serve  in  the  innumerable  privateers,  and, 
the  two  above-mentioned  officers,  in  urging  the  ne 
cessity  of  building  line-of-battle  ships,  state  that  it 
was  hard  work  to  recruit  men  for  vessels  of  an  in- 

1  James'  statements  to  the  contrary  being  in  every  case  utterly  with 
out  foundation.      He  is  also  wrong  in  his  assertion  that  the  American 
ships  had  no  boys  ;   they  had  nearly  as  many  in  proportion  as  the 
British.      The  Constitution  had  31,  the  Adams  15,  etc.     So,  when  he 
states    that  our   midshipmen  were    generally  masters    and  mates    of 
merchantmen  ;  they  were  generally  from  eleven  to  seventeen  years 
old  at  the  beginning  of  the  war,  and,  besides,  had  rarely  or  never  been 
in  the  merchant  marine. 

2  Reading    through  the  volumes  of  official  letters  about  this  war, 
which  are  preserved  in  the  office  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  one  of 
the  most  noticeable  things  is  the  continual  complaints  about  the  diffi 
culty  of  getting  men.     The  Adams  at  one  time  had  a  crew  of  but 
nineteen  men — "  fourteen  of  whom  are  marines,"  adds  the  aggrieved 
commander.    A  log-book  of  one  of  the  gun-boats  records  the  fact  that 
after   much  difficulty  two  men  were  enlisted — from  the  jail,  with  a 
parenthetical    memorandum   to   the   effect  that  they  were  both  very 
drunk.      British  ships  were  much  more  easily  manned,  as  they  could 
always  have  recourse  to  impressment. 

The  Constitution  on  starting  out  on  her  last  cruises  had  an  ex 
traordinary  number  of  able  seamen  aboard,  viz.,  218,  with  but  92 
ordinary  seamen,  12  boys,  and  44  marines,  making,  with  the  officers, 
a  total  of  440  men.  (See  letter  of  Captain  Bainbridge,  Oct.  16,  1814; 
it  is  letter  No.  51,  in  the  fortieth  volume  of  "Captains'  Letters,"  in 
the  clerk's  office  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy.) 


NAVAL    WAR    OF    l8l2.  37 

ferior  grade,  so  long  as  the  enemy  had  ships  of  the 
line. 

One  of  the  standard  statements  made  by  the 
British  historians  about  this  war  is  that  our  ships 
were  mainly  or  largely  manned  by  British  sailors. 
This,  if  true,  would  not  interfere  with  the  lessons 
which  it  teaches ;  and,  besides  that,  it  is  not  true. 

In  this,  as  in  every  thing  else,  all  the  modern 
writers  have  merely  followed  James  or  Brenton,  and 
I  shall  accordingly  confine  myself  to  examining 
their  assertions.  The  former  begins  (vol.  iv,  p.  470) 
by  diffidently  stating  that  there  is  a  "similarity*1 
of  language  between  the  inhabitants  of  the  two 
countries — an  interesting  philological  discovery  that 
but  few  will  attempt  to  controvert.  In  vol.  vi,  p. 
154,  he  mentions  that  a  number  of  blanks  occur  in 
the  American  Navy  List  in  the  column  "  Where 
Born  "  ;  and  in  proof  of  the  fact  that  these  blanks 
are  there  because  the  men  were  not  Americans,  he 
says  that  their  names  "  are  all  English  and  Irish." 
They  certainly  are;  and  so  are  all  the  other  names 
in  the  list.  It  could  not  well  be  otherwise,  as  the 
United  States  Navy  was  not  officered  by  Indians. 
In  looking  over  this  same  Navy  List  (of  1816)  it 
will  be  seen  that  but  a  little  over  5  per  cent,  of  the 

1  For  example,  James  writes  :  "  Out  of  the  32  captains  one  only, 
Thomas  Tingey,  has  England  marked  as  his  birthplace.  .  .  . 
Three  blanks  occur,  and  we  consider  it  rather  creditable  to  Captains 
John  Shaw,  Daniel  S.  Patterson,  and  John  Ord  Creighton,  that  they 
were  ashamed  to  tell  where  they  were  born."  I  have  not  been  able 
to  find  out  the  latter's  birth-place  ,  but  Captain  Shaw  was  born  in 
New  York,  and  I  have  seen  Captain  Patterson  incidentally  alluded  to 
as  "born  and  bred  in  America."  Generally,  whenever  I  have  been 
able  to  fill  up  the  vacancies  in  the  column  "  Where  Born,"  I  have 
found  that  it  was  in  America.  From  these  facts  it  would  appear 
that  James  was  somewhat  hasty  in  concluding  that  the  omission  of 
the  birth-place  proved  the  owner  of  the  name  to  be  a  native  of  Great 
Britain. 


38  NAVAL   WAR    OF    l8l2. 

officers  were  born  abroad — a  smaller  proportion  by 
far  than  would  exist  in  the  population  of  the  coun 
try  at  large — and  most  of  these  had  come  to  Amer 
ica  when  under  ten  years  of  age.  On  p.  155  James 
adds  that  the  British  sailors  composed  "  one  third 
in  number  and  one  half  in  point  of  effectiveness"  of 
the  American  crews.  Brenton  in  his  "  Naval  His 
tory  "  writes  :  "  It  was  said,  and  I  have  no  reason  to 
doubt  the  fact,  that  there  were  200  British  seamen 
aboard  the  Constitution.1  These  statements  are 
mere  assertions,  unsupported  by  proof,  and  of  such 
a  loose  character  as  to  be  difficult  to  refute.  As  our 
navy  was  small,  it  may  be  best  to  take  each  ship  in 
turn.  The  only  ones  of  which  the  British  could 
write  authoritatively  were,  of  course,  those  which 
they  captured.  The  first  one  taken  was  the 
Wasp.  James  says  many  British  were  discovered 
among  her  crew,  instancing  especially  one  sailor 
named  Jack  Lang;  now  Jack  Lang  was  born  in  the 
town  of  Brunswick,  New  Jersey,  but  had  been  im 
pressed  and  forced  to  serve  in  the  British  Navy.  The 
same  was  doubtless  true  of  the  rest  of  the  "  many 
British  "  seamen  of  her  crew ;  at  any  rate,  as  the 
only  instance  James  mentions  (Jack  Lang)  was  an 
American,  he  can  hardly  be  trusted  for  those  whom 
he  does  not  name. 

Of  the  95  men  composing  the  crew  of  the  Nauti 
lus  when  she  was  captured,  "  6  were  detained  and 
sent  to  England  to  await  examination  as  being  sus 
pected  of  being  British  subjects."  2  Of  the  other 

1  New  edition,  London,  1837,  vol.  ii,  p.  456. 

2  Quoted  from   letter  of   Commodore   Rodgers  of   September   12, 
1812    (in  Naval   Archives,    "Captains'   Letters,"   vol  xxv,    No.  43), 
enclosing  a   "  List  of  American   prisoners  of  war  discharged  out   of 
custody  of  Lieutenant  William  Miller,  agent  at  the  port  of  Halifax." 
in  exchange  for  some  of  the   British  captured   by  Porter.     This  list, 


NAVAL   WAR    OF    l8l2. 


39 


small  brigs,  the  Viper,  Vixen,  Rattlesnake,  and 
Syren,  James  does  not  mention  the  composition  of 
the  crew,  and  I  do  not  know  that  any  were  claimed 
as  British.  Of  the  crew  of  the  Argus  "  about  10 
or  12  were  believed  to  be  British  subjects;  the 
American  officers  swore  the  crew  contained  none" 
(James,  "  Naval  Occurrences,"  p.  278).  From  o  to 
10  per  cent,  can  be  allowed.  When  the  Frolic 
was  captured  "  her  crew  consisted  of  native  Ameri 
cans  "  (do.  p.  340).  James  speaks  ("  History,"  p.  418) 
of  "  a  portion  of  the  British  subjects  on  board  the 
Essex,"  but  without  giving  a  word  of  proof  or  stat 
ing  his  grounds  of  belief.  One  man  was  claimed 
as  a  deserter  by  the  British,  but  he  turned  out  to  be 
a  New  Yorker.  There  were  certainly  a  certain  num 
ber  of  British  aboard,  but  the  number  probably  did 
not  exceed  thirty.  Of  the  President's  crew  he 
says  ("  Naval  Occurrences,"  p.  448):  "In  the  opinion 
of  several  British  officers  there  were  among  them 
many  British  seamen  "  ;  but  Commodore  Decatur, 
Lieutenant  Gallagher,  and  the  other  officers  swore 
that  there  were  none.  Of  the  crew  of  the  Chesa 
peake,  he  says,  "about  32"  were  British  subjects, 
or  about  10  per  cent.  One  or  two  of  these  were 
afterward  shot,  and  some  25,  together  with  a  Portu 
guese  boatswain's  mate,  entered  into  the  British 
service.  So  that  of  the  vessels  captured  by  the 
British,  the  Chesapeake  had  the  largest  number  of 
British  (about  10  per  cent,  of  her  crew)  on  board, 
the  others  ranging  from  that  number  down  to  none 
at  all,  as  in  the  case  of  the  Wasp. 

by  the  way,  shows  the  crew  of  the  Nautilus  (counting  the  six  men 
detained  as  British)  to  have  been  95  in  number,  instead  of  106,  as 
stated  by  James.  Commodore  Rodgers  adds  that  he  has  detained  12 
men  of  the  Gnerrieres  crew  as  an  offset  to  the  6  men  belonging  to  the 
Nautilus. 


40  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

As  these  eleven  ships  would  probably  represent  a 
fair  average,  this  proportion,  of  from  o  to  10  per  cent., 
should  be  taken  as  the  proper  one.  James,  however, 
is  of  the  opinion  that  those  ships  manned  by  Ameri 
cans  were  more  apt  to  be  captured  than  those  manned 
by  the  braver  British  ;  which  calls  for  an  examination 
of  the  crews  of  the  remaining  vessels.  Of  the 
American  sloop  Peacock,  James  says  ("  Naval  Oc 
currences,"  p.  348)  that  "  several  of  her  men  were 
recognized  as  British  seamen  "  ;  even  if  this  were 
true,  "  several  "  could  not  probably  mean  more  than 
sixteen,  or  10  per  cent.  Of  the  second  Wasp  he 
says,  "  Captain  Blakely  was  a  native  of  Dublin,  and, 
along  with  some  English  and  Scotch,  did  not,  it 
may  be  certain,  neglect  to  have  in  his  crew  a  great 
many  Irish."  Now  Captain  Blakely  left  Ireland 
when  he  was  but  16  months  old,  and  the  rest 
of  James'  statement  is  avowedly  mere  conjecture. 
It  was  asserted  positively  in  the  American  news 
papers  that  the  Wasp,  which  sailed  from  Ports 
mouth,  was  manned  exclusively  by  New  Englanders, 
except  a  small  draft  of  men  from  a  Baltimore  priva 
teer,  and  that  there  was  not  a  foreigner  in  her  crew, 
Of  the  Hornet  James  states  that  "  some  of  her 
men  were  natives  of  the  United  Kingdom  "  ;  but  he 
gives  no  authority,  and  the  men  he  refers  to  were  in 
all  probability  those  spoken  of  in  the  journal  of  one 
of  the  Hornet's  officers,  which  says  that  "  many  of 
our  men  (Americans)  had  been  impressed  in  the  Brit 
ish  service."  As  regards  the  gun-boats,  James  asserts 
that  they  were  commanded  by  "Commodore  Joshua 
Barney,  a  native  of  Ireland."  This  officer,  how 
ever,  was  born  at  Baltimore  on  July  6,  1759.  As  to 
the  Constitution,  Brenton,  as  already  mentioned, 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  4! 

supposes  the  number  of  British  sailors  in  her  crew  to 
have  been  200;  James  makes  it  less,  or  about  150. 
Respecting  this,  the  only  definite  statements  I  can 
find  in  British  works  are  the  following:  In  the  "Naval 
Chronicle,"  vol.  xxix,  p.  452,  an  officer  of  the  Java 
states  that  most  of  the  Constitution  s  men  were  Brit 
ish,  many  being  from  the  Guerriere  ;  which  should 
be  read  in  connection  with  James'  statement  (vol.  vi, 
p.  156)  that  but  eight  of  the  Guerriere  s  crew  de 
serted,  and  but  two  shipped  on  board  the  Constitu 
tion.  Moreover,  as;  a  matter  of  fact,  these  eight  men 
were  all  impressed  Americans.  In  the  "  Naval  Chron 
icle  "  it  is  also  said  that  the  Chesapeake  s  surgeon  was 
an  Irishman,  formerly  of  the  British  navy;  he  was 
born  in  Baltimore,  and  was  never  in  the  British  navy 
in  his  life.  The  third  lieutenant  "  was  supposed  to 
be  an  Irishman  "  (Brenton,  ii,  456).  The  first  lieu 
tenant  "  was  a  native  of  Great  Britain,  we  have  been 
informed"  (James,  vi,  194);  he  was  Mr.  George 
Parker,  born  and  bred  in  Virginia.  The  remaining 
three  citations,  if  true,  prove  nothing.  "One  man 
had  served  under  Mr.  Kent  "  of  the  Guerriere 
(James,  vi,  p.  153).  "  One  had  been  in  the  Achille  " 
and  "one  in  the  Eurydice"  (Brenton,  ii,  456). 
These  three  men  were  most  probably  American  sea 
men  who  had  been  impressed  on  British  ships. 
From  Cooper  (in  "  Putnam's  Magazine,"  vol.  i,  p.  593) 
as  well  as  from  several  places  in  the  Constitution  s 
log,1  we  learn  that  those  of  the  crew  who  were  Brit- 

1  See  her  log-book  (vol.  ii,  Feb.  i,  1812  to  Dec.  13,  1813);  especially 
on  July  1 2th,  when  twelve  men  were  discharged.  In  some  of  Hull's 
lette.s  he  alludes  to  the  desire  of  the  British  part  of  the  crew  to  serve 
on  the  gun-boats  or  in  the  ports  ;  and  then  writes  that  ' '  in  accordance 
with  the  instructions  sent  him  by  che  Secretary  of  the  Navy"  he  had 
allowed  the  British-born  portion  to  leave  the  ship.  The  log-books 
are  in  the  Bureau  of  Navigation. 


42  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

ish  deserters  were  discharged  from  the  Constitu 
tion  before  she  left  port,  as  they  were  afraid  to 
serve  in  a  war  against  Great  Britain.  That  this 
fear  was  justifiable  may  be  seen  by  reading  James, 
vol.  iv,  p.  483.  Of  the  four  men  taken  by  the 
Leopard  from  the  Chesapeake,  as  deserters,  one 
was  hung  and  three  scourged,  in  reality  the  crew 
of  the  Constitution  probably  did  not  contain  a 
dozen  British  sailors;  in  her  last  cruises  she  was 
manned  almost  exclusively  by  New  Englanders. 
The  only  remaining  vessel  is  the  United  States, 
respecting  whose  crew  some  remarkable  statements 
have  been  made.  Marshall  (vol.  ii,  p.  1019)  writes 
that  Commodore  Decatur  "  declared  there  was  not  a 
seaman  in  his  ship  who  had  not  served  from  5  to  12 
years  in  a  British  man-of-war,"  from  which  he  con 
cludes  that  they  were  British  themselves.  It  may 
be  questioned  whether  Decatur  ever  made  such  an 
assertion  ;  or  if  he  did,  it  is  safe  to  assume  again 
that  his  men  were  long-impressed  Americans.1 

1  At  the  beginning  of  the  war  there  were  on  record  in  the  American 
State  Department  6,257  cases  of  impressed  American  seamen. 
These  could  represent  but  a  small  part  of  the  whole,  which  must 
have  amounted  to  20,000  men,  or  more  than  sufficient  to  man  our 
•entire  navy  five  times  over.  According  to  the  British  Admiralty 
Report  to  the  House  of  Commons,  February  I,  1815,  2,548  impressed 
American  seamen,  who  refused  to  serve  against  their  country,  were 
imprisoned  in  1812.  According  to  Lord  Castlereagh's  speech  in  the 
House,  February  18,  1813,  3,300  men  claiming  to  be  American  sub 
jects  were  serving  in  the  British  navy  in  January,  1811,  and  he 
certainly  did  not  give  any  thing  like  the  whole  number.  In  the 
American  service  the  term  of  enlistment  extended  for  two  years,  and 
the  frigate,  United  States,  referred  to,  had  not  had  her  crew  for  any 
very  great  length  of  time  as  yet.  If  such  a  crew  were  selected  at 
random  from  American  sailors,  among  them  there  would  be,  owing  to 
the  small  number  serving  in  our  own  navy  and  the  enormous  number 
impressed  into  the  British  navy,  probably  but  one  of  the  former  to 
two  of  the  latter.  As  already  mentioned  the  American  always  left  a 
British  man-of-war  as  soon  as  he  could,  by  desertion  or  discharge  ; 
but  he  had  no  unwillingness  to  serve  in  the  home  navy,  where  the  pay 
was  larger,  and  the  discipline  far  more  humane,  not  to  speak  of  mo- 


NAVAL    WAR    OF    l8l2.  43 

Of  the  Carolina  s  crew  of  70  men,  five  were 
British.  This  fact  was  not  found  out  till  three 
deserted,  when  an  investigation  was  made  and  the 
two  other  British  discharged.  Captain  Henly,  in 
reporting  these  facts,  made  no  concealment  of  his 
surprise  that  there  should  be  any  British  at  all  in 
his  crew.1 

From  these  facts  and  citations  we  may  according 
ly  conclude  that  the  proportion  of  British  seamen 
serving  on  American  ships  after  the  war  broke  out, 
varied  between  none,  as  on  the  Wasp  and  Consti 
tution,  to  ten  per  cent.,  as  on  the  Chesapeake  and 
Essex.  On  the  average,  nine  tenths  of  each  of  our 
crews  were  American  seamen,  and  about  one  twen 
tieth  British,  the  remainder  being  a  mixture  of 
various  nationalities. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  is  to  be  said  that  the  British 
frigate  Guerriere  had  ten  Americans  among  her 
crew,  who  were  permitted  to  go  below  during  ac 
tion,  and  the  Macedonian  eight,  who  were  not  al 
lowed  that  privilege,  three  of  them  being  killed. 
Three  of  the  British  sloop  Peacock's  men  were 
Americans,  who  were  forced  to  fight  against  the 
Hornet ;  one  of  them  was  killed.  Two  of  the  Eper- 
viers  men  were  Americans,  who  were  also  forced  to 
fight.  When  the  crew  of  the  Nautilus  was  ex- 
changed,  a  number  of  other  American  prisoners 
were  sent  with  them  ;  among  these  were  a  number 
of  American  seamen  who  had  been  serving  in  the 
Shannon,  Acasta,  Africa,  and  various  other  vessels. 

lives  of  patriotism.  Even  if  the  ex-British  man-of-war's  man  kept 
out  of  service  for  some  time,  he  would  be  very  apt  to  enlist  when  a 
war  broke  out,  which  his  country  undertook  largely  to  avenge  his  own 
wrongs. 

'See  his  letter  in  "  Letters  of  Masters'  Commandant,"  1814,  I, 
No.  116. 


44  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

So  there  was  also  a  certain  proportion  of  Americans 
among  the  British  crews,  although  forming  a  smaller 
percentage  of  them  than  the  British  did  on  board 
the  American  ships.  In  neither  case  was  the  num 
ber  sufficient  to  at  all  affect  the  result. 

The  crews  of  our  ships  being  thus  mainly  native 
Americans,  it  may  be  interesting  to  try  to  find  out 
the  proportions  that  were  furnished  by  the  different 
sections  of  the  country.  There  is  not  much  diffi 
culty  about  the  officers.  The  captains,  masters 
commandant,  lieutenants,  marine  officers,  whose 
birthplaces  are  given  in  the  Navy  List  of  1816, — 
240  in  all, — came  from  the  various  States  as  fol 
lows: 

fN.  H.,       5 
New  England 


J  Mass., 
]  R.  I, 

^Conn., 


fN.  Y,  17 

Middle  States-!  pejn'  22 

[D™''  34 

District  of  Columbia  {D.  C., 

fMd,  46 

Va,  42 

I  N.  C.,  4 

Southern  States-!  S.  C.,  16 

Ga.,  2  I 

La.,  4  I 

Ky.,  2) 

Total  of  given  birthplaces         .          .    240 

Thus,   Maryland   furnished,   both   absolutely  and 
proportionately,  the  greatest  number  of  officers,  Vir- 


NAVAL    WAR    OF    1 8 12.  45 

ginia,  then  the  most  populous  of  all  the  States,  com 
ing  next ;  four  fifths  of  the  remainder  came  from  the 
Northern  States. 

It  is  more  difficult  to  get  at  the  birthplaces  of 
the  sailors.  Something  can  be  inferred  from  the 
number  of  privateers  and  letters  of  marque  fitted  out. 
Here  Baltimore  again  headed  the  list ;  following 
closely  came  New  York,  Philadelphia,  and  the  New 
England  coast  towns,  with,  alone  among  the  South 
ern  ports,  Charleston,  S.  C.  A  more  accurate  idea 
of  the  quotas  of  sailors  furnished  by  the  different 
sections  can  be  arrived  at  by  comparing  the  total 
amount  of  tonnage  the  country  possessed  at  the  out 
break  of  the  war.  Speaking  roughly,  44  per  cent,  of 
it  belonged  to  New  England,  32  per  cent,  to  the 
Middle  States,  and  u  per  cent,  to  Maryland.  This 
makes  it  probable  (but  of  course  not  certain) 
that  three  fourths  of  the  common  sailors  hailed 
from  the  Northern  States,  half  the  remainder  from 
Maryland,  and  the  rest  chiefly  from  Virginia  and 
South  Carolina. 

Having  thus  discussed  somewhat  at  length  the 
character  of  our  officers  and  crews,  it  will  now  be 
necessary  to  present  some  statistical  tables  to  give 
a  more  accurate  idea  of  the  composition  of  the 
navy;  the  tonnage,  complements,  and  armaments  of 
the  ships,  etc. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  war  the  Government  pos 
sessed  six  navy  yards  (all  but  the  last  established 
in  1801)  as  follows:  ' 

1  Report  of  Naval  Secretary  Jones,  Nov.  30,  1814. 


46  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

Minimum  numbei 
Place.  Original  cost.        of  men  employed. 

1.  Portsmouth,  N.  H.,  $  5, 500  10 

2.  Charleston,  Mass.,  39,214  20 

3.  New  York,  40,000  102 

4.  Philadelphia,  37,°oo  13 

5.  Washington,  4,000  36 

6.  Gosport,  12,000  16 

In  1812  the  following  was  the  number  of  officers 
in  the  navy  :  * 

12  captains 

10  masters  commandant 
73  lieutenants 
53  masters 
310  midshipmen 
42  marine  officers 


500 


At  the  opening  of  the  year,  the  number  of  sea 
men,  ordinary  seamen,  and  boys  in  service  was 
4,010,  and  enough  more  were  recruited  to  increase  it 
to  5,230,  of  whom  only  2,346  were  destined  for  the 
cruising  war  vessels,  the  remainder  being  detailed 
for  forts,  gun-boats,  navy  yards,  the  lakes,  etc.2  The 
marine  corps  was  already  ample,  consisting  of  i,523 
men.3 

No  regular  navy  lists  were  published  till  1816, 
and  I  have  been  able  to  get  very  little  information 
respecting  the  increase  in  officers  and  men  during 

1  "  List  of  Vessels,"  etc.,  by  Geo.  H.  Preble,  U.  S.  N.  (1874). 

2  Report  of  Secretary  Paul  Hamilton,  Feb.  21,  1812. 

3  Ibid. 


NAVAL    WAR    OF    l8l2.  47 

1813  and   1814;    but  we  have  full  returns  for   1815, 
which  may  be  summarized  as  follows  :' 

30  captains, 

25  masters  commandant, 
141   lieutenants, 
24  commanders, 
510  midshipmen, 
230  sailing-masters, 
50  surgeons, 
12  chaplains, 
50  pursers, 
10  coast  pilots, 
45   captain's  clerks, 
80  surgeon's  mates, 

530  boatswains,  gunners,  carpenters,  and  sail- 
makers, 

268  boatswain's  mates,  gunner's  mates,  etc., 
1,106  quarter  gunners,  etc., 
5,000  able  seamen, 
6,849  ordinary  seamen  and  boys. 

Making  a  total  of  14,960,  with  2,715  marines.3 

Comparing  this  list  with  the  figures  given  before, 
it  can  be  seen  that  during  the  course  of  the  war  our 
navy  grew  enormously,  increasing  to  between  three 
and  four  times  its  original  size. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  year  1812,  the  navy  of 
the  United  States  on  the  ocean  consisted  of  the  fol 
lowing  vessels,  which  either  were,  or  could  have 
been,  made  available  during  the  war.3 

1  Seybert's  "Statistical  Annals,"  p.  676  (Philadelphia,  1818). 

u  Report  of  Secretary  B.  W.  Crowninshield,  April  18,  1816. 

s  Letter  of  Secretary  Benjamin  Stoddart  to  Fifth  Congress,  Dec. 
24,  1798  ;  Letter  of  Secretary  Paul  Hamilton,  Feb.  21,  1812  ;  "  Amer 
ican  State  Papers,"  vol.  xix,  p.  149.  See  also  The  "  History  of  the 
Navy  of  the  United  States,"  by  Lieut.  G.  E.  Emmons,  U.  S.  N. 
(published  in  Washington,  MDCCCLiil,  under  the  authority  of  the 
Navy  Department.) 


48 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 


Where   Built.         When 


Ton 
nage. 


Cost. 


Philadelphia, 

1797 

1576 

$299,336 

Boston, 

1797 

1576 

302,718 

New  York, 

1800 

1576 

220,910 

Baltimore, 

1797 

1265 

314,212 

Portsmouth, 

1799 

1268 

197,246 

Norfolk, 

1799 

1244 

220,677 

Salem, 

1799 

860 

139,362 

New  York, 

1799 

560 

76,622 

Baltimore, 

1805 

480 

52,603 

Washington, 

1806 

45° 

40,000 

Boston, 

1803 

298 

37,428 

Philadelphia, 

1803 

250 

32,521 

Baltimore, 

1803 

185 

18,763 

Baltimore, 

1803 

185 

20,872 

Baltimore, 

1799 

165 

16,240 

Purchased, 

1810 

148 

<£!£>. 


44    United  States, 
44  Constitution, 
44  President, 
38  Constellation, 
38  Congress, 
38  Chesapeake, 
32  Essex, 
28  Adams, 
1  8  Hornet, 
1  8    Wasp, 
1  6  Argus, 
1  6  Syren, 
14  Nautilus, 
14    Vixen, 
1  2  Enterprise, 
1  2    Viper, 


There  also  appeared  on  the  lists  the  New  York, 
36,  Boston,  28,  and  John  Adams,  28.  The  two 
former  were  condemned  hulks  ;  the  latter  was  en 
tirely  rebuilt  after  the  war.  The  Hornet  was  origi 
nally  a  brig  of  440  tons,  and  18  guns  ;  having  been 
transformed  into  a  ship,  she  was  pierced  for  20 
guns,  and  in  size  was  of  an  intermediate  grade 
between  the  Wasp  and  the  heavy  sloops,  built 
somewhat  later,  of  509  tons.  Her  armament  con 
sisted  of  32-pound  carronades,  with  the  exception 
of  the  two  bow-guns,  which  were  long  I2*s.  The 
whole  broadside  was  in  nominal  weight  just  300 
pounds  ;  in  actual  weight  about  277  pounds.  Her 
complement  of  men  was  140,  but  during  the  war 
she  generally  left  port  with  150.'  The  Wasp  had 

1  In  the  Hornet' s  log  of  Oct.  25,  1812,  while  in  port,  it  is  men 
tioned  that  she  had  158  men  ;  four  men  who  were  sick  were  left  be- 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  49 

been  a  ship  from  the  beginning,  mounted  the 
number  of  guns  she  rated  (of  the  same  calibres  as 
the  Hornet ' s]  and  carried  some  ten  men  less.  She 
was  about  the  same  length  as  the  British  i8-gun 
brig-sloop,  but,  being  narrower,  measured  nearly  30 
tons  less.  The  Argus  and  Syren  were  similar  and 
very  fine  brigs,  the  former  being  the  longer.  Each 
carried  two  more  guns  than  she  rated ;  and  the 
Argus,  in  addition,  had  a  couple  thrust  through 
the  bridle-ports.  The  guns  were  24-pound  carron- 
ades,  with  two  long  I2's  for  bow-chasers.  The 
proper  complement  of  men  was  100,  but  each  sailed 
usually  with  about  125.  The  four  smaller  craft 
were  originally  schooners,  armed  with  the  same 
number  of  light  long  guns  as  they  rated,  and  carry 
ing  some  70  men  apiece  ;  but  they  had  been  very 
effectually  ruined  by  being  changed  into  brigs,  with 
crews  increased  to  a  hundred  men.  Each  was 
armed  with  1 8-pound  carronades,  carrying  two  more 
than  she  rated.  The  Enterprise,  in  fact,  mounted 
16  guns,  having  two  long  nines  thrust  through  the 
bridle-ports.  These  little  brigs  were  slow,  not  very 
seaworthy,  and  overcrowded  with  men  and  guns  ; 
they  all  fell  into  the  enemy's  hands  without  doing 
any  good  whatever,  with  the  single  exception  of 
the  Enterprise,  which  escaped  capture  by  sheer 
good  luck,  and  in  her  only  battle  happened  to  be 
pitted  against  one  of  the  corresponding  and  equally 
bad  class  of  British  gun-brigs.  The  Adams  after  sev 
eral  changes  of  form  finally  became  a  flush-decked 
corvette.  The  Essex  had  originally  mounted  twenty- 
six  long  I2*s  on  her  main-deck,  and  sixteen  24- 

hind  before  she  started.  (See,  in  the  Navy  Archives,  the  Log-book, 
Hornet,  Wasp,  and  Argus,  July  20,  1809,  to  Oct.  6,  1813.) 


50  NAVAL   WAR   OF    1 8 12. 

pound  carronades  on  her  spar-deck ;  but  official 
wisdom  changed  this,  giving  her  46  guns,  twenty- 
four  32-pound  carronades,  and  two  long  I2's  on  the 
main-deck,  and  sixteen  32-pound  carronades  with 
four  long  I2*s  on  the  spar-deck.  When  Captain 
Porter  had  command  of  her  he  was  deeply  sensible 
of  the  disadvantages  of  an  armament  which  put  him 
at  the  mercy  of  any  ordinary  antagonist  who  could 
choose  his  distance;  accordingly  he  petitioned  sev 
eral  times,  but  always  without  success,  to  have  his 
\>ng  I2's  returned  to  him. 

The  American  38*5  were  about  the  size  of  the 
British  frigates  of  the  same  rate,  and  armed  almost 
exactly  in  the  same  way,  each  having  28  long  i8's 
on  the  main-deck  and  20  32-pound  carronades  on 
the  spar-deck.  The  proper  complement  was  300 
men,  but  each  carried  from  40  to  80  more.1 

Our  three  44-gun  ships  were  the  finest  frigates 
then  afloat  (although  the  British  possessed  some  as 
heavy,  such  as  the  Egyptienne,  44).  They  were 
beautifully  modelled,  with  very  thick  scantling,  ex 
tremely  stout  masts,  and  heavy  cannon.  Each  car 
ried  on  her  main-deck  thirty  long  24*5,  and  on  her 

1  The  Chesapeake,  by  some  curious  mistake,  was  frequently  rated 
as  a  44,  and  this  drew  in  its  train  a  number  of  attendant  errors. 
When  she  was  captured,  James  says  that  in  one  of  her  lockers  was 
found  a  letter,  dated  in  February,  1811,  from  Robert  Smith,  the 
Secretary  of  War,  to  Captain  Evans,  at  Boston,  directing  him  to 
open  houses  of  rendezvous  for  manning  the  Chesapeake,  and  enu 
merating  her  crew  at  a  total  of  443.  Naturally  this  gave  British  histori 
ans  the  idea  that  such  was  the  ordinary  complement  of  our  38-gun 
frigates.  But  the  ordering  so  large  a  crew  was  merely  a  mistake,  as  may 
be  seen  by  a  letter  from  Captain  Bainbridge  to  the  Secretary  of  the 
Navy,  which  is  given  in  full  in  the  "  Captains'  Letters,"  vol.  xxv, 
No.  19  (Navy  Archives).  In  it  he  mentions  the  extraordinary 
number  of  men  ordered  for  the  Chesapeake,  saying,  "  There  is  a 
mistake  in  the  crew  ordered  for  the  Chesapeake,  as  it  equals  in  num 
ber  the  crews  of  our  44-gun  frigates,  whereas  the  Chesapeake  is 
of  the  class  of  the  Congress  and  Constellation" 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  51 

spar-deck  two  long  bow-chasers,  and  twenty  or 
twenty-two  carronades — 42-pounders  on  the  Presi 
dent  and  United  States,  32-pounders  on  the  Constitu 
tion.  Each  sailed  with  a  crew  of  about  450  men — 
50  in  excess  of  the  regular  complement.1 

It  may  be  as  well  to  mention  here  the  only  other 
class  of  vessels  that  we  employed  during  the  war. 
This  was  composed  of  the  ship-sloops  built  in  1813, 
which  got  to  sea  in  1814.  They  were  very  fine  ves 
sels,  measuring  509  tons  apiece,2  with  very  thick 
scantling  and  stout  masts  and  spars.  Each  carried 
twenty  32-pound  carronades  and  two  long  I2's 
with  a  crew  nominally  of  160  men,  but  with  usu 
ally  a  few  supernumeraries.3 

The  British  vessels  encountered  were  similiar,  but 
generally  inferior,  to  our  own.  The  only  24-pounder 
frigate  we  encountered  was  the  Endymion  of  about 
a  fifth  less  force  than  the  President.  Their  38-gun 
frigates  were  almost  exactly  like  ours,  but  with 
fewer  men  in  crew  as  a  rule.  They  were  three 

1  The  President  when  in  action  with  the  Endymion  had  450  men 
aboard,  as  sworn  by  Decatur  ;  the  muster-roll  of  the  Constitution,  a 
few  days  before  her  action  with  the  Guerriere  contains  464  names  (in 
cluding  51  marines)  ;  8  men  were  absent  in  a  prize,  so  she  had  aboard 
in  the  action  456.      Her  muster-roll  just  before  the  action  with  the 
Cyane  and  Levant  shows  461  names. 

2  The  dimensions  were  117  feet   II    inches  upon  the  gun-deck,  97 
feet  6  inches  keel  for  tonnage,  measuring   from  one  foot  before  the 
forward  perpendicular  and  along  the   base  line  to   the  front  of  the 
rabbet  of  the  port,  deducting  \  of  the  moulded  breadth  of  the  beam, 
which    is  31    feet    6    inches  ;     making   509^    tons.     (See   in    Navy 
Archives,  "  Contracts,"  vol.  ii,  p.    137.) 

3  The  Peacock  had    166  men,  as  we    learn  from  her   commander 
Warrington's,  letter  of  June  1st  (Letter  No.  140  in  ''  Masters'  Com 
mandant  Letters,"  1814,  vol.  i).     The  Frolic  took  aboard    "  10   or 
12  men  beyond  her  regular  complement  "  (see  letter  of  Joseph  Bain- 
bridge,  No.  51,  in  same  vol.).     Accordingly  when   she  was   captured 
by  the  Orpheus,  the  commander  of  the  latter,  Captain  Hugh  Pigot, 
reported  the  number  of  men  aboard  to  be  171.     The  Wasp  left  port 
with  173  men,  with   which   she  fought  her  first  action  ;  she  had  a 
much  smaller  number  aboard  in  her  second. 


52  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

times  matched  against  our  44-gun  frigates,  to  which 
they  were  inferior  about  as  three  is  to  four.  Their 
36-gun  frigates  were  larger  than  the  Essex,  with  a 
more  numerous  crew,  but  the  same  number  of 
guns  ;  carrying  on  the  lower  deck,  however,  long 
l8's  instead  of  32-pound  carronades, — a  much  more 
effective  armament.  The  32-gun  frigates  were 
smaller,  with  long  I2's  on  the  main-deck.  The 
largest  sloops  were  also  frigate-built,  carrying 
twenty-two  32-pound  carronades  on  the  main-deck, 
and  twelve  lighter  guns  on  the  quarter-deck  and 
forecastle,  with  a  crew  of  180.  The  large  flush- 
decked  ship-sloops  carried  21  or  23  guns,  with  a 
crew  of  140  men.  But  our  vessels  most  often 
came  in  contact  with  the  British  i8-gun  brig-sloop; 
this  was  a  tubby  craft,  heavier  than  any  of  our 
brigs,  being  about  the  size  of  the  Hornet.  The 
crew  consisted  of  from  iioto  135  men;  ordinarily 
each  was  armed  with  sixteen  32-pound  carronades, 
two  long  6's,  and  a  shifting  12-pound  carronade ; 
often  with  a  light  long  gun  as  a  stern-chaser,  mak 
ing  20  in  all.  The  Reindeer  and  Peacock  had  only 
24-pound  carronades ;  the  Epervier  had  but  eighteen 
guns,  all  carronades.1 

Among  the  stock  accusations  against  our  navy  of 
1812,  were,  and  are,  statements  that  our  vessels 
were  rated  at  less  than  their  real  force,  and  in  par 
ticular  that  our  large  frigates  were  "  disguised  line- 
of-battle  ships/'  As  regards  the  ratings,  most  ves 
sels  of  that  time  carried  more  guns  than  they  rated  ; 

1  The  Epervier  was  taken  into  our  service  under  the  same  name 
and  rate.  Both  Preble  and  Emmons  describe  her  as  of  477  tons. 
Warrington,  her  captor,  however,  says  :  "  The  surveyor  of  the  port 
has  just  measured  the  Epervier  and  reports  her  467  tons."  (In  the 
Navy  Archives,  "  Masters'  Commandant  Letters,"  1814,  i,  No.  F25.) 

For  a  full  discussion  of  tonnage,  see  Appendix,  A. 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  53 

the  disparity  was  less  in  the  French  than  in  either 
the  British  or  American  navies.  Our  38-gun  frigates 
carried  48  guns,  the  exact  number  the  British  38*5 
possessed.  The  worst  case  of  underrating  in  our 
navy  was  the  Essex,  which  rated  32,  and  carried 
46  guns,  so  that  her  real  was  44  per  cent,  in  excess 
of  her  nominal  force ;  but  this  was  not  as  bad  as  the 
British  sloop  Cyane,  which  was  rated  a  2O  or  22, 
and  carried  34  guns,  so  that  she  had  either  55  or  70 
per  cent,  greater  real  than  nominal  force.  At  the 
beginning  of  the  war  we  owned  two  i8-gun  ship- 
sloops,  one  mounting  18  and  the  other  20  guns; 
the  i8-gun  brig-sloops  they  captured  mounted  each 
19  guns,  so  the  average  was  the  same.  Later 
we  built  sloops  that  rated  1 8  and  mounted  22  guns, 
but  when  one  was  captured  it  was  also  put  down  in 
the  British  navy  list  as  an  i8-gun  ship-sloop.  Dur 
ing  all  the  combats  of  the  war  there  were  but  four 
vessels  that  carried  as  few  guns  as  they  rated.  Two 
were  British,  the  Epervier  and  Levant,  and  two 
American,  the  Wasp  and  Adams.  One  navy  was  cer 
tainly  as  deceptive  as  another,  as  far  as  underrating 
went. 

The  force  of  the  statement  that  our  large  frigates 
were  disguised  line-of-battle  ships,  of  course  depends 
entirely  upon  what  the  words  "  frigate  "  and  "  line-of- 
battle  ship"  mean.  When  on  the  roth  of  August, 
1653,  De  Ruyter  saved  a  great  convoy  by  beating 
off  Sir  George  Ayscough's  fleet  of  38  sail,  the  largest 
of  the  Dutch  admiral's  "  33  sail  of  the  line  "  carried 
but  30  guns  and  150  men,  and  his  own  flag-ship  but 
28  guns  and  134  men.1  The  Dutch  book  from 

"•La  Vie  et  les  Actions  Memorables  du_Sr.  Michel  de  Ruyter,  4 
Amsterdam,  Chez  Henry  et  Theodore  Boom,  MDCLXXVII.  The  work 
is  by  Barthelemy  Pielat,  a  surgeon  in  de  Ruyter's  fleet,  and  personally 


54 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 


which  this  statement  is  taken  speaks  indifferently  of 
frigates  of  18,  40,  and  58  guns.  Toward  the  end  of 
the  eighteenth  century  the  terms  had  crystallized. 
Frigate  then  meant  a  so-called  single-decked  ship ; 
it  in  reality  possessed  two  decks,  the  main-  or  gun- 
deck,  and  the  upper  one,  which  had  no  name  at  all, 
until  our. sailors  christened  it  spar-deck.  The  gun- 
deck  possessed  a  complete  battery,  and  the  spar- 
deck  an  interrupted  one,  mounting  guns  on  the 
forecastle  and  quarter-deck.  At  that  time  all  "  two- 
decked  "  or  "  three-decked "  (in  reality  three-  and 
four-decked)  ships  were  liners.  But  in  1812  this  had 
changed  somewhat  ;  as  the  various  nations  built 
more  and  more  powerful  vessels,  the  lower  rates  of 
the  different  divisions  were  dropped.  Thus  the 
British  ship  Cyane,  captured  by  the  Constitution, 
was  in  reality  a  small  frigate,  with  a  main-deck 
battery  of  22  guns,  and  12  guns  on  the  spar- 
deck  ;  a  few  years  before  she  would  have  been 
called  a  24-gun  frigate,  but  she  then  ranked  merely 
as  a  22-gun  sloop.  Similarly  the  50-  and  64-gun 
ships  that  had  fought  in  the  line  at  the  Doggerbank, 
Camperdown,  and  even  at  Aboukir,  were  now  no 
longer  deemed  fit  for  that  purpose,  and  the  74  was 
the  lowest  line-of-battle  ship. 

The  Constitution,  President,  and  States  must  then 
be  compared  with  the  existing  European  vessels 
that  were  classed  as  frigates.  The  French  in  1812 
had  no  24-pounder  frigates,  for  the  very  good  rea 
son  that  they  had  all  fallen  victims  to  the  English 
i8-pounder's  ;  but  in  July  of  that  year  a  Danish  frig 
ate,  the  Nayaden,  which  carried  long  24*5,  was  de 
stroyed  by  the  English  ship  Dictator,  64. 

present  during  many  of  his  battles.  It  is  written  in  French,  but  is  in 
t  ne  more  strongly  anti-French  than  anti-English. 


NAVAL    WAR   OF    l8l2.  55 

The  British  frigates  were  of  several  rates.  The 
lowest  rated  32,  carrying  in  all  40  guns,  26  long  I2's 
on  the  main-deck  and  14  24-pound  carronades  on  the 
spar-deck — a  broadside  of  324  pounds.1  The  36-gun 
frigates,  like  the  Phccbe,  carried  46  guns,  26  long 
i8's  on  the  gun-deck  and  32-pound  carronades 
above.  The  38-gun  frigates,  like  the  Macedonian, 
carried  48  or  49  guns,  long  i8's  below  and  32-pound 
carronades  above.  The  32-gun  frigates,  then,  pre 
sented  in  broadside  13  long  I2's  below  and  7  24- 
pound  carronades  above  ;  the  38-gun  frigates,  14 
long  1 8's  below  and  10  32-pound  carronades  above;  so 
that  a  44-gun  frigate  would  naturally  present  I  5  long 
24*8  below  and  12  42-pound  carronades  above,  as  the 
United  States  did  at  first.  The  rate  was  perfectly 
proper,  for  French,  British,  and  Danes  already  pos 
sessed  24-pounder  frigates  ;  and  there  was  really  less 
disparity  between  the  force  and  rate  of  a  44  that  car 
ried  54  guns,  than  there  was  in  a  38  that  carried 
49,  or,  like  the  Shannon,  52.  Nor  was  this  all. 
Two  of  our  three  victories  were  won  by  the  Con 
stitution,  which  only  carried  32-pound  carronades, 
and  once  54  and  once  52  guns  ;  and  as  two  thirds  of 
the  work  was  thus  done  by  this  vessel,  I  shall  now 
compare  her  with  the  largest  British  frigates.  Her 
broadside  force  consisted  of  15  long  24*3  on  the  main- 
deck,  and  on  the  spar-deck  one  long  24,  and  in  one 
case  10,  in  the  other  11  32-pound  carronades — a 
broadside  of  704  or  736  pounds.2  There  was  then  in 
the  British  navy  the  Acasta,  40,  carrying  in  broad 
side  15  long  1 8's  and  u  32-pound  carronades;  when 

1  In  all  these  vessels  there  were  generally  two  long  6's  or  g's  sub 
stituted  for  the  bow-chase  carronades. 

*  Nominally  ;  in  reality  about  7  per  cent,  less  on  account  of  the 
short  weight  in  the  metal. 


56  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

the  spar-deck  batteries  are  equal,  the  addition  of  90 
pounds  to  the  main-deck  broadside  (which  is  all  the 
superiority  of  the  Constitution  over  the  Acastd] 
is  certainly  not  enough  to  make  the  distinction  be 
tween  a  frigate  and  a  disguised  74.  But  not  consid 
ering  the  Acasta,  there  were  in  the  British  navy 
three  24-pounder  frigates,  the  Cornwallis,  Inde 
fatigable,  and  Endymion.  We  only  came  in  con 
tact  with  the  latter  in  1815,  when  the  Constitu 
tion  had  but  52  guns.  The  Endymion  then  had 
an  armament  of  28  long  24*5,  2  long  i8's,  and 
20  32-pound  carronades,  making  a  broadside  of  674 
pounds,1  or  including  a  shifting  24-pound  carronade, 
of  698  pounds — just  six  pounds,  or  i  per  cent.,  less 
than  the  force  of  that  "  disguised  line-of-battle 
ship  "  the  Constitution !  As  the  Endymion  only 
rated  as  a  40,  and  the  Constitution  as  a  44, 
it  was  in  reality  the  former  and  not  the  latter 
which  was  underrated.  I  have  taken  the  Constitu 
tion,  because  the  British  had  more  to  do  with 
her  than  they  did  with  our  other  two  44*5 
taken  together.  The  latter  were  both  of  heavier 
metal  than  the  Constitution,  carrying  42-pound 
carronades.  In  1812  the  United  States  carried 
her  full  54  guns,  throwing  a  broadside  of  846  pounds  ; 
when  captured,  the  President  carried  53>  having 
substituted  a  24-pound  carronade  for  two  of  her  42*5, 
and  her  broadside  amounted  to  828  pounds,  or  16  per 
cent,  nominal,  and,  on  account  of  the  short  weight 
of  her  shot,  9  per  cent,  real  excess  over  the  Endym 
ion.  If  this  difference  made  her  a  line-of-bat 
tle  ship,  then  the  Endymion  was  doubly  a  line-of- 

1  According  to  James  664  pounds  :  he  omits  the  chase  guns  for  no 
reason. 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  57 

battle  ship  compared  to  the  Congress  or  Con 
stellation.  Moreover,  the  American  commanders 
found  their  42-pound  carronades  too  heavy  ;  as  I 
have  said  the  Constitution  only  mounted  32'$, 
and  the  United  States  landed  6  of  her  guns. 
When,  in  1813,  she  attempted  to  break  the  block 
ade,  she  carried  but  48  guns,  throwing  a  broadside 
of  720  pounds — just  3  per  cent,  more  than  the 
Endymion.1  If  our  frigates  were  line-of-battle 
ships  the  disguise  was  certainly  marvellously  com 
plete,  and  they  had  a  number  of  companions  equally- 
disguised  in  the  British  ranks. 

The  44's  were  thus  true  frigates,  with  one  com 
plete  battery  of  long  guns  and  one  interrupted  one 
of  carronades.  That  they  were  better  than  any 
other  frigates  was  highly  creditable  to  our  ingenuity 
and  national  skill.  We  cannot,  perhaps,  lay  claim 
to  the  invention  and  first  use  of  the  heavy  frigate, 
for  24-pounder  frigates  were  already  in  the  service 
of  at  least  three  nations,  and  the  French  36-pound 
carronnade,  in  use  on  their  spar-decks,  threw  a 
heavier  ball  than  our  42-pounder.  But  we  had  en 
larged  and  perfected  the  heavy  frigate,  and  were  the 
first  nation  that  ever  used  it  effectively.  The 
French  Forte  and  the  Danish  Nayaden  shared 
the  fate  of  ships  carrying  guns  of  lighter  calibre  ; 
and  the  British  24-pounders,  like  the  Endymion 
had  never  accomplished  any  thing.  Hitherto  there 

1  It  was  on  account  of  this  difference  of  3  per  cent,  that  Captain 
Hardy  refused  to  allow  the  Endymion  to  meet  the  States. 
(James,  vi,  p.  470).  This  was  during  the  course  of  some  challenges 
and  counter-challenges  which  ended  in  nothing,  Decatur  in  his  turn 
being  unwilling  to  have  the  Macedonian  meet  the  Stalira,  un 
less  the  latter  should  agree  not  to  take  on  a  picked  crew.  He  was 
perfectly  right  in  this  ;  but  he  ought  never  to  have  sent  the  challenge 
at  all,  as  two  ships  but  an  hour  or  two  out  of  port  would  be  at  a 
frightful  disadvantage  in  a  fight. 


58  NAVAL   WAR   OF    1812. 

had  been  a  strong  feeling,  especially  in  England, 
that  an  1 8-pound  gun  was  as  -effective  as  a  24-  in  arm 
ing  a  frigate  ;  we  made  a  complete  revolution  in  this 
respect.  England  had  been  building  only  18- 
pounder  vessels  when  she  ought  to  have  been  build 
ing  24-pounders.  It  was  greatly  to  our  credit  that 
our  average  frigate  was  superior  to  the  average  Brit 
ish  frigate  ;  exactly  as  it  was  to  our  discredit  that  the 
Essex  was  so  ineffectively  armed.  Captain  Por 
ter  owed  his  defeat  chiefly  to  his  ineffective  guns, 
but  also  to  having  lost  his  topmast,  to  the  weather 
being  unfavorable,  and,  still  more,  to  the  admirable 
skill  with  which  Hilyar  used  his  superior  armament. 
The  Java,  Macedonian,  and  Guerriere  owed 
their  defeat  partly  to  their  lighter  guns,  but  much 
more  to  the  fact  that  their  captains  and  seamen  did 
not  display  either  as  good  seamanship  or  as  good 
gunnery  as  their  foes.  Inferiority  in  armament  was 
a  factor  to  be  taken  into  account  in  all  the  four 
cases,  but  it  was  more  marked  in  that  of  the 
Essex  than  in  the  other  three ;  it  would  have 
been  fairer  for  Porter  to  say  that  he  had  been  cap 
tured  by  a  line-of-battle  ship,  than  for  the  captain 
of  the  Java  to  make  that  assertion.  In  this  last 
case  the  forces  of  the  two  ships  compared  almost 
•exactly  as  their  rates.  A  44  was  matched  against  a 
38;  it  was  not  surprising  that  she  should  win,  but 
it  was  surprising  that  she  should  win  with  ease  and 
impunity.  The  long  24*5  on  the  Constitution  s 
gun-deck  no  more  made  her  a  line-of-battle  ship  than 
the  32-pound  carronades  mounted  on  an  English 
frigate's  quarter-deck  and  forecastle  made  her  a  line- 
of-battle  ship  when  opposed  to  a  Frenchman  with 
only  8's  and  6's  on  his  spar-deck.  When,  a  few 


OF  THE 

UNIVERSITY 


NAVAL   WAR    OF    l8l2.  59 


ye^rs  before,  the  English  PJioebe  had  captured 
the  French  Nereide,  their  broadsides  were  re 
spectively  407  and  258  pounds,  a  greater  disparity 
than  in  any  of  our  successful  fights  ;  yet  no  author 
thought  of  claiming  that  the  PJioebe  was  any 
thing  but  a  frigate.  So  with  the  Clyde,  throwing 
425  Ibs.,  which  took  the  Vestale,  throwing  but 
246.  Tf\£  facts  were  that  i8-pounder  frigates  had 
captured  32-pounders,  exactly  as  our  24-pounders  in 
turn  captx\red  the  i8-pounders. 

Shortly  before  Great  Britain  declared  war  on  us, 
one  of  her  j8-pounder  frigates,  the  San  Florenzo, 
throwing  476  Ibs.  in  a  broadside,  captured  the  12- 
pounder  French  frigate  PsycJie",  whose  broadside 
was  only  246  Ibs.  The  force  of  the  former  was  thus 
almost  double  thxt  of  the  latten  yet  the  battle  was 
long  and  desperate,  the  English  losing  48  and  the 
French  124  muv  This  conflict,  then,  reflected  as 
much  credit  on  the  skill  and  seamanship  of  the 
defeated  as  of  the  victorious  side;  the  difference  in 
loss  could  fairly  be  ascribed  to  the  difference  in 
weight  of  metal.  But  where,  as  in  the  famous  ship- 
duels  of  1812,  th>s  difference  in  force  is  only  a  fifth, 
instead  of  a  half,  and  yet  the  slaughter,  instead  of 
being  as  five  is  to  two,  is  as  six  to  one,  then  the 
victory  is  certainly  to  be  ascribed  as  much  to 
superiority  in  skill  as  to  superiority  in  force.  But, 
on  the  other  hand,  it  should  always  be  remembered 
that  there  was  a  very  decided  superiority  in  force. 
It  is  a  very  discreditable  feature  of  many  of  our 
naval  histories  that  they  utterly  ignore  this  superi 
ority,  seeming  ashamed  to  confess  that  it  existed. 
In  reality  it  was  something  to  be  proud  of.  It  was 
highly  to  the  credit  of  the  United  States  that  her 


60  Is  AVAL    WAR    OF    1 8 12. 

frigates  were  of  better  make  and  armament  than  any 
others ;  it  always  speaks  well  for  a  nation's  energy 
and  capacity  that  any  of  her  implements  of  warfare 
are  of  superior  kind.  This  is  a  perfectly  legitimate 
reason  for  pride. 

It  spoke  well  for  the  Prussians  in  1866  that  they 
opposed  breech-loaders  to  the  muzzle-loaders  of  the 
Austrians ;  but  it  would  be  folly  to  give  all  the 
credit  of  the  victory  to  the  breech-loaders  and  none 
to  Moltke  and  his  lieutenants.  Thus,  it  must  be 
remembered  that  two  things  contributed  to  our 
victories.  One  was  the  excellent  make  and  arma 
ment  of  our  ships ;  the  other  was  the  skilful  sea 
manship,  excellent  discipline,  and  superb  gunnery 
of  the  men  who  were  in  them.  British  writers  are 
apt  only  to  speak  of  the  first,  and  Americans  only 
of  the  last,  whereas  both  should  be  taken  into  con 
sideration. 

To  sum  up :  the  American  44-gun  frigate  was  a 
true  frigate,  in  build  and  armament,  properly  rated, 
stronger  than  a  38-gun  frigate  just  about  in  the  pro 
portion  of  44  to  38,  and  not  exceeding  in  strength 
an  i8-pounder  frigate  as  much  as  the  latter  ex 
ceeded  one  carrying  12-pounders.  They  were  in  no 
way  whatever  line-of-battle  ships ;  but  they  were 
superior  to  any  other  frigates  afloat,  and,  what  is 
still  more  important,  they  were  better  manned  and 
commanded  than  the  average  frigate  of  any  other 
navy.  Lord  Codrington  says  ("  Memoirs,"  i,  p.  310) : 
"  But  I  well  know  the  system  of  favoritism  and 
borough  corruption  prevails  so  very  much  that 
many  people  are  promoted  and  kept  in  command 
that  should  be  dismissed  the  service,  and  while  such 
is  the  case  the  few  Americans  chosen  for  their 


NAVAL    WAR    OF    l8l2.  6 1 

merit  may  be  expected  to  follow  up  their  successes 
except  where  they  meet  with  our  best  officers  on 
even  terms."  1  The  small  size  of  our  navy  was 
probably  to  a  certain  extent  effective  in  keeping  it 
up  to  a  high  standard  ;  but  this  is  not  the  only 
explanation,  as  can  be  seen  by  Portugal's  small  and 
poor  navy.  On  the  other  hand,  the  champions  or 
pick  of  a  large  navy  ought  to  be  better  than  the 
champions  of  a  small  one.2 

1  To  show  that  I  an  not  quoting  an  authority  biassed  in  our  favor  I 
will  give  Sir  Edward   Codrington's  opinion  of  our  rural  better  class 
(i,  318).      "It  is  curious  to  observe  the  animosity  which  prevails  here 
among   what    is   called   the  better  order  of  people,  which  I  think  is 
more  a  misnomer  here   than  in  any  other  country  I  have  ever  been. 
Their  whig  and  tory  are  democrat  and  federalist,  and  it  would  seem 
for  the  sake  of  giving  vent  to  that  bitterness  of   hatred  which  marks 
the  Yankee    character,    every   gentleman   (God  save    the    term)  who 
takes  possession  of  a  property  adopts  the  opposite  political  creed  to 
that  of  his  nearest  neighbor." 

2  In  speaking  of  tonnage  I  wish  I  could  have  got  better  authority 
than  James  for  the  British  side  of  the  question.      He  is  so  bitter  that 
it  involuntarily  gives  one  a  distrust  of  his  judgment.   Thus,  in  speak 
ing  of  the  Penguin  s  capture,  he,  in   endeavoring  to  show  that   the 
Hornet's   loss  was  greater  than  she   acknowledged,    says,    "several 
of  the  dangerously  wounded  were  thrown  overboard  because  the  sur 
geon    was   afraid   to    amputate,    owing  to   his  want    of  experience" 
("  Naval  Occurrences,"  492).     Now  what  could  persuade  a  writer  to 
make  such  a  foolish  accusation  ?     No  matter  how  utterly  depraved  and 
brutal  Captain   Biddle  might  be,  he  would   certainly  not  throw  his 
wounded  over  alive  because  he  feared  they  might  die.     Again,  in  vol. 
vi,  p.  546,  he  says  :  ' '  Captain  Stewart  had  caused   the  Cyane  to  be 
painted  to  resemble    a  3&-gun  frigate.     The  object  of  this  was  to 
aggrandize  his  exploit  in  the  eyes  of  the  gaping  citizens  of  Boston." 
No  matter  how  skilful  an  artist   Captain  Stewart  was,  and  no  matter 
how   great    the   gaping    capacities    of    the    Bostonians,     the    Cyane 
(which  by  the  way  went  to  New  York  and  not  Boston)  could  no  more 
be  painted  to  look  like  a  36-gun   frigate  than  a  schooner  could  be 
painted  to  look  like  a  brig.     Instances  of  rancor  like  these  two  occur 
constantly  in  his  work,  and  make  it  very  difficult  to  separate  what  is 
matter  of  fact  from  what  is  matter  of  opinion.      I  always  rely  on  the 
British  official  accounts  when  they  can  be  reached,  except  in  the  case 
of  the  Java,  which  seem  garbled.       That  such  was  sometimes  the 
case  with  British  officials  is  testified  to  by  both  James  (vol.  iv,  p.  17) 
and  Brenton  (vol.  ii,  p.  454,  note).     From  the  "  Memoir  of  Admiral 
Broke "    we   learn    that  his  public   letter   was   wrong  in    a   number 
of  particulars.     See   also   any  one  of   the  numerous  biographies  of 
Lord    Dundonald,  the   hero  of  the    little    Speedy  s   fight.     It  is  very 


62  NAVAL    WAR   OF    l8l2. 

Again,  the  armaments  of  the  American  as  well  as 
of  the  British  ships  were  composed  of  three  very 
different  styles  of  guns.  The  first,  or  long  gun,  was 
enormously  long  and  thick-barrelled  in  comparison 
to  its  bore,  and  in  consequence  very  heavy  ;  it  pos 
sessed  a  very  long  range,  and  varied  in  calibre  from 
two  to  forty-two  pounds.  The  ordinary  calibres  in 
our  navy  were  6,  9,  12,  18,  and  24.  The  second 
style  was  the  carronade,  a  short,  light  gun  of  large 
bore  ;  compared  to  a  long  gun  of  the  same  weight 
it  carried  a  much  heavier  ball  for  a  much  shorter 
distance.  The  chief  calibres  were  9,  12,  18,  24,  32, 
42,  and  68-pounders,  the  first  and  the  last  being 
hardly  in  use  in  our  navy.  The  third  style  was  the 
columbiad,  of  an  intermediate  grade  between  the 
first  two.  Thus  it  is  seen  that  a  gun  of  one  style 
by  no  means  corresponds  to  a  gun  of  another  style 
of  the  same  calibre.  As  a  rough  example,  a  long 
12,  a  columbiad  18,  and  a  32-pound  carronade  would 
be  about  equivalent  to  one  another.  These  guns 
were  mounted  on  two  different  types  of  vessel. 
The  first  was  flush-decked  ;  that  is,  it  had  a  single 
straight  open  deck  on  which  all  the  guns  were 
mounted.  This  class  included  one  heavy  corvette, 
(the  Adams),  the  ship-sloops,  and  the  brig-sloops. 

unfortunate  that  the  British  stopped  publishing  official  accounts  of 
their  defeats  ;  it  could  not  well  help  giving  rise  to  unpleasant  sus 
picions. 

It  may  be  as  well  to  mention  here,  again,  that  James'  accusations 
do  not  really  detract  from  the  interest  attaching  to  the  war,  and  its 
value  for  purposes  of  study.  If,  as  he  says,  the  American  com 
manders  were  cowards,  and  their  crews  renegades,  it  is  well  worth 
while  to  learn  the  lesson  that  good  training  will  make  such  men  able 
to  beat  brave  officers  with  loyal  crews.  And  why  did  the  British 
have  such  bad  average  crews  as  he  makes  out  ?  He  says,  for  instance, 
that  the  Javas  was  unusually  bad  ;  yet  Brenton  says  (vol.  ii,  p. 
461)  it  was  like  "  the  generality  of  our  crews."  It  is  worth  while  ex 
plaining  the  reason  that  such  a  crew  was  generally  better  than  a 
French  and  worse  than  an  American  one. 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  63 

Through  the  bow-chase  port,  on  each  side,  each  of 
these  mounted  a  long  gun  ;  the  rest  of  their  guns 
were  carronades,  except  in  the  case  of  the  Adams, 
which  had  all  long  guns.  Above  these  came  the 
frigates,  whose  gun-deck  was  covered  above  by 
another  deck  ;  on  the  fore  and  aft  parts  (forecastle 
and  quarter-deck)  of  this  upper,  open  deck  were 
also  mounted  guns.  The  main-deck  guns  were  all 
long,  except  on  the  Essex,  which  had  carronades; 
on  the  quarter-deck  were  mounted  carronades,  and 
on  the  forecastle  also  carronades,  with  two  long; 
bow-chasers. 

Where  two  ships  of  similar  armament  fought  one 
another,  it  is  easy  to  get  the  comparative  force  by 
simply  comparing  the  weight  in  broadsides,  each 
side  presenting  very  nearly  the  same  proportion  of 
long  guns  to  carronades.  For  such  a  broadside  we 
take  half  the  guns  mounted  in  the  ordinary  way ; 
and  all  guns  mounted  on  pivots  or  shifting.  Thus 
Perry's  force  in  guns  was  54  to  Barclay's  63  ;  yet 
each  presented  34  in  broadside.  Again,  each  of  the 
British  brig-sloops  mounted  19  guns,  presenting  10 
in  broadside.  Besides  these,  some  ships  mounted 
bow-chasers  run  through  the  bridle-ports,  or  stern- 
chasers,  neither  of  which  could  be  used  in  broad 
sides.  Nevertheless,  I  include  them, both  because  it 
works  in  about  an  equal  number  of  cases  against 
each  navy,  and  because  they  were  sometimes  ter 
ribly  effective.  James  excludes  the  Guerriercs. 
bow-chaser;  in  reality  he  ought  to  have  included 
both  it  and  its  fellow,  as  they  worked  more  damage 
than  all  the  broadside  guns  put  together.  Again, 
he  excludes  the  Endymiori s  bow-chasers,  though 
in  her  action  they  proved  invaluable.  Yet  he  in- 


64  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

eludes  those  of  the  Enterprise  and  Argus,  though 
the  former's  were  probably  not  fired.  So  I  shall 
take  the  half  of  the  fixed,  plus  all  the  movable  guns 
aboard,  in  comparing  broadside  force. 

But  the  chief  difficulty  appears  when  guns  of  one 
style  are  matched  against  those  of  another.  If  a 
a  ship  armed  with  long  I2's,  meets  one  armed  with 
32-pound  carronades,  which  is  superior  in  force?  At 
long  range  the  first,  and  at  short  range  the  second ; 
and  of  course  each  captain  is  pretty  sure  to  insist 
that  "  circumstances  "  forced  him  to  fight  at  a  dis 
advantage.  The  result  would  depend  largely  on 
the  skill  or  luck  of  each  commander  in  choosing 
position. 

One  thing  is  certain  ;  long  guns  are  more  formid 
able  than  carronades  of  the  same  calibre.  There  are 
exemplifications  of  this  rule  on  both  sides  ;  of  course, 
American  writers,  as  a  rule,  only  pay  attention  to 
one  set  of  cases,  and  British  to  the  others.  The 
Cyane  and  Levant  threw  a  heavier  broadside  than 
the  Constitution  but  were  certainly  less  formidably 
armed  ;  and  \\\z  Essex  threw  a  heavier  broadside  than 
the  Phoebe,  yet  was  also  less  formidable.  On  Lake 
Ontario  the  American  ship  General  Pike  threw  less 
metal  at  a  broadside  than  either  of  her  two  chief 
.antagonists,  but  neither  could  be  called  her  equal ; 
while  on  Lake  Champlain  a  parallel  case  is  afforded 
by  the  British  ship  Confiance.  Supposing  that  two 
ships  throw  the  same  broadside  weight  of  metal,  one 
from  long  guns,  the  other  from  carronades,  at  short 
range  they  are  equal ;  at  long,  one  has  it  all  her 
own  way.  Her  captain  thus  certainly  has  a  great 
superiority  of  force,  and  if  he  does  not  take  ad 
vantage  of  it  it  is  owing  to  his  adversary's  skill  or 


NAVAL    WAR    OF    l8l2.  65 

his  own  mismanagement.      As  a  mere  approxima 
tion,  it  may  be  assumed,  in  comparing  the  broad 
sides  of  two  vessels  or  squadrons,  that  long  guns 
count  for  at  least  twice  as  much  as  carronades  of 
the  same  calibre.      Thus  on  Lake  Champlain  Cap 
tain    Downie    possessed   an  immense  advantage  in 
his    long  guns,    which    Commodore    Macdonough's 
exceedingly  good   arrangements    nullified.       Some 
times  part  of  the  advantage  may  be  willingly  fore 
gone,    so    as    to    acquire    some    other.       Had     the 
Constitution    kept    at    long    bowls   with  the    Cyane 
and    Levant    she    could    have    probably    captured 
one      without      any     loss     to    herself,    while    the 
other    would    have    escaped ;  she    preferred   to   run 
down  close  so  as  to  insure    the    capture    of    both, 
knowing    that    even    at    close    quarters   long  guns 
are  somewhat  better  than  short  ones  (not  to  men 
tion  her  other  advantages  in  thick  scantling,  speed, 
etc.).     The    British    carronades    often    upset  in  ac 
tion  ;  this  was    either    owing  to  their  having  been 
insufficiently  secured,  and  to  this  remaining  undis 
covered  because  the   men    were    not    exercised    at 
the  guns,  or  else  it  was    because    the    unpractised 
sailors  would  greatly  overcharge    them.     Our    bet 
ter-trained    sailors    on  the   ocean   rarely  committed 
these    blunders,    but   the    less-skilled  crews    on  the 
lakes  did  so  as  often  as  their  antagonists. 

But  while  the  Americans  thus,  as  a  rule,  had 
heavier  and  better-fitted  guns,  they  labored  under 
one  or  two  disadvantages.  Our  foundries  were  gen 
erally  not  as  good  as  those  of  the  British,  and  our 
guns,  in  consequence,  more  likely  to  burst  ;  it  was 
an  accident  of  this  nature  which  saved  the  British 
Belvidera  ;  and  the  General  Pike,  under  Com- 


66  NAVAL   WAR    OF    l8l2. 

modore  Chauncy,  and  the  new  American  frigate 
Guerriere  suffered  in  the  same  way;  while  often 
'the  muzzles  of  the  guns  would  crack.  A  more  uni 
versal  disadvantage  was  in  the  short  weight  of 
our  shot.  When  Captain  Blakely  sunk  the  Avon 
he  officially  reported  that  her  four  shot  which  came 
aboard  weighed  just  32  pounds  apiece,  a  pound  and 
three  quarters  more  than  his  heaviest ;  this  would 
make  his  average  shot  about  2.y2  pounds  less,  or 
rather  over  7  per  cent.  Exactly  similar  statements 
were  made  by  the  officers  of  the  Constitution  in 
her  three  engagements.  Thus  when  she  fought 
the  Java,  she  threw  at  a  broadside,  as  already 
stated,  704  pounds ;  the  Java  mounted  28  long 
i8's,  1 8  32-pound  carronades,  2  long  12*3,  and  one 
shifting  24-pound  carronade,  a  broadside  of  576 
pounds.  Yet  by  the  actual  weighing  of  all  the 
different  shot  on  both  sides  it  was  found  that  the 
difference  in  broadside  force  was  only  about  77 
pounds,  or  the  Constitution ' s  shot  were  about  7  per 
cent,  short  weight.  The  long  24's  of  the  United 
States  each  threw  a  shot  but  4j^  pounds  heavier 
than  the  long  i8's  of  the  Macedonian;  here  again 
the  difference  was  about  7  per  cent.  The  same  dif* 
erence  existed  in  favor  of  the  Penguin  and  E'pervief 
compared  with  the  Wasp  and  Hornet.  Mr.  Feni- 
more  Cooper 1  weighed  a  great  number  of  shot 
some  time  after  the  war.  The  later  castings,  even, 
weighed  nearly  5  per  cent,  less  than  the  British  shot, 
and  some  of  the  older  ones,  about  9  per  cent.  The 
average  is  safe  to  take  at  7  per  cent,  less,  and  I  shall 
throughout  make  this  allowance  for  ocean  cruisers. 
The  deficit  was  sometimes  owing  to  windage,  but 

1  See  "Naval  History,"  i,  p.  380. 


NAVAL   WAR    OF    l8l2.  6/ 

more  often  the  shot  was  of  full  size  but  defective 
in  density.  The  effect  of  this  can  be  gathered  from 
the  following  quotation  from  the  work  of  a  British 
artillerist :  "  The  greater  the  density  of  shot  of  like 
calibres,  projected  with  equal  velocity  and  elevation, 
the  greater  the  range,  accuracy,  and  penetration." 
This  defectiveness  in  density  might  be  a  serious  in 
jury  in  a  contest  at  a  long  distance,  but  would  make 
but  little  difference  at  close  quarters  (although  it  may 
have  been  partly  owing  to  their  short  weight  that 
so  many  of  the  Chesapeake  s  shot  failed  to  penetrate 
the  Shannon  s  hull).  Thus  in  the  actions  with  the 
Macedonian  and  Java  the  American  frigates  showed 
excellent  practice  when  the  contest  was  carried  on 
within  fair  distance,  while  their  first  broadsides  at 
long  range  went  very  wild  ;  but  in  the  case  of  the 
Guerriere,  the  Constitution  reserved  her  fire  for  close 
quarters,  and  was  probably  not  at  all  affected  by  the 
short  weight  of  her  shot. 

As  to  the  officers  and  crew  of  a  44-gun  frigate, 
the  following  was  the  regular  complement  estab 
lished  by  law :  a 

1  captain,  i   purser, 
4  lieutenants,  i   surgeon, 

2  lieutenants  of  marines,  2  surgeon's  mates, 
2  sailing-masters,  i   clerk, 

2  master's  mates,  i   carpenter, 

7  midshipmen,  2  carpenter's  mates, 

1 "  Heavy  Ordnance,"  Captain  T.  F.  Simmons,  R.  A.,  London,  1837. 
James  supposes  that  the  "Yankee  captains"  have  in  each  case 
hunted  round  till  they  could  get  particularly  small  American  shot  to 
weigh  ;  and  also  denies  that  short  weight  is  a  disadvantage.  The 
last  proposition  carried  out  logically  would  lead  to  some  rather  as 
tonishing  results. 

2  See  State  Papers,  vol.  xiv,  159  (Washington,  1834). 


68  NAVAL   WAR    OF    1 8 12. 

1  boatswain,  i   cook, 

2  boatswain's  mates,                i   chaplain, 
i   yeoman  of  gun-room,     

i   gunner,  50 

ii   quarter  gunners,  120  able  seamen, 

i   coxswain,  150  ordinary  seamen, 

i   sailmaker,  30  boys, 

i   cooper,  50  marines, 
i   steward, 

i   armorer,  400  in  all. 
i   master  of  arms, 

An  i8-gun  ship  had  32  officers  and  petty  officers, 
30  able  seamen,  46  ordinary  seamen,  12  boys,  and 
20  marines — 140  in  all.  Sometimes  ships  put  to  sea 
without  their  full  complements  (as  in  the  case  of 
the  first  Wasp),  but  more  often  with  supernu 
meraries  aboard.  The  weapons  for  close  quarters 
were  pikes,  cutlasses,  and  a  few  axes  ;  while  the  ma 
rines  and  some  of  the  toomen  had  muskets,  and 
occasionally  rifles. 

In  comparing  the  forces  of  the  contestants  I  have 
always  given  the  number  of  men  in  crew  ;  but  this 
in  most  cases  was  unnecessary.  When  there  were 
plenty  of  men  to  handle  the  guns,  trim  the  sails, 
make  repairs,  act  as  marines,  etc.,  any  additional 
number  simply  served  to  increase  the  slaughter  on 
board.  The  Guerriere  undoubtedly  suffered  from 
being  short-handed,  but  neither  the  Macedonian  nor 
Java  would  have  been  benefited  by  the  presence  of 
a  hundred  additional  men.  Barclay  possessed  about 
as  many  men  as  Perry,  but  this  did  not  give  him  an 
equality  of  force.  The  Penguin  and  Frolic  would 
have  been  taken  just  as  surely  had  the  Hornet  and 
Wasp  had  a  dozen  men  less  apiece  than  they  did. 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  69 

The  principal  case  where  numbers  would  help  would 
be  in  a  hand-to-hand  fight.  Thus  the  Chesapeake 
having  fifty  more  men  than  the  Shannon  ought  to 
have  been  successful  ;  but  she  was  not,  because  the 
superiority  of  her  crew  in  numbers  was  more  than 
counterbalanced  by  the  superiority  of  the  Shan 
non  s  crew  in  other  respects.  The  result  of  the 
battle  of  Lake  Champlain,  which  was  fought  at 
anchor,  with  the  fleets  too  far  apart  for  musketry  to 
reach,  was  not  in  the  slightest  degree  affected  by 
the  number  of  men  on  either  side,  as  both  com 
batants  had  amply  enough  to  manage  the  guns  and 
perform  every  other  service. 

In  all  these  conflicts  the  courage  of  both  parties 
is  taken  for  granted  ;  it  was  not  so  much  a  factor  in 
gaining  the  victory,  as  one  which  if  lacking  was 
fatal  to  all  chances  of  success.  In  the  engagements 
between  regular  cruisers,  not  a  single  one  was  gained 
by  superiority  in  courage.  The  crews  of  both  the 
Argus  and  Epervier  certainly  flinched  ;  but  had  they 
fought  never  so  bravely  they  were  too  unskilful  to 
win.  The  Chesapeake' s  crew  could  hardly  be  said  to 
lack  courage ;  it  was  more  that  they  were  inferior 
to  their  opponents  in  discipline  as  well  as  in  skill. 

There  was  but  one  conflict  during  the  war  where 
the  victory  could  be  said  to  be  owing  to  superiority 
in  pluck.  This  was  when  the  Neufchatel  privateer 
beat  off  the  boats  of  the  Endymion.  The  privateers- 
men  suffered  a  heavier  proportional  loss  than  their 
assailants,  and  they  gained  the  victory  by  sheer 
ability  to  stand  punishment. 

For  convenience  in  comparing  them  I  give  in 
tabulated  form  the  force  of  the  three  British  38*5 
taken  by  American  44/3  (allowing  for  short  weight 
of  metal  of  latter). 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 
CONSTITUTION.  GUERRIERE. 

30  long  i8's, 

2   long   I2*S, 

16  short  32*3, 
•  i  short  1 8. 


30  long  24*5, 

2  long  24*5, 

22  short  32*5. 


Broadside,  nominal,  736  Ibs. 
real,  684  Ibs. 


Broadside,  556  Ibs. 


UNITED  STATES. 

30  long  24*5, 

2  long  24's, 

22  short  42*5. 


Broadside,  nominal,  846  Ibs. 
real,  786  Ibs. 


MACEDONIAN. 

28  long  i8's, 

2   long   I2*S, 

2  long  9's, 

16  short  32*5, 

i  short  18. 

Broadside,  547  Ibs. 


CONSTITUTION. 

30  long  24^, 

2  long  24^, 

20  short  32*5. 


Broadside,  nominal.  704  Ibs. 
real,  654  Ibs. 


JAVA. 

28  long  i8's, 
2  long  i2's, 

1 8  short  32*3, 
i  short  24. 

Broadside,  576  Ibs. 


The  smallest  line-of-battle  ship,  the  74,  with  only 
long  i8's  on  the  second  deck,  was  armed  as  follows: 

28  long    32*5, 
28     "      i8's, 

6  "       i2's, 
14  short  32*5, 

7  "     i8's, 

or  a  broadside  of  1,032  Ibs.,  736  from  long  guns,  296 
from  carronades  ;  while  the  Constitution  threw  (in 
reality)  684  Ibs.,  356  from  long  guns,  and  328  from 
her  carronades,  and  the  United  States  102  Ibs. 


NAVAL   WAR    OF    l8l2.  J\ 

more  from  her  carronades.  Remembering  the  dif 
ference  between  long  guns  and  carronades,  and  con 
sidering  sixteen  of  the  74*5  long  i8's  as  being 
replaced  by  42-pound  carronades1  (so  as  to  get  the 
metal  on  the  ships  distributed  in  similar  proportions 
between  the  two  styles  of  cannon),  we  get  as  the 
74's  broadside  592  Ibs  from  long  guns,  and  632  from 
carronades.  The  United  States  threw  nominally 
360  and  486,  and  the  Constitution  nominally  360 
and  352  ;  so  the  74  was  superior  even  to  the  former 
nominally  about  as  three  is  to  two  ;  while  the  Con 
stitution,  if  "  a  line-of-battle  ship,"  was  disguised 
to  such  a  degree  that  she  was  in  reality  of  but  little 
more  than  one  half  the  force  of  one  of  the  smallest 
true  liners  England  possessed  ! 

1  That  this  change  would  leave  the  force  about  as  it  was,  can  be 
gathered  from  the  fact  that  the  Adams  and  John  Adams  both  of 
which  had  been  armed  with  42-pound  carronades  (which  were  sent  to 
Sackett's  Harbor),  had  them  replaced  by  long  and  medium  iS- 
pounders,  these  being  considered  to  be  more  formidable  ;  so  that  the 
substitution  of  42-pound  carronades  would,  if  any  thing,  reduce  the 
force  of  the  74. 


CHAPTER    III. 

1812. 

ON   THE    OCEAN. 

Commodore  Rodgers'  cruise  and  unsuccesful  chase  of  the  Belvidera— Cruise 
of  the  Essex — Captain  Hull's  cruise,  and  escape  from  the  squadron  of  Com 
modore  Broke — Constitution  captures  Guerriere — Wasp  captures  Frolic — 
Second  unsuccessful  cruise  of  Commodore  Rodgers—  United  States  cap 
tures  Macedonian — Constitution  captu  es  Java — Essex  starts  on  a  cruise — 
Summary. 

AT  the  time  of  the  declaration  of  war,  June  18, 
1812,  the  American  navy  was  but  partially 
prepared  for  effective  service.  The  Wasp,  18,  was 
still  at  sea,  on  her  return  voyage  from  France ;  the 
Constellation  38,  was  lying  in  the  Chesapeake  river, 
unable  to  receive  a  crew  for  several  months  to  come  ; 
the  Chesapeake,  38,  was  lying  in  a  similar  condition  in 
Boston  harbor  ;  the  Adams,  28,  was  at  Washington, 
being  cut  down  and  lengthened  from  a  frigate  into  a 
corvette.  These  three  cruisers  were  none  of  them 
fit  to  go  to  sea  till  after  the  end  of  the  year.  The 
Essex,  32,  was  in  New  York  harbor,  but,  having  some 
repairs  to  make,  was  not  yet  ready  to  put  out.  The 
Constitution,  44,  was  at  Annapolis,  without  all  of 
her  stores,  and  engaged  in  shipping  a  new  crew,  the 
time  of  the  old  one  being  up.  The  Nautilus,  14, 
was  cruising  off  New  Jersey,  and  the  other  small 
brigs  were  also  off  the  coast.  The  only  vessels  im 
mediately  available  were  those  under  the  command 
of  Commodore  Rodgers,  at  New  York,  consisting  of 

72 


NAVAL   WAR    OF    l8l2.  73 

his  own  ship,  the  President,  44,  and  of  the  United 
States,  44,  Commodore  Decatur,  Congress,  38,  Cap 
tain  Smith,  Hornet,  18,  Captain  Lawrence,  and  Argus ; 
16,  Lieut.  Sinclair.  It  seems  marvellous  that  any 
nation  should  have  permitted  its  ships  to  be  so  scat 
tered,  and  many  of  them  in  such  an  unfit  condition, 
at  the  beginning  of  hostilities.  The  British  vessels 
cruising  off  the  coast  were  not  at  that  time  very  nu 
merous  or  formidable,  consisting  of  the  Africa,  64,, 
Acasta,  40,  Shannon,  38,  Guerriere,  38,  Belvidera,  36,. 
ALolus,  32,  Southampton,  32,  and  Minerva,  32,  with  a. 
number  of  corvettes  and  sloops  ;  their  force  wasr 
however,  strong  enough  to  render  it  impossible  for 
Commodore  Rodgers  to  make  any  attempt  on  the 
coast  towns  of  Canada  or  the  West  Indies.  But 
the  homeward  bound  plate  fleet  had  sailed  from 
Jamaica  on  May  2oth,  and  was  only  protected  by 
the  Thalia,  36,  Capt.  Vashon,  and  Reindeer,  18, 
Capt.  Manners.  Its  capture  or  destruction  would 
have  been  a  serious  blow,  and  one  which  there 
seemed  a  good  chance  of  striking,  as  the  fleet  would 
have  to  pass  along  the  American  coast,  running  with 
the  Gulf  Stream.  Commodore  Rodgers  had  made 
every  preparation,  in  expectation  of  war  being  de 
clared,  and  an  hour  after  official  intelligence  of  it, 
together  with  his  instructions,  had  been  received,  his 
squadron  put  to  sea,  on  June  2ist,  and  ran  off  toward 
the  south-east1  to  get  at  the  Jamaica  ships.  Having 
learned  from  an  American  brig  that  she  had  passed 
the  plate  fleet  four  days  before  in  lat.  36°  N.,  long. 
67°  W.,  the  Commodore  made  all  sail  in  that  direc 
tion.  At  6  A.M.  on  June  23d  a  sail  was  made  out 

1  Letter  of  Commodore  John  Rodgers  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navyt 
Sept.  i,  1812. 


74  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

in  the  N.  E.,  which  proved  to  be  the  British  frigate 
Belvidera,  36,  Capt.  Richard  Byron.1  The  latter 
had  sighted  some  of  Commodore  Rodgers'  squadron 
some  time  before,  and  stood  toward  them,  till  at  6.30 
she  made  out  the  three  largest  ships  to  be  frigates. 
Having  been  informed  of  the  likelihood  of  war  by 
a  New  York  pilot  boat,  the  Belvidera  now  stood 
away,  going  N.  E.  by  E.,  the  wind  being  fresh  from 
the  west.  The  Americans  made  all  sail  in  chase,  the 
President,  a  very  fast  ship  off  the  wind,  leading,  and 
the  Congress  coming  next.  At  noon  the  President 
bore  S.  W.,  distant  2^  miles  from  the  Belvidera, 
Nantucket  shoals  bearing  100  miles  N.  and  48  miles 
E.2  The  wind  grew  lighter,  shifting  more  toward 
the  south-west,  while  the  ships  continued  steadily 
in  their  course,  going  N.  E.  by  E.  As  the  President 
kept  gaining,  Captain  Byron  cleared  his  ship  for  ac 
tion,  and  shifted  to  the  stern  ports  two  long  eighteen 
pounders  on  the  main-deck  and  two  thirty-two  pound 
carronades  on  the  quarter-deck. 

At  4:30 3  the  President's  starboard  forecastle  bow- 
gun  was  fired  by  Commodore  Rodgers  himself ; 
the  corresponding  main-deck  gun  was  next  dis 
charged,  and  then  Commodore  Rodgers  fired  again. 
These  three  shots  all  struck  the  stern  of  the  Bel 
videra,  killing  and  wounding  nine  men, — one  of 
them  went  through  the  rudder  coat,  into  the  after 
gun-room,  the  other  two  into  the  captain's  cabin. 
A  few  more  such  shots  would  have  rendered  the 
Belvideras  capture  certain,  but  when  the  Presi- 

1  Brenton,  v.  46. 

8  Log  of  Belvidera,  June  23,  1812. 

*  Cooper,  ii,  151.  According  to  James,  vi,  117,  the  President 
was  then  600  yards  distant  from  the  Belvidera,  half  a  point  on  her 
weather  or  port  quarter. 


NAVAL   WAR    OF    l8l2.  75 

dent's  main-deck  gun  was  discharged  for  the  second 
time  it  burst,  blowing  up  the  forecastle  deck  and 
killing  and  wounding  16  men,  among  them  the  Com 
modore  himself,  whose  leg  was  broken.  This  saved 
the  British  frigate.  Such  an  explosion  always  causes 
a  half  panic,  every  gun  being  at  once  suspected. 
In  the  midst  of  the  confusion  Captain  Byron's  stern- 
chasers  opened  with  spirit  and  effect,  killing  or 
wounding  six  men  more.  Had  the  President 
still  pushed  steadily  on,  only  using  her  bow-chasers 
until  she  closed  abreast,  which  she  could  probably 
have  done,  the  Belvidera  could  still  have  been 
taken ;  but,  instead,  the  former  now  bore  up  and 
fired  her  port  broadside,  cutting  her  antagonist's 
rigging  slightly,  but  doing  no  other  damage,  while 
the  Belvidera  kept  up  a  brisk  and  galling  fire, 
although  the  long  bolts,  breeching-hooks,  and 
breechings  of  the  guns  now  broke  continually, 
wounding  several  of  the  men,  including  Captain 
Byron.  The  President  had  lost  ground  by  yaw 
ing,  but  she  soon  regained  it,  and,  coming  up 
closer  than  before,  again  opened  from  her  bow- 
chasers  a  well-directed  fire,  which  severely  wounded 
her  opponent's  main-top  mast,  cross-jack  yard,  and 
one  or  two  other  spars ;:  but  shortly  afterward 
she  repeated  her  former  tactics  and  again  lost 
ground  by  yawing  to  discharge  another  broadside, 
even  more  ineffectual  than  the  first.  Once  more 
she  came  up  closer  than  ever,  and  once  more  yawed  ; 
the  single  shots  from  her  bow-chasers  doing  consid 
erable  damage,  but  her  raking  broadsides  none.2 
Meanwhile  the  active  crew  of  the  Belvidera  repaired 

1  James,  vi,  119.      He  says  the  President  was  within  400  yards. 

2  Lord  Howard  Douglass,  "  Naval  Gunnery,"  p.  419  (third  edition). 


76  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

every  thing  as  fast  as  it  was  damaged,  while  under 
the  superintendence  of  Lieutenants  Sykes,  Bruce, 
and  Campbell,  no  less  than  300  shot  were  fired 
from  her  stern  guns.1  Finding  that  if  the  President 
ceased  yawing  she  could  easily  run  alongside,  Cap 
tain  Byron  cut  away  one  bower,  one  stream,  and 
two  sheet  anchors,  the  barge,  yawl,  gig,  and  jolly 
boat,  and  started  14  tons  of  water.  The  effect  of 
this  was  at  once  apparent,  and  she  began  to  gain  ; 
meanwhile  the  damage  the  sails  of  the  combatants 
had  received  had  enabled  the  Congress  to  close, 
and  when  abreast  of  his  consort  Captain  Smith 
opened  with  his  bow-chasers,  but  the  shot  fell  short. 
The  Belvidera  soon  altered  her  course  to  east  by 
south,  set  her  starboard  studding-sails,  and  by  mid 
night  was  out  of  danger  ;  and  three  days  afterward 
reached  Halifax  harbor. 

Lord  Howard  Douglass'  criticisms  on  this  en 
counter  seem  very  just.  He  says  that  the  Presi 
dent  opened  very  well  with  her  bow-chasers  (in 
fact  the  Americans  seem  to  have  aimed  better  and 
to  have  done  more  execution  with  these  guns  than 
the  British  with  their  stern-chasers)  ;  but  that  she  lost 
so  much  ground  by  yawing  and  delivering  harmless 
broadsides  as  to  enable  her  antagonist  to  escape. 
Certainly  if  it  had  not  been  for  the  time  thus  lost 
to  no  purpose,  the  Commodore  would  have  run 
alongside  his  opponent,  and  the  fate  of  the  little 
36  would  have  been  sealed.  On  the  other  hand  it 
must  be  remembered  that  it  was  only  the  bursting 
of  the  gun  on  board  the  President,  causing  such 
direful  confusion  and  loss,  and  especially  harmful 
in  disabling  her  commander,  that  gave  the  Belvi- 

1  James,  vi,  118. 


NAVAL   WAR    OF    l8l2.  77 

dera  any  chance  of  escape  at  all.  At  any  rate, 
whether  the  American  frigate  does,  or  does  not,  de 
serve  blame,  Captain  Byron  and  his  crew  do  most 
emphatically  deserve  praise  for  the  skill  with  which 
their  guns  were  served  and  repairs  made,  the 
coolness  with  which  measures  to  escape  were 
adopted,  and  the  courage  with  which  they  resisted 
so  superior  a  force.  On  this  occasion  Captain 
Byron  showed  himself  as  good  a  seaman  and  as 
brave  a  man  as  he  subsequently  proved  a  humane 
and  generous  enemy  when  engaged  in  the  blockade 
of  the  Chesapeake.1 

This  was  not  a  very  auspicious  opening  of  hostil 
ities  for  America.  The  loss  of  the  Belvidera  was 
not  the  only  thing  to  be  regretted,  for  the  distance 
the  chase  took  the  pursuers  out  of  their  course  prob 
ably  saved  the  plate  fleet.  When  the  Belvidera 
was  first  made  out,  Commodore  Rodgers  was  in 
latitude  39°  26'  N.,  and  longitude  71°  10'  W.;  at  noon 
the  same  day  the  Thalia  and  her  convoy  were  in  lat 
itude  39°  N.,  longitude  62°  W.  Had  they  not 
chased  the  Belvidera  the  Americans  would  probably 
have  run  across  the  plate  fleet. 

The  American  squadron  reached  the  western  edge 
of  the  Newfoundland  Banks  on  June  29th,2  and  on 
July  1st,  a  little  to  the  east  of  the  Banks,  fell  in  with 
large  quantities  of  cocoa-nut  shells,  orange  peels, 
etc.,  which  filled  every  one  with  great  hopes  of 
overtaking  the  quarry.  On  July  9th,  the  Hornet 
captured  a  British  privateer,  in  latitude  45°  30'  N., 

1  Even  Niles,  unscrupulously  bitter  as  he  is  toward  the  British, 
does  justice  to  the  humanity  of  Captains  Byron  and  Hardy — which 
certainly  shone  in  comparison  to  some  of  the  rather  buccaneering  ex 
ploits  of  Cockburn's  followers  in  Chesapeake  Bay. 

8  Letter  of  Commodore  Rodgers,  Sept.  ist. 


78  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

and  longitude  23°  W.,  and  her  master  reported  that 
he  had  seen  the  Jamaica-men  the  previous  evening; 
but  nothing  further  was  heard  or  seen  of  them,  and 
on  July  I3th,  being  within  twenty  hours'  sail  of  the 
English  Channel,  Commodore  Rodgers  reluctantly 
turned  southward,  reaching  Madeira  July  2ist. 
Thence  he  cruized  toward  the  Azores  and  by  the 
Grand  Banks  home,  there  being  considerable  sick 
ness  on  the  ships.  On  August  3ist  he  reached 
Boston  after  a  very  unfortunate  cruise,  in  which  he 
had  made  but  seven  prizes,  all  merchant-men,  and} 
had  recaptured  one  American  vessel. 

On  July  3d  the  Essex,  32,  Captain  David  Porter 
put  out  of  New  York.  As  has  been  already  ex. 
plained  she  was  most  inefficiently  armed,  almost  en 
tirely  with  carronades.  This  placed  her  at  the  mer 
cy  of  any  frigate  with  long  guns  which  could  keep  at 
a  distance  of  a  few  hundred  yards  ;  but  in  spite  of 
Captain  Porter's  petitions  and  remonstrances  he  was 
not  allowed  to  change  his  armament.  On  the  I  ith 
of  July  at  2  A.  M.,  IctlliuJc  33°  N.,  longitude  66° 
WM  the  Essex  fell  in  with  the  Minerva,  32,  Cap 
tain  Richard  Hawkins,  convoying  seven  transports, 
each  containing  about  200  troops,  bound  from  Bar- 
badoes  to  Quebec.  The  convoy  was  sailing  in  open 
order,  and,  there  being  a  dull  moon,  the  Essex 
ran  in  and  cut  out  transport  No.  299,  with  197  soU 
diers  aboard.  Having  taken  out  the  soldiers,  Cap 
tain  Porter  stood  back  to  the  convoy,  expecting 
Captain  Hawkins  to  come  out  and  fight  him  ;  but 
this  the  latter  would  not  do,  keeping  the  convoy  in 
close  order  around  him.  The  transports  were  all 
armed  and  still  contained  in  the  aggregate  1,200 
soldiers.  As  the  Essex  could  only  fight  at  close 


NAVAL    WAR    OF    l8l2.  79 

quarters  these  heavy  odds  rendered  it  hopeless  for 
her  to  try  to  cut  out  the  Minerva.  Her  carron- 
ades  would  have  to  be  used  at  short  range  to  be 
effective,  arid  it  would  of  course  have  been  folly  to 
run  in  right  among  the  convoy,  and  expose  herself 
to  the  certainty  of  being  boarded  by  five  times  as 
many  men  as  she  possessed.  The  Minerva  had 
three  less  guns  a  side,  and  on  her  spar-deck  carried 
24-pound  carronades  instead  of  32*5,  and,  moreover, 
had  fifty  men  less  than  the  Essex,  which  had 
about  270  men  this  cruise ;  on  the  other  hand,  her 
main-deck  was  armed  with  long  I2's,  so  that  it  is 
hard  to  say  whether  she  did  right  or  not  in  refusing 
to  fight.  She  was  of  the  same  force  as  the  South 
ampton  whose  captain,  Sir  James  Lucas  Yeo,  sub 
sequently  challenged  Porter,  but  never  appointed 
a  meeting-place.  In  the  event  of  a  meeting,  the  ad 
vantage,  inshipsof  such  radically  different  armaments, 
would  have  been  with  that  captain  who  succeeded 
in  outmanoeuvring  the  other  and  in  making  the 
fight  come  off  at  the  distance  best  suited  to  him 
self.  At  long  range  either  the  Minerva  or  South 
ampton  would  possess  an  immense  superiority  ;  but 
if  Porter  could  have  contrived  to  run  up  within 
a  couple  of  hundred  yards,  or  still  better,  to  board,, 
his  superiority  in  weight  of  metal  and  number  of 
men  would  have  enabled  him  to  carry  either  of 
them.  Porter's  crew  was  better  trained  for  board 
ing  than  almost  any  other  American  commander's ; 
and  probably  none  of  the  British  frigates  on  the 
American  station,  except  the  Shannon  and  Tene- 
dos,  would  have  stood  a  chance  with  the  Essex 
in  a  hand-to-hand  struggle.  Among  her  youngest 
midshipmen  was  one,  by  name  David  Glas- 


8O  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

gow  Farragut,  then  but  thirteen  years  old,  who 
afterward  became  the  first  and  greatest  admiral  of 
the  United  States.  His  own  words  on  this  point 
will  be  read  with  interest.  "  Every  day,"  he  says,1 
"  the  crew  were  exercised  at  the  great  guns,  small 
arms,  and  single  stick.  And  I  may  here  mention 
the  fact  that  I  have  never  been  on  a  ship  where  the 
crew  of  the  old  Essex  was  represented  but  that 
I  found  them  to  be  the  best  swordsmen  on  board. 
They  had  been  so  thoroughly  trained  as  boarders 
that  every  man  was  prepared  for  such  an  emergency, 
with  his  cutlass  as  sharp  as  a  razor,  a  dirk  made  by 
the  ship's  armorer  out  of  a  file,  and  a  pistol."  : 

On  August  1 3th  a  sail  was  made  out  to  windward, 
which  proved  to  be  the  British  ship-sloop  Alert 
1 6,  Captain  T.  L.  O.  Laugharne,  carrying  20  eighteen- 
pound  carronades  and  100  men.3  As  soon  as  the 
Essex  discovered  the  Alert  she  put  out  drags  astern, 

1  "  Life  of  Farragut  "  (embodying  his  journal  and  letters),  p.  31. 
By  his  son,  Loyall  Farragut,  New  York,  1879. 

2  James  says  :    "Had  Captain   Porter  really  endeavored  to    bring 
the  Minerva  to  action  we  do  not  see  what  could  have  prevented  the 
Essex  with  her  superiority  of  sailing,  from  coming  alongside  of  her. 
But   no   such   thought,   we  are  sure,  entered  into  Captain  Porter's 
head."      What    "prevented    the  Essex"    was    the   Minerva's   not 
venturing  out  of  the  convoy.     Farragut,  in  his  journal  writes  :  "  The 
captured  British  officers  were  very  anxious  for  us  to  have  a  fight  with 
the  Minerva,   as  they  considered  her  a  good  match  for  the  Essex, 
and  Captain  Porter  replied  that  he  should  gratify  them  with  pleasure 
if  his  majesty's  commander  was  of  their  taste.       So  we  stood  toward 
the  convoy  and  when  within  gunshot  hove  to,  and  awaited  the  Min- 
,erva,   but  she  tacked  and  stood  in  among  the  convoy,  to  the  utter 
amazement  of  our  prisoners,  who  denounced  the  commander  as  a  base 
•coward,  and  expressed  their  determination  to  report  him  to  the  Ad 
miralty."     An  incident  of  reported  "  flinching"  like  this  is  not  worth 
mentioning  ;  I  allude  to  it  only  to  show  the  value  of  James'  sneers. 

3  James    (History,    vi,    p.    128)    says    "86    men."     In    the    Naval 
Archives  at  Washington   in  the   "  Captains'  Letters"  for  1812  (vol. 
ii.  No.  182)  can  be  found  enclosed  in  Porter's  letter  the  parole  of  the 
officers  and  crew  of  the    Alert  signed  by  Captain    Laugharne  ;    it 
contains  either  100  or   101    names  of  the  crew  of   the  Alert  besides 
those  of  a  number  of  other  prisoners  sent  back  in  the  same  cartel. 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  8 1 

and  led  the  enemy  to  believe  she  was  trying  to 
escape  by  sending  a  few  men  aloft  to  shake  out 
the  reefs  and  make  sail.  Concluding  the  frigate  to 
be  a  merchant-man,  the  Alert  bore  down  on  her; 
while  the  Americans  went  to  quarters  and  cleared 
for  action,  although  the  tompions  were  left  in  the 
guns,  and  the  ports  kept  closed.1  The  Alert  fired 
a  gun  and  the  Essex  hove  to,  when  the  former 
passed  under  her  stern,  and  when  on  her  lee  quarter 
poured  in  a  broadside  of  grape  and  canister ;  but  the 
sloop  was  so  far  abaft  the  frigate's  beam  that  her 
shot  did  not  enter  the  ports  and  caused  no  damage. 
Thereupon  Porter  put  up  his  helm  and  opened  as 
soon  as  his  guns  would  bear,  tompions  and  all.  The 
Alert  now  discovered  her  error  and  made  off,  but 
too  late,  for  in  eight  minutes  the  Essex  was  along 
side,  and  the  Alert  fired  a  musket  and  struck, 
three  men  being  wounded  and  several  feet  of 
water  in  the  hold.  She  was  disarmed  and  sent  as  a 
cartel  into  St.  Johns.  It  has  been  the  fashion 
among  American  writers  to  speak  of  her  as  if  she 
were  "  unworthily '  given  up,  but  such  an  accusa 
tion  is  entirely  groundless.  The  Essex  was  four 
times  her  force,  and  all  that  could  possibly  be  ex 
pected  of  her  was  to  do  as  she  did — exchange  broad 
sides  and  strike,  having  suffered  some  loss  and  dam 
age.  The  Essex  returned  to  New  York  on  Septem 
ber  /th,  having  made  10  prizes,  containing  423  men.8 

1  "  Life  of  Farragut,"  p.  16. 

a  Before  entering  New  York  the  Essex  fell  in  with  a  British  force 
which,  in  both  Porter's  and  Farragut's  works,  is  said  to  have  been 
composed  of  the  Acasta  and  Shannon,  each  of  fifty  guns,  and  King- 
dove,  of  twenty.  James  says  it  was  the  Shannon,  accompanied  by  a 
merchant  vessel.  It  is  not  a  point  of  much  importance,  as  nothing 
came  of  the  meeting,  and  the  Shannon,  alone,  with  her  immensely 
superior  armament,  ought  to  have  been  a  match  twice  over  for  the 
Essex  ;  although,  if  James  is  right,  as  seems  probable,  it  gives  rather 
a  comical  turn  to  Porter's  account  of  his  "  extraordinary  escape." 


82  NAVAL   WAR    OF    1 8 12. 

The  Belvidera,  as  has  been  stated,  carried  the  news 
of  the  war  to  Halifax.  On  July  5th  Vice-Admiral 
Sawyer  despatched  a  squadron  to  cruise  against  the 
United  States,  commanded  by  Philip  Vere  Broke,  of 
the  Shannon,  38,  having  under  him  the  Belvidera,  36, 
Captain  Richard  Byron,  Africa,  64,  Captain  John 
Bastard,  and  ALolus,  32,  Captain  Lord  James  Town- 
send.  On  the  Qth,  while  off  Nantucket,  they  were 
joined  by  the  Guerri'ere,  38,  Captain  James  Richard 
Dacres.  On  the  i6th  the  squadron  fell  in  with  and 
captured  the  United  States  brig  Nautilus,  14,  Lieu 
tenant  Crane,  which,  like  all  the  little  brigs,  was 
overloaded  with  guns  and  men.  She  threw  her  lee 
guns  overboard  and  made  use  of  every  expedient  to 
escape,  but  to  no  purpose.  At  3  P.  M.  of  the  follow 
ing  day,  when  the  British  ships  were  abreast  of 
Barnegat,  about  four  leagues  off  shore,  a  strange  sail 
was  seen  and  immediately  chased,  in  the  south  by 
east,  or  windward  quarter,  standing  to  the  north 
east.  This  was  the  United  States  frigate  Con 
stitution,  44,  Captain  Isaac  Hull.1  When  the  war 
broke  out  he  was  in  the  Chesapeake  River  getting  a 
new  crew  aboard.  Having  shipped  over  450  men 
(counting  officers),  he  put  out  of  harbor  on  the  I2th 
of  July.  His  crew  was  entirely  new,  drafts  of  men 
coming  on  board  up  to  the  last  moment.2  On  the 
I7th,  at  2  P.  M.,  Hull  discovered  four  sail,  in  the 

1  For  the  ensuing  chase  I   have  relied  mainly  on  Cooper  ;   see  also 
"Memoir   of  Admiral  Broke,"  p.    240;   James,    vi,    133;   and  Mar 
shall's  "  Naval  Biography"  (London,  1825),  ii,  625. 

2  In  a  letter  to  the   Secretary  of  the  Navy  ("Captains'  Letters," 
1812,  ii,  No.  85),  Hull,  after  speaking  of  the  way  his  men  were  arriv 
ing,  says  :   "  The  crew  are  as  yet  unacquainted  with   a  ship  of  war, 
as  many  have  but  lately  joined  and  have  never  been  on  an  armed  ship 
before.     *     *     *     We  are   doing  all  that   we  can  to  make  them  ac 
quainted  with  their  duty,  and  in  a  few  days  we  shall  have  nothing  to 
fear  from  any  single-decked  slrp 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  83 

northern  board,  heading  to  the  westward.  At  3,  the 
wind  being  very  light,  the  Constitution  made  sail 
and  tacked,  in  i8J  fathoms.  At  4,  in  the  N.  E.,  a 
fifth  sail  appeared,  which  afterward  proved  to  be 
the  Guerrtire.  The  first  four  ships  bore  N.  N. 
W.,  and  were  all  on  the  starboard  tack ;  while  by  6 
o'clock  the  fifth  bore  E.  N.  E.  At  6.15  the  wind 
shifted  and  blew  lightly  from  the  south,  bringing  the 
American  ship  to  windward.  She  then  wore  round 
with  her  head  to  the  eastward,  set  her  light  stud 
ding-sails  and  stay-sails,  and  at  7.30  beat  to  action, 
intending  to  speak  the  nearest  vessel,  the  Guer- 
riere.  The  two  frigates  neared  one  another  gradu 
ally  and  at  10  the  Constitution  began  making  sig 
nals,  which  she  continued  for  over  an  hour.  At 
3.30  A.  M.  on  the  1 8th  the  Guerriere,  going  gradu 
ally  toward  the  Constitution  on  the  port  tack,  and 
but  one  half  mile  distant,  discovered  on  her  lee 
beam  the  Belvidera  and  the  other  British  vessels, 
and  signalled  to  them.  They  did  not  answer  the 
signals,  thinking  she  must  know  who  they  were — a 
circumstance  which  afterward  gave  rise  to  sharp  re 
criminations  among  the  captains — and  Dacres,  con 
cluding  them  to  be  Commodore  Rodgers'  squadron, 
tacked,  and  then  wore  round  and  stood  away  from 
the  Constitution  for  some  time  before  discovering 
his  mistake. 

At  5  A.  M.  Hull  had  just  enough  steerage  way  on 
to  keep  his  head  to  the  east,  on  the  starboard 
tack ;  on  his  lee  quarter,  bearing  N.  E.  by  N.,  were 
the  Belvidera  and  Guerriere  and  astern  the 
Shannon,  ALolus,  and  Africa.  At  5.30  it  fell 
entirely  calm,  and  Hull  put  out  his  boats  to  tow 
the  ship,  always  going  southward.  At  the  same 


84  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

time  he  whipped  up  a  24  from  the  main-deck,  and 
got  the  forecastle-chaser  aft,  cutting  away  the  taff- 
rail  to  give  the  two  guns  more  freedom  to  work  in 
and  also  running  out,  through  the  cabin  windows, 
two  of  the  long  main-deck  24*3.  The  British  boats 
were  towing  also.  At  6  A.  M.  a  light  breeze 
sprang  up,  and  the  Constitution  set  studding- 
sails  and  stay-sails  ;  the  Shannon  opened  at  her 
with  her  bow  guns,  but  ceased  when  she  found  she 
could  not  reach  her.  At  6.30,  the  wind  having 
died  away,  the  Shannon  began  to  gain,  almost  all 
the  boats  of  the  squadron  towing  her.  Having 
sounded  in  26  fathoms,  Lieutenant  Charles  Morris 
suggested  to  Hull  to  try  kedging.  All  the  spare 
rope  was  bent  on  to  the  cables,  payed  out  into  the 
cutters,  and  a  kedge  run  out  half  a  mile  ahead  and 
let  go ;  then  the  crew  clapped  on  and  walked  away 
with  the  ship,  overrunning  and  tripping  the  kedge 
as  she  came  up  with  the  end  of  the  line.  Mean 
while,  fresh  lines  and  another  kedge  were  carried 
ahead,  and  the  frigate  glided  away  from  her  pur 
suers.  At  7.30  A.  M.  a  little  breeze  sprang  up,  when 
the  Constitution  set  her  ensign  and  fired  a  shot 
at  the  Shannon.  It  soon  fell  calm  again  and  the 
Shannon  neared.  At  9.10  a  light  air  from  the 
southward  struck  the  ship,  bringing  her  to  wind 
ward.  As  the  breeze  was  seen  coming,  her  sails 
were  trimmed,  and  as  soon  as  she  obeyed  her  helm 
she  was  brought  close  up  on  the  port  tack.  The 
boats  dropped  in  alongside;  those  that  belonged  to 
the  davits  were  run  up,  while  the  others  were  just 
lifted  clear  of  the  water,  by  purchases  on  the  spare 
spars,  stowed  outboard,  where  they  could  be  used 
again  at  a  minute's  notice.  Meanwhile,  on  her  lee 


NAVAL  WAR   OF    l8l2.  85 

beam,  the  Guerrierc  opened  fire ;  but  her  shot  fell 
short,  and  the  Americans  paid  not  the  slightest 
heed  to  it.  Soon  it  again  fell  calm,  when  Hull  had 
2000  gallons  of  water  started,  and  again  put  out 
his  boats  to  tow.  The  Shannon  with  some  of  the 
other  boats  of  the  squadron  helping  her,  gained 
on  the  Constitution  but  by  severe  exertion  was 
again  left  behind.  Shortly  afterward,  a  slight  wind 
springing  up,  the  Belvidera  gained  on  the  other 
British  ships,  and  when  it  fell  calm  she  was  nearer 
to  the  Constitution  than  any  of  her  consorts,  their 
boats  being  put  on  to  her.1  At  10.30,  observing 
the  benefit  that  the  Constitution  had  derived  from 
warping,  Captain  Byron  did  the  same,  bending  all 
his  hawsers  to  one  another,  and  working  two  kedge 
anchors  at  the  same  time  by  paying  the  warp  out 
through  one  hawse-hole  as  it  was  run  in  through  the 
other  opposite.  Having  men  from  the  other  frigates 
aboard,  and  a  lighter  ship  to  work,  Captain  Byron, 
at  2  P.  M.  was  near  enough  to  exchange  bow-  and 
stern-chasers  with  the  Constitution,  out  of  range 
however.  Hull  expected  to  be  overtaken,  and  made 
every  arrangement  to  try  in  such  case  to  disable  the 
first  frigate  before  her  consorts  could  close.  But 
neither  the  Belvidera  nor  the  Shannon  dared  to  tow 
very  near  for  fear  of  having  their  boats  sunk  by  the 
American's  stern-chasers. 

The  Constitutions  crew  showed  the  most  excellent 
spirit.  Officers  and  men  relieved  each  other  regu 
larly,  the  former  snatching  their  rest  any  where  on 

1  Cooper  speaks  as  if  this  was  the  Shannon;  but  from  Marshall's 
"Naval  Biography"  we  learn  that  it  was  the  Belvidera.  At  other 
times  he  confuses  the  Belvidera  with  the  Guerriere.  Captain  Hull,  of 
course,  could  not  accurately  distinguish  the  names  of  his  pursuers. 
My  account  is  drawn  from  a  careful  comparison  of  Marshall,  Cooper 
and  James. 


86  NAVAL  WAR   OF    l8l2. 

deck,  the  latter  sleeping  at  the  guns.  Gradually 
the  Constitution  drew  ahead,  but  the  situation  con 
tinued  most  critical.  All  through  the  afternoon  the 
British  frigates  kept  towing  and  kedging,  being 
barely  out  of  gunshot.  At  3  P.M.  a  light  breeze 
sprung  up,  and  blew  fitfully  at  intervals  ;  every 
puff  was  watched  closely  and  taken  advantage  of  to 
the  utmost.  At  7  in  the  evening  the  wind  almost 
died  out,  and  for  four  more  weary  hours  the  worn- 
out  sailors  towed  and  kedged.  At  10.45  a  little 
breeze  struck  the  frigate,  when  the  boats  dropped 
alongside  and  were  hoisted  up,  excepting  the  first 
cutter.  Throughout  the  night  the  wind  continued 
very  light,  the  Belvidcra  forging  ahead  till  she  was 
off  the  Constitution  s  lee  beam  ;  and  at  4  A.  M.  on 
the  morning  of  the  iQth,  she  tacked  to  the  east 
ward,  the  breeze  being  light  from  the  south  by 
east.  At  4.20  the  Constitution  tacked  also  ;  and  at 
5.15  the  sEolus,  which  had  drawn  ahead,  passed  on 
the  contrary  tack.  Soon  afterward  the  wind  fresh 
ened  so  that  Captain  Hull  took  in  his  cutter.  The 
Africa  was  now  so  far  to  leeward  as  to  be  almost 
out  of  the  race  ;  while  the  five  frigates  were  all 
running  on  the  starboard  tack  with  every  stitch  of 
canvas  set.  At  9  A.  M.  an  American  merchant-man 
hove  in  sight  and  bore  down  toward  the  squadron. 
The  Belvidera,  by  way  of  decoy,  hoisted  American 
colors,  when  the  Constitution  hoisted  the  British 
flag,  and  the  merchant  vessel  hauled  off.  The 
breeze  continued  light  till  noon,  when  Hull  found 
he  had  dropped  the  British  frigates  well  behind  ; 
the  nearest  was  the  Belvidera,  exactly  in  his  wake, 
bearing  W.  N.  W.  2^  miles  distant.  The  Shannon 
was  on  his  lee,  bearing  N.  by  W.  £  W.  distant  3^ 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  8/ 

miles.  The  other  two  frigates  were  five  miles  off  on 
the  lee  quarter.  Soon  afterward  the  breeze  fresh 
ened,  and  "old  Ironsides"  drew  slowly  ahead  from 
her  foes,  her  sails  being  watched  and  tended  with 
the  most  consummate  skill.  At  4  P.  M.  the  breeze 
again  lightened,  but  even  the  Belvidera  was  now 
four  miles  astern  and  to  leeward.  At  6.45  there 
were  indications  of  a  heavy  rain  squall,  which  once 
more  permitted  Hull  to  show  that  in  seamanship  he 
excelled  even  the  able  captains  against  whom  he 
was  pitted.  The  crew  were  stationed  and  every 
thing  kept  fast  till  the  last  minute,  when  all  was 
clewed  up  just  before  the  squall  struck  the  ship. 
The  light  canvas  was  furled,  a  second  reef  taken  in 
the  mizzen  top-sail,  and  the  ship  almost  instantly 
brought  under  short  sail.  The  British  vessels  see 
ing  this  began  to  let  go  and  haul  down  without 
waiting  for  the  wind,  and  were  steering  on  different 
tacks  when  the  first  gust  struck  them.  But  Hull  as 
soon  as  he  got  the  weight  of  the  wind  sheeted 
home,  hoisted  his  fore  and  main-top  gallant  sails, 
and  went  off  on  an  easy  bowline  at  the  rate  of  1 1 
knots.  At  7.40  sight  was  again  obtained  of  the 
enemy,  the  squall  having  passed  to  leeward  ;  the 
Belvidera,  the  nearest  vessel,  had  altered  her  bear 
ings  two  points  to  leeward,  and  was  a  long  way 
astern.  Next  came  the  Shannon  ;  the  Guerriere  and 
^Eolus  were  hull  down,  and  the  Africa  barely  visi 
ble.  The  wind  now  kept  light,  shifting  occasion 
ally  in  a  very  baffling  manner,  but  the  Constitution 
gained  steadily,  wetting  her  sails  from  the  sky-sails 
to  the  courses.  At  6  A.  M,  on  the  morning  of  the 
2Oth  the  pursuers  were  almost  out  of  sight  ;  and 
at  8.15  A.  M.  they  abandoned  the  chase.  Hull  at 


88  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

once  stopped  to  investigate  the  character  of  two 
strange  vessels,  but  found  them  to  be  only  Ameri 
cans  ;  then,  at  midday,  he  stood  toward  the  east, 
and  went  into  Boston  on  July  26th. 

In  this  chase  Captain  Isaac  Hull  was  matched 
against  five  British  captains,  two  of  whom,  Broke 
and  Byron,  were  fully  equal  to  any  in  their  navy  ; 
and  while  the  latter  showed  great  perseverance, 
good  seamanship,  and  ready  imitation,  there  can  be 
no  doubt  that  the  palm  in  every  way  belongs  to 
the  cool  old  Yankee.  Every  daring  expedient 
known  to  the  most  perfect  seamanship  was  tried, 
and  tried  with  success ;  and  no  victorious  fight 
could  reflect  more  credit  on  the  conqueror  than 
this  three  days'  chase  did  on  Hull.  Later,  on  two 
occasions,  the  Constitution  proved  herself  far  su 
perior  in  gunnery  to  the  average  British  frigate ; 
this  time  her  officers  and  men  showed  that  they 
could  handle  the  sails  as  well  as  they  could  the 
guns.  Hull  out-manoeuvred  Broke  and  Byron  as 
cleverly  as  a  month  later  he  out-fought  Dacres. 
His  successful  escape  and  victorious  fight  were 
both  performed  in  a  way  that  place  him  above  any 
single  ship  captain  of  the  war. 

On  Aug.  2d  the  Constitution  made  sail  from  Bos 
ton1  and  stood  to  the  eastward,  in  hopes  of  falling 
in  with  some  of  the  British  cruisers.  She  was  un 
successful,  however,  and  met  nothing.  Then  she 
ran  down  to  the  Bay  of  Fundy,  steered  along  the 
coast  of  Nova  Scotia,  and  thence  toward  New 
foundland,  and  finally  took  her  station  off  Cape 
Race  in  the  Gulf  of  St.  Lawrence,  where  she  took 
and  burned  two  brigs  of  little  value.  On  the  i$th 

1  Letter  of  Capt.  Isaac  Hull,  Aug.  28,  1812. 


NAVAL   WAR    OF    l8l2.  89 

she  recaptured  an  American  brig  from  the  British 
ship-sloop  Avenger,  though  the  latter  escaped  ; 
Capt.  Hull  manned  his  prize  and  sent  her  in.  He 
then  sailed  southward,  and  on  the  night  of  the  i8th 
spoke  a  Salem  privateer  which  gave  him  news  of  a 
British  frigate  to  the  south  ;  thither  he  stood,  and 
at  2  P.  M.  on  the  iQth,  in  lat.  41°  30'  N.  and  55°  W., 
made  out  a  large  sail  bearing  E.  S.  E.  and  to  leeward,1 
which  proved  to  be  his  old  acquaintance,  the  frigate 
Guerriere  Captain  Dacres.  It  was  a  cloudy  day  and 
the  wind  was  blowing  fresh  from  the  northwest.  The 
Guerriere  was  standing  by  the  wind  on  the  starboard 
tack,  under  easy  canvas2;  she  hauled  up  her  courses,, 
took  in  her  top-gallant  sails,  and  at  4.30  backed  her 
main-top  sail.  Hull  then  very  deliberately  began 
to  shorten  sail,  taking  in  top-gallant  sails,  stay-sails,, 
and  flying  jib,  sending  down  the  royal  yards  and 
putting  another  reef  in  the  top-sails.  Soon  the 
Englishman  hoisted  three  ensigns,  when  the  Amer 
ican  also  set  his  colors,  one  at  each  rnast-head,  and 
one  at  the  mizzen  peak. 

The  Constitution  now  ran  down  with  the  wind 
nearly  aft.  The  Guerriere  was  on  the  starboard 
tack,  and  at  five  o'clock  opened  with  her  weather- 
guns,3  the  shot  falling  short,  then  wore  round  and 
fired  her  port  broadside,  of  which  two  shot  struck  her 
opponent,  the  rest  passing  over  and  through  her  rig 
ging.4  As  the  British  frigate  again  wore  to  open  with 

1  Do.,  Aug.  3Oth. 

<J  Letter  of  Capt.  James  R.  Dacres,  Sept.  7,  1812. 

s  Log  of  Guerriere. 

*  See  in  the  Naval  Archives  (Bureau  of  Navigation)  the  Constitution's 
Log-Book  (vol.  ii,  from  Feb.  I,  1812,  to  Dec.  13,  1813).  The  point 
is  of  some  little  importance  because  Hull,  in  his  letter,  speaks  as  if 
both  the  first  broadsides  fell  short,  whereas  the  log  distinctly  says  that 
the  second  went  over  the  ship,  except  two  shot,  which  came  home. 


90  NAVAL    WAR    OF    l8j2. 

her  starboard  battery,  the  Constitution  yawed  a  little 
and  fired  two  or  three  of  her  port  bow-guns.  Three 
or  four  times  the  Guerriere  repeated  this  manoeuvre, 
wearing  and  firing  alternate  broadsides,  but  with 
little  or  no  effect,  while  the  Constitution  yawed  as 
often  to  avoid  being  raked,  and  occasionally  fired 
one  of  her  bow  guns.  This  continued  nearly  an 
hour,  as  the  vessels  were  very  far  apart  when  the  ac 
tion  began,  hardly  any  loss  or  damage  being  in< 
flicted  by  either  party.  At  6.00  the  Guerriere  bore 
up  and  ran  off  under  her  top-sails  and  jib,  with  the 
wind  almost  astern,  a  little  on  her  port  quarter; 
when  the  Constitution  set  her  main-top  gallant  sail 
and  foresail,  and  at  6.05  closed  within  half  pistol- 
shot  distance  on  her  adversary's  port  beam.1  Im 
mediately  a  furious  cannonade  opened,  each  ship 
firing  as  the  guns  bore.  By  the  time  the  ships  were 
fairly  abreast,  at  6.20,  the  Constitution  shot  away  the 
Guerriere  s  mizzen-mast,  which  fell  over  the  star 
board  quarter,  knocking  a  large  hole  in  the  counter, 
and  bringing  the  ship  round  against  her  helm. 
Hitherto  she  had  suffered  very  greatly  and  the  Con 
stitution  hardly  at  all.  The  latter,  finding  that 
she  was  ranging  ahead,  put  her  helm  aport  and  then 
luffed  short  round  her  enemy's  bows,2  delivering  a 
heavy  raking  fire  with  the  starboard  guns  and  shoot 
ing  away  the  Guerriere' s  main-yard.  Then  she  wore 
and  again  passed  her  adversary's  bows,  raking  with 
her  port  guns.  The  mizzen-mast  of  the  Guerriere, 
dragging  in  the  water,  had  by  this  time  pulled  her 

The  hypothesis  of  the  Guerriere  having  damaged  powder  was  founded 
purely  on  this  supposed  falling  short  of  the  first  two  broadsides. 

'"Autobiography  of  Commodore  Morris"  (Annapolis,  1880),  p. 
164. 

2  Log  of  Constitution. 


NAVAL   WAR    OF    l8l2.  91 

bow  round  till  the  wind  came  on  her  starboard 
quarter  ;  and  so  near  were  the  two  ships  that  the 
Englishman's  bowsprit  passed  diagonally  over  the 
Constitution  s  quarter-deck,  and  as  the  latter  ship  fell 
off  it  got  foul  of  her  mizzen-rigging,  and  the  vessels 
then  lay  with  the  Guerrtire  s  starboard  bow  against 
the  Constitution  s  port,  or  lee  quarter-gallery.1  The 
Englishman's  bow  guns  played  havoc  with  Captain 
Hull's  cabin,  setting  fire  to  it;  but  the  flames  were 
soon  extinguished  by  Lieutenant  Hoffmann.  On 
both  sides  the  boarders  were  called  away  ;  the  Brit 
ish  ran  forward,  but  Captain  Dacres  relinquished  the 
idea  of  attacking  *  when  he  saw  the  crowds  of  men 
on  the  American's  decks.  Meanwhile,  on  the  Constitu 
tion^  the  boarders  and  marines  gathered  aft,  but  such 
a  heavy  sea  was  running  that  they  could  not  get  on 
the  Gucrriere.  Both  sides  suffered  heavily  from  the 
closeness  of  the  musketry  fire  ;  indeed,  almost  the 
entire  loss  on  the  Constitution  occurred  at  this  junct 
ure.  As  Lieutenant  Bush,  of  the  marines,  sprang 
upon  the  taffrail  to  leap  on  the  enemy's  decks,  a 
British  marine  shot  him  dead  ;  Mr.  Morris,  the  first 
Lieutenant,  and  Mr.  Alwyn,  the  master,  had  also 
both  leaped  on  the  taffrail,  and  both  were  at  the 
same  moment  wounded  by  the  musketry  fire.  On 
the  Guerriere  the  loss  was  far  heavier,  almost  all  the 
men  on  the  forecastle  being  picked  off.  Captain 
Dacres  himself  was  shot  in  the  back  and  severely 
wounded  by  one  of  the  American  mizzen  topmen, 
while  he  was  standing  on  the  starboard  forecastle 
hammocks  cheering  on  his  crew3;  two  of  the  lieu- 

1  Cooper,  in  "  Putnam's  Magazine,"  i,  475. 

*  Address  of  Captain  Dacres  to  the  court-martial  at  Halifax. 

3  James,  vi,  144. 


92  NAVAL   WAR    OF    l8l2. 

tenants  and  the  master  were  also  shot  down.  The 
ships  gradually  worked  round  till  the  wind  was  again 
on  the  port  quarter,  when  they  separated,  and  the 
Guerrtires  foremast  and  main-mast  at  once  went  by 
the  board,  and  fell  over  on  the  starboard  side,  leav 
ing  her  a  defenseless  hulk,  rolling  her  main-deck 
guns  into  the  water.1  At  6.30  the  Constitution 
hauled  aboard  her  tacks,  ran  off  a  little  distance  to  the 
eastward,  and  lay  to.  Her  braces  and  standing  and 
running  rigging  were  much  cut  up  and  some  of  the 
spars  wounded,  but  a  few  minutes  sufficed  to  repair 
damages,  when  Captain  Hull  stood  under  his  ad 
versary's  lee,  and  the  latter  at  once  struck,  at  7.00 
P.  M.,2  just  two  hours  after  she  had  fired  the  first 
shot.  On  the  part  of  the  Constitution,  however,  the 
actual  fighting,  exclusive  of  six  or  eight  guns  fired 
during  the  first  hour,  while  closing,  occupied  less 
than  30  minutes. 

The  tonnage  and  metal  of  the  combatants  have 
already  been  referred  to.  The  Constitution  had,  as 
already  said,  about  456  men  aboard,  while  of  the 
Guerrtire  s  crew,  267  prisoners  were  received  aboard 
the  Constitution  ;  deducting  10  who  were  Americans 
and  would  not  fight,  and  adding  the  15  killed  out 
right,  we  get  272  ;  28  men  were  absent  in  prizes. 

COMPARATIVE     FORCE. 

Comparative 

Broad-  Comparative  loss 

Tons.  Guns.      side.      Men.  Loss.        Force.  Inflicted. 

Constitution     1576     27         684       456     14       i.oo  I.oo 

Guerriere          1338     25          556       272     79         .70  .18 

The  loss  of   the  Constitution  included  Lieutenant 

1  Brenton,  v,  51. 

2  Log  of  the  Constitution. 


CONSTITUTION 


This  diagram  is  taken  from  Commodute 
Morris'  autobiography  ami  the  log  of  the 
Guerritre  ;  the  official  accounts  apparently 
consider  "larboard"  and  "starboard"  as 
interchangeable  terms. 


6.30 


94  NAVAL    \VAR    OF    l8l2. 

William  S.  Bush,  of  the  marines,  and  six  seamen 
killed,  and  her  first  lieutenant,  Charles  Morris,  Mas 
ter,  John  C.  Alwyn,  four  seamen,  and  one  marine, 
wounded.  Total,  seven  killed  and  seven  wounded. 
Almost  all  this  loss  occurred  when  the  ships  came 
foul,  and  was  due  to  the  Guerriere' s  musketry  and 
the  two  guns  in  her  bridle-ports. 

The  Guerriere  lost  23  killed  and  mortally  wounded, 
including  her  second  lieutenant,  Henry  Ready,  and 
56  wounded  severely  and  slightly,  including  Captain 
Dacres  himself,  the  first  lieutenant,  Bartholomew 
Kent,  Master,  Robert  Scott,  two  master's  mates, 
and  one  midshipman. 

The  third  lieutenant  of  the .  Constitution,  Mr. 
George  Campbell  Read,  was  sent  on  board  the  prize, 
and  the  Constitution  remained  by  her  during  the 
night  ;  but  at  daylight  it  was  found  that  she  was  in 
danger  of  sinking.  Captain  Hull  at  once  began  re 
moving  the  prisoners,  and  at  three  o'clock  in  the  af 
ternoon  set  the  Guerriere  on  fire,  and  in  a  quarter  of 
an  hour  she  blew  up.  He  then  set  sail  for  Boston, 
where  he  arrived  on  August  3Oth.  "  Captain  Hull 
and  his  officers,"  writes  Captain  Dacres  in  his  offi 
cial  letter,  "  have  treated  us  like  brave  and  generous 
enemies  ;  the  greatest  care  has  been  taken  that  we 
should  not  lose  the  smallest  trifle." 

The  British  laid  very  great  stress  on  the  rotten 
and  decayed  condition  of  the  Guerriere;  mention 
ing  in  particular  that  the  main-mast  fell  solely  be 
cause  of  the  weight  of  the  falling  foremast.  But  it 
must  be  remembered  that  until  the  action  occurred 
she  was  considered  a  very  fine  ship.  Thus,  in 
Brighton's  "  Memoir  of  Admiral  Broke,"  it  is  de 
clared  that  Dacres  freely  expressed  the  opinion  that 


NAVAL    WAR    OF    l8l2.  95 

she  could  take  a  ship  in  half  the  time  the  Shannon 
could.  The  fall  of  the  main-mast  occurred  when  the 
fight  was  practically  over ;  it  had  no  influence  what 
ever  on  the  conflict.  It  was  also  asserted  that  her 
powder  was  bad,  but  on  no  authority  ;  her  first 
broadside  fell  short,  but  so,  under  similar  circum 
stances,  did  the  first  broadside  of  the  United  Sfates* 
None  of  these  causes  account  for  the  fact  that  her 
shot  did  not  hit.  Her  opponent  was  of  such  superior 
force — nearly  in  the  proportion  of  3  to  2 — that  suc 
cess  would  have  been  very  difficult  in  any  event,  and 
no  one  can  doubt  the  gallantry  and  pluck  with  which 
the  British  ship  was  fought ;  but  the  execution  was 
very  greatly  disproportioned  to  the  force.  The  gun 
nery  of  the  Gucrricre  was  very  poor,  and  that  of  the 
Constitution  excellent ;  during  the  few  minutes  the 
ships  were  yard-arm  and  yard-arm,  the  latter  was  not 
hulled  once,  while  no  less  than  30  shot  took  effect 
on  the  former's  engaged  side,'  five  sheets  of  copper 
beneath  the  bends.  The  Guerriere,  moreover,  was 
out-manoeuvred ;  "  in  wearing  several  times  and  ex 
changing  broadsides  in  such  rapid  and  continual 
changes  of  position,  her  fire  was  much  more  harm 
less  than  it  would  have  been  if  she  had  kept  more 
steady."2  The  Constitution  was  handled  faultless 
ly  ;  Captain  Hull  displayed  the  coolness  and  skill  of 
a  veteran  in  the  way  in  which  he  managed,  first  to- 
avoid  being  raked,  and  then  to  improve  the  advan 
tage  which  the  precision  and  rapidity  of  his  fire  had: 
gained.  ''  After  making  every  allowance  claimed  by 
the  enemy,  the  character  of  this  victory  is  not  es 
sentially  altered.  Its  peculiarities  were  a  fine  dis- 

•  Captain  Dacres'  address  to  the  court-martial. 

2  Lord  Howard  Douglass,  "  Treatise  on  Naval  Gunnery"  (London, 
1851),  p.  454. 


g6  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

play  of  seamanship  in  the  approach,  extraordinary 
efficiency  in  the  attack,  and  great  readiness  in  re 
pairing  damages ;  all  of  which  denote  cool  and  ca 
pable  officers,  with  an  expert  and  trained  crew ;  in  a 
word,  a  disciplined  man-of-war."  '  The  disparity  of 
force,  10  to  7,  is  not  enough  to  account  for  the  dis 
parity  of  execution,  10  to  2.  Of  course,  something 
must  be  allowed  for  the  decayed  state  of  the  Eng 
lishman's  masts,  although  I  really  do  not  think  it 
had  any  influence  on  the  battle,  for  he  was  beaten 
when  the  main-mast  fell  ;  and  it  must  be  remem 
bered,  on  the  other  hand,  that  the  American  crew 
was  absolutely  new,  while  the  Guerriere  was  manned 
by  old  hands.  So  that,  while  admitting  and  admir 
ing  the  gallantry,  and,  on  the  whole,  the  seamanship 
of  Captain  Dacres  and  his  crew,  and  acknowledging 
that  he  fought  at  a  great  disadvantage,  especially  in 
being  short-handed,  yet  all  must  acknowledge  that 
the  combat  showed  a  marked  superiority,  particular 
ly  in  gunnery,  on  the  part  of  the  Americans.  Had 
the  ships  not  come  foul,  Captain  Hull  would  prob 
ably  not  have  lost  more  than  three  or  four  men  ;  as 
it  was,  he  suffered  but  slightly.  That  the  Guerriere 
was  not  so  weak  as  she  was  represented  to  be  can 
be  gathered  from  the  fact  that  she  mounted  two 
more  main-deck  guns  than  the  rest  of  her  class;  thus 
carrying  on  her  main-deck  30  long  i8-pounders  in 
battery,  to  oppose  to  the  30  long  24*5,  or  rather  (al 
lowing  for  the  short  weight  of  shot)  long  22's,  of  the 
Constitution.  Characteristically  enough,  James, 
though  he  carefully  reckons  in  the  long  bow- 
chasers  in  the  bridle-ports  of  the  Argus  and 
Enterprise,  yet  refuses  to  count  the  two  long 

'Cooper,  ii,  173. 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  97 

eighteens  mounted  through  the  bridle-ports  on  the 
Guerrtircs  main-deck.  Now,  as  it  turned  out,  these 
two  bow  guns  were  used  very  effectively,  when 
the  ships  got  foul,  and  caused  more  damage  and 
loss  than  all  of  the  other  main-deck  guns  put  to 
gether. 

Captain  Dacres,  very  much  to  his  credit,  allowed 
the  ten  Americans  on  board  to  go  below,  so  as  not 
to  fight  against  their  flag;  and  in  his  address  to 
the  court-martial  mentions,  among  the  reasons  for 
his  defeat,  "  that  he  was  very  much  weakened  by 
permitting  the  Americans  on  board  to  quit  their 
quarters."  Coupling  this  with  the  assertion  made 
by  James  and  most  other  British  writers  that  the 
Constitution  was  largely  manned  by  Englishmen,  we 
reach  the  somewhat  remarkable  conclusion,  that  the 
British  ship  was  defeated  because  the  Americans  on 
board  would  not  fight  against  their  country,  and 
that  the  American  was  victorious  because  the  Brit 
ish  on  board  would.  However,  as  I  have  shown, 
in  reality  there  were  probably  not  a  score  of  British 
on  board  the  Constitution. 

In  this,  as  well  as  the  two  succeeding  frigate  ac 
tions,  every  one  must  admit  that  there  was  a 
great  superiority  in  force  on  the  side  of  the  victors, 
and  British  historians  have  insisted  that  this  superi 
ority  was  so  great  as  to  preclude  any  hopes  of  a 
successful  resistance.  That  this  was  not  true,  and 
that  the  disparity  between  the  combatants  was  not 
as  great  as  had  been  the  case  in  a  number  of  en 
counters  in  which  English  frigates  had  taken  French 
ones,  can  be  best  shown  by  a  few  accounts  taken 
from  the  French  historian  Troude,  who  would  cer 
tainly  not  exaggerate  the  difference.  Thus  on 


98  NAVAL   WAR   OF    1 8 12. 

March  I,  1799,  the  English  38-gun  i8-pounder 
frigate  Sybil,  captured  the  French  44-gun  24-pounder 
frigate  Forte,  after  an  action  of  two  hours  and  ten 
minutes.1  In  actual  weight  the  shot  thrown  by  one 
of  the  main-deck  guns  of  the  defeated  Forte  was 
over  six  pounds  heavier  than  the  shot  thrown  by 
one  of  the.  main-deck  guns  of  the  victorious  Consti 
tution  or  United  States? 

There  are  later  examples  than  this.  But  a  very 
few  years  before  the  declaration  of  war  by  the 
United  States,  and  in  the  same  struggle  that  was 
then  still  raging,  there  had  been  at  least  two  vic 
tories  gained  by  English  frigates  over  French  foes  as 
superior  to  themselves  as  the  American  44*3  were  to 
the  British  ships  they  captured.  On  Aug  10,  1805, 
the  Ph&nix,  36,  captured  the  Didon,  40,  after  3^- 
hours'  fighting,  the  comparative  broadside  force 
being:3 

PHOENIX.  DIDON. 

13X18  14X18 

2X    9  2X    8 

6X32  7X36 


21  guns,  444  Ibs.  23  guns,  522   Ibs. 

(nominal;  about 
600,  real). 

On  March  8,  1808,  the  San  Florenzo,  36,  captured 
the  Piedmontaise,  40,  the  force  being  exactly  what  it 
was  in  the  case  of  the  Phoenix  and  Didon?  Com- 


1  "Batailles  Navales  de  la  France."     O.  Troude  (Paris,  1868),  iv, 
171. 

2  See  Appendix  B,  for  actual  weight  of  French  shot. 
8 Ibid.,  iii,  425.  *  Ibid.,  iii,  499. 


NAVAL    WAR    OF    l8l2.  99 

paring  the  real,  not  the  nominal  weight  of  metal, 
we  find  that  the  Didon  and  PMmontaise  were 
proportionately  of  greater  force  compared  to  the 
PJicenix  and  San  Florence,  than  the  Constitution  was 
compared  to  the  Guerrtire  or  Java.  The  French 
i8's  threw  each  a  shot  weighing  but  about  two 
pounds  less  than  that  thrown  by  an  American  24  of 
1812,  while  their  36-pound  carronades  each  threw  a 
shot  over  TO  pounds  heavier  than  that  thrown  by 
one  of  the  Constitution  s  spar-deck  32*5. 

That  a  24-pounder  can  not  always  whip  an  18- 
pounder  frigate  is  shown  by  the  action  of  the 
British  frigate  Eurotas  with  the  French  frigate 
CJilorinde,  on  Feb.  25,  1814.'  The  first  with  a  crew 
of  329  men  threw  625  pounds  of  shot  at  a  broad 
side,  the  latter  carrying  344  men  and  throwing  463 
pounds ;  yet  the  result  was  indecisive.  The  French 
lost  90  and  the  British  60  men.  The  action  showed 
that  heavy  metal  was  not  of  much  use  unless  used 
well. 

To  appreciate  rightly  the  exultation  Hull's  vic 
tory  caused  in  the  United  States,  and  the  intense 
annoyance  it  created  in  England,  it  must  be  re- 
memfrered  that  during  the  past  twenty  years  the 
Island  Power  had  been  at  war  with  almost  every 
state  in  Europe,  at  one  time  or  another,  and  in  the 
course  of  about  two  hundred  single  conflicts  be 
tween  ships  of  approximately  equal  force  (that  is, 
where  the  difference  was  less  than  one  half),  waged 
against  French,  Spanish,  Italian,  Turkish,  Algerine, 
Russian,  Danish,  and  Dutch  antagonists,  her  ships 
had  been  beaten  and  captured  in  but  five  instances. 
Then  war  broke  out  with  America,  and  in  eight 

1  James,  vi,  391. 


100  NAVAL   WAR   OF    1 8 12. 

months  five  single-ship  actions  occurred,  in  every 
one  of  which  the  British  vessel  was  captured. 
Even  had  the  victories  been  due  solely  to  superior 
force  this  would  have  been  no  mean  triumph  for 
the  United  States. 

On  October  13,  1812,  the  American  i8-gun  ship- 
sloop  Wasp,  Captain  Jacob  Jones,  with  137  men 
aboard,  sailed  from  the  Delaware  and  ran  off  south 
east  to  get  into  the  track  of  the  West  India  vessels ; 
on  the  i6th  a  heavy  gale  began  to  blow,  causing  the 
loss  of  the  jib-boom  and  two  men  who  were  on  it. 
The  next  day  the  weather  moderated  somewhat, 
and  at  11.30  P.  M.,  in  latitude  37°  N.,  longitude  65° 
W.,  several  sail  were  descried.1  These  were  part  of 
a  convoy  of  14  merchant-men  which  had  quitted  the 
bay  of  Honduras  on  September  1 2th,  bound  for  Eng 
land,2  under  the  convoy  of  the  British  i8-gun  brig- 
sloop  Frolic,  of  19  guns  and  110  men.  Captain 
Thomas  Whinyates.  They  had  been  dispersed  by 
the  gale  of  the  i6th,  during  which  the  Frolic 's  main- 
yard  was  carried  away  and  both  her  top-sails  torn  to 
pieces  3  ;  next  day  she  spent  in  repairing  damages, 
and  by  dark  six  of  the  missing  ships  had  joined  her. 
The  day  broke  almost  cloudless  on  the  i8th  (Sun 
day),  showing  the  convoy,  ahead  and  to  leeward  of 
the  American  ship,  still  some  distance  off,  as  Captain 
Jones  had  not  thought  it  prudent  to  close  during 
the  night,  while  he  was  ignorant  of  the  force  of  his 
antagonists.  The  Wasp  now  sent  down  her  top-gal 
lant  yards,  close  reefed  her  top-sails,  and  bore  down 
under  short  fighting  canvas  ;  while  the  Frolic  removed 

1  Capt.  Jones'  official  letter,  Nov.  24,  1812. 

2  James'  History,  vi,  158. 

3  Capt.  Whinyates'  official  letter,  Oct.  18,  1812 


NAVAL   WAR    OF    l8l2.  IOI 

her  main-yard  from  the  casks,  lashed  it  on  deck, 
and  then  hauled  to  the  wind  under  her  boom  main-sail 
and  close-reefed  foretop-sail,  hoisting  Spanish  colors 
to  decoy  the  stranger  under  her  guns,  and  permit 
the  convoy  to  escape.  At  1 1.32  the  action  began— 
the  two  ships  running  parallel  on  the  starboard  tack, 
not  60  yards  apart,  the  Wasp  firing  her  port,  and  the 
Frolic  her  starboard,  guns.  The  latter  fired  very 
rapidly,  delivering  three  broadsides  to  the  Wasp's 
two,1  both  crews  cheering  loudly  as  the  ships  wal 
lowed  through  the  water.  There  was  a  very  heavy 
sea  running,  which  caused  the  vessels  to  pitch  and 
roll  heavily.  The  Americans  fired  as  the  engaged 
side  of  their  ship  was  going  down,  aiming  at  their 
opponent's  hull2 ;  while  the  British  delivered  their 
broadsides  while  on  the  crests  of  the  seas,  the  shot 
going  high.  The  water  dashed  in  clouds  of  spray 
over  both  crews,  and  the  vessels  rolled  so  that  the 
muzzles  of  the  guns  went  under.3  But  in  spite  of 
the  rough  weather,  the  firing  was  not  only  spirited 
but  well  directed.  At  11.36  the  Wasp's  maintop- 
mast  was  shot  away  and  fell,  with  its  yard,  across 
the  port  fore  and  foretop-sail  braces,  rendering  the 
head  yards  unmanageable;  at  11.46  the  gaff  and 
mizzentop-gallant  mast  came  down,  and  by  11.52 
every  brace  and  most  of  the  rigging  was  shot  away.4 
It  would  now  have  been  very  difficult  to  brace 
any  of  the  yards.  But  meanwhile  the  Frolic  suf 
fered  dreadfully  in  her  hull  and  lower  masts,  and  had 
her  gaff  and  head  braces  shot  away.5  The  slaughter 
among  her  crew  was  very  great,  but  the  survivors 
kept  at  their  work  with  the  dogged  courage  of  their 

1  Cooper,  182.  2  Niles'  Register,  iii,  p.  324.  3  Do. 

4  Capt.  Jones'  letter.  5  Capt.  Whinyates'  letter. 


IO2  NAVAL    WAR    OF    l8l2. 

race.  At  first  the  two  vessels  ran  side  by  side,  but 
the  American  gradually  forged  ahead,  throwing  in 
her  fire  from  a  position  in  which  she  herself  received 
little  injury  ;  by  degrees  the  vessels  got  so  close  that 
the  Americans  struck  the  Frolic  s  side  with  their  ram 
mers  in  loading,1  and  the  British  brig  was  raked 
with  dreadful  effect.  The  Frolic  then  fell  aboard  her 
antagonist,  her  jib-boom  coming  in  between  the 
main-  and  mizzen-rigging  of  the  Wasp  and  passing 
over  the  heads  of  Captain  Jones  and  Lieutenant 
Biddle,  who  were  standing  near  the  capstan.  This 
forced  the  Wasp  up  in  the  wind,  and  she  again  raked 
her  antagonist,  Captain  Jones  trying  to  restrain  his 
men  from  boarding  till  he  could  put  in  another 
broadside.  But  they  could  no  longer  be  held  back, 
and  Jack  Lang,  a  New  Jersey  seaman,  leaped  on  the 
Frolic  s  bowsprit.  Lieutenant  Biddle  then  mounted 
on  the  hammock  cloth  to  board,  but  his  feet  got 
entangled  in  the  rigging,  and  one  of  the  midship 
men  seizing  his  coat-tails  to  help  himself  up,  the 
lieutenant  tumbled  back  on  the  deck.  At  the  next 
swell  he  succeeded  in  getting  on  the  bowsprit,  on 
which  there  were  already  two  seamen  whom  he 
passed  on  the  forecastle.  But  there  was  no  one  to 
oppose  him  ;  not  twenty  Englishmen  were  left  un 
hurt.2  The  man  at  the  wheel  was  still  at  his  post, 
grim  and  undaunted,  and  two  or  three  more  were 
on  deck,  including  Captain  Whinyates  and  Lieu 
tenant  Wintle,  both  so  severely  wounded  that  they 
could  not  stand  without  support.3  There  could  be 
no  more  resistance,  and  Lieutenant  Biddle  lowered 
the  flag  at  12.15 — Just  43  minutes  after  the  begin- 

1  Capt.  Jones'  letter.  2  Capt.  Whinyates'  letter. 

3  James,  vi,    161. 


NAVAL    WAR    OF    l8l2.  103 

ning  of  the  fight.1  A  minute  or  two  afterward  both 
the  Frolic  s  masts  went  by  the  board — the  foremast 
about  fifteen  feet  above  the  deck,  the  other  short 
off.  Of  her  crew,  as  already  said,  not  twenty  men 
had  escaped  unhurt.  Every  officer  was  wounded  ; 
two  of  them,  the  first  lieutenant,  Charles  McKay, 
and  master,  John  Stephens,  soon  died.  Her  total 
loss  was  thus  over  go2;  about  30  of  whom  were 
killed  outright  or  died  later.  The  Wasp  suffered 
very  severely  in  her  rigging  and  aloft  generally,  but 
only  two  or  three  shots  struck  her  hull  ;  five  of  her 
men  were  killed — two  in  her  mizzen-top  and  one  in 
her  maintop-mast  rigging — and  five  wounded,3 
chiefly  while  aloft. 

The  two  vessels  were  practically  of  equal  force. 
The  loss  of  the  Frolic  s  main-yard  had  merely  con 
verted  her  into  a  brigantine,  and,  as  the  roughness 
of  the  sea  made  it  necessary  to  fight  under  very 
short  canvas,  her  inferiority  in  men  was  fully  com 
pensated  for  by  her  superiority  in  metal.  She  had 
been  desperately  defended  ;  no  men  could  have 
fought  more  bravely  than  Captain  Whinyates  and 
his  crew.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Americans  had 
done  their  work  with  a  coolness  and  skill  that  could 
not  be  surpassed ;  the  contest  had  been  mainly  one 
of  gunnery,  and  had  been  decided  by  the  greatly 
superior  judgment  and  accuracy  with  which  they 
fired.  Both  officers  and  crew  had  behaved  well ; 
Captain  Jones  particularly  mentions  Lieutenant 
Ciaxton,  who,  though  too  ill  to  be  of  any  service, 

1  Capt.  Jones'  letter. 

2  Capt.  Whinyates'  official  letter  thus  states  it,  and  is,  of  course,  to 
be  taken  as  authority  ;  the  Bermuda  account  makes  it  69,  and  James 
only  62. 

*  Capt.  Jones'  letter. 


104  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

persisted  in  remaining   on  deck   throughout  the  en 
gagement.  DIAGRAM.  ' 


1  It  is  difficult  to  reconcile  the  accounts  of  the  manoeuvres  in  this 
action.  James  says  "larboard"  where  Cooper  says  "starboard"; 
one  says  the  Wasp  wore,  the  other  says  that  she  could  not  do  so,  etc. 

The  Wasp  was  armed  with  2  long  I2's  and  16 
32-pound  carronades ;  the  Frolic  with  2  long  6's,  16 
32-pound  carronades,  and  i  shifting  1 2-pound  car- 
ronade. 

COMPARATIVE   FORCE. 

Tons.     No.  Guns.     Weight  Metal.     Crews.     Loss. 
Wasp  450  9  250  135  10 

Frolic  467  10  274  no  90 

Vice-Admiral  Jurien  de  la  Graviere  comments  on 
this  action  as  follows2: 

44  The  American  fire  showed  itself  to  be  as  accu 
rate  as  it  was  rapid.  On  occasions  when  the  rough 
ness  of  the  sea  would  seem  to  render  all  aim  exces- 


'  Guerres  Maritimes,"  ii,  287  (Septieme  Edition.  Paris,  1881). 


NAVAL    WAR    OF    l8l2.  10$ 

sively  uncertain,  the  effects  of  their  artillery  were 
not  less  murderous  than  under  more  advantageous 
conditions.  The  corvette  Wasp  fought  the  brig 
Frolic  in  an  enormous  sea,  under  very  short  canvas, 
and  yet,  forty  minutes  after  the  beginning  of  the 
action,  when  the  two  vessels  came  together,  the 
Americans  who  leaped  aboard  the  brig  found  on  the 
deck,  covered  with  dead  and  dying,  but  one  brave 
man,  who  had  not  left  the  wheel,  and  three  officers, 
all  wounded,  who  threw  down  their  swords  at  the 
feet  of  the  victors."  Admiral  de  la  Graviere's  criti 
cisms  are  especially  valuable,  because  they  are  those 
of  an  expert,  who  only  refers  to  the  war  of  1812  in 
order  to  apply  to  the  French  navy  the  lessons  which 
it  teaches,  and  who  is  perfectly  unprejudiced.  He 
cares  for  the  lesson  taught,  not  the  teacher,  and  is 
quite  as  willing  to  learn  from  the  defeat  of  the 
Chesapeake  as  from  the  victories  of  the  Constitution 
— while  most  American  critics  only  pay  heed  to  the 
latter. 

The  characteristics  of  the  action  are  the  practical 
equality  of  the  contestants  in  point  of  force  and 
the  enormous  disparity  in  the  damage  each  suffered  ; 
numerically,  the  Wasp  was  superior  by  5  per  cent., 
and  inflicted  a  ninefold  greater  loss. 

Captain  Jones  was  not  destined  to  bring  his  prize 
into  port,  for  a  few  hours  afterward  the  Poictiers,  a 
British  74,  Captain  John  Poer  Beresford,  hove  in 
sight.  Now  appeared  the  value  of  the  Frolic  s  des 
perate  defence;  if  she  could  not  prevent  herself 
from  being  captured,  she  had  at  least  ensured  her 
own  recapture,  and  also  the  capture  of  the  foe. 
When  the  Wasp  shook  out  her  sails  they  were 
found  to  be  cut  into  ribbons  aloft,  and  she  could 


106  NAVAL  WAR   OF    l8l2. 

not  make  off  with  sufficient  speed.  As  the  Poictiers 
passed  the  Frolic,  rolling  like  a  log  in  the  water,  she 
threw  a  shot  over  her,  and  soon  overtook  the  Wasp. 
Both  vessels  were  carried  into  Bermuda.  Captain 
Whinyates  was  again  put  in  command  of  the  Frolic. 
Captain  Jones  and  his  men  were  soon  exchanged ; 
25,000  dollars  prize-money  was  voted  them  by  Con 
gress,  and  the  Captain  and  Lieutenant  Biddle  were 
both  promoted,  the  former  receiving  the  captured 
ship  Macedonian.  Unluckily  the  blockade  was  too 
close  for  him  to  succeed  in  getting  out  during  the 
remainder  of  the  war. 

On  Oct.  8th  Commodore  Rodgers  left  Boston  on 
his  second  cruise,  with  the  President,  United  States, 
Congress,  and  Argus?  leaving  the  Hornet  in  port. 
Four  days  out,  the  United  States  and  Argus  sepa 
rated,  while  the  remaining  two  frigates  continued 
their  cruise  together.  The  Argus?  Captain  Sinclair, 
cruised  to  the  eastward,  making  prizes  of  6  valua 
ble  merchant-men,  and  returned  to  port  on  January 
3d.  During  the  cruise  she  was  chased  for  three 
days  and  three  nights  (the  latter  being  moonlight) 
by  a  British  squadron,  and  was  obliged  to  cut  away 
her  boats  and  anchors  and  start  some  of  her  water. 
But  she  saved  her  guns,  and  was  so  cleverly  han 
dled  that  during  the  chase  she  actually  succeeding 
in  taking  and  manning  a  prize,  though  the  enemy 
got  near  enough  to  open  fire  as  the  vessels  sepa 
rated.  Before  relating  what  befell  the  United  States, 
we  shall  bring  Commodore  Rodgers'  cruise  to  an 
end. 

On  Oct.  loth  the  Commodore  chased,  but  failed 

1  Letter  of  Commodore  Rodgers,  Jan.  I,  1813. 
3  Letter  of  Capt.  Arthur  Sinclair,  Jan.  4,  1813. 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    1 8 12.  107 

to  overtake,  the  British  frigate  Nymphe,  38,  Captain 
Epworth.  On  the  i8th,  off  the  great  Bank  of  New 
foundland,  he  captured  the  Jamaica  packet  Swal 
low,  homeward  bound,  with  200,000  dollars  in 
specie  aboard.  On  the  3ist,  at  9  A.M.,  lat.  33°  N., 
long.  32°  W.,  his  two  frigates  fell  in  with  the  British 
frigate  Galatea,  36,  Captain  Woodley  Losack,  con 
voying  two  South  Sea  ships,  to  windward.  The 
Galatea  ran  down  to  reconnoitre,  and  at  10  A.  M., 
recognizing  her  foes,  hauled  up  on  the  starboard 
tack  to  escape.  The  American  frigates  made  all  sail 
in  chase,  and  continued  beating  to  windward,  tack 
ing  several  times,  for  about  three  hours.  Seeing 
that  she  was  being  overhauled,  the  Galatea  now 
edged  away  to  get  on  her  best  point  of  sailing  ;  at 
the  same  moment  one  of  her  convoy,  the  Argo, 
bore  up  to  cross  the  hawse  of  her  foes,  but  was  in 
tercepted  by  the  Congress,  who  lay  to  to  secure  her. 
Meanwhile  the  President  kept  after  the  Galatea  ; 
she  set  her  top-mast,  top-gallant  mast  and  lower 
studding-sails,  and  when  it  was  dusk  had  gained 
greatly  upon  her.  But  the  night  was  very  dark, 
the  President  lost  sight  of  the  chase,  and,  toward 
midnight,  hauled  to  the  wind  to  rejoin  her  consort. 
The  two  frigates  cruised  to  the  east  as  far  as  22°  W., 
and  then  ran  down  to  17°  N. ;  but  during  the  month 
of  November  they  did  not  see  a  sail.  They  had 
but  slightly  better  luck  on  their  return  toward 
home.  Passing  120  miles  north  of  Bermuda,  and 
cruising  a  little  while  toward  the  Virginia  capes, 
they  reentered  Boston  on  Dec.  3ist,  having  made 
9  prizes,  most  of  them  of  little  value. 

When  four  days  out,   on  Oct.  I2th,  Commodore 
Decatur   had  separated  from  the  rest  of  Rodgers' 


108  NAVAL   WAR   OF    1 8 12. 

squadron  and  cruised  east ;  on  the  25th,  in  lat.  29° 
N.,  and  long.  29°  30',  W.  while  going  close-hauled  on 
the  port  tack,  with  the  wind  fresh  from  the  S.  S. 
E.,  a  sail  was  descried  on  the  weather  beam, 
about  12  miles  distant.1  This  was  the  British  38- 
gun  frigate  Macedonian,  Captain  John  Surnam  Car- 
den.  She  was  not,  like  the  Guerriere,  an  old  ship 
captured  from  the  French,  but  newly  built  of  oak, 
and  larger  than  any  American  i8-pounder  frigate; 
she  was  reputed  (very  wrongfully)  to  be  a  "  crack 
ship."  According  to  Lieut.  David  Hope,  "  the 
state  of  discipline  on  board  was  excellent  ;  in  no 
British  ship  was  more  attention  paid  to  gunnery. 
Before  this  cruise  the  ship  had  been  engaged  almost 
every  day  with  the  enemy ;  and  in  time  of  peace 
the  crew  were  constantly  exercised  at  the  great 
guns."  2  How  they  could  have  practised  so  much 
and  learned  so  little  is  certainly  marvellous. 

The  Macedonian  set  her  foretop-mast  and  top 
gallant  studding  sails  and  bore  away  in  chase,3  edg 
ing  down  with  the  wind  a  little  aft  the  starboard 
beam.  Her  first  lieutenant  wished  to  continue  on 
this  course  and  pass  down  ahead  of  the  United 
States*  but  Captain  Garden's  over-anxiety  to  keep  the 
weather-gage  lost  him  this  opportunity  of  closing.5 
Accordingly  he  hauled  by  the  wind  and  passed 
way  to  windward  of  the  American.  As  Commo 
dore  Decatur  got  within  range,  he  eased  off  and 
fired  a  broadside,  most  of  which  fell  short6 ;  he  then 

1  Official  letter  of  Commodore  Decatur,  Oct.  30,  1812. 
'*  Marshall's  "  Naval  Biography,"  vol.  iv,  p.  1018. 
sCapt.  Garden  to  Mr.  Croker,  Oct.  28,  1812. 
4  James,  vi,  166. 

'"  Sentence  of  Court-martial  held  on  the  San  Domingo,  74,  at  the 
Bermudas,  May  27,  1812.  6  Marshall,  iv,  1080. 


NAVAL    WAR    OF    1 8 12.  1OO, 

kept  his  luff,  and, the  next  time  he  fired, his  long  24*5 
told  heavily,  while  he  received  very  little  injury 
himself.1  The  fire  from  his  main-deck  (for  he  did 
not  use  his  carronades  at  all  for  the  first  half  hour)2 
was  so  very  rapid  that  it  seemed  as  if  the  ship  was 
on  fire  ;  his  broadsides  were  delivered  with  almost 
twice  the  rapidity  of  those  of  the  Englishman.3 
The  latter  soon  found  he  could  not  play  at  long 
bowls  with  any  chance  of  success  ;  and,  having  al 
ready  erred  either  from  timidity  or  bad  judgment, 
Captain  Garden  decided  to  add  rashness  to  the  cat 
alogue  of  his  virtues.  Accordingly  he  bore  up,  and 
came  down  end  on  toward  his  adversary,  with  the 
wind  on  his  port  quarter.  The  States  now  (10.15) 
laid  her  main-topsail  aback  and  made  heavy  play 
with  her  long  guns,  and,  as  her  adversary  came 
nearer,  with  her  carronades  also.  The  British  ship 
would  reply  with  her  starboard  guns,  hauling  up  to 
do  so  ;  as  she  came  down,  the  American  would  ease 
off,  run  a  little  way  and  again  come  to,  keeping  up 
a  terrific  fire.  As  the  Macedonian  bore  down  to 
close,  the  chocks  of  all  her  forecastle  guns  (which 
were  mounted  on  the  outside)  were  cut  away4 ;  her 
fire  caused  some  damage  to  the  American's  rigging, 
but  hardly  touched  her  hull,  while  she  herself  suf 
fered  so  heavily  both  alow  and  aloft  that  she  grad 
ually  dropped  to  leeward,  while  the  American  fore- 
reached  on  her.  Finding  herself  ahead  and  to 
windward,  the  States  tacked  and  ranged  up  under 
her  adversary's  lee,  when  the  latter  struck  her  col 
ors  at  11.15,  Just  an  hour  and  a  half  after  the  be 
ginning  of  the  action.5 

1  Cooper,  ii,  178.  a  Letter  of  Commodore  Decatur. 

3  James,  vi,  169.  4  Letter  of  Captain  Garden. 

6  Letter  of  Commodore  Decatur. 


110  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

The  United  States  had  suffered  surprisingly  little  ; 
what  damage  had  been  done  was  aloft.  Her  mizzen 
top-gallant  mast  was  cut  away,  some  of  the  spars 
were  wounded,  and  the  rigging  a  good  deal  cut;  the 
hull  was  only  struck  two  or  three  times.  The  ships 
were  never  close  enough  to  be  within  fair  range  of 
grape  and  .musketry,1  and  the  wounds  were  mostly 
inflicted  by  round  shot  and  were  thus  apt  to  be 
fatal.  Hence  the  loss  of  the  Americans  amounted 
to  Lieutenant  John  Messer  Funk  (5th  of  the  ship) 
and  six  seamen  killed  or  mortally  wounded,  and 
only  five  severely  and  slightly  wounded. 

The  Macedonian,  on  the  other  hand,  had  received 
over  a  hundred  shot  in  her  hull,  several  between 
wind  and  water  ;  her  mizzen-mast  had  gone  by  the 
board  ;  her  fore-  and  maintop-masts  had  been  shot 
away  by  the  caps,  and  her  main-yard  in  the  slings ; 
almost  all  her  rigging  was  cut  away  (only  the  fore 
sail  being  left);  on  the  engaged  side  all  of  her  car- 
ronades  but  two,  and  two  of  her  main-deck  guns,  were 
dismounted.  Of  her  crew  43  were  killed  and  mor 
tally  wounded,  and  61  (including  her  first  and  third 
lieutenants)  severely  and  slightly  wounded.2  Among 
her  crew  were  eight  Americans  (as  shown  by  her 
muster-roll)  ;  these  asked  permission  to  go  below 
before  the  battle,  but  it  was  refused  by  Captain 
Garden,  and  three  were  killed  during  the  action. 
James  says  that  they  were  allowed  to  go  below,  but 
this  is  untrue  ;  for  if  they  had,  the  three  would  not 
have  been  slain.  The  others  testified  that  they  had 
been  forced  to  fight,  and  they  afterward  entered 
the  American  service — the  only  ones  of  the  Macedo 
nians  crew  who  did,  or  who  were  asked  to. 

1  Letter  of  Commodore  Decatur.  2  Letter  of  Captain  Garden. 


k 


\ 


S\ 


III 


Broadside 
Size.           Guns. 

Weifeht 
Metal 

Men.           Loss. 

1576              27 

786 

178              12 

1325              25 

547 

301            104 

Comparative 
Force. 

Comparative  Loss 
Inflicted. 

100 

100 

66 

II 

112  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

The  Macedonian  had  her  full  complement  of  301 
.men  ;  the  States  had,  by  her  muster-roll  of  October 
2oth,  428  officers,  petty  officers,  seamen,  and  boys, 
and  50  officers  and  privates  of  marines,  a  total  of 
478  (instead  of  509  as  Marshall  in  his  "  Naval  Bi 
ography  "  makes  it). 

COMPARATIVE   PORCE. 


United  States 
Macedonian 


States 
Macedonian 


That  is,  the  relative  force  being  about  as  three  is 
to  two,1  the  damage  done  was  as  nine  to  one! 

Of  course,  it  would  have  been  almost  impossible 
for  the  Macedonian  to  conquer  with  one  third  less 
force  ;  but  the  disparity  was  by  no  means  sufficient 
to  account  for  the  ninefold  greater  loss  suffered,  and 
the  ease  and  impunity  with  which  the  victory  was 
won.  The  British  sailors  fought  with  their  accus 
tomed  courage,  but  their  gunnery  was  exceedingly 

1 1  have  considered  the  United  States  as  mounting  her  full  allowance 
of  54  guns  ;  but  it  is  possible  that  she  had  no  more  than  49.  In 
Decatur's  letter  of  challenge  of  Jan.  17,  1814  (which  challenge,  by 
the  way,  was  a  most  blustering  affair,  reflecting  credit  neither  on  De- 
catur,  nor  his  opponent,  Captain  Hope,  nor  on  any  one  else,  excepting 
Captain  Stackpole  of  H.  M.  S.  Statira),  she  is  said  to  have  had  that 
number  ;  her  broadside  would  then  be  15  long  24*5  below,  I  long  24, 
I  12-pound,  and  8  42-pound  carronades  above.  Her  real  broadside 
•weight  of  metal  would  thus  be  about  680  Ibs.,  and  she  would  be  su 
perior  to  the  Macedonian  in  the  proportion  of  5  to  4.  But  it  is  possi 
ble  that  Decatur  had  landed  some  of  his  guns  in  1813,  as  James  asserts  ; 
and  though  I  am  not  at  all  sure  of  this,  I  have  thought  it  best  to  be 
on  the  safe  side  in  describing  his  force. 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  113 

poor ;  and  it  must  be  remembered  that  though  the 
ship  was  bravely  fought,  still  the  defence  was  by  no 
means  so  desparate  as  that  made  by  the  Essex  or 
even  the  Chesapeake,  as  witnessed  by  their  respective 
losses.  The  Macedonian,  moreover,  was  surrendered 
when  she  had  suffered  less  damage  than  either  the 
Guerrtire  or  Java.  The  chief  cause  of  her  loss  lay 
in  the  fact  that  Captain  Garden  was  a  poor  comman 
der.  The  gunnery  of  the  Java,  Guerriere,  and  Mace 
donian  was  equally  bad  ;  but  while  Captain  Lambert 
proved  himself  to  be  as  able  as  he  was  gallant,  and 
Captain  Dacres  did  nearly  as  well,  Captain  Garden, 
on  the  other  hand,  was  first  too  timid,  and  then  too 
rash,  and  showed  bad  judgment  at  all  times.  By 
continuing  his  original  course  he  could  have  closed 
at  once  ;  but  he  lost  his  chance  by  over-anxiety  to 
keep  the  weather-gage,  and  was  censured  by  the 
court-martial  accordingly.  Then  he  tried  to  remedy 
one  error  by  another,  and  made  a  foolishly  rash  ap 
proach.  A  very  able  and  fair-minded  English 
writer  says  of  this  action:  "  As  a  display  of  cour 
age  the  character  of  the  service  was  nobly  upheld, 
but  we  would  be  deceiving  ourselves  were  we  to  ad 
mit  that  the  comparative  expertness  of  the  crews  in 
gunnery  was  equally  satisfactory.  Now,  taking  the 
difference  of  effect  as  given  by  Captain  Garden,  we 
must  draw  this  conclusion — that  the  comparative 
loss  in  killed  and  wounded  (104  to  12),  together  with 
the  dreadful  account  he  gives  of  the  condition  of  his 
own  ship,  while  he  admits  that  the  enemy's  vessel 
was  in  comparatively  good  order,  must  have  arisen 
from  inferiority  in  gunnery  as  well  as  in  force."1 
On  the  other  hand,  the  American  crew,  even  ac- 

JLord  Howard  Douglass,  "  Naval  Gunnery,"  p.  525. 


114  NAVAL   WAR   OF    1 8 12. 

cording  to  James,  were  as  fine  a  set  of  men  as  ever 
were  seen  on  shipboard.  Though  not  one  fourth 
'were  British  by  birth,  yet  many  of  them  had  served 
on  board  British  ships  of  war,  in  some  cases  volun 
tarily,  but  much  more  often  because  they  were  im 
pressed.  They  had  been  trained  at  the  guns  with 
the  greatest  care  by  Lieutenant  Allen.  And  final 
ly  Commodore  Decatur  handled  his  ship  with  ab 
solute  faultlessness.  To  sum  up :  a  brave  and 
skilful  crew,  ably  commanded,  was  matched  against 
an  equally  brave  but  unskilful  one,  with  an  in 
competent  leader ;  and  this  accounts  for  the  dis 
parity  of  loss  being  so  much  greater  than  the  dis 
parity  in  force. 

At  the  outset  of  this  battle  the  position  of  the 
parties  was  just  the  reverse  of  that  in  the  case  of  the 
Constitution  and  Guerriere  ;  the  Englishman  had  the 
advantage  of  the  wind,  but  he  used  it  in  a  very  dif 
ferent  manner  from  that  in  which  Captain  Hull  had 
done.  The  latter  at  once  ran  down  to  close,  but 
manoeuvred  so  cautiously  that  no  damage  could  be 
done  him  till  he  was  within  pistol  shot.  Captain 
Garden  did  not  try  to  close  till  after  fatal  indecision, 
and  then  made  the  attempt  so  heedlessly  that  he  was 
cut  to  pieces  before  he  got  to  close  quarters.  Com 
modore  Decatur,  also,  manoeuvred  more  skilfully 
than  Captain  Dacres,  although  the  difference  was 
less  marked  between  these  two.  The  combat  was 
a  plain  cannonade  ;  the  States  derived  no  advantage 
from  the  superior  number  of  her  men,  for  they  were 
not  needed.  The  marines  in  particular  had  nothing 
whatever  to  do,  while  they  had  been  of  the  greatest 
service  against  the  Guerriere.  The  advantage  was 
simply  in  metal,  as  10  is  to  7.  Lord  Howard  Doug- 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    1 8 12.  115 

lass'  criticisms  on  these  actions  seem  to  me  only  ap 
plicable  in  part.  He  says  (p.  524) :  "  The  Americans 
would  neither  approach  nor  permit  us  to  join  in 
close  battle  until  they  had  gained  some  extra 
ordinary  advantage  from  the  superior  faculties  of 
their  long  guns  in  distant  cannonade,  and  from  the 
intrepid,  uncircumspect,  and  often  very  exposed  ap 
proach  of  assailants  who  had  long  been  accustomed 
to  contemn  all  manoeuvring.  Our  vessels  were 
crippled  in  distant  cannonade  from  encountering 
rashly  the  serious  disadvantage  of  making  direct  at 
tacks  ;  the  uncircumspect  gallantry  of  our  com 
manders  led  our  ships  unguardedly  into  the  snares 
which  wary  caution  had  spread." 

These  criticisms  are  very  just  as  regards  the 
Macedonian,  and  I  fully  agree  with  them  (possibly 
reserving  the  right  to  doubt  Captain  Garden's  gal- 
lintry,  though  readily  admitting  his  uncircumspec- 
tion).  But  the  case  of  the  Guerriere  differed  widely. 
There  the  American  ship  made  the  attack,  while  the 
British  at  first  avoided  close  combat ;  and,  so  far 
from  trying  to  cripple  her  adversary  by  a  distant 
cannonade,  the  Constitution  hardly  fired  a  dozen 
times  until  within  pistol  shot.  This  last  point  is 
worth  mentioning,  because  in  a  work  on  "  Heavy 
Ordnance,"  by  Captain  T.  F.  Simmons,  R.  A.  (Lon 
don,  1837),  it  is  stated  that  the  Guerrtire  received 
her  injuries  before  the  closing,  mentioning  especially 
the  "  thirty  shot  below  the  water-line  "  ;  whereas,  by 
the  official  accounts  of  both  commanders,  the  reverse 
was  the  case.  Captain  Hull,  in  his  letter,  and  Lieu 
tenant  Morris,  (in  his  autobiography)  say  they  only 
fired  a  few  guns  before  closing  ;  and  Captain  Dacres, 
in  his  letter,  and  Captain  Brenton,  in  his  "  History," 


Il6  NAVAL   WAR   OF    1 8 12. 

say  that  not  much  injury  was  received  by  the  Guer- 
riere  until  about  the  time  the  mizzen-mast  fell, 
which  was  three  or  four  minutes  after  close  action 
began. 

Lieutenant  Allen  was  put  aboard  the  Macedonian 
as  prize-master  ;  he  secured  the  fore-  and  main-masts 
and  rigged  a  jury  mizzen-mast,  converting  the  vessel 
into  a  bark.  Commodore  Decatur  discontinued  his 
cruise  to  convoy  his  prize  back  to  America ;  they 
reached  New  London  Dec.  4th.  Had  it  not  been 
for  the  necessity  of  convoying  the  Macedonian, 
the  States  would  have  continued  her  cruise,  for 
the  damage  she  suffered  was  of  the  most  trifling 
character. 

Captain  Garden  stated  (in  Marshall's  "  Naval 
Biography")  that  the  States  measured  1,670  tons, 
was  manned  by  509  men,  suffered  so  from  shot 
under  water  that  she  had  to  be  pumped  out  every 
watch,  and  that  two  eighteen-pound  shot  passed  in 
a  horizontal  line  through  her  main-masts;  all  of 
which  statements  were  highly  creditable  to  the 
vividness  of  his  imagination.  The  States  measured 
but  1,5/6  tons  (and  by  English  measurement  very 
much  less),  had  478  men  aboard,  had  not  been 
touched  by  a  shot  under  water-line,  and  her  lower 
masts  were  unwounded.  James  states  that  most 
of  her  crew  were  British,  which  assertion  I  have 
already  discussed  ;  and  that  she  had  but  one  boy 
aboard,  and  that  he  was  seventeen  years  old, — 
in  which  case  29  others,  some  of  whom  (as  we  learn 
from  the  "  Life  of  Decatur")  were  only  twelve,  must 
have  grown  with  truly  startling  rapidity  during  the 
hour  and  a  half  that  the  combat  lasted. 

During  the  twenty   years  preceding    1812    there 


NAVAL  WAR   OF    l8l2.  I  I/ 

had  been  almost  incessant  warfare  on  the  ocean,  and 
although  there  had  been  innumerable  single  con 
flicts  between  French  and  English  frigates,  there 
had  been  but  one  case  in  which  the  French  frigate, 
single-handed,  was  victorious.  This  was  in  the 
year  1805  when  the  Milan  captured  the  Cleopatra. 
According  to  Troude,  the  former  threw  at  a  broad 
side  574  pounds  (actual),  the  latter  but  334;  and  the 
former  lost  35  men  out  of  her  crew  of  350,  the  lat 
ter  58  out  of  200.  Or,  the  forces  being  as  100  to 
58,  the  loss  inflicted  was  as  100  to  60 ;  while  the 
States  force  compared  to  the  Macedonian  s  being 
as  100  to  66,  the  loss  she  inflicted  was  as  100  to  1 1. 

British  ships,  moreover,  had  often  conquered 
against  odds  as  great  ;  as,  for  instance,  when  the  Sea 
Horse  captured  the  great  Turkish  frigate  Badere- 
Zaffer  ;  when  the  Astrea  captured  the  French  frig 
ate  Gloire,  which  threw  at  a  broadside  286  pounds  of 
shot,  while  she  threw  but  174;  and  when,  most 
glorious  of  all,  Lord  Dundonald,  in  the  gallant  little 
Speedy,  actually  captured  the  Spanish  xebec  Gamo, 
of  over  five  times  her  own  force  !  Similarly,  the 
corvette  Comus  captured  the  Danish  frigate  Fred- 
rickscoarn,  the  brig  Onyx  captured  the  Dutch  sloop 
Manly,  the  little  cutter  Thorn  captured  the  French 
Courier-National,  and  the  Pasley  the  Spanish  Virgin  ; 
while  there  had  been  many  instances  of  drawn  bat 
tles  between  English  12-pound  frigates  and  French 
or  Spanish  i8-pounders. 

Captain  Hull  having  resigned  the  command  of  the 
Constitution,  she  was  given  to  Captain  Bainbridge, 
of  the  Constellation,  who  was  also  entrusted  with  the 
command  of  the  Essex  and  Hornet.  The  latter  ship 
was  in  the  port  of  Boston  with  the  Constitution,  un- 


Il8  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

der  the  command  of  Captain  Lawrence,  The  Essex 
was  in  the  Delaware,  and  accordingly  orders  were 
sent  to  Captain  Porter  to  rendezvous  at  the  Island  of 
San  Jago ;  if  that  failed  several  other  places  were 
appointed,  and  if,  after  a  certain  time,  he  did  not 
fall  in  with  his  commodore  he  was  to  act  at  his  own 
discretion. 

On  October  26th  the  Constitution  and  Hornet 
sailed,  touched  at  the  different  rendezvous,  and  on 
December  I3th  arrived  off  San  Salvador,  where  Cap 
tain  Lawrence  found  the  Bonne  Citoyenne,  18,  Cap 
tain  Pitt  Barnaby  Greene.  The  Bonne  Citoyenne 
was  armed  with  18  32-pound  carronades  and  2  long 
nines,  and  her  crew  of  150  men  was  exactly  equal  in 
number  to  that  of  \hzHornet;  the  latter's  short 
weight  in  metal  made  her  antagonist  superior  to 
her  in  about  the  same  proportion  that  she  her 
self  was  subsequently  superior  to  the  Penguin,  or,  in 
other  words,  the  ships  were  practically  equal.  Cap 
tain  Lawrence  now  challenged  Captain  Greene  to 
single  fight,  giving  the  usual  pledges  that  the  Con 
stitution  should  not  interfere.  The  challenge  was 
not  accepted  for  a  variety  of  reasons ;  among  others 
the  Bonne  Citoyenne  was  carrying  home  half  a  mil 
lion  pounds  in  specie.1  Leaving  the  Hornet  to 

1  Brenton  and  James  both  deny  that  Captain  Greene  was  blockaded 
by  the  Hornet,  and  claim  that  he  feared  the  Constitution.  James 
says  (p.  275)  that  the  occurrence  was  one  which  "  the  characteristic 
cunning  of  Americans  turned  greatly  to  their  advantage  "  ;  and  adds 
that  Lawrence  only  sent  the  challenge  because  "  it  could  not  be  ac 
cepted,"  and  so  he  would  "  suffer  no  personal  risk."  He  states  that 
the  reason  it  was  sent,  as  well  as  the  reason  that  it  was  refused,  was 
because  the  Constitution  was  going  to  remain  in  the  offing  and  cap 
ture  the  British  ship  if  she  proved  conqueror.  It  is  somewhat  sur 
prising  that  even  James  should  have  had  the  temerity  to  advance  such 
arguments.  According  to  his  own  account  (p.  277)  the  Constitution 
left  for  Boston  on  Jan.  6th,  and  the  Hornet  remained  blockading  the 
Bonne  Citoyenne  till  the  24th,  when  the  Montagu,  74,  arrived.  Dur- 
i  g  'hese  eighteen  days  there  could  have  been  no  possible  chance  of 


NAVAL   WAR    OF    l8l2.  I  19 

blockade  her,  Commodore  Bainbridge  ran  off  to  the 
southward,  keeping  the  land  in  view. 

At  9  A.M.,  Dec.  29,  1812,  while  the  Constitution 
was  running  along  the  coast  of  Brazil,  about  thirty 
miles  off  shore  in  latitude  13°  6'  S.,  and  longitude 
31°  W.,  two  strange  sail  were  made,1  inshore  and  to 
windward.  These  were  H.  B.  M.  frigate  Java, 
Captain  Lambert,  forty-eight  days  out  of  Spithead, 
England,  with  the  captured  ship  William  in  com 
pany.  Directing  the  latter  to  make  for  San  Salva 
dor,  the  Java  bore  down  in  chase  of  the  Constitu 
tion?  The  wind  was  blowing  light  from  the 
N.N.E.,  and  there  was  very  little  sea  on.  At  10 
the  Java  made  the  private  signals,  English,  Span 
ish,  arid  Portuguese  in  succession,  none  being  an 
swered  ;  meanwhile  the  Constitution  was  standing  up 
toward  the  Java  on  the  starboard  tack  ;  a  little 
after  1 1  she  hoisted  her  private  signal,  and  then, 
being  satisfied  that  the  strange  sail  was  an  enemy, 
she  wore  and  stood  off  toward  the  S.  E.,  to  draw  her 
antagonist  away  from  the  land,3  which  was  plainly 
visible.  The  Java  hauled  up,  and  made  sail  in  a 
parallel  course,  the  Constitution  bearing  about  three 
points  on  her  lee  bow.  The  Java  gained  rapidly, 
being  much  the  swifter. 

At  1.30  the  Constitution  luffed  up,  shortened  her 

the  Constitution  or  any  other  ship  interfering,  and  it  is  ridiculous  to 
suppose  that  any  such  fear  kept  Captain  Greene  from  sailing  out  to 
attack  his  foe.  No  doubt  Captain  Greene's  course  was  perfectly  jus 
tifiable,  but  it  is  curious  that  with  all  the  assertions  made  by  James 
as  to  the  cowardice  of  the  Americans,  this  is  the  only  instance  through 
out  the  war  in  which  a  ship  of  either  party  declined  a  contest  with  an 
antagonist  of  equal  force  (the  cases  of  Commodore  Rodgers  and  Sir 
George  Collier  being  evidently  due  simply  to  an  overestimate  of  the 
opposing  ships.) 

1  Official  letter  of  Commodore  Bainbridge,  Jan.  3,  1813. 

2  Official  letter  of  Lieutenant  Chads,  Dec.  31,  1812. 

3  Log  of  the  Constitution. 


I2O  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

canvas  to  top-sails,  top-gallant  sails,  jib,  and  spanker, 
and  ran  easily  off  on  the  port  tack,  heading  toward 
the  southeast ;  she  carried  her  commodore's  pen 
dant  at  the  main,  national  ensigns  at  the  mizzen- 
peak  and  main  top-gallant  mast-head,  and  a  Jack  at 
the  fore.  The  Java  also  had  taken  in  the  main-sail 
and  royals,  and  came  down  in  a  lasking  course  on 
her  adversary's  weather-quarter,1  hoisting  her  ensign 
at  the  mizzen-peak,  a  union  Jack  at  the  mizzen  top 
gallant  mast-head,  and  another  lashed  to  the  main- 
rigging.  At  2  P.M.,  the  Constitution  fired  a  shot 
ahead  of  her,  following  it  quickly  by  a  broadside,2 
and  the  two  ships  began  at  long  bowls,  the  English 
firing  the  lee  or  starboard  battery  while  the 
Americans  replied  with  their  port  guns.  The  can 
nonade  was  very  spirited  on  both  sides,  the  ships 
suffering  about  equally.  The  first  broadside  of  the 
Java  was  very  destructive,  killing  and  wounding 
several  of  the  Constitution  s  crew.  The  Java  kept 
edging  down,  and  the  action  continued,  with  grape 
and  musketry  in  addition  ;  the  swifter  British  ship 
soon  forereached  and  kept  '  away,  intending  to 
wear  across  her  slower  antagonist's  bow  and  rake 
her;  but  the  latter  wore  in  the  smoke,  and  the  two 
combatants  ran  off  to  the  westward,  the  Englishman 
still  a-weather  and  steering  freer  than  the  Constitu 
tion,  which  had  luffed  to  close.3  The  action  went 
on  at  pistol-shot  distance.  In  a  few  minutes,  how 
ever,  the  Java  again  forged  ahead,  out  of  the 
weight  of  her  adversary's  fire,  and  then  kept  off,  as 
before,  to  cross  her  bows;  and,  as  before,  the  Con 
stitution  avoided  this  by  wearing,  both  ships  again 

1  Lieutenant  Chads'  Address  to  the  Court-martial,  April  23,  1813. 

2  Commodore  Bainbridge's  letter.  3  Log  of  the  Constitution. 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  121 

coming  round  with  their  heads  to  the  east,  the 
American  still  to  leeward.  The  Java  kept  the 
weather-gage  tenaciously,  forereaching  a  little, 
and  whenever  the  Constitution  luffed  up  to  close,1 
the  former  tried  to  rake  her.  But  her  gunnery  was 
now  poor,  little  damage  being  done  by  it ;  most  of 
the  loss  the  Americans  suffered  was  early  in  the 
action.  By  setting  her  foresail  and  main-sail  the 
Constitution  got  up  close  on  the  enemy's  lee  beam, 
her  fire  being  very  heavy  and  carrying  away  the 
end  of  the  Java  s  bowsprit  and  her  jib-boom.2  The 
Constitution  forged  ahead  and  repeated  her  former 
manoeuvre,  wearing  in  the  smoke.  The  Java  at 
once  hove  in  stays,  but  owing  to  the  loss  of  head- 
sail  fell  off  very  slowly,  and  the  American  frigate 
poured  a  heavy  raking  broadside  into  her  stern,  at 
about  two  cables'  length  distance.  The  Java  re 
plied  with  her  port  guns  as  she  fell  off.3  Both 
vessels  then  bore  up  and  ran  off  free,  with  the  wind 
on  the  port  quarter ;  the  Java  being  abreast  and  to 
windward  of  her  antagonist,  both  with  their  heads  a 
little  east  of  south.  The  ships  were  less  than  a 
cable's  length  apart,  and  the  Constitution  inflicted 
great  damage  while  suffering  very  little  herself. 
The  British  lost  many  men  by  the  musketry  of  the 
American  topmen,  and  suffered  still  more  from  the 
round  and  grape,  especially  on  the  forecastle,4  many 
marked  instances  of  valor  being  shown  on  both 
sides.  The  Javas  masts  were  wounded  and  her 
rigging  cut  to  pieces,  and  Captain  Lambert  then 
ordered  her  to  be  laid  aboard  the  enemy,  who  was 

1  Log  of  the  Constitution.  2  Lieutenant  Chads'  letter. 

3  Lieutenant  Chads'  letter. 

4  Testimony  of  Christopher  Speedy,  in  minutes  of  the  Court-mar 
tial  on  board  H.  M.  S.  Gladiator,  at  Portsmouth,  April  23, 


122  NAVAL   WAR   OF    1 8 12. 

on  her  lee  beam.  The  helm  was  put  a-weather,  and 
the  Java  came  down  for  the  Constitution  s  main- 
chains.  The  boarders  and  marines  gathered  in  the 
gangways  and  on  the  forecastle,  the  boatswain 
having  been  ordered  to  cheer  them  up  with  his  pipe 
that  they  might  make  a  clean  spring.1  The  Ameri 
cans,  however,  raked  the  British  with  terrible  effect, 
cutting  off  their  main  top-mast  above  the  cap,  and 
their  foremast  near  the  cat  harpings.2  The  stump 
of  the  Java  s  bowsprit  got  caught  in  the  Constitu 
tion  s  mizzen-rigging,  and  before  it  got  clear  the  Brit 
ish  suffered  still  more. 

Finally  the  ships  separated,  the  Java's  bowsprit 
passing  over  the  taffrail  of  the  Constitution ;  the 
latter  at  once  kept  away  to  avoid  being  raked. 
The  ships  again  got  nearly  abreast,  but  the  Consti 
tution,  in  her  turn,  forereached  ;  whereupon  Commo 
dore  Bainbridge  wore,  passed  his  antagonist,  luffed 
up  under  his  quarter,  raked  him  with  the  starboard 
guns,  then  wore,  and  recommenced  the  action  with 
his  port  broadside  at  about  3.10.  Again  the  vessels 
were  abreast,  and  the  action  went  on  as  furiously  as 
ever.  The  wreck  of  the  top  hamper  on  the  Java  lay 
over  her  starboard  side,  so  that  every  discharge  of 
her  guns  set  her  on  fire,3  and  in  a  few  minutes  her 
able  and  gallant  commander  was  mortally  wounded 
by  a  ball  fired  by  one  of  the  American  main-top- 
men.4  The  command  then  devolved  on  the  first 
lieutenant,  Chads,  himself  painfully  wounded.  The 
slaughter  had  been  terrible,  yet  the  British  fought 
on  with  stubborn  resolution,  cheering  lustily.  But 
success  was  now  hopeless,  for  nothing  could  stand 
against  the  cool  precision  of  the  Yankee  fire.  The 

1  Testimony  of  James  Humble,  in  do.,  do.        2  Log  of  Constitution. 
3  Lieut.  Chads'  Address.  4  Surgeon  J.  C.  Jones'  Report. 


NAVAL  WAR   OF    l8l2.  123 

stump  of  the  Java  s  foremast  was  carried  away  by 
a  double-headed  shot,  the  mizzen-mast  fell,  the  gaff 
and  spanker  boom  were  shot  away,  also  the  main- 
yard,  and  finally  the  ensign  was  cut  down  by  a  shot, 
and  all  her  guns  absolutely  silenced  ;  when  at  4.05 
the  Constitution,  thinking  her  adversary  had  struck,1 
ceased  firing,  hauled  aboard  her  tacks,  and  passed 
across  her  adversary's  bows  to  windward,  with  her 
top-sails,  jib,  and  spanker  set.  A  few  minutes  after 
ward  the  Javas  main-mast  fell,  leaving  her  a  sheer 
hulk.  The  Constitution  assumed  a  weatherly  posi 
tion,  and  spent  an  hour  in  repairing  damages  and 
securing  her  masts  ;  then  she  wore  and  stood  tow 
ard  her  enemy,  whose  flag  was  again  flying,  but 
only  for  bravado,  for  as  soon  as  the  Constitution 
stood  across  her  forefoot  she  struck.  At  5.25  she 
was  taken  possession  of  by  Lieutenant  Parker,  1st 
of  the  Constitution,  in  one  of  the  latter's  only  two 
remaining  boats. 

The  American  ship  had  suffered  comparatively 
little.  But  a  few  round  shot  had  struck  her  hull, 
one  of  which  carried  away  the  wheel;  one  18- 
pounder  went  through  the  mizzen-mast  ;  the  fore 
mast,  main-top-mast,  and  a  few  other  spars  were 
slightly  wounded,  and  the  running  rigging  and 
shrouds  were  a  good  deal  cut ;  but  in  an  hour  she 
was  again  in  good  fighting  trim.  Her  loss  amounted 
to  8  seamen  and  I  marine  killed  ;  the  5th  lieuten 
ant,  John  C.  Aylwin,  and  2  seamen,  mortally, 
Commodore  Bainbridge  and  12  seamen,  severely, 
and  7  seamen  and  2  marines,  slightly  wounded ; 
in  all  12  killed  and  mortally  wounded,  and  22 
wounded  severely  and  slightly.2 

1  Log  of  the  Constitution  (as  given  in  Bainbridge's  letter). 
3  Report  of  Surgeon  Amos  A.  Evans. 


124  NAVAL   WAR   OF    1 8 12. 

"  The  Java  sustained  unequalled  injuries  beyond 
the  Constitution"  says  the  British  account.1  These 
have  already  been  given  in  detail ;  she  was  a  riddled 
and  entirely  dismasted  hulk.  Her  loss  (for  discus 
sion  of  which  see  farther  on)  was  48  killed  (includ 
ing  Captain  Henry  Lambert,  who  died  soon  after 
the  close  of  the  action,  and  five  midshipmen),  and 
102  wounded,  among  them  Lieutenant  Henry  Ducie 
Chads,  Lieutenant  of  Marines  David  Davies,  Com 
mander  John  Marshall,  Lieut.  James  Saunders,  the 
boatswain,  James  Humble,  master,  Batty  Robinson, 
and  four  midshipmen. 

In  this  action  both  ships  displayed  equal  gal 
lantry  and  seamanship.  "  The  Java"  says  Com 
modore  Bainbridge,  "  was  exceedingly  well  handled 
and  bravely  fought.  Poor  Captain  Lambert  was  a 
distinguished  and  gallant  officer,  and  a  most  worthy 
man,  whose  death  I  sincerely  regret."  The  ma 
noeuvring  on  both  sides  was  excellent ;  Captain 
Lambert  used  the  advantage  which  his  ship  pos 
sessed  in  her  superior  speed  most  skilfully,  always 
endeavoring  to  run  across  his  adversary's  bows  and 
rake  him  when  he  had  forereached,  and  it  was  only 
owing  to  the  equal  skill  which  his  antagonist  dis 
played  that  he  wras  foiled,  the  length  of  the  com 
bat  being  due  to  the  number  of  evolutions.  The 
great  superiority  of  the  Americans  was  in  their 
gunnery.  The  fire  of  the  Java  was  both  less  rapid 
and  less  well  directed  than  that  of  her  antagonist ; 
the  difference  of  force  against  her  was  not  heavy, 
being  about  as  ten  is  to  nine,  and  was  by  no  means 
enough  to  account  for  the  almost  fivefold  greater 
loss  she  suffered. 

1  "  Naval  Chronicle,"  xxix,  452. 


126  NAVAL    WAR   OF    l8l2. 

The  foregoing  is  a  diagram  of  the  battle.  It  dif 
fers  from  both  of  the  official  accounts,  as  these  con- 
'flict  greatly  both  as  to  time  and  as  regards  some  of 
the  evolutions.  I  generally  take  the  mean  in  cases 
of  difference;  for  example,  Commodore  Bainbridge's 
report  makes  the  fight  endure  but  I  hour  and  55 
minutes,  Lieutenant  Chads'  2  hours  and  25  minutes  ; 
I  have  made  it  2  hours  and  10  minutes,  etc.,  etc. 

The  tonnage  and  weight  of  metal  of  the  comba 
tants  have  already  been  stated  ;  I  will  give  the 
complements  shortly.  The  following  is  the 

COMPARATIVE   FORCE   AND    LOSS. 

Tons.        Weight  Metal.      No.  Men.         Loss. 

Constitution  1576  654  475  34 

Java  1340  576  426  150 


Relative  Relative  Loss 

Force.  Inflicted. 

Constitution  100  100 

Java  89  23 

In  hardly  another  action  of  the  war  do  the  ac 
counts  of  the  respective  forces  differ  so  widely  ;  the 
official  British  letter  makes  their  total  of  men  at  the 
beginning  of  the  action  377,  of  whom  Commodore 
Bainbridge  officially  reports  that  he  paroled  378  ! 
The  British  state  their  loss  in  killed  and  mortally 
wounded  at  24 ;  Commodore  Bainbridge  reports  that 
the  dead  alone  amounted  to  nearly  60  !  Usually  I 
have  taken  each  commander's  account  of  his  own 
force  and  loss,  and  I  should  do  so  now  if  it  were  not 
that  the  British  accounts  differ  among  themselves, 
and  whenever  they  relate  to  the  Americans,  are  flat- 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  I2/ 

ly  contradicted  by  the  affidavits  of  the  latter's  offi 
cers.  The  British  first  handicap  themselves  by  the 
statement  that  the  surgeon  of  the  Constitution  was 
an  Irishman  and  lately  an  assistant  surgeon  in  the 
British  navy  ("  Naval  Chronicle,"  xxix,  452)  ;  which 
draws  from  Surgeon  Amos  A..  Evans  a  solemn  state 
ment  in  the  Boston  Gazette  that  he  was  born  in 
Maryland  and  was  never  in  the  British  navy  in  his 
life.  Then  Surgeon  Jones  of  the  Java,  in  his  offi 
cial  report,  after  giving  his  own  killed  and  mortally 
wounded  at  24,  says  that  the  Americans  lost  in  all 
about  60,  and  that  4  of  their  amputations  perished 
under  his  own  eyes  ;  whereupon  Surgeon  Evans 
makes  the  statement  (Niles  Register,  vi,  p.  35), 
backed  up  by  affidavits  of  his  brother  officers, 
that  in  all  he  had  but  five  amputations,  of  whom 
only  one  died,  and  that  one,  a  month  after  Surgeon 
Jones  had  left  the  ship.  To  meet  the  assertions  of 
Lieutenant  Chads  that  he  began  action  with  but 
377  men,  the  Constitution  s  officers  produced  the 
Javas  muster-roll,  dated  Nov.  I7th,  or  five  days 
after  she  had  sailed,  which  showed  446  persons,  of 
whom  20  had  been  put  on  board  a  prize.  The 
presence  of  this  large  number  of  supernumeraries  on 
board  is  explained  by  the  fact  that  the  Java  was. 
carrying  out  Lieutenant-General  Hislop,  the  newly- 
appointed  Governor  of  Bombay,  and  his  suite,  to 
gether  with  part  of  the  crews  for  the  Cornwallis,  74, 
and  gun-sloops  Chameleon  and  Icarus;  she  also  con 
tained  stores  for  those  two  ships. 

Besides  conflicting  with  the  American  reports,  the 
British  statements  contradict  one  another.  The 
official  published  report  gives  but  two  midshipmen 
as  killed  ;  while  one  of  the  volumes  of  the  "  Naval 


128  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

Chronicle  "  (vol.  xxix,  p.  452)  contains  a  letter  from 
one  of  the  Javas  lieutenants,  in  which  he  states 
'  that  there  were  five.  Finally,  Commodore  Bain- 
bridge  found  on  board  the  Constitution,  after  the 
prisoners  had  left,  a  letter  from  Lieutenant  H.  D. 
Cornick,  dated  Jan.  i,  1813,  and  addressed  to  Lieu 
tenant  Peter  V.  Wood,  22d  Regiment,  foot,  in  which 
he  states  that  65  of  their  men  were  killed.  James 
("  Naval  Occurrences ")  gets  around  this  by  stat 
ing  that  it  was  probably  a  forgery  ;  but,  aside  from 
the  improbability  of  Commodore  Bainbridge  being  a 
forger,  this  could  not  be  so,  for  nothing  would  have 
been  easier  than  for  the  British  lieutenant  to  have 
denied  having  written  it,  which  he  never  did.  On 
the  other  hand,  it  would  be  very  likely  that  in  the 
heat  of  the  action,  Commodore  Bainbridge  and  the 
Javas  own  officers  should  overestimate  the  latter's 
loss.1 

Taking  all  these  facts  into  consideration,  we  find 
446  men  on  board  the  Java  by  her  own  muster-list ; 
378  of  these  were  paroled  by  Commodore  Bainbridge 
at  San  Salvador;  24  men  were  acknowledged  by 
the  enemy  to  be  killed  or  mortally  wounded ;  20 
were  absent  in  a  prize,  leaving  24  unaccounted 
for,  who  were  undoubtedly  slain. 

The  British  loss  was  thus  48  men  killed  and 
mortally  wounded,  and  102  wounded  severely  and 
slightly.  The  Java  was  better  handled  and  more 
desperately  defended  than  the  Macedonian  or  even 

1  For  an  account  of  the  shameless  corruption  then  existing  in  the 
Naval  Administration  of  Great  Britian,  see  Lord  Dundonald's  "  Auto 
biography  of  a  seaman."  The  letters  of  the  commanders  were  often 
garbled,  as  is  mentioned  by  Brenton.  Among  numerous  cases 
that  he  gives,  may  be  mentioned  the  cutting  out  of  the  Chevrette, 
where  he  distinctly  says,  "our  loss  was  much  greater  than  was  ever 
acknowledged."  (Vol.  i,  p.  505,  edition  of  1837.) 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  1 29 

the  Guerriere,  and  the  odds  against  her  were  much 
smaller ;  so  she  caused  her  opponent  greater  loss, 
though  her  gunnery  was  no  better  than  theirs. 

Lieutenant  Parker,  prize-master  of  the  Java,  re 
moved  all  the  prisoners  and  baggage  to  the  Consti 
tution,  and  reported  the  prize  to  be  in  a  very  dis 
abled  state  ;  owing  partly  to  this,  but  more  to  the 
long  distance  from  home  and  the  great  danger  there 
was  of  recapture,  Commodore  Bainbridge  destroyed 
her  on  the  3ist,  and  then  made  sail  for  San  Salva 
dor.  "Our  gallant  enemy,"  reports  Lieutenant 
Chads,  "has  treated  us  most  generously";  and 
Lieutenant-General  Hislop  presented  the  Commo 
dore  with  a  very  handsome  sword  as  a  token  of 
gratitude  for  the  kindness  with  which  he  had  treated 
the  prisoners. 

Partly  in  consequence  of  his  frigate's  injuries,  but 
especially  because  of  her  decayed  condition,  Commo 
dore  Bainbridge  sailed  from  San  Salvador  on  Jan. 
6,  1813,  reaching  Boston  Feb.  2/th,  after  his  four 
months'  cruise.  At  San  Salvador  he  left  the  Hornet 
still  blockading  the  Bonne  Citoyenne. 

In  order  "  to  see  ourselves  as  others  see  us,"  I  shall 
again  quote  from  Admiral  Jurien  de  la  Graviere,1  as 
his  opinions  are  certainly  well  worthy  of  attention 
both  as  to  these  first  three  battles,  and  as  to  the 
lessons  they  teach.  "  When  the  American  Congress 
declared  war  on  England  in  1812,"  he  says,  "  it 
seemed  as  if  this  unequal  conflict  would  crush  her 
navy  in  the  act  of  being  born  ;  instead,  it  but  fertil 
ized  the  germ.  It  is  only  since  that  epoch  that  the 
United  States  has  taken  rank  among  maritime  pow 
ers.  Some  combats  of  frigates,  corvettes,  and  brigs, 

1  "Guerres  Maritimes,"  ii,  284  (Paris,  1881). 


130  NAVAL    WAR    OF    l8l2. 

insignificant  without  doubt  as  regards  material  re 
sults,  sufficed  to  break  the  charm  which  protected 
the  standard  of  St.  George,  and  taught  Europe  what 
she  could  have  already  learned  from  some  of  our 
combats,  if  the  louder  noise  of  our  defeats  had  not 
drowned  the  glory,  that  the  only  invincibles  on  the 
sea  are  good  seamen  and  good  artillerists. 

"  The  English  covered  the  ocean  with  their  cruis 
ers  when  this  unknown  navy,  composed  of  six  frig 
ates  and  a  few  small  craft  hitherto  hardly  numbered, 
dared  to  establish  its  cruisers  at  the  mouth  of  the 
Channel,  in  the  very  centre  of  the  British  power. 
But  already  the  Constitution  had  captured  the  Guer- 
riere  and  Java,  the  United  States  had  made  a  prize 
of  the  Macedonian,  the  Wasp  of  the  Frolic,  and  the 
Hornet  of  the  Peacock.  The  honor  of  the  new  flag 
was  established.  England,  humiliated,  tried  to  at 
tribute  her  multiplied  reverses  to  the  unusual  size  of 
the  vessels  which  Congress  had  had  constructed  in 
1799,  and  which  did  the  fighting  in  1812.  She 
wished  to  refuse  them  the  name  of  frigates,  and 
called  them,  not  without  some  appearance  of  reason, 
disguised  line-of-battle  ships.  Since  then  all  mari 
time  powers  have  copied  these  gigantic  models,  as 
the  result  of  the  war  of  1812  obliged  England  her 
self  to  change  her  naval  material ;  but  if  they  had 
employed,  instead  of  frigates,  cut-down  74's  (vais- 
seaux  rases),  it  would  still  be  difficult  to  explain  the 
prodigious  success  of  the  Americans.  * 

"  In  an  engagement  which  terminated  in  less  than 
half  an  hour,  the  English  frigate  Guerriere,  com 
pletely  dismasted,  had  fifteen  men  killed,  sixty- 
three  wounded,  and  more  than  thirty  shot  below  the 
water-line.  She  sank  twelve  hours  after  the  combat. 


NAVAL    WAR    OF    l8l2.  131 

The  Constitution,  on  the  contrary,  had  but  seven 
men  killed  and  seven  wounded,  and  did  not  lose  a 
mast.  As  soon  as  she  had  replaced  a  few  cut  ropes 
and  changed  a  few  sails,  she  was  in  condition,  even 
by  the  testimony  of  the  British  historian,  to  take 
another  Guerriere.  The  United  States  took  an  hour 
and  a  half  to  capture  the  Macedonian,  and  the  same 
difference  made  itself  felt  in  the  damage  suffered  by 
the  two  ships.  The  Macedonian  had  her  masts  shat 
tered,  two  of  her  main-deck  and  all  her  spar-deck 
guns  disabled  ;  more  than  a  hundred  shot  had  pene 
trated  the  hull,  and  over  a  third  of  the  crew  had 
suffered  by  the  hostile  fire.  The  American  frigate, 
on  the  contrary,  had  to  regret  but  five  men  killed 
and  seven  wounded  ;  her  guns  had  been  fired 
each  sixty-six  times  to  the  Macedonian  s  thirty-six. 
The  combat  of  the  Constitution  and  the  Java  lasted 
two  hours,  and  was  the  most  bloody  of  these  three 
engagements.  The  Java  only  struck  when  she  had 
been  razed  like  a  sheer  hulk  ;  she  had  twenty-two 

men  killed  and  one  hundred  and  two  wounded. 
****** 

"This  war  should  be  studied  with  unceasing  dili 
gence  ;  the  pride  of  two  peoples  to  whom  naval 
affairs  are  so  generally  familiar  has  cleared  all  the 
details  and  laid  bare  all  the  episodes,  and  through 
the  sneers  which  the  victors  should  have  spared, 
merely  out  of  care  for  their  own  glory,  at  every  step 
can  be  seen  that  great  truth,  that  there  is  only  suc 
cess  for  those  who  know  how  to  prepare  it. 

•*  *  *  *  -x-  •& 

"  It  belongs  to  us  to  judge  impartially  these  marine 
events,  too  much  exalted  perhaps  by  a  national 
vanity  one  is  tempted  to  excuse.  The  Americans 


132  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

showed,  in  the  War  of  1812,  a  great  deal  of  skill  and 
resolution.  But  if,  as  they  have  asserted,  the 
chances  had  always  been  perfectly  equal  between 
them  and  their  adversaries,  if  they  had  only  owed 
their  triumphs  to  the  intrepidity  of  Hull,  Decatur, 
and  Bainbridge,  there  would  be  for  us  but  little  in 
terest  in  recalling  the  struggle.  We  need  not  seek 
lessons  in  courage  outside  of  our  own  history.  On 
the  contrary,  what  is  to  be  well  considered  is  that 
the  ships  of  the  United  States  constantly  fought 
with  the  chances  in  their  favor,  and  it  is  on  this  that 
the  American  government  should  found  its  true 
title  to  glory.  *  The  Americans  in  1812 

had  secured  to  themselves  the  advantage  of  a  better 
organization  [than  the  English]." 

The  fight  between  the  Constitution  and  the  Java 
illustrates  best  the  proposition,  *'  that  there  is  only 
success  for  those  who  know  how  to  prepare  it." 
Here  the  odds  in  men  and  metal  were  only  about 
as  10  to  9  in  favor  of  the  victors,  and  it  is  safe  to 
say  that  they  might  have  been  reversed  without 
vitally  affecting  the  result.  In  the  fight  Lambert 
handled  his  ship  as  skilfully  as  Bainbridge  did  his ; 
and  the  Javas  men  proved  by  their  indomitable 
courage  that  they  were  excellent  material.  The  Javas 
crew  was  new  shipped  for  the  voyage,  and  had  been 
at  sea  but  six  weeks  ;  in  the  Constitution  s  first  fight 
her  crew  had  been  aboard  of  her  but  five  weeks. 
So  the  chances  should  have  been  nearly  equal,  and 
the  difference  in  fighting  capacity  that  was  shown 
by  the  enormous  disparity  in  the  loss,  and  still 
more  in  the  damage  inflicted,  was  due  to  the  fact 
that  the  officers  of  one  ship  had,  and  the  officers  of 
the  other  had  not,  trained  their  raw  crews.  The 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  133 

Constitution  s  men  were  not  "  picked,"  but  simply 
average  American  sailors,  as  the  Java  s  were  average 
British  sailors.  The  essential  difference  was  in  the 
training. 

During  the  six  weeks  the  Java  was  at  sea  her  men 
had  fired  but  six  broadsides,  of  blank  cartridges ; 
during  the  first  five  weeks  the  Constitution  cruised, 
her  crew  were  incessantly  practised  at  firing  with 
blank  cartridges  and  also  at  a  target.1  The  Javas 
crew  had  only  been  exercised  occasionally,  even  in 
pointing  the  guns,  and  when  the  captain  of  a  gun 
was  killed  the  effectiveness  of  the  piece  was  tem 
porarily  ruined,  and,  moreover,  the  men  did  not 
work  together.  The  Constitution  s  crew  were  exer 
cised  till  they  worked  like  machines,  and  yet  with 
enough  individuality  to  render  it  impossible  to  cripple 
a  gun  by  killing  one  man.  The  unpractised  British 
sailors  fired  at  random  ;  the  trained  Americans  took 
aim.  The  British  marines  had  not  been  taught  any 
thing  approximating  to  skirmishing  or  sharp-shoot 
ing ;  the  Americans  had.  The  British  sailors  had 
not  even  been  trained  enough  in  the  ordinary  duties 
of  seamen  ;  while  the  Americans  in  five  weeks  had 
been  rendered  almost  perfect.  The  former  were  at 
a  loss  what  to  do  in  an  emergency  at  all  out  of  their 
own  line  of  work ;  they  were  helpless  when  the 
wreck  fell  over  their  guns,  when  the  Americans 
would  have  cut  it  away  in  a  jiffy.  As  we  learn 
from  Commodore  Morris'  "  Autobiography,"  each 
Yankee  sailor  could,  at  need,  do  a  little  carpentering 
or  sail-mending,  and  so  was  more  self-reliant.  The 

1  In  looking  through  the  logs  of  the  Constitution,  Hornet,  etc.,  we 
continually  find  such  entries  as  "  beat  to  quarters,  exercised  the  men 
at  the  great  guns,"  "exercised  with  musketry,"  "exercised  the 
boarders,"  "  exercised  the  great  guns,  blank  cartridges,  and  after 
ward  firing  at  mark." 


134  NAVAL   WAR   OF    1 8 12. 

crew  had  been  trained  to  act  as  if  guided  by  one 
mind,  yet  each  man  retained  his  own  individuality. 
The  petty  officers  were  better  paid  than  in  Great 
Britain,  and  so  were  of  a  better  class  of  men, 
thoroughly  self-respecting ;  the  Americans  soon  got 
their  subordinates  in  order,  while  the  British  did 
not.  To  sum  up  :  one  ship's  crew  had  been  trained 
practically  and  thoroughly,  while  the  other  crew  was 
not  much  better  off  than  the  day  it  sailed  ;  and,  as 
far  as  it  goes,  this  is  a  good  test  of  the  efficiency  of 
the  two  navies. 

The  U.  S.  brig  Vixen,  12,  Lieutenant  George  U. 
Read,  had  been  cruising  off  the  southern  coast;  on 
Nov.  22d  she  fell  in  with  the  Southampton,  32,  Captain 
Sir  James  Lucas  Yeo,  and  was  captured  after  a  short 
but  severe  trial  of  speed.  Both  vessels  were  wrecked 
soon  afterward. 

The  Essex,  32,  Captain  David  Porter,  left  the  Del 
aware  on  Oct.  28th,  two  days  after  Commodore 
Bainbridge  had  left  Boston.  She  expected  to  make 
a  very  long  cruise  and  so  carried  with  her  an  unus 
ual  quantity  of  stores  and  sixty  more  men  than  or 
dinarily,  so  that  her  muster-roll  contained  319  names. 
Being  deep  in  the  water  she  reached  San  lago  after 
Bainbridge  had  left.  Nothing  was  met  with  until 
after  the  Essex  had  crossed  the  equator  in  latitude 
30°  W.  on  Dec.  nth.  On  the  afternoon  of  the  next 
day  a  sail  was  made  out  to  windward,  and  chased. 
At  nine  in  the  evening  it  was  overtaken,  and  struck 
after  receiving  a  volley  of  musketry  which  killed  one 
man.  The  prize  proved  to  be  the  British  packet 
Nocton,  of  10  guns  and  31  men,  with  $55,000  in 
specie  aboard.  The  latter  was  taken  out,  and  the 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    1 8 12.  135 

Nocton  sent  home  with  Lieutenant  Finch  and  a 
prize  crew  of  17  men,  but  was  recaptured  by  a 
British  frigate. 

The  next  appointed  rendezvous  was  the  Island  of 
Fernando  de  Noronha,  where  Captain  Porter  found 
a  letter  from  Commodore  Bainbridge,  informing 
him  that  the  other  vessels  were  off  Cape  Frio. 
Thither  cruised  Porter,  but  his  compatriots  had  left. 
On  the  2Qth  he  captured  an  English  merchant 
vessel ;  and  he  was  still  cruising  when  the  year 
closed. 

The  year  1812,  on  the  ocean,  ended  as  gloriously 
as  it  had  begun.  In  four  victorious  fights  the 
disparity  in  loss  had  been  so  great  as  to  sink  the 
disparity  of  force  into  insignificance.  Our  suc 
cesses  had  been  unaccompanied  by  any  important 
reverse.  Nor  was  it  alone  by  the  victories,  but  by 
the  cruises,  that  the  year  was  noteworthy.  The 
Yankee  men-of-war  sailed  almost  in  sight  of  the 
British  coast  and  right  in  the  tract  of  the  merchant 
fleets  and  their  armed  protectors.  Our  vessels  had 
shown  themselves  immensely  superior  to  their  foes. 

The  reason  of  these  striking  and  unexpected  suc 
cesses  was  that  our  navy  in  1812  was  the  exact  re 
verse  of  what  our  navy  is  now,  in  1882.  I  am  not 
alluding  to  the  personnel,  which  still  remains  excel 
lent  ;  but,  whereas  we  now  have  a  large  number  of 
worthless  vessels,  standing  very  low  down  in  their 
respective  classes,  we  then  possessed  a  few  vessels, 
each  unsurpassed  by  any  foreign  ship  of  her  class. 
To  bring  up  our  navy  to  the  condition  in  which  it 
stood  in  1812  it  would  not  be  necessary  (although  in 
reality  both  very  wise  and  in  the  end  very  economi- 


136  NAVAL  WAR   OF    1 8 12. 

cal)  to  spend  any  more  money  than  at  present ;  only 
instead  of  using  it  to  patch  up  a  hundred  antiquat 
ed  hulks,  it  should  be  employed  in  building  half  a 
dozen  ships  on  the  most  effective  model.  If  in  1812 
our  ships  had  borne  the  same  relation  to  the  British 
ships  that  they  do  now,  not  all  the  courage  and 
skill  of  our  sailors  would  have  won  us  a  single  suc 
cess.  As  it  was,  we  could  only  cope  with  the  lower 
rates,  and  had  no  vessels  to  oppose  to  the  great 
"liners";  but  to-day  there  is  hardly  any  foreign 
ship,  no  matter  how  low  its  rate,  that  is  not  supe 
rior  to  the  corresponding  American  ones.  It  is  too 
much  to  hope  that  our  political  shortsightedness 
will  ever  enable  us  to  have  a  navy  that  is  first-class 
in  point  of  size  ;  but  there  certainly  seems  no  rea 
son  why  what  ships  we  have  should  not  be  of  the 
very  best  quality.  The  effect  of  a  victory  is  two 
fold,  moral  and  material.  Had  we  been  as  roughly 
handled  on  water  as  we  were  on  land  during  the  first 
year  of  the  war,  such  a  succession  of  disaster? 
would  have  had  a  most  demoralizing  effect  on  the 
nation  at  large.  As  it  was,  our  victorious  sea- 
fights,  while  they  did  not  inflict  any  material  dam 
age  upon  the  colossal  sea-might  of  England,  had 
the  most  important  results  in  the  feelings  they 
produced  at  home  and  even  abroad.  Of  course 
they  were  magnified  absurdly  by  most  of  our 
writers  at  the  time ;  but  they  do  not  need  to  be 
magnified,  for  as  they  are  any  American  can  look 
back  upon  them  with  the  keenest  national  pride. 
For  a  hundred  and  thirty  years  England  had  had 
no  equal  on  the  sea ;  and  now  she  suddenly 
found  one  in  the  untried  navy  of  an  almost  un 
known  power. 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 


137 


BRITISH    VESSELS    CAPTURED     OR    DESTROYED    IN 

1812. 


Name. 

Guns. 

Tonnage. 

Guerri'ere 

49 

1,340 

Macedonian 

49 

1,325 

Java 

49 

1,340 

Frolic 

'9 

477 

Alert 

20 

325 

186 

4,807 

19 

477 

Remarks. 


Recaptured. 


Deducting  Frolic- 


167 


4,330 


AMERICAN  VESSELS   CAPTURED    OR 


Name. 

Guns. 

Tonnage. 

Wasp 

18 

45° 

Nautilus 

14 

l85 

Vixen 

14 

I85 

46 

820 

VESSELS   BUILT   IN    1 8 12 


Name.                        Rig.        Guns.  Tonnage.  WK/jre  Built.       Cost. 

Nonsuch  Schooner   14  148  Charleston  $15,000 

Carolina  Schooner  14  230  8,743 

Louisiana  Ship           16  341  New  Orleans  15,500 


138  NAVAL   WAR   OF    1 8 12. 


PRIZES   MADE.1 

Ship.  No.  of  Prizes. 

President  7 

United  States  2 

Constitution  9 

Congress  2 

Chesapeake  i 

Essex  1 1 

Wasp  2 

Hornet  \ 

Argus  6 

Small  Craft  5 

46 

1  These  can  only  be  approximately  given  ;  the  records  are  often 
incomplete  or  contradictory,  especially  as  regards  the  small  craft. 
Most  accounts  do  not  give  by  any  means  the  full  number. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

1812. 

ON   THE   LAKES. 

^The  combatants  starting  nearly  on  an  equality— Difficulties 
of  creating  a  naval  force — Difficulty  of  comparing  the  force  of  the  rival  squad 
rons— Meagreness  of  the  published  accounts — Unreliability  of  James — ONTA 
RIO — Extraordinary  nature  of  the  American  squadron — Canadian  squadron 
forming  only  a  kind  of  water  militia — Sackett's  Harbor  feebly  attacked  by 
Commodore  Earle — Commodore  Chauncy  bombards  York — ERIE— Lieutenant 
Elliott  captures  the  Detroit  and  Caledonia — Unsuccessful  expedition  of  Lieu 
tenant  Angus. 

AT  the  time  we  are  treating  of,  the  State  of 
Maine  was  so  sparsely  settled,  and  covered 
with  such  a  dense  growth  of  forest,  that  it  was 
practically  impossible  for  either  of  the  contending 
parties  to  advance  an  army  through  its  territory. 
A  continuation  of  the  same  wooded  and  mountain 
ous  district  protected  the  northern  parts  of  Ver 
mont  and  New  Hampshire,  while  in  New  York  the 
Adirondack  region  was  an  impenetrable  wilderness. 
It  thus  came  about  that  the  northern  boundary  was 
formed,  for  military  purposes,  by  Lake  Huron,  Lake 
Erie,  the  Niagara,  Lake  Ontario,  the  St.  Lawrence, 
and,  after  an  interval,  by  Lake  Champlain.  The 
road  into  the  States  by  the  latter  ran  close  along 
shore,  and  without  a  naval  force  the  invader  would 
be  wholly  unable  to  protect  his  flanks,  and  would 
probably  have  his  communications  cut.  This  lake, 
however,  was  almost  wholly  within  the  United 
States,  and  did  not  become  of  importance  till  tow- 

139 


140  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

ard  the  end  of  the  war.  Upon  it  were  two  Ameri 
can  gun-boats,  regularly  officered  and  manned,  and 
for  such  smooth  water  sufficiently  effective  vessels. 

What  was  at  that  time  the  western  part  of  the 
northern  frontier  became  the  main  theatre  of  mil 
itary  operations,  and  as  it  presented  largely  a  water 
front,  a  naval  force  was  an  indispensable  adjunct, 
the  command  of  the  lakes  being  of  the  utmost  im 
portance.  As  these  lakes  were  fitted  for  the  ma 
noeuvring  of  ships  of  the  largest  size,  the  operations 
upon  them  were  of  the  same  nature  as  those  on  the 
ocean,  and  properly  belong  to  naval  and  not  to  mil 
itary  history.  But  while  on  the  ocean  America 
started  with  too  few  ships  to  enable  her  really  to 
do  any  serious  harm  to  her  antagonist,  on  the  in 
land  waters  the  two  sides  began  very  nearly  on  an 
equality.  The  chief  regular  forces  either  belligerent 
possessed  were  on  Lake  Ontario.  Here  the  United 
States  had  a  man-of-war  brig,  the  Oneida,  of  240 
tons,  carrying  16  24-pound  carronades,  manned 
by  experienced  seamen,  and  commanded  by 
Lieutenant  M.  T.  Woolsey.  Great  Britain  pos 
sessed  the  Royal  George,  22,  Prince  Regent,  16,  Earl 
of  Moira,  14,  Gloucester,  10,  Seneca,  8,  and  Simco,  8, 
all  under  the  command  of  a  Commodore  Earle  ;  but 
though  this  force  was  so  much  the  more  powerful 
it  was  very  inefficient,  not  being  considered  as  be 
longing  to  the  regular  navy,  the  sailors  being  undis 
ciplined,  and  the  officers  totally  without  experience, 
never  having  been  really  trained  in  the  British  ser 
vice.  From  these  causes  it  resulted  that  the  strug 
gle  on  the  lakes  was  to  be  a  work  as  much  of  creating 
as  of  using  a  navy.  On  the  seaboard  success  came 
to  those  who  made  best  use  of  the  ships  that  had 


NAVAL    WAR    OF    1 8 12.  141 

already  been  built ;  on  the  lakes  the  real  contest  lay 
in  the  building.  And  building  an  inland  navy  was 
no  easy  task.  The  country  around  the  lakes, 
especially  on  the  south  side,  was  still  very  sparsely 
settled,  and  all  the  American  naval  supplies  had  to 
be  brought  from  the  seaboard  cities  through  the 
valley  of  the  Mohawk.  There  was  no  canal  or  other 
means  of  communication,  except  very  poor  roads 
intermittently  relieved  by  transportation  on  the 
Mohawk  and  on  Oneida  Lake,  when  they  were  navi 
gable.  Supplies  were  thus  brought  up  at  an  enor 
mous  cost,  with  tedious  delays  and  great  difficulty  ; 
and  bad  weather  put  a  stop  to  all  travel.  Very 
little  indeed,  beyond  timber,  could  be  procured  at 
the  stations  on  the  lakes.  Still  a  few  scattered 
villages  and  small  towns  had  grown  up  on  the 
shores,  whose  inhabitants  were  largely  engaged  in 
the  carrying  trade.  The  vessels  used  for  the  pur 
pose  were  generally  small  sloops  or  schooners,  swift 
and  fairly  good  sailors,  but  very  shallow  and  not 
fitted  for  rough  weather.  The  frontiersmen  them 
selves,  whether  Canadian  or  American,  were  bold, 
hardy  seamen,  and  when  properly  trained  and  led 
made  excellent  man-of-war's  men;  but  on  the  Amer 
ican  side  they  were  too  few  in  number,  and  too  un 
trained  to  be  made  use  of,  and  the  seamen  had  to 
come  from  the  coast.  But  the  Canadian  shores  had 
been  settled  longer,  the  inhabitants  were  more  numer 
ous,  and  by  means  of  the  St.  Lawrence  the  country 
was  easy  of  access  to  Great  Britain  ;  so  that  the  seat 
of  war,  as  regards  getting  naval  supplies,  and  even 
men,  was  nearer  to  Great  Britain  than  to  us.  Our 
enemies  also  possessed  in  addition  to  the  squadron 
on  Lake  Ontario  another  on  Lake  Erie,  consisting  of 


142  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

the  Queen  Charlotte,  17,  Lady  Prevost,  13,  Hunter,  10, 
Caledonia,  2,  Little  Belt,  2,  and  Chippeway^  2.  These 
two  squadrons  furnished  training  schools  for  some 
five  hundred  Canadian  seamen,  whom  a  short  course 
of  discipline  under  experienced  officers  sufficed  to 
render  as  good  men  as  their  British  friends  or 
American  foes.  Very  few  British  seamen  ever 
reached  Lake  Erie  (according  to  James,  not  over 
fifty) ;  but  on  Lake  Ontario,  and  afterward  on 
Lake  Champlain,  they  formed  the  bulk  of  the  crews, 
"  picked  seamen,  sent  out  by  government  expressly 
for  service  on  the  Canada  lakes."  '  As  the  contrary 
has  sometimes  been  asserted  it  may  be  as  well  to 
mention  that  Admiral  Codrington  states  that  no 
want  of  seamen  contributed  to  the  British  disasters 
on  the  lakes,  as  their  sea-ships  at  Quebec  had  men 
drafted  from  them  for  that  service  till  their  crews 
were  utterly  depleted.2  I  am  bound  to  state  that 
while  I  think  that  on  the  ocean  our  sailors  showed 
themselves  superior  to  their  opponents,  especially  in 
gun  practice,  on  the  lakes  the  men  of  the  rival 
fleets  were  as  evenly  matched,  in  skill  and  courage, 
as  could  well  be.  The  difference,  when  there  was 
any,  appeared  in  the  officers,  and,  above  all,  in  the 
builders  ;  which  was  the  more  creditable  to  us,  as  in 
the  beginning  we  were  handicapped  by  the  fact  that 
the  British  already  had  a  considerable  number  of 
war  vessels,  while  we  had  but  one. 

The  Falls  of  Niagara  interrupt  navigation  be 
tween  Erie  and  Ontario ;  so  there  were  three  inde 
pendent  centres  of  naval  operations  on  the  northern 
frontier.  The  first  was  on  Lake  Champlain,  where 

1  James,  vi,  353. 

a  Memoirs,  i,  322,  referring  especially  to  battle  of  Lake  Cham- 
plain. 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  143 

omy  the  Americans  possessed  any  force,  and,  singu 
larly  enough,  this  was  the  only  place  where  the 
British  showed  more  enterprise  in  ship-building 
than  we  did.  Next  came  Lake  Ontario,  where 
both  sides  made  their  greatest  efforts,  but  where 
the  result  was  indecisive,  though  the  balance  of  suc 
cess  was  slightly  inclined  toward  us.  Our  naval 
station  was  at  Sackett's  Harbor ;  that  of  our  foes  at 
Kingston.  The  third  field  of  operations  was  Lake 
Erie  and  the  waters  above  it.  Here  both  sides 
showed  equal  daring  and  skill  in  the  fighting,  and 
our  advantage  must  be  ascribed  to  the  energy  and 
success  with  which  we  built  and  equipped  vessels. 
Originally  we  had  no  force  at  all  on  these  waters, 
while  several  vessels  were  opposed  to  us.  It  is  a 
matter  of  wonder  that  the  British  and  Canadian 
governments  should  have  been  so  supine  as  to  per 
mit  their  existing  force  to  go  badly  armed,  and  so 
unenterprising  as  to  build  but  one  additional  ship, 
when  they  could  easily  have  preserved  their  supe 
riority. 

It  is  very  difficult  to  give  a  full  and  fair  account 
of  the  lake  campaigns.  The  inland  navies  were 
created  especially  for  the  war,  and,  after  it  were 
allowed  to  decay,  so  that  the  records  of  the  tonnage,, 
armament,  and  crews  are  hard  to  get  at.  Of  course, 
where  everything  had  to  be  created,  the  services 
could  not  have  the  regular  character  of  those  on  the 
ocean.  The  vessels  employed  were  of  widely  differ 
ent  kinds,  and  this  often  renders  it  almost  impossi 
ble  to  correctly  estimate  the  relative  force  of  two 
opposing  squadrons.  While  the  Americans  were 
building  their  lake  navy,  they,  as  make-shifts,  made 
use  of  some  ordinary  merchant  schooners,  which 


144  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

were  purchased  and  fitted  up  with  one  or  two  long, 
heavy  guns  each.  These  gun-vessels  had  no  quar 
ters,  and  suffered  under  all  the  other  disadvantages 
which  make  a  merchant  vessel  inferior  to  a  regularly 
constructed  man-of-war.  The  chief  trouble  was  that 
in  a  heavy  sea  they  had  a  strong  tendency  to  cap 
size,  and  were  so  unsteady  that  the  guns  could  not 
be  aimed  when  any  wind  was  blowing.  Now,  if  a 
few  of  these  schooners,  mounting  long  32*3,  encoun 
tered  a  couple  of  man-of-war  brigs,  armed  with  car- 
ronades,  which  side  was  strongest?  In  smooth 
water  the  schooners  had  the  advantage,  and  in 
rough  weather  they  were  completely  at  the  mercy 
of  the  brigs ;  so  that  it  would  be  very  hard  to  get  at 
the  true  worth  of  such  a  contest,  as  each  side  would 
be  tolerably  sure  to  insist  that  the  weather  was  such 
as  to  give  a  great  advantage  to  the  other.  In  all 
the  battles  and  skirmishes  on  Champlain,  Erie,  and 
Huron,  at  least  there  was  no  room  left  for  doubt  as 
to  who  were  the  victors.  But  on  Lake  Ontario 
there  was  never  any  decisive  struggle,  and  whenever 
an  encounter  occurred,  each  commodore  always 
claimed  that  his  adversary  had  "  declined  the  com 
bat  "  though  "much  superior  in  strength."  It  is, 
of  course,  almost  impossible  to  find  out  which  really 
did  decline  the  combat,  for  the  official  letters  flatly 
contradict  each  other  ;  and  it  is  often  almost  as  dif 
ficult  to  discover  where  the  superiority  in  force  lay, 
when  the  fleets  differed  so  widely  in  character  as 
was  the  case  in  1813.  Then  Commodore  Chauncy's 
squadron  consisted  largely  of  schooners;  their  long, 
heavy  guns  made  his  total  foot  up  in  a  very  impos 
ing  manner,  and  similar  gun-vessels  did  very  good 
work  on  Lake  Erie  ;  so  Commodore  Yeo,  and  more 


NAVAL    WAR    OF    l8l2.  145 

especially  Commodore  Yeo's  admirers,  exalted  these 
schooners  to  the  skies,  and  conveyed  the  impression 
that  they  were  most  formidable  craft,  by  means  of 
which  Chauncy  ought  to  have  won  great  victories. 
Yet  when  Yeo  captured  two  of  them  he  refused  to 
let  them  even  cruise  with  his  fleet,  and  they  were 
sent  back  to  act  as  coast  gun-boats  and  transports, 
which  certainly  would  not  have  been  done  had  they 
been  fitted  to  render  any  effectual  assistance. 
Again,  one  night  a  squall  came  on  and  the  two 
largest  schooners  went  to  the  bottom,  which  did  not 
tend  to  increase  the  confidence  felt  in  the  others. 
So  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  in  all  but  very 
smooth  water  the  schooners  could  almost  be  counted 
out  of  the  fight.  Then  the  question  arises  in  any 
given  case,  was  the  water  smooth?  And  the  testi 
mony  is  as  conflicting  as  ever. 

It  is  not  too  easy  to  reconcile  the  official  letters  of 
the  commanders,  and  it  is  still  harder  to  get  at  the 
truth  from  either  the  American  or  British  histories. 
Cooper  is  very  inexact,  and,  moreover,  paints  every 
thing  couleur  derose,  paying  no  attention  to  the  Brit 
ish  side  of  the  question,  and  distributing  so  much 
praise  to  everybody  that  one  is  at  a  loss  to  know 
where  it  really  belongs.  Still,  he  is  very  useful, 
for  he  lived  at  the  time  of  the  events  he  narrates, 
and  could  get  much  information  about  them  at  first 
hand,  from  the  actors  themselves.  James  is  almost 
the  only  British  authority  on  the  subject  ;  but  he  is 
not  nearly  as  reliable  as  when  dealing  with  the 
ocean  contests,  most  of  this  part  of  his  work  being 
taken  up  with  a  succession  of  acrid  soliloquies  on 
the  moral  defects  of  the  American  character.  The 
British  records  for  this  extraordinary  service  on  the 


146  NAVAL   WAR    OF    1 8 12. 

lakes  were  not  at  all  carefully  kept,  and  so  James  is 
not  hampered  by  the  necessity  of  adhering  more  or 
less  closely  to  official  documents,  but  lets  his  imagi 
nation  run  loose.  On  the  ocean  and  seaboard  his 
account  of  the  British  force  can  generally  be  relied 
upon  ;  but  on  the  lakes  his  authority  is  questionable 
in  every  .thing  relating  either  to  friends  or  foes. 
This  is  the  more  exasperating  because  it  is  done 
wilfully,  when,  if  he  had  chosen,  he  could  have 
written  an  invaluable  history  ;  he  must  often  have 
known  the  truth  when,  as  a  matter  of  preference,  he 
chose  either  to  suppress  or  alter  it.  Thus  he  ignores 
all  the  small  "  cutting  out  "  expeditions  in  which 
the  Americans  were  successful,  and  where  one 
would  like  to  hear  the  British  side.  For  example, 
Captain  Yeo  captured  two  schooners,  the  Julia  and 
Growler,  but  Chauncy  recaptured  both.  We  have 
the  American  account  of  this  recapture  in  full,  but 
James  does  not  even  hint  at  it,  and  blandly  puts 
down  both  vessels  in  the  total  "  American  loss  "  at 
the  end  of  his  smaller  work.  Worse  still,  when  the 
Growler  again  changed  hands,  he  counts  it  in  again, 
in  the  total,  as  if  it  were  an  entirely  different  boat, 
although  he  invariably  rules  out  of  the  American 
list  all  recaptured  vessels.  A  more  serious  perver 
sion  of  facts  are  his  statements  about  comparative 
tonnage.  This  was  at  that  time  measured  arbitra 
rily,  the  depth  of  hold  being  estimated  at  half  the 
breadth  of  beam  ;  and  the  tonnage  of  our  lake 
vessels  was  put  down  exactly  as  if  they  were  reg 
ular  ocean  cruisers  of  the  same  dimensions  in 
length  and  breadth.  But  on  these  inland  seas  the 
vessels  really  did  not  draw  more  than  half  as  much 
water  as  on  the  ocean,  and  the  depth  would  of 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  147 

course  be  much  less.  James,  in  comparing  the  ton 
nage,  gives  that  of  the  Americans  as  if  they  were 
regular  ocean  ships,  but  in  the  case  of  the  British 
vessels,  carefully  allows  for  their  shallowness,  al 
though  professing  to  treat  the  two  classes  in  the 
same  way  ;  and  thus  he  makes  out  a  most  striking 
and  purely  imaginary  difference.  The  best  example 
is  furnished  by  his  accounts  of  the  fleets  on  Lake 
Erie.  The  captured  vessels  were  appraised  by  two 
captains  and  the  ship-builder,  Mr.  Henry  Eckford ; 
their  tonnage  being  computed  precisely  as  the  ton 
nage  of  the  American  vessels.  The  appraisement 
was  recorded  in  the  Navy  Department,  and  was 
first  made  public  by  Cooper,  so  that  it  could  not 
have  been  done  for  effect.  Thus  measured  it  was 
found  that  the  tonnage  was  in  round  numbers  as 
follows  :  Detroit,  490  tons  ;  Queen  Charlotte,  400 ; 
Lady  Prevost,  230;  Hunter,  180;  Little  Belt,  90; 
Chippeway,  70.  James  makes  them  measure  respec 
tively  305,  280,  1 20,  74,  54,  and  32  tons,  but  care 
fully  gives  the  American  ships  the  regular  sea  ton 
nage.  So  also  he  habitually  deducts  about  25  per 
cent,  from  the  real  number  of  men  on  board  the 
British  ships  ;  as  regards  Lake  Erie  he  contradicts 
himself  so  much  that  he  does  not  need  to  be  ex 
posed  from  outside  sources.  But  the  most  glaring 
and  least  excusable  misstatements  are  made  as  to 
the  battle  of  Lake  Champlain,  where  he  gives  the 
American  as  greatly  exceeding  the  British  force.  He 
reaches  this  conclusion  by  the  most  marvellous  series 
of  garblings  and  misstatements.  First,  he  says  that 
the  Confiance  and  the  Saratoga  were  of  nearly  equal 
tonnage.  The  Confiance  being  captured  was  placed 
on  our  naval  lists,  where  for  years  she  ranked  as  a 


148  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

36-gun  frigate,  while  the  Saratoga  ranked  among 
the  24-gun  corvettes  ;  and  by  actual  measurement 
the  former  was  half  as  large  again  as  the  latter.  He 
gives  the  Confiance  but  270  men  ;  one  of  her  officers, 
in  a  letter  published  in  the  London  Naval  Chronicle? 
gives  her  over  300  ;  more  than  that  number  of  dead 
and  prisoners  were  taken  out  of  her.  He  misstates  the 
calibre  of  her  guns,  and  counts  out  two  of  them  be 
cause  they  were  used  through  the  bow-ports ; 
whereas,  from  the  method  in  which  she  made  her 
attack,  these  would  have  been  peculiarly  effective. 
The  guns  are  given  accurately  by  Cooper,  on  the 
authority  of  an  officer2  who  was  on  board  the  Confi 
ance  within  15  minutes  after  the  Linnet  struck,  and 
who  was  in  charge  of  her  for  two  months. 

Then  James  states  that  there  were  but  10  British 
gallies,  while  Sir  George  Prevost's  official  account, 
as  well  as  all  the  American  authorities,  state  the 
number  to  be  12.  He  says  that  the  Finch  grounded 
opposite  an  American  battery  before  the  engage 
ment  began,  while  in  reality  it  was  an  hour  after 
ward,  and  because  she  had  been  disabled  by  the 
shot  of  the  American  fleet.  The  gallies  were  largely 
manned  by  Canadians,  and  James,  anxious  to  put 
the  blame  on  these  rather  than  the  British,  says 
that  they  acted  in  the  most  cowardly  way,  whereas 
in  reality  they  caused  the  Americans  more  trouble 
than  Downie's  smaller  sailing  vessels  did.  His  ac 
count  of  the  armament  of  these  vessels  differs  widely 
from  the  official  reports.  He  gives  the  Linnet  and 
Chubb  a  smaller  number  of  men  than  the  number  of 
prisoners  that  were  actually  taken  out  of  them,  not 

1  Vol.  xxxii,  p.  272.     The  letter  also  says  that  hardly  fire  of  her 
men  remained  unhurt. 

2  Lieutenant  E.  A.  F.  Lavallette. 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  149 

including  the  dead.  Even  misstating  Downie's 
force  in  guns,  underestimating  the  number  of  his 
men,  and  leaving  out  two  of  his  gun-boats,  did  not 
content  James  ;  and  to  make  the  figures  show  a 
proper  disproportion,  he  says  (vol.  vi,  p.  504)  that 
he  shall  exclude  the  Finch  from  the  estimate,  be 
cause  she  grounded,  and  half  of  the  gun-boats,  be 
cause  he  does  not  think  they  acted  bravely.  Even 
were  these  assertions  true,  it  would  be  quite  as 
logical  for  an  American  writer  to  put  the  Chesa 
peake  s  crew  down  as  only  200,  and  say  he  should 
exclude  the  other  men  from  the  estimate  because 
they  flinched;  and  to  exclude  all  the  guns  that 
were  disabled  by  shot,  would  be  no  worse  than  to 
exclude  the  Finch.  James'  manipulation  of  the 
figures  is  a  really  curious  piece  of  audacity.  Natu 
rally,  subsequent  British  historians  have  followed 
him  without  inquiry.  James'  account  of  this  battle, 
alone,  amply  justifies  our  rejecting  his  narrative 
entirely,  as  far  as  affairs  on  the  lakes  go,  whenever 
it  conflicts  with  any  other  statement,  British  or 
American.  Even  when  it  does  not  conflict,  it  must 
be  followed  with  extreme  caution,  for  whenever  he 
goes  into  figures  the  only  thing  certain  about  them 
is  that  they  are  wrong.  He  gives  no  details  at  all 
of  most  of  the  general  actions.  Of  these,  however, 
we  already  possess  excellent  accounts,  the  best 
being  those  in  the  "  Manual  of  Naval  Tactics,"  by 
Commander  J.  H.  Ward,  U.  S.  N.  (1859),  an<^  m 
Lossing's  ''Field-Book  of  the  War  of  1812,"  and 
Cooper's  "  Naval  History."  The  chief  difficulty 
occurs  in  connection  with  matters  on  Lake  Ontario,1 

1  The  accounts  of  the  two  commanders  on  Lake  Ontario  are  as  diffi 
cult  to  reconcile  as  are  those  of  the  contending  admirals  in  the  battles 
which  the  Dutch  waged  against  the  English  and  French  during  the 


I5O  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

where  I  have  been  obliged  to  have  recourse  to  a 
perfect  patchwork  of  authors  and  even  newspapers, 
for  the  details,  using  Niles  Register  and  James  as 
mutual  correctives.  The  armaments  and  equip 
ments  being  so  irregular  I  have  not,  as  in  other 
cases,  made  any  allowance  for  the  short  weight  of 
the  American  shot,  as  here  the  British  may  have 
suffered  under  a  similar  disadvantage  ;  and  it  may 
be  as  well  to  keep  in  mind  that  on  these  inland 
waters  the  seamen  of  the  two  navies  seem  to  have 
been  as  evenly  matched  in  courage  and  skill  as  was 
possible.  They  were  of  exactly  the  same  stock, 
with  the  sole  exception  that  among  and  under,  but 
entirely  distinct  from,  the  Canadian-English,  fought 
the  descendants  of  the  conquered  Canadian-French ; 
and  even  these  had  been  trained  by  Englishmen, 
were  led  by  English  captains,  fought  on  ships  built 
by  English  gold,  and  with  English  weapons  and 
discipline. 

ON    LAKE  ONTARIO. 

There  being,  as  already  explained,  three  inde 
pendent  centres  of  inland  naval  operations,  the 
events  at  each  will  be  considered  separately. 

At  the  opening  of  the  war  Lieutenant  Woolsey, 
with  the  Oneida,  was  stationed  at  Sackett's  Harbor, 
which  was  protected  at  the  entrance  by  a  small 
fort  with  a  battery  composed  of  one  long  32.  The 

years  1672-1675.  In  every  one  of  De  Ruyter's  last  six  battles  each 
side  regularly  claimed  the  victory,  although  there  can  be  but  little 
doubt  that  on  the  whole  the  strategical,  and  probably  the  tactical, 
advantage  remained  with  De  Ruyter.  Every  historian  ought  to  feel 
a  sense  of  the  most  lively  gratitude  toward  Nelson  ;  in  his  various 
encounters  he  never  left  any  possible  room  for  dispute  as  to  which 
side  had  come  out  first  best. 


NAVAL  WAR  OF    l8l2.  15  I 

Canadian  squadron  of  six  ships,  mounting  nearly 
80  guns,  was  of  course  too  strong  to  be  med 
dled  with.  Indeed,  had  the  Royal  George,  22,  the 
largest  vessel,  been  commanded  by  a  regular  Brit 
ish  sea-officer,  she  would  have  been  perfectly  com 
petent  to  take  both  the  Oneida  and  Sackett's  Har 
bor  ;  but  before  the  Canadian  commodore,  Earle, 
made  up  his  mind  to  attack,  Lieut.  Woolsey  had 
time  to  make  one  or  two  short  cruises,  doing  some 
damage  among  the  merchant  vessels  of  the  enemy. 

On  the  igth  of  July  Earle's  ships  appeared  off  the 
Harbor  ;  the  Oneida  was  such  a  dull  sailor  that  it 
was  useless  for  her  to  try  to  escape,  so  she  was 
hauled  up  under  a  bank  where  she  raked  the  en 
trance,  and  her  off  guns  landed  and  mounted  on 
the  shore,  while  Lieut.  Woolsey  took  charge  of  the 
"battery,"  or  long  32,  in  the  fort.  The  latter  was 
the  only  gun  that  was  of  much  use,  for  after  a  des 
ultory  cannonade  of  about  an  hour,  Earle  with 
drew,  having  suffered  very  little  damage,  inflicted 
none  at  all,  and  proved  himself  and  his  subordi 
nates  to  be  grossly  incompetent. 

Acting  under  orders,  Lieut.  Woolsey  now  set 
about  procuring  merchant  schooners  to  be  fitted 
and  used  as  gun-vessels  until  more  regular  cruisers 
could  be  built.  A  captured  British  schooner  was 
christened  the  Julia,  armed  with  a  long  32  and  two 
6's,  manned  with  30  men,  under  Lieut.  Henry 
Wells,  and  sent  down  to  Ogdensburg.  "  On  her 
way  thither  she  encountered  and  actually  beat  off, 
without  losing  a  man,  the  Moira,  of  14,  and  Glouces 
ter,  of  10  guns."1  Five  other  schooners  were  also 
purchased  ;  the  Hamilton,  of  10  guns,  being  the 

1  James,  vi,  350. 


152  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

largest,  while  the  other  four,  the  Governor  Tornp- 
kins,  Growler,  Conquest,  and  Pert  had  but  1 1  pieces 
between  them.  Nothing  is  more  difficult  than  to 
exactly  describe  the  armaments  of  the  smaller  lake 
vessels.  The  American  schooners  were  mere  make 
shifts,  and  their  guns  were  frequently  changed1  ;  as 
soon  as  they  could  be  dispensed  with  they  were  laid 
up,  or  sold,  and  forgotten. 

It  was  even  worse  with  the  British,  who  mani 
fested  the  most  indefatigable  industry  in  intermit 
tently  changing  the  armament,  rig,  and  name  of  al 
most  every  vessel,  and,  the  records  being  very 
loosely  kept,  it  is  hard  to  find  what  was  the  force 
at  any  one  time.  A  vessel  which  in  one  conflict 
was  armed  with  long  i8's,  in  the  next  would  have 
replaced  some  of  them  with  68-pound  carronades  ; 
or,  beginning  life  as  a  ship,  she  would  do  most  of 
her  work  as  a  schooner,  and  be  captured  as  a  brig, 
changing  her  name  even  oftener  than  any  thing 
else. 

On  the  first  of  September  Commodore  Isaac 
Chauncy  was  appointed  commander  of  the  forces 
on  the  lakes  (except  of  those  on  Lake  Champlain), 
and  he  at  once  bent  his  energies  to  preparing  an 
effective  flotilla.  A  large  party  of  ship-carpenters 
were  immediately  despatched  to  the  Harbor  ;  and 
they  were  soon  followed  by  about  a  hundred  offi 
cers  and  seamen,  with  guns,  stores,  etc.  The  keel 
of  a  ship  to  mount  24  32-pound  carronades,  and  to 

1  They  were  always  having  accidents  happen  to  them  that  necessi 
tated  some  alteration.  If  a  boat  was  armed  with  a  long  32,  she 
rolled  too  much,  and  they  substituted  a  24  ;  if  she  also  had  an  18- 
pound  carronade,  it  upset  down  the  hatchway  in  the  middle  of  a 
fight,  and  made  way  for  a  long  12,  which  burst  as  soon  as  it  was 
used,  and  was  replaced  by  two  medium  6's.  So  a  regular  gamut  of 
changes  would  be  rung. 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    1 8 12.  155 

be  called  the  Madison,  was  laid  down,  and  she  was 
launched  on  the  26th  of  November,  just  when 
navigation  had  closed  on  account  of  the  ice. 
Late  in  the  autumn,  four  more  schooners  were 
purchased,  and  named  the  Ontario,  Scourge,  Fair 
American,  and  Asp,  but  these  were  hardly  used  until 
the  following  spring.  The  cruising  force  of  the 
Americans  was  composed  solely  of  the  Oneida  and 
the  six  schooners  first  mentioned.  The  British 
squadron  was  of  nearly  double  this  strength,  and 
had  it  been  officered  and  trained  as  it  was  during 
the  ensuing  summer,  the  Americans  could  not  have 
stirred  out  of  port.  But  as  it  was,  it  merely 
served  as  a  kind  of  water  militia,  the  very  sailors,, 
who  subsequently  did  well,  being  then  almost  use 
less,  and  unable  to  oppose  their  well-disciplined 
foes,  though  the  latter  were  so  inferior  in  number 
and  force.  For  the  reason  that  it  was  thus  prac 
tically  a  contest  of  regulars  against  militia,  I  shall 
not  give  numerical  comparisons  of  the  skirmishes 
in  the  autumn  of  1812,  and  shall  touch  on  them 
but  slightly.  They  teach  the  old  lesson  that, 
whether  by  sea  or  land,  a  small,  well-officered,  and 
well-trained  force,  can  not,  except  very  rarely,  be 
resisted  by  a  greater  number  of  mere  militia;  and 
that  in  the  end  it  is  true  economy  to  have  the 
regular  force  prepared  beforehand,  without  waiting 
until  we  have  been  forced  to  prepare  it  by  the 
disasters  happening  to  the  irregulars.  The  Cana 
dian  seamen  behaved  badly,  but  no  worse  tharu 
the  American  land-forces  did  at  the  same  time ; 
later,  under  regular  training,  both  nations  re 
trieved  their  reputations. 

Commodore  Chauncy  arrived  at    Sackett's  Har- 


154  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

bor  in  October,  and  appeared  on  the  lake  on  Nov. 
8th,  in  the  Oneida,  Lieutenant  Woolsey,  with  the 
six  schooners  Conquest,  Lieutenant  Elliott ;  Hamil- 
ton>  Lieutenant  McPherson ;  Tompkins,  Lieutenant 
Brown  ;  Pert,  Sailing-master  Arundel ;  Julia,  Sailing- 
master  Trant ;  Groivler,  Sailing-master  Mix.  The 
Canadian  vessels  were  engaged  in  conveying  sup 
plies  from  the  westward.  Commodore  Chauncy  dis 
covered  the  Royal  George  off  the  False  Duck  Islands, 
and  chased  her  under  the  batteries  of  Kingston,  on 
the  Qth.  Kingston  was  too  well  defended  to  be  taken 
by  such  a  force  as  Chauncy's;  but  the  latter  de 
cided  to  make  a  reconnoissance,  to  discover  the  en 
emy's  means  of  defence  and  see  if  it  was  possible  to 
lay  the  Royal  George  aboard.  At  3  P.  M.  the  attack 
was  made.  The  Hamilton  and  Tompkins  were  ab 
sent  chasing,  and  did  not  arrive  until  the  fighting 
had  begun.  The  other  four  gun-boats,  Conquest, 
Julia,  Pert,a.nd  Growler,  led,  in  the  order  named,  to 
open  the  attack  with  their  heavy  guns,  and  prepare 
the  way  for  the  Oneida,  which  followed.  At  the 
third  discharge  the  Perfs  gun  burst,  putting  her 
nearly  hors  de  combat,  badly  wounding  her  gallant 
commander,  Mr.  Arundel  (who  shortly  afterward  fell 
overboard  and  was  drowned),  and  slightly  wounding 
four  of  her  crew.  The  other  gun-boats  engaged  the 
five  batteries  of  the  enemy,  while  the  Oneida  pushed 
on  without  firing  a  shot  till  at  3.40  she  opened  on 
the  Royal  George,  and  after  20  minutes'  combat  act 
ually  succeeded  in  compelling  her  opponent,  though 
of  double  her  force,  to  cut  her  cables,  run  in,  and 
tie  herself  to  a  wharf,  where  some  of  her  people  de 
serted  her ;  here  she  was  under  the  protection  of  a 
large  body  of  troops,  and  the  Americans  could  not 


NAVAL   WAR    OF    l8l2.  155 

board  her  in  face  of  the  land-forces.  It  soon  began 
to  grow  dusk,  and  Chauncy's  squadron  beat  out 
through  the  channel,  against  a  fresh  head-wind.  In 
this  spirited  attack  the  American  loss  had  been  con 
fined  to  half  a  dozen  men,  and  had  fallen  almost  ex 
clusively  on  the  Oneida.  The  next  day  foul  weather 
came  on,  and  the  squadron  sailed  for  Sackett's  Han. 
bor.  Some  merchant  vessels  were  taken,  and  the 
Simco,  8,  was  chased,  but  unsuccessfully. 

The  weather  now  became  cold  and  tempestuous, 
but  cruising  continued  till  the  middle  of  November. 
The  Canadian  commanders,  however,  utterly  refused 
to  fight ;  the  Royal  George  even  fleeing  from  the 
Oneida,  when  the  latter  was  entirely  alone,  and 
leaving  the  American  commodore  in  undisputed 
command  of  the  lake.  Four  of  the  schooners 
continued  blockading  Kingston  till  the  middle  of 
November  ;  shorly  afterward  navigation  closed.1 

LAKE    ERIE. 

On  Lake  Erie  there  was  no  American  naval 
force  ;  but  the  army  had  fitted  out  a  small  brig, 
armed  with  six  6-pounders.  This  fell  into  the 
hands  of  the  British  at  the  capture  of  Detroit,  and 
was  named  after  that  city,  so  that  by  the  time  a 
force  of  American  officers  and  seamen  arrived  at  the 
lake  there  was  not  a  vessel  on  it  for  them  to  serve 
in,  while  their  foes  had  eight.  But  we  only  have  to 
deal  with  two  of  the  latter  at  present.  The  Detroit, 
still  mounting  six  6-pounders,  and  with  a  crew  of  56 
men,  under  the  command  of  Lieutenant  of  Marines 

1  These  preliminary  events  were  not  very  important,  and  the  histo 
rians  on  both  sides  agree  almost  exactly,  so  that  I  have  not  considered 
it  necessary  to  quote  authorities. 


156  NAVAL  AVAR   OF    l8l2. 

Rolette,  of  the  Royal  Navy,  assisted  by  a  boat 
swain  and  gunner,  and  containing  also  30  American 
prisoners,  and  the  Caledonia,  a  small  brig  mount 
ing  two  4-pounders  on  pivots,  with  a  crew  of 
12  men,  Canadian-English,  under  Mr.  Irvine,  and 
having  aboard  also  10  American  prisoners,  and  a 
very  valuable  cargo  of  furs  worth  about  200,000 
dollars,  moved  down  the  lake,  and  on  Oct.  7th  an 
chored  under  Fort  Erie.1 

Commander  Jesse  D.  Elliott  had  been  sent  up  to 
Erie  some  time  before  with  instructions  from  Com 
modore  Chauncy  to  construct  a  naval  force,  partly  by 
building  two  brigs  of  300  tons  each,2  and  partly  by 
purchasing  schooners  to  act  as  gun-boats.  No 
sailors  had  yet  arrived  ;  but  on  the  very  day  on 
which  the  two  brigs  moved  down  and  anchored 
under  Fort  Erie,  Captain  Elliott  received  news  that 
the  first  detachment  of  the  promised  seamen,  51  in 
number,  including  officers,3  was  but  a  few  miles  dis 
tant.  He  at  once  sent  word  to  have  these  men 
hurried  up,  but  when  they  arrived  they  were  found 
to  have  no  arms,  for  which  application  was  made  to 
the  military  authorities.  The  latter  not  only  gave 
a  sufficiency  of  sabres,  pistols,  and  muskets  to  the 
sailors,  but  also  detailed  enough  soldiers,  under 
Captain  N.  Towson  and  Lieutenant  Isaac  Roach, 
to  make  the  total  number  of  men  that  took  part  in 
the  expedition  124.  This  force  left  Black  Rock  at 

1  Letter  of  Captain  Jesse  D.  Elliott  to  Secretary  of  Navy,  Black 
Rock,  Oct.  5,  1812. 

3  That  is,  of  300  tons  actual  capacity  ;  measured  as  if  they  had 
been  ordinary  sea  vessels  they  each  tonned  480.  Their  opponent,  the 
ship  Detroit,  similarly  tonned  305,  actual  measurement,  or  490,  com 
puting  it  in  the  ordinary  manner. 

3  The  number  of  men  in  this  expedition  is  taken  from  Lossing's 
"Field-Book  of  the  War  of  1812,"  by  Benson  L.  Lossing,  New  York, 
1869,  p.  385,  note,  where  a  complete  list  of  the  names  is  given. 


NAVAL   WAR    OF    l8l2.  157 

one  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  8th  in  two  large 
boats,  one  under  the  command  of  Commander 
Elliott,  assisted  by  Lieutenant  Roach,  the  other 
under  Sailing-master  George  Watts  and  Captain 
Towson.  After  two  hours'  rowing  they  reached  the 
foe,  and  the  attack  was  made  at  three  o'clock. 
Elliott  laid  his  boat  alongside  the  Detroit  before  he 
was  discovered,  and  captured  her  after  a  very  brief 
struggle,  in  which  he  lost  but  one  man  killed,  and 
Midshipman  J.  C.  Cummings  wounded  with  a  bay 
onet  in  the  leg.  The  noise  of  the  scuffle  roused  the 
hardy  provincials  aboard  the  Caledonia,  and  they 
were  thus  enabled  to  make  a  far  more  effectual 
resistance  to  Sailing-master  Watts  than  the  larger 
vessel  had  to  Captain  Elliott.  As  Watts  pulled 
alongside  he  was  greeted  with  a  volley  of  musketry, 
but  at  once  boarded  and  carried  the  brig,  the  twelve 
Canadians  being  cut  down  or  made  prisoners ;  one 
American  was  killed  and  four  badly  wounded.  The 
wind  was  too  light  and  the  current  too  strong  to 
enable  the  prizes  to  beat  out  and  reach  the  lake,  so 
the  cables  were  cut  and  they  ran  down  stream.  The 
Caledonia  was  safely  beached  under  the  protection 
of  an  American  battery  near  Black  Rock.  The 
Detroit,  however,  was  obliged  to  anchor  but  four 
hundred  yards  from  a  British  battery,  which,  to 
gether  with  some  flying  artillery,  opened  on  her. 
Getting  all  his  guns  on  the  port  side,  Elliott  kept 
up  a  brisk  cannonade  till  his  ammunition  gave  out, 
when  he  cut  his  cable  and  soon  grounded  on  Squaw 
Island.  Here  the  Detroit  was  commanded  by  the 
guns  of  both  sides,  and  which  ever  party  took  pos 
session  of  her  was  at  once  driven  out  by  the  other. 
The  struggle  ended  in  her  destruction,  most  of  her 


158  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

guns  being  taken  over  to  the  American  side.  This 
was  a  very  daring  and  handsome  exploit,  reflecting 
great  credit  on  Commander  Elliott,  and  giving  the 
Americans,  in  the  Caledonia,  the  nucleus  of  their 
navy  on  Lake  Erie ;  soon  afterward  Elliott  re 
turned  to  Lake  Ontario,  a  new  detachment  of  sea 
men  under  Commander  S.  Angus  having  arrived. 

On  the  28th  of  November,  the  American  general, 
Smith,  despatched  two  parties  to  make  an  attack  on 
some  of  the  British  batteries.  One  of  these  consisted 
of  10  boats,  under  the  command  of  Captain  King  of 
the  1 5th  infantry,  with  150  soldiers,  and  with  him 
went  Mr.  Angus  with  82  sailors,  including  officers. 
The  expedition  left  at  one  o'clock  in  the  morning, 
but  was  discovered  and  greeted  with  a  warm  fire 
from  a  field  battery  placed  in  front  of  some  British 
barracks  known  as  the  Red  House.  Six  of  the 
boats  put  back ;  but  the  other  four,  containing 
about  a  hundred  men,  dashed  on.  While  the 
soldiers  were  forming  line  and  firing,  the  seamen 
rushed  in  with  their  pikes  and  axes,  drove  off  the 
British,  capturing  their  commander,  Lieut.  King,  of 
the  Royal  Army,  spiked  and  threw  into  the  river 
the  guns,  and  then  took  the  barracks  and  burned 
them,  after  a  desperate  fight.  Great  confusion  now 
ensued,  which  ended  in  Mr.  Angus  and  some  of  the 
seamen  going  off  in  the  boats.  Several  had  been 
killed  ;  eight,  among  whom  were  Midshipmen 
Wragg,  Dudley,  and  Holdup,  all  under  20  years 
old,  remained  with  the  troops  under  Captain  King, 
and  having  utterly  routed  the  enemy  found  them 
selves  deserted  by  their  friends.  After  staying  on 
the  shore  a  couple  of  hours  some  of  them  found  two 
boats  and  got  over  ;  but  Captain  King  and  a  few 


NAVAL  WAR   OF    l8l2.  159 

soldiers  were  taken  prisoners.  Thirty  of  the  sea 
men,  including  nine  of  the  twelve  officers,  were 
killed  or  wounded — among  the  former  being  Sail 
ing-masters  Sisson  and  Watts,  and  among  the  latter 
Mr.  Angus,  Sailing-master  Carter,  and  Midshipmen 
Wragg,  Holdup,  Graham,  Brailesford,  and  Irvine. 
Some  twenty  prisoners  were  secured  and  taken 
over  to  the  American  shore ;  the  enemy's  loss  was 
more  severe  than  ours,  his  resistance  being  very 
stubborn,  and  a  good  many  cannon  were  destroyed, 
but  the  expedition  certainly  ended  most  disas 
trously.  The  accounts  of  it  are  hard  to  reconcile, 
but  it  is  difficult  to  believe  that  Mr.  Angus  acted 
correctly. 

Later  in  the  winter  Captain  Oliver  Hazard  Perry 
arrived  to  take  command  of  the  forces  on  Lake 
Erie. 


CHAPTER  V. 
1813. 

ON  THE  OCEAN. 

Blockade  of  the  American  coast— The  Essex  in  the  South  Pacific— The 
Hornet  captures  the  Peacock— American  privateers  cut  out  by  British  boats- 
Unsuccessful  cruise  of  Commodore  Rodgers— The  Chesapeake  is  captured  by 
the  Shannon— Futile  gun-boat  actions— Defence  of  Craney  Island— Cutting- 
out  expeditions— The  A  rgus  is  captured  by  the  Pelican— The  Enterprise  cap 
tures  the  Boxer— Summary. 

BY  the  beginning  of  the  year  1813  the  British 
had  been  thoroughly  aroused  by  the  Ameri 
can  successes,  and  active  measures  were  at  once 
taken  to  counteract  them.  The  force  on  the  Ameri 
can  station  was  largely  increased,  and  a  strict  block 
ade  begun,  to  keep  the  American  frigates  in  port. 
The  British  frigates  now  cruised  for  the  most  part  in 
couples,  and  orders  were  issued  by  the  Board  of  Ad 
miralty  that  an  i8-pounder  frigate  was  not  to  engage 
an  American  24-pounder.  Exaggerated  accounts  of 
the  American  44*5  being  circulated,  a  new  class  of 
spar-deck  frigates  was  constructed  to  meet  them, 
rating  50  and  mounting  60  guns ;  and  some  74*5 
-were  cut  down  for  the  same  purpose.1  These  new 
•ships  were  all  much  heavier  than  their  intended 
opponents. 

As  New  England's  loyalty  to  the  Union  was,  not 
unreasonably,  doubted  abroad,  her  coasts  were  at 
first  troubled  but  little.  A  British  squadron  was 

Barnes,  vi,  p.  206. 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    1 8 12.  l6l 

generally  kept  cruising  off  the  end  of  Long  Island 
Sound,  and  another  off  Sandy  Hook.  Of  course 
America  had  no  means  of  raising  a  blockade,  as  each 
squadron  contained  generally  a  74  or  a  razee,  vessels 
too  heavy  for  any  in  our  navy  to  cope  with.  Frig 
ates  and  sloops  kept  skirting  the  coasts  of  New 
Jersey,  the  Carolinas,  and  Georgia.  Delaware  Bay 
no  longer  possessed  the  importance  it  had  during 
the  Revolutionary  War,  and  as  the  only  war  vessels 
in  it  were  some  miserable  gun-boats,  the  British  gen 
erally  kept  but  a  small  force  on  that  station.  Chesa 
peake  Bay  became  the  principal  scene  of  their  opera 
tions  ;  it  was  there  that  their  main  body  collected, 
and  their  greatest  efforts  were  made.  In  it  a  num 
ber  of  line-of-battle  ships,  frigates,  sloops,  and  cutters 
had  been  collected,  and  early  in  the  season  Admiral 
Sir  John  Warren  and  Rear-Admiral  Cockburn  arrived 
to  take  command.  The  latter  made  numerous  de 
scents  on  the  coast,  and  frequently  came  into  contact 
with  the  local  militia,  who  generally  fled  after  a  couple 
of  volleys.  These  expeditions  did  not  accomplish 
much,  beyond  burning  the  houses  and  driving  off  the 
live-stock  of  the  farmers  along  shore,  and  destroying  a 
few  small  towns — one  of  them,  Hampton,  being 
sacked  with  revolting  brutality.1  The  government 
of  the  United  States  was,  in  fact,  supported  by  the 
people  in  its  war  policy  very  largely  on  account  of 
these  excesses,  which  were  much  exaggerated  by 
American  writers.  It  was  really  a  species  of  civil 
war,  and  in  such  a  contest,  at  the  beginning  of  this 
century,  it  was  impossible  that  some  outrages  should 
not  take  place. 

1  James  (vi,  340)  says:  The  conduct  of  the  British  troops  on  this 
occasion  was  "  revolting  to  human  nature  "  and  "  disgraceful  to  the 


1 62  NAVAL  WAR   OF    l8l2. 

The  American  frigate  Constellation  had  by  this 
time  got  ready  for  sea,  and,  under  the  command  of 
Captain  Stewart,  she  prepared  to  put  out  early  in 
January.  As  the  number  of  blockaders  rendered  a 
fight  almost  certain  within  a  few  days  of  her  de 
parture,  her  crew  were  previously  brought  to  the 
highest  state  of  discipline,  the  men  being  exercised 
with  especial  care  in  handling  the  great  guns  and  in 
firing  at  a  target.1  However,  she  never  got  out ;  for 
when  she  reached  Hampton  Roads  she  fell  in  with  a 
British  squadron  of  line-of-battle  ships  and  frigates. 
She  kedged  up  toward  Norfolk,  and  when  the  tide 
rose  ran  in  and  anchored  between  the  forts ;  and  a 
few  days  later  dropped  down  to  cover  the  forts 
which  were  being  built  at  Craney  Island.  Here  she 
was  exposed  to  attacks  from  the  great  British  force 
still  lying  in  Hampton  Roads,  and,  fearing  they 
would  attempt  to  carry  her  by  surprise,  Captain 
Stewart  made  every  preparation  for  defence.  She 
was  anchored  in  the  middle  of  the  narrow  channel, 
flanked  by  gun-boats,  her  lower  ports  closed,  not  a 
rope  left  hanging  over  the  sides;  the  boarding  net 
tings,  boiled  in  half-made  pitch  till  they  were  as 
hard  as  wire,  were  triced  outboard  toward  the  yard- 
arms,  and  loaded  with  kentledge  to  fall  on  the  at 
tacking  boats  when  the  tricing  lines  were  cut,  while 
the  carronades  were  loaded  to  the  muzzle  with  mus 
ket  balls,  and  depressed  so  as  to  sweep  the  water 
near  the  ship.2  Twice,  a  force  of  British,  estimated 
by  their  foes  to  number  2,000  men,  started  off  at 
night  to  carry  the  Constellation  by  surprise;  but  on 

1  Life  of  Commodore  Tatnall,  by  C.   C.  Jones  (Savannah,  1878), 
P-  15- 

2  For  an  admirable  account  of  these  preparations,  as  well  as  of  the 
subsequent  events,  see  Cooper,  ii,  242. 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  163 

each  occasion  they  were  discovered  and  closely 
watched  by  her  guard-boats,  and  they  never  ven 
tured  to  make  the  attack.  However,  she  was  un 
able  to  get  to  sea,  and  remained  blockaded  to  the 
close  of  the  war. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  year  several  frigates  and 
smaller  craft  were  at  sea.  The  Chesapeake,  Captain 
Evans,  had  sailed  from  Boston  on  Dec.  13,  I8I2.1 
She  ran  down  past  Madeira,  the  Canaries,  and  Cape 
de  Verde,  crossed  the  equator,  and  for  six  we-eks 
cruised  to  the  south  of  the  line  between  longitudes 
16°  and  25°.  Thence  she  steered  to  the  west,  pass 
ing  near  Surinam,  over  the  same  spot  on  which  the 
Hornet  had  sunk  the  Peacock  but  a  day  previous. 
Cruising  northward  through  the  West  Indies,  she 
passed  near  the  Bermudas,  where  she  was  chased  by 
a  74  and  a  frigate  ;  escaping  from  them  she  got  into 
Boston  on  April  Qth,  having  captured  five  merchant 
men,  and  chased  unsuccessfully  for  two  days  a  brig- 
sloop.  The  term  of  two  years  for  which  her  crew 
were  enlisted  now  being  up,  they,  for  the  most  part, 
left,  in  consequence  of  some  trouble  about  the  prize- 
money.  Captain  Evans  being  in  ill  health,  Captain 
James  Lawrence  was  appointed  to  command  her. 
He  reached  Boston  about  the  middle  of  May2  and 
at  once  set  about  enlisting  a  new  crew,  and  tried, 
with  but  partial  success,  to  arrange  matters  with  the 
old  sailors,  who  were  now  almost  in  open  mutiny. 

When  the  year    1812  had   come  to  an   end,   the 

Statistical  "  History  of  the  U.  S.  Navy,"  by  Lieutenant  G.  E. 
Emmons. 

2  He  was  still  on  the  Hornet  at  New  York  on  May  loth,  as  we 
know  from  a  letter  of  Biddle's,  written  on  that  date  (in  letters  of 
"  Masters'  Commandant,"  1813,  No.  58),  and  so  could  hardly  have 
been  with  the  Chesapeake  two  weeks  before  he  put  out  ;  and  had  to 
get  his  crew  together  and  train  them  during  that  time. 


164  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

Essex,  32,  was  in  the  South  Atlantic,  and  Captain 
Porter  shortly  afterward  ran  into  St.  Catherines  to 
'water.  Being  at  a  loss  where  to  find  his  consorts, 
he  now  decided  to  adopt  the  exceedingly  bold 
measure  of  doubling  Cape  Horn  and  striking  at  the 
British  whalers  in  the  Pacific.  This  was  practically 
going  into,  the  enemy's  waters,  the  Portuguese  and 
Spanish  countries  being  entirely  under  the  influence 
of  Britain,  while  there  were  no  stations  where  Por 
ter  could  revictual  or  repair  in  safety.  However, 
the  Essex  started,  doubled  the  Horn,  and  on  March 
1 3th  anchored  in  the  harbor  of  Valparaiso.  Her  ad 
venturous  cruise  in  the  Pacific  was  the  most  striking 
feature  of  the  war ;  but  as  it  has  been  most  minutely 
described  by  Commodore  Porter  himself,  by  his  son, 
Admiral  Porter,  by  Admiral  Farragut,  and  by 
Cooper,  I  shall  barely  touch  upon  it. 

On  March  2Oth  the  Essex  captured  the  Peruvian 
corsair  Nereyda,  16,  hove  her  guns  and  small  arms 
overboard,  and  sent  her  into  port.  She  made  the 
island  of  San  Gallan,  looked  into  Callao,  and  thence 
went  to  the  Gallipagos,  getting  every  thing  she 
wanted  from  her  prizes.  Then  she  went  toTumbez, 
and  returned  to  the  Gallipagos  ;  thence  to  the  Mar 
quesas,  and  finally  back  to  Valparaiso  again.  By 
this  year's  campaign  in  the  Pacific,  Captain  Porter 
had  saved  all  our  ships  in  those  waters,  had  not  cost 
the  government  a  dollar,  living  purely  on  the 
enemy,  and  had  taken  from  him  nearly  4,000  tons 
of  shipping  and  400  men,  completely  breaking  up 
his  whaling  trade  in  the  South  Pacific. 

The  cruise  was  something  sui  generis  in  modern 
warfare,  recalling  to  rnind  the  cruises  of  the  early 
English  and  Dutch  navigators.  An  American  ship 


NAVAL   WAR    OF    l8l2.  165 

was  at  a  serious  disadvantage  in  having  no  harbor 
of  refuge  away  from  home  ;  while  on  almost  every 
sea  there  were  British,  French,  and  Spanish  ports 
into  which  vessels  of  those  nations  could  run  for 
safety.  It  was  an  unprecedented  thing  for  a  small 
frigate  to  cruise  a  year  and  a  half  in  enemy's 
waters,  and  to  supply  herself  during  that  time, 
purely  from  captured  vessels,  with  every  thing — 
cordage,  sails,  guns,  anchors,  provisions,  and  medi 
cines,  and  even  money  to  pay  the  officers  and  men ! 
Porter's  cruise  was  the  very  model  of  what  such  an 
expedition  should  be,  harassing  the  enemy  most 
effectually  at  no  cost  whatever.  Had  the  Essex 
been  decently  armed  with  long  guns,  instead  of  car- 
ronades,  the  end  might  have  been  as  successful  as  it 
was  glorious.  The  whalers  were  many  of  them 
armed  letters-of-marque,  and,  though  of  course  un 
able  to  oppose  the  frigate,  several  times  smart  skir 
mishes  occurred  in  attacking  them  with  boats,  or  in 
captured  ships  ;  as  when  Lieutenant  Downs  and 
20  men  in  the  prize  Gcorgiana  after  a  short  brush 
captured  the  Hector,  with  25  men,  two  of  whom 
were  killed  and  six  wounded  ;  and  v/hen,  under  simi 
lar  circumstances,  the  prize  Greenwich,  of  25  men, 
captured  the  Seringapatam  of  40.  The  cruise  of  the 
Essex,  the  first  American  man-of-war  ever  in  the 
Pacific,  a  year  and  a  half  out  and  many  thousand 
miles  away  from  home,  was  a  good  proof  of  Porter's 
audacity  in  planning  the  trip  and  his  skill  and  re 
source  in  carrying  it  out. 

To  return  now  to  the  Hornet.  This  vessel  had 
continued  blockading  the  Bonne  Citoyenne  until 
January  24th,  when  the  Montagu,  74,  arrived  toward 
evening  and  chased  her  into  port.  As  the  darkness 


1 66  NAVAL  WAR   OF    l8l2. 

came  on  the  Hornet  wore,  stood  out  to  sea,  passing 
into  the  open  without  molestation  from  the  74,  and 
then  steered  toward  the  northeast,  cruising  near  the 
coast,  and  making  a  few  prizes,  among  which  was 
a  brig,  the  Resolution,  with  $23,000  in  specie  aboard, 
captured  on  February  I4th.  On  the  24th  of  Feb 
ruary,  while  nearing  the  mouth  of  the  Demerara 
River,  Captain  Lawrence  discovered  a  brig  to  lee 
ward,  and  chased  her  till  he  ran  into  quarter  less 
five,  when,  having  no  pilot,  he  hauled  off-shore. 
Just  within  the  bar  a  man-of-war  brig  was  lying  at 
anchor ;  and  while  beating  round  Caroband  Bank,  in 
order  to  get  at  her,  Captain  Lawrence  discovered 
another  sail  edging  down  on  his  weather-quarter.1 
The  brig  at  anchor  was  the  Espiegle>  of  18  guns, 
32-pound  carronades,  Captain  John  Taylor2;  and 
the  second  brig  seen  was  the  Peacock,  Captain 
William  Peake,3  which,  for  some  unknown  reason, 
had  exchanged  her  32-pound  carronades  for  24*5. 
She  had  sailed  from  the  Espiegles  anchorage  the 
same  morning  at  10  o'clock.  At  4.20  P.  M.  the  Pea 
cock  hoisted  her  colors ;  then  the  Hornet  beat  to 
quarters  and  cleared  for  action.  Captain  Lawrence 
kept  close  by  the  wind,  in  order  to  get  the  weather- 
gage  ;  when  he  was  certain  he  could  weather  the 
enemy,  he  tacked,  at  5.10,  and  the  Hornet  hoisted 
her  colors.  The  ship  and  the  brig  now  stood  for 
each  other,  both  on  the  wind,  the  Hornet  being  on 
the  starboard  and  the  Peacock  on  the  port  tack,  and 
at  5.25  they  exchanged  broadsides,  at  half  pistol- 
shot  distance,  while  going  in  opposite  directions, 
the  Americans  using  their  lee  and  the  British  their 

1  Letter  of  Captain  Lawrence,  March  29,  1813. 

2  James,  vi,  278.  3  Do, 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  l6/ 

weather  battery.  The  guns  were  fired  as  they  bore, 
and  the  Peacock  suffered  severely,  while  her  antago 
nist's  hull  was  uninjured,  though  she  suffered 
slightly  aloft  and  had  her  pennant  cut  off  by  the  first 
shot  fired.1  One  of  the  men  in  the  mizzen-top  was 
killed  by  a  round  shot,  and  two  more  were  wounded 
in  the  main-top.2  As  soon  as  they  were  clear,  Cap 
tain  Peake  put  his  helm  hard  up  and  wore,  firing  his 
starboard  guns  ;  but  the  Hornet  had  watched  him 
closely,  bore  up  as  quickly,  and  coming  down  at  5.35, 
ran  him  close  aboard  on  the  starboard  quarter.  Cap 
tain  Peake  fell  at  this  moment,  together  with  many 
of  his  crew,  and,  unable  to  withstand  the  Hornet's 
heavy  fire,  the  Peacock  surrendered  at  5.39,  just  14 
minutes  after  the  first  shot  ;  and  directly  afterward 
hoisted  her  ensign  union  down  in  the  forerigging 
as  a  signal  of  distress.  Almost  immediately  her 
main-mast  went  by  the  board.  Both  vessels  then 
anchored,  and  Lieutenant  J.  T.  Shubrick,  being  sent 
on  board  the  prize,  reported  her  sinking.  Lieu 
tenant  D.  Connor  was  then  sent  in  another  boat  to 
try  to  save  the  vessel ;  but  though  they  threw  the 
guns  overboard,  plugged  the  shot  holes,  tried  the 
pumps,  and  even  attempted  bailing,  the  water 
gained  so  rapidly  that  the  Hornet's  officers  devoted 
themselves  to  removing  the  wounded  and  other 
prisoners ;  and  while  thus  occupied  the  short  tropi 
cal  twilight  left  them.  Immediately  afterward  the 
prize  settled,  suddenly  and  easily,  in  5|  fathoms 
water,  carrying  with  her  three  of  the  Hornet's  peo 
ple  and  nine  of  her  own,  who  were  rummaging  be- 

1  Cooper,  p.  200. 

2  See   entry  in   her  log  for  this  day  (In   "  Log-Book  of    Hornet, 
Wasp,  and  Argus,  from  July  20,  1809,  to  October  6,  1813,")  in  the 
Bureau  of  Navigation,  at  Washington. 


1 68  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

low  ;  meanwhile  four  others  of  her  crew  had  lowered 
her  damaged  stern  boat,  and  in  the  confusion  got  off 
unobserved  and  made  their  way  to  the  land.  The 
foretop  still  remained  above  water,  and  four  of  the 
prisoners  saved  themselves  by  running  up  the  rig 
ging  into  it.  Lieutenant  Connor  and  Midshipman 
Cooper  (who  had  also  come  on  board)  saved  them 
selves,  together  with  most  of  their  people  and  the 
remainder  of  the  Peacock's  crew,  by  jumping  into 
the  launch,  which  was  lying  on  the  booms,  and 
paddling  her  toward  the  ship  with  pieces  of  boards 
in  default  of  oars. 

The  Hornet's  complement  at  this  time  was  150, 
of  whom  she  had  8  men  absent  in  a  prize  and  7  on 
the  sick  list,1  leaving  135  fit  for  duty  in  the  action3; 
of  these  one  man  was  killed,  and  two  wounded,  all 
aloft.  Her  rigging  and  sails  were  a  good  deal  cut, 
a  shot  had  gone  through  the  foremast,  and  the 
bowsprit  was  slightly  damaged  ;  the  only  shot  that 
touched  her  hull  merely  glanced  athwart  her  bows, 
indenting  a  plank  beneath  the  cat-head.  The  Pea 
cock's  crew  had  amounted  to  134,  but  4  were  absent 
in  a  prize,  and  but  I223  fit  for  action;  of  these  she 
lost  her  captain,  and  seven  men  killed  and  mortally 
wounded,  and  her  master,  one  midshipman,  and  28 
men  severely  and  slightly  wounded, — in  all  8  killed 
and  30  v/ounded,  or  about  13  times  her  antagonist's 
loss.  She  suffered  under  the  disadvantage  of  light 
metal,  having  24*3  opposed  to  32*5;  but  judging 
from  her  gunnery  this  was  not  much  of  a  loss,  as 
6-pounders  would  have  inflicted  nearly  as  great 

1  Letter  of  Captain  Lawrence. 

2  Letter  of  Lieutenant  D.  Conner,  April  26,  1813. 

3  Letter  of  Lieutenant   F.  W.  Wright  (of  the  Peacock],  April  17, 
1813. 


NAVAL    WAR    OF    l8l2.  169 

damage.  She  was  well  handled  and  bravely  fought ; 
but  her  men  showed  a  marvellous  ignorance  of 
gunnery.  It  appears  that  she  had  long  been  known 
as  "the  yacht,"  on  account  of  the  tasteful  arrange 
ment  of  her  deck  ;  the  breechings  of  the  carronades 
were  lined  with  white  canvas,  and  nothing  could 
exceed  in  brilliancy  the  polish  upon  the  traversing 
bars  and  elevating  screws.1  In  other  words,  Cap 
tain  Peake  had  confounded  the  mere  incidents  of 
good  discipline  with  the  essentials.2 

The  Hornet ' s  victory  cannot  be  regarded  in  any 
other  light  than  as  due,  not  to  the  heavier  metal,, 
but  to  the  far  more  accurate  firing  of  the  Ameri 
cans  ;  "  had  the  guns  of  the  Peacock  been  of  the 
largest  size  they  could  not  have  changed  the  result,, 
as  the  weight  of  shot  that  do  not  hit  is  of  no  great 
moment."  Any  merchant-ship  might  have  been  as 
well  handled  and  bravely  defended  as  she  was ;  and 
an  ordinary  letter-of-marque  would  have  made  as 
creditable  a  defence. 

During  the  entire  combat  the  Espiegle  was  not 
more  than  4  miles  distant  and  was  plainly  visible 
from  the  Hornet ;  but  for  some  reason  she  did  not 
come  out,  and  her  commander  reported  that  he 
knew  nothing  of  the  action  till  the  next  day.  Cap 
tain  Lawrence  of  course  was  not  aware  of  this,  and 
made  such  exertions  to  bend  on  new  sails,  stow  his 
boats,  and  clear  his  decks  that  by  nine  o'clock  he 
was  again  prepared  for  action,3  and  at  2  P.  M.  got 
under  way  for  the  N.w.  Being  now  overcrowded 
with  people  and  short  of  water  he  stood  for  home, 

1  James,  vi,  280. 

2  Codrington  ("  Memoirs,"  i,  310)  comments  very  forcibly  on  the 
uselessness  of  a  mere  martinet. 

3  Letter  of  Captain  Lawrence. 


\, 

\1 


\ 


\ 


\ 


170 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  I J\ 

anchoring  at    Holmes'  Hole   in   Martha's  Vineyard 
on  the  iQth  of  March. 

On  their  arrival  at  New  York  the  officers  of  the 
Peacock  published  a  card  expressing  in  the  warmest 
terms  their  appreciation  of  the  way  they  and 
their  men  had  been  treated.  Say  they:  "  We 
ceased  to  consider  ourselves  prisoners ;  and  every 
thing  that  friendship  could  dictate  was  adopted  by 
you  and  the  officers  of  the  Hornet  to  remedy  the 
inconvenience  we  would  otherwise  have  experienced 
from  the  unavoidable  loss  of  the  whole  of  our  prop 
erty  and  clothes  owing  to  the  sudden  sinking  of  the 
Peacock"  ]  This  was  signed  by  the  first  and  second 
lieutenants,  the  master,  surgeon  and  purser. 


Weight 

Tonnage. 

Guns. 

Metal. 

Men 

Los 

Hornet 

480 

10 

279 

135 

3 

Peacock 

477 

10 

210 

122 

38 

Relative  Relative  Loss 

Force.  Inflicted. 

Hornet  i.oo  i.oo 

Peacock  .83  .08 

That  is,  the  forces  standing  nearly  as  13  is  to  11, 
the  relative  execution  was  about  as  13  is  to  i. 

The  day  after  the  capture  Captain  Lawrence  re 
ported  277  souls  aboard,  including  the  crew  of  the 
English  brig  Resolution  which  he  had  taken,  and  of 
the  American  brig  Hunter,  prize  to  the  Peacock.  As 
James,  very  ingeniously,  tortures  these  figures  into 
meaning  what  they  did  not,  it  may  be  well  to  show 
exactly  what  the  277  included.  Of  the  Hornet's 
original  crew  of  150,  8  were  absent  in  a  prize,  I 

1  Quoted  in  full  in  "  Niles'  Register  "and  Lossing's  "  Field  Book." 


1/2  NAVAL   WAR    OF    1 8 12. 

killed,  and  3  drowned,  leaving  (including  7  sick) 
138  ;  of  the  Peacock's  original  134,  4  were  ab 
sent  in  a  prize,  5  killed,  9  drowned,  and  4  es 
caped,  leaving  (including  8  sick  and  3  mortally 
wounded)  112;  there  were  also  aboard  16  other 
British  prisoners,  and  the  Hunter  s  crew  of  1 1  men 
—making  just  277.'  According  to  Lieutenant  Con 
nor's  letter,  written  in  response  to  one  from  Lieu 
tenant  Wright,  there  were  in  reality  139  in  the 
Peacock's  crew  when  she  began  action  ;  but  it  is,  of 
course,  best  to  take  each  commander's  account  of 
the  number  of  men  on  board  his  ship  that  were  fit 
for  duty. 

On  Jan.  I7th  the  Viper,  12,  Lieutenant  J.  D.  Henly 
was  captured  by  the  British  frigate  Narcissus,  32, 
Captain  Lumly. 

On  Feb.  8th,  while  a  British  squadron,  consisting 
of  the  four  frigates  Belvidera  (Captain  Richard  By 
ron),  Maidstone,  Junon,  and  Statira,  were  at  anchor 
in  Lynhaven  Bay,  a  schooner  was  observed  in  the 
northeast  standing  down  Chesapeake  Bay.2  This 
was  the  Lottery,  letter-of-marque,  of  six  12-pounder 
carronades  and  25  men,  Captain  John  Southcomb, 
bound  from  Baltimore  to  Bombay.  Nine  boats,  with 
200  men,  under  the  command  of  Lieutenant  Kelly 
Nazer  were  sent  against  her,  and,  a  calm  coming  on, 
overtook  her.  The  schooner  opened  a  well-directed 
fire  of  round  and  grape,  but  the  boats  rushed  for 
ward  and  boarded  her,  not  carrying  her  till  after  a 

1  The  277  men  were  thus  divided  into  :  Hornet's  crew,  138  ;  Peacock's 
crew,  112  ;  Resolution's  crew,  16  ;  Hunter's  crew,  n.  James  quotes 
"  270"  men,  which  he  divides  as  follows  :  Hornet  160,  Peacock  IOT, 
Hunter,  9, — leaving  out  the  Resolution's  crew,  1 1  of  the  Peacock's, 
and  2  of  the  Hunter's. 

*  James,  vi,  325. 


NAVAL    WAR   OF    1 8 12.  173 

most  obstinate  struggle,  in  which  Captain  South- 
comb  and  19  of  his  men,  together  with  13  of  the  as 
sailants,  were  killed  or  wounded.  The  best  war  ship 
of  a  regular  navy  might  be  proud  of  the  discipline 
and  courage  displayed  by  the  captain  and  crew  of 
the  little  Lottery.  Captain  Byron  on  this,  as  well  as 
on  many  another  occasion,  showed  himself  to  be  as 
humane  as  he  was  brave  and  skilful.  Captain 
Southcomb,  mortally  wounded,  was  taken  on  board 
Byron's  frigate,  where  he  was  treated  with  the  great 
est  attention  and  most  delicate  courtesy,  and  when 
he  died  his  body  was  sent  ashore  with  every  mark 
of  the  respect  due  to  so  brave  an  officer.  Captain 
Stewart  (of  the  Constellation)  wrote  Captain  Byron 
a  letter  of  acknowledgment  for  his  great  courtesy 
and  kindness.1 

On  March  i6th  a  British  division  of  five  boats  and 
105  men,  commanded  by  Lieutenant  James  Polking- 
horne,  set  out  to  attack  the  privateer  schooner 
Dolphin  of  12  guns  and  70  men,  and  the  letters-of- 
marque,  Racer,  Arab,  and  Lynx,  each  of  six  guns 
and  30  men.  Lieutenant  Polkinghorne,  after  pulling 
15  miles,  found  the  four  schooners  all  prepared  to 
receive  him,  but  in  spite  of  his  great  inferiority  in 
force  he  dashed  gallantly  at  them.  The  Arab  and 
Lynx  surrendered  at  once  ;  the  Racer  was  carried 
after  a  sharp  struggle  in  which  Lieutenant  Polking 
horne  was  wounded,  and  her  guns  turned  on  the 
Dolphin.  Most  of  the  latter's  crew  jumped  over 
board  ;  a  few  rallied  round  their  captain,  but  they 
were  at  once  scattered  as  the  British  seamen  came 
aboard.  The  assailants  had  13,  and  the  privateers- 

1  The  correspondence  between  the  two  captains  is  given  in  full  in 
"  Niles'  Register,"  which  also  contains  fragmentary  notes  on  the  ac 
tion,  principally  as  to  the  loss  incurred. 


174  NAVAL   WAR   OF    i8l2. 

men  16  men  killed  and  wounded  in  the  fight.  It 
was  certainly  one  of  the  most  brilliant  and  daring 
cutting-out  expeditions  that  took  place  during  the 
vvar,  and  the  victors  well  deserved  their  success. 
The  privateersmen  (according  to  the  statement  of 
the  Dolphins  master,  in  "  Niles'  Register")  were 
panic-struck,  and  acted  in  any  thing  but  a  brave 
manner.  All  irregular  fighting-men  do  their  work 
by  fits  and  starts.  No  regular  cruisers  could  behave 
better  than  did  the  privateers  Lottery,  Chasseur,  and 
General  Armstrong;  none  would  behave  as  badly  as 
the  Dolphin,  Lynx,  and  Arab.  The  same  thing  ap 
pears  on  shore.  Jackson's  irregulars  at  New  Orleans 
did  as  well,  or  almost  as  well,  as  Scott's  troops  at 
Lundy's  Lane ;  but  Scott's  troops  would  never  have 
suffered  from  such  a  panic  as  overcame  the  militia 
at  Bladensburg. 

On  April  Qth  the  schooner  Norwich,  of  14  guns  and 
61  men,  Sailing-master  James  Monk,  captured  the 
British  privateer  Caledonia,  of  10  guns  and  41  men, 
after  a  short  action  in  which  the  privateer  lost  7  men. 

On  April  3Oth  Commodore  Rodgers,  in  the 
President,  44,  accompanied  by  Captain  Smith  in  the 
Congress,  38,  sailed  on  his  third  cruise.1  On  May 
2d  he  fell  in  with  and  chased  the  British  sloop  Cur 
lew,  1 8,  Captain  Michael  Head,  but  the  latter  es 
caped  by  knocking  away  the  wedges  of  her  masts 
and  using  other  means  to  increase  her  rate  of  sail 
ing.  On  the  8th,  in  latitude  39°  30'  N.,  long.  60° 
W.,  the  Congress  parted  company,  and  sailed  off 
toward  the  southeast,  making  four  prizes,  of  no 
great  value,  in  the  North  Atlantic2;  when  about  in 

1  Letter  of  Commodore  Rodgers,  Sept.  30,  1813. 
3  Letter  of  Captain  Smith,  Dec.  15,  1813. 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    1 8 12.  1/5 

long.  35°  W.  she  steered  south,  passing  to  the  south 
of  the  line.  But  she  never  saw  a  man-of-war,  and 
during  the  latter  part  of  her  cruise  not  a  sail  of  any 
kind  ;  and  after  crusing  nearly  eight  months  returned 
to  Portsmouth  Harbor  on  Dec.  I4th,  having  cap 
tured  but  four  merchant-men.  Being  unfit  to  cruise 
longer,  owing  to  her  decayed  condition,  she  was  dis 
armed  and  laid  up  ;  nor  was  she  sent  to  sea  again 
during  the  war.1 

Meanwhile  Rodgers  cruised  along  the  eastern 
edge  of  the  Grand  Bank  until  he  reached  latitude 
48°,  without  meeting  any  thing,  then  stood  to  the 
southeast,  and  cruised  off  the  Azores  till  June  6th. 
Then  he  crowded  sail  to  the  northeast  after  a 
Jamaica  fleet  of  which  he  had  received  news,  but 
which  he  failed  to  overtake,  and  on  June  I3th,  in 
lat.  46°,  long.  28°,  he  gave  up  the  chase  and  shaped 
his  course  toward  the  North  Sea,  still  without  any 
good  luck  befalling  him.  On  June  2/th  he  put  into 
North  Bergen  in  the  Shetlands  for  water,  and  thence 
passed  the  Orkneys  and  stretched  toward  the 
North  Cape,  hoping  to  intercept  the  Archangel 
fleet.  On  July  iQth,  when  off  the  North  Cape,  in 
lat.  71°  52'  N.,  long.  20°  18'  E.,  he  fell  in  with  two 
sail  of  the  enemy,  who  made  chase;  after  four  days* 
pursuit  the  commodore  ran  his  opponents  out  of 
sight.  According  to  his  letter  the  two  sail  were  a 
line-of-battle  ship  and  a  frigate ;  according  to 
James  they  were  the  12-pounder  frigate  Alexandria, 

1  James  states  that  she  was  "blockaded"  in  port  by  the  Tenedos, 
during  part  of  1814  ;  but  was  too  much  awed  by  the  fate  of  the  Chesa- 
peake  to  come  out  during  the  "long  blockade"  of  Captain  Parker. 
Considering  the  fact  that  she  was  too  decayed  to  put  to  sea,  had  no 
guns  aboard,  no  crew,  and  was,  in  fact,  laid  up,  the  feat  of  the  Tene 
dos  was  not  very  wonderful ;  a  row-boat  could  have  "blockaded"  her 
quite  as  well.  It  is  worth  noticing,  as  an  instance  of  the  way  James 
alters  a  fact  by  suppressing  half  of  it. 


176  NAVAL  WAR   OF    1 8 12. 

Captain  Cathcart,  and  Spitfire,  16,  Captain  Ellis. 
James  quotes  from  the  logs  of  the  two  British  ships, 
and  it  would  seem  that  he  is  correct,  as  it  would  not 
be  possible  for  him  to  falsify  the  logs  so  utterly. 
In  case  he  is  true,  it  was  certainly  carrying  caution 
to  an  excessive  degree  for  the  commodore  to  re 
treat  before  getting  some  idea  of  what  his  antago 
nists  really  were.  His  mistaking  them  for  so 
much  heavier  ships  was  a  precisely  similar  error  to 
that  made  by  Sir  George  Collier  and  Lord  Stuart  at 
a  later  date  about  the  Cyane  and  Levant.  James 
wishes  to  prove  that  each  party  perceived  the  force 
of  the  other,  and  draws  a  contrast  (p.  312)  between 
the  "  gallantry  of  one  party  and  pusillanimity  of  the 
other."  This  is  nonsense,  and,  as  in  similar  cases, 
James  overreaches  himself  by  proving  too  much. 
If  he  had  made  an  i8-pounder  frigate  like  the  Con 
gress  flee  from  another  i8-pounder,  his  narrative 
would  be  within  the  bounds  of  possibility  and 
would  need  serious  examination.  But  the  little  12- 
pounder  Alexandria,  and  the  ship-sloop  with  her  18- 
pound  carronades,  would  not  have  stood  the  ghost 
of  a  chance  in  the  contest.  Any  man  who  would 
have  been  afraid  of  them  would  also  have  been 
afraid  of  the  Little  Belt,  the  sloop  Rodgers  cap 
tured  before  the  war.  As  for  Captains  Cathcart 
.and  Ellis,  had  they  known  the  force  of  the  Presi 
dent,  and  chased  her  with  a  view  of  attacking  her, 
their  conduct  would  have  only  been  explicable  on 
the  ground  that  they  were  afflicted  with  emotional 
insanity. 

The  President  now  steered  southward  and  got 
into  the  mouth  of  the  Irish  Channel ;  on  August 
2d  she  shifted  her  berth  and  almost  circled  Ireland  ; 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    I8l2.  177 

then  steered  across  to  Newfoundland,  and  worked 
south  along  the  coast.  On  Sept.  23d,  a  little  south 
of  Nantucket,  she  decoyed  under  her  guns  and  cap 
tured  the  British  schooner  Highflyer,  6,  Lieut. 
William  Hutchinson,  and  45  men  ;  and  went  into 
Newport  on  the  27th  of  the  same  month,  having 
made  some  12  prizes. 

On  May  24th  Commodore  Decatur  in  the  Unit 
ed  States,  which  had  sent  ashore  six  carron- 
ades,  and  now  mounted  but  48  guns,  accom 
panied  by  Captain  Jones  in  the  Macedonian,  38, 
and  Captain  Biddle  in  the  Wasp,  20,  left  New 
York,  passing  through  Hell  Gate,  as  there  was  a 
large  blockading  force  off  the  Hook.  Opposite 
Hunter's  Point  the  main-mast  of  the  States  was 
struck  by  lightning,  which  cut  off  the  broad  pen 
dant,  shot  down  the  hatchway  into  the  doctor's 
cabin,  put  out  his  candle,  ripped  up  the  bed,  and 
entering  between  the  skin  and  ceiling  of  the  ship 
tore  off  two  or  three  sheets  of  copper  near  the  water- 
line,  and  disappeared  without  leaving  a  trace  !  The 
Macedonian,  which  was  close  behind,  hove  all  aback, 
in  expectation  of  seeing  the  States  blown  up. 

At  the  end  of  the  sound  Commodore  Decatur 
anchored  to  watch  for  a  chance  of  getting  out. 
Early  on  June  1st  he  started;  but  in  a  couple  of 
hours  met  the  British  Captain  R.  D.  Oliver's 
squadron,  consisting  of  a  74,  a  razee,  and  a  frigate. 
These  chased  him  back,  and  all  his  three  ships  ran 
into  New  London.  Here,  in  the  mud  of  the 
Thames  river,  the  two  frigates  remained  blockaded 
till  the  close  of  the  war  ;  but  the  little  sloop  slipped 
out  later,  to  the  enemy's  cost. 


1/8  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

We  left  the  Chesapeake,  38,  being  fitted  out  at 
Boston  by  Captain  James  Lawrence,  late  of  the 
Hornet.  Most  of  her  crew,  as  already  stated,  their 
time  being  up,  left,  dissatisfied  with  the  ship's  ill 
luck,  and  angry  at  not  having  received  their  due 
share  of  prize-money.  It  was  very  hard  to  get 
sailors,  most  of  the  men  preferring  to  ship  in  some 
of  the  numerous  privateers  where  the  discipline  was 
less  strict  and  the  chance  of  prize-money  much 
greater.  In  consequence  of  this  an  unusually  large 
number  of  foreigners  had  to  be  taken,  including 
about  forty  British  and  a  number  of  Portuguese. 
The  latter  were  peculiarly  troublesome;  one  of  their 
number,  a  boatswain's  mate,  finally  almost  brought 
about  a  mutiny  among  the  crew,  which  was  only 
pacified  by  giving  the  men  prize-checks.  A  few  of 
the  Constitution  s  old  crew  came  aboard,  and  these, 
together  with  some  of  the  men  who  had  been  on 
the  Chesapeake  during  her  former  voyage,  made  an 
excellent  nucleus.  Such  men  needed  very  little 
training  at  either  guns  or  sails  ;  but  the  new  hands 
were  unpractised,  and  came  on  board  so  late  that 
the  last  draft  that  arrived  still  had  their  hammocks 
and  bags  lying  in  the  boats  stowed  over  the  booms 
when  the  ship  was  captured.  The  officers  were 
largely  new  to  the  ship,  though  the  first  lieutenant, 
Mr.  A.  Ludlow,  had  been  the  third  in  her  former 
cruise ;  the  third  and  fourth  lieutenants  were  not 
regularly  commissioned  as  such,  but  were  only  mid 
shipmen  acting  for  the  first  time  in  higher  positions. 
Captain  Lawrence  himself  was  of  course  new  to  all, 
both  officers  and  crew.1  In  other  words,  the  CJiesa- 

1  On  the  day  on  which  he  sailed  to  attack  the  Shannon,  Lawrence 
writes  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  as  follows  :  "  Lieutenant  Paige 
is  so  ill  as  to  be  unable  to  go  to  sea  with  the  ship.  At  the  urgent  re- 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  179 

peakc  possessed  good  material,  but  in  an  exceedingly 
unseasoned  state. 

Meanwhile  the  British  frigate  Shannon,  38,  Cap 
tain  Philip  Bowes  Vere  Broke,  was  cruising  off  the 
mouth  of  the  harbor.  To  give  some  idea  of  the 
reason  why  she  proved  herself  so  much  more  for 
midable  than  her  British  sister  frigates  it  may  be 
well  to  quote,  slightly  condensing,  from  James : 

"  There  was  another  point  in  which  the  generality 
of  British  crews,  as  compared  with  any  one  Ameri 
can  crew,  were  miserably  deficient ;  that  is,  skill  in 
the  art  of  gunnery.  While  the  American  seamen 
were  constantly  firing  at  marks,  the  British  seamen, 
except  in  particular  cases,  scarcely  did  so  once  in  a 
year ;  and  some  ships  could  be  named  on  board 
which  not  a  shot  had  been  fired  in  this  way  for  up 
ward  of  three  years.  Nor  was  the  fault  wholly  the 
captain's.  The  instructions  under  which  he  was 
bound  to  act  forbade  him  to  use,  during  the  first 
six  months  after  the  ship  had  received  her  arma 
ment,  more  shots  per  month  than  amounted  to  a 
third  in  number  of  the  upper-deck  guns ;  and,  after 
these  six  months,  only  half  the  quantity.  Many 
captains  never  put  a  shot  in  the  guns  till  an  enemy 
appeared  ;  they  employed  the  leisure  time  of  the 
men  in  handling  the  sails  and  in  decorating  the 
ship."  Captain  Broke  was  not  one  of  this  kind. 
"  From  the  day  on  which  he  had  joined  her,  the 
I4th  of  September,  1806,  the  Shannon  began  to  feel 
the  effect  of  her  captain's  proficiency  as  a  gunner 
and  zeal  for  the  service.  The  laying  of  the  ship's 

quest  of  Acting-Lieutenant  Pierce  I  have  granted  him,  also,  permission 
to  go  on  shore  ;  one  inducement  for  my  granting  his   request  was  his 


"  Captains'  Let- 
:hives  at  Washi 
officers  nor  men  had  shaken  together. 


being  at  variance  with  every  officer  in   his  mess."     "  Capt 

ters,"  vol.  29,  No.  I,  in  the  Naval  Archives  at  Washington.     Neither 


I  So  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

ordnance  so  that  it  may  be  correctly  fired  in  a 
horizontal  direction  is  justly  deemed  a  most  impor 
tant  operation,  as  upon  it  depends  in  a  great  meas 
ure  the  true  aim  and  destructive  effect  of  the  shot ; 
this  was  attended  to  by  Captain  Broke  in  person. 
By  draughts  from  other  ships,  and  the  usual  means 
to  which  a  British  man-of-war  is  obliged  to  resort, 
the  Shannon  got  together  a  crew ;  and  in  the  course 
of  a  year  or  two,  by  the  paternal  care  and  excellent 
regulations  of  Captain  Broke,  the  ship's  company 
became  as  pleasant  to  command  as  it  was  dangerous 
to  meet."  The  Shannon  s  guns  were  all  carefully 
sighted,  and,  moreover,  "  every  day,  for  about  an 
hour  and  a  half  in  the  forenoon,  when  not  prevented 
by  chase  or  the  state  of  the  weather,  the  men  were 
exercised  at  training  the  guns,  and  for  the  same 
time  in  the  afternoon  in  the  use  of  the  broadsword, 
pike,  musket,  etc.  Twice  a  week  the  crew  fired  at 
targets,  both  with  great  guns  and  musketry ;  and 
Captain  Broke,  as  an  additional  stimulus  beyond 
the  emulation  excited,  gave  a  pound  of  tobacco  to 
every  man  that  put  a  shot  through  the  bull's  eye." 
He  would  frequently  have  a  cask  thrown  overboard 
and  suddenly  order  some  one  gun  to  be  manned  to 
sink  the  cask.  In  short,  the  Shannon  was  very 
greatly  superior,  thanks  to  her  careful  training,  to 
the  average  British  frigate  of  her  rate,  while  the 
Chesapeake,  owing  to  her  having  a  raw  and  inexperi 
enced  crew,  was  decidedly  inferior  to  the  average 
American  frigate  of  the  same  strength. 

In  force  the  two  frigates  compared  pretty 
equally,1  the  American  being  the  superior  in  just 
about  the  same  proportion  that  the  Wasp  was  to 

1  Taking  each  commander's  account  for  his  own  force. 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  l8l 

the  Frolic,  or,  at  a  later  date,  the  Hornet  to  the 
Penguin.  The  Chesapeake  carried  50  guns  (26  in 
broadside),  28  long  i8's  on  the  gun-deck,  and 
on  the  spar-deck  two  long  I2's,  one  long  18,  eigh 
teen  32-pound  carronades,  and  one  12-pound  car- 
ronade  (which  was  not  used  in  the  fight  however). 
Her  broadside,  allowing  for  the  short  weight  of 
metal  was  542  Ibs. ;  her  complement,  379  men.  The 
Shannon  carried  52  guns  (26  in  broadside),  28  long 
i8's  on  the  gun-deck,  and  on  the  spar-deck  four  long 
9's,  one  long  6,  16  32-pound  carronades,  and  three 
12-pound  carronades  (two  of  which  were  not  used 
in  the  fight).  Her  broadside  was  550  Ibs.;  her 
crew  consisted  of  330  men,  30  of  whom  were  raw 
hands.  Early  on  the  morning  of  June  1st,  Captain 
Broke  sent  in  to  Captain  Lawrence,  by  an  Ameri 
can  prisoner,  a  letter  of  challenge,  which  for  cour- 
teousness,  manliness,  and  candor  is  the  very  model 
of  what  such  an  epistle  should  be.  Before  it 
reached  Boston,  however,  Captain  Lawrence  had 
weighed  anchor,  to  attack  the  Shannon,  which  frig 
ate  was  in  full  sight  in  the  offing.  It  has  been 
often  said  that  he  engaged  against  his  judgment, 
but  this  may  be  doubted.  His  experience  with  the 
Bonne  Citoyenne,  Espiegle,  and  Peacock  had  not  tended 
to  give  him  a  very  high  idea  of  the  navy  to  which 
he  was  opposed,  and  there  is  no  doubt  that  he  was 
confident  of  capturing  the  Shannon?  It  was  most 

1  In  his  letter  written  just  before  sailing  (already  quoted  on  p.  178) 
he  says  :  "  An  English  frigate  is  now  in  sight  from  our  deck.  *  *  * 
I  am  in  hopes  to  give  a  good  account  of  her  before  night."  My  ac 
count  of  the  action  is  mainly  taken  from  James'  "Naval  History"  and 
Brighton's  "Memoir  of  Admiral  Broke"  (according  to  which  the 
official  letter  of  Captain  Broke  was  tampered  with) ;  see  also  the 
letter  of  Lieut.  George  Budd,  June  15,  1813;  the  report  of  the 
Court  of  Inquiry,  Commodore  Bainbridge  presiding,  and  the  Court- 
martial  held  on  board  frigate  United  States,  April  15,  1814,  Commo 
dore  Decatur  presiding. 


1 82  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

unfortunate  that  he  did  not  receive  Broke's  letter, 
as  the  latter  in  it  expressed  himself  willing  to  meet 
Lawrence  in  any  latitude  and  longitude  he  might 
appoint ;  and  there  would  thus  have  been  some 
chance  of  the  American  crew  having  time  enough 
to  get  into  shape. 

At  midday  of  June  I,  1812,  the  Chesapeake 
weighed  anchor,  stood  out  of  Boston  Harbor,  and 
at  I  P.  M.  rounded  the  Light-house.  The  Shannon 
stood  off  under  easy  sail,  and  at  3.40  hauled  up  and 
reefed  top-sails.  At  4  P.  M.  she  again  bore  away 
with  her  foresail  brailed  up,  and  her  main  top-sail 
braced  flat  and  shivering,  that  the  Chesapeake  might 
overtake  her.  An  hour  later,  Boston  Light-house 
bearing  west  distant  about  six  leagues,  she  again 
hauled  up,  with  her  head  to  the  southeast,  and  lay 
to  under  top-sails,  top-gallant  sails,  jib,  and  spanker. 
Meanwhile,  as  the  breeze  freshened  the  Chesapeake 
took  in  her  studding-sails,  top-gallant  sails,  and  roy 
als,  got  her  royal  yards  on  deck,  and  came  down 
very  fast  under  top-sails  and  jib.  At  5,30,  to  keep 
under  command  and  be  able  to  wear  if  necessary, 
the  Shannon  filled  her  main  top-sail  and  kept  a 
close  luff,  and  then  again  let  the  sail  shiver.  At 
5.25  the  Chesapeake  hauled  up  her  foresail,  and, 
with  three  ensigns  flying,  steered  straight  for  the 
Shannon  s  starboard  quarter.  Broke  was  afraid  that 
Lawrence  would  pass  under  the  Shannon  s  stern, 
rake  her,  and  engage  her  on  the  quarter;  but 
either  overlooking  or  waiving  this  advantage,  the 
American  captain  luffed  up  within  50  yards  upon 
the  Shannon  s  starboard  quarter,  and  squared  his 
main-yard.  On  board  the  Shannon  the  captain  of 
the  I4th  gun,  William  Mindham,  had  been  ordered 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  183 

not  to  fire  till  it  bore  into  the  second  main-deck 
port  forward;  at  5.50  it  was  fired,  and  then  the 
other  guns  in  quick  succession  from  aft  forward, 
the  Chesapeake  replying  with  her  whole  broadside. 
At  5.53  Lawrence,  finding  he  was  forging  ahead, 
hauled  up  a  little.  The  Chesapeake  s  broadsides 
were  doing  great  damage,  but  she  herself  was  suf 
fering  even  more  than  her  foe  ;  the  men  in  the 
Shannon  s  tops  could  hardly  see  the  deck  of  the 
American  frigate  through  the  cloud  of  splinters, 
hammocks,  and  other  wreck  that  was  flying  across 
it.  Man  after  man  was  killed  at  the  wheel  ;  the 
fourth  lieutenant,  the  master,  and  the  boatswain 
were  slain  ;  and  at  5.56,  having  had  her  jib  sheet 
and  foretop-sail  tie  shot  away,  and  her  spanker 
brails  loosened  so  that  the  sail  blew  out,  the  Chesa 
peake  came  up  into  the  wind  somewhat,  so  as  to  ex 
pose  her  quarter  to  her  antagonist's  broadside, 
which  beat  in  her  stern-ports  and  swept  the  men 
from  the  after  guns.  One  of  the  arm  chests  on  the 
quarter-deck  was  blown  up  by  a  hand-grenade 
thrown  from  the  Shannon.1  The  Chesapeake  was 
now  seen  to  have  stern-way  on  and  to  be  paying 
slowly  off ;  so  the  Shannon  put  her  helm  a-starboard 

1  This  explosion  may  have  had  more  effect  than  is  commonly  sup 
posed  in  the  capture  of  the  Chesapeake.  Commodore  Bainbridge, 
writing  from  Charleston,  Mass.,  on  June  2,  1813  (see  "Captains' 
Letters,"  vol.  xxix,  No.  10),  says  :  "  Mr.  Knox,  the  pilot  on  board, 
left  the  Chesapeake  at  5  P.  M.  *  *  *  At  6  P.M.,  Mr.  Knox  in 
forms  me,  the  fire  opened,  and  at  12  minutes  past  six  both  ships  were 
laying  alongside  one  another  as  if  in  the  act  of  boarding  ;  at  that 
moment  an  explosion  took  place  on  board  the  Chesapeake,  which 
spread  a  fire  on  her  upper  deck  from  the  foremast  to  the  mizzen- 
mast,  as  high  as  her  tops,  and  enveloped  both  ships  in  smoke  for  sev 
eral  minutes.  After  it  cleared  away  they  were  seen  separate,  with 
the  British  flag  hoisted  on  board  the  Chesapeake  over  the  American." 
James  denies  that  the  explosion  was  caused  by  a  hand-grenade, 
though  he  says  there  were  some  of  these  aboard  the  Shannon.  It  is 
a  point  of  no  interest. 


1 84  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

and  shivered  her  mizzen  top-sail,  so  as  to  keep  off 
the  wind  and  delay  the  boarding.  But  at  that 
moment  her  jib  stay  was  shot  away,  and,  her  head- 
sails  becoming  becalmed,  she  went  off  very  slowly. 
In  consequence,  at  6  P.  M.  the  two  frigates  fell 
aboard,  the  Chesapeake  s  quarter  pressing  upon  the 
Shannons  side  just  forward  the  starboard  main- 
chains,  and  the  frigates  were  kept  in  this  position 
by  the  fluke  of  the  Shannon  s  anchor  catching  in  the 
Chesapeake' s  quarter  port. 

The  Shannon  s  crew  had  suffered  severely,  but  not 
the  least  panic  or  disorder  existed  among  them. 
Broke  ran  forward,  and  seeing  his  foes  flinching 
from  the  quarter-deck  guns,  he  ordered  the  ships  to 
be  lashed  together,  the  great  guns  to  cease  firing, 
and  the  boarders  to  be  called.  The  boatswain,  who 
had  fought  in  Rodney's  action,  set  about  fastening 
the  vessels  together,  which  the  grim  veteran  suc 
ceeded  in  doing,  though  his  right  arm  was  literally 
hacked  off  by  a  blow  from  a  cutlass.  All  was 
confusion  and  dismay  on  board  the  Chesapeake. 
Lieutenant  Ludlow  had  been  mortally  wounded 
and  carried  below  ;  Lawrence  himself,  while  stand 
ing  on  the  quarter-deck,  fatally  conspicuous  by  his 
full-dress  uniform  and  commanding  stature,  was 
shot  down,  as  the  vessels  closed,  by  Lieutenant  Law 
of  the  British  marines.  He  fell  dying,  and  was  car 
ried  below,  exclaiming  :  "  Don't  give  up  the  ship  " — 
a  phrase  that  has  since  become  proverbial  among  his 
countrymen.  The  third  lieutenant,  Mr.  W.  S.  Cox, 
came  on  deck,  but,  utterly  demoralized  by  the 
aspect  of  affairs,  he  basely  ran  below  without  stay 
ing  to  rally  the  men,  and  was  court-martialled  after 
ward  for  so  doing.  At  6.02  Captain  Broke  stepped 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  185 

from  the  Shannon  s  gangway  rail  on  to  the  muzzle 
of  the  Chesapeake  s  aftermost  carronade,  and  thence 
over  the  bulwark  on  to  her  quarter-deck,  followed 
by  about  20  men.  As  they  came  aboard,  the  Ches 
apeake' s  foreign  mercenaries  and  the  raw  natives' of 
the  crew  deserted  their  quarters ;  the  Portuguese 
boatswain's  mate  removed  the  gratings  of  the  berth- 
deck,  and  he  ran  below,  followed  by  many  of  the 
crew,  among  them  one  of  the  midshipmen  named 
Deforest.  On  the  quarter-deck  almost  the  only 
man  that  made  any  resistance  was  the  chaplain,. 
Mr.  Livermore,  who  advanced,  firing  his  pistol  at: 
Broke,  and  in  return  nearly  had  his  arm  hewed  off 
by  a  stroke  from  the  latter's  broad  Toledo  blade.  On 
the  upper  deck  the  only  men  who  behaved  well  were 
the  marines,  but  of  their  orignal  number  of  44  men, 
14,  including  Lieutenant  James  Broom  and  Corporal 
Dixon,  were  dead,  and  20,  including  Sergeants  Twin 
and  Harris,  wounded,  so  that  there  were  left  but  one 
corporal  and  nine  men,  several  of  whom  had  been 
knocked  down  and  bruised,  though  reported  un- 
wounded.  There  was  thus  hardly  any  resistance, 
Captain  Broke  stopping  his  men  for  a  moment  till 
they  were  joined  by  the  rest  of  the  boarders  under 
Lieutenants  Watt  and  Falkiner.  The  Chesapeake' s 
mizzen-topmen  began  firing  at  the  boarders,  mor 
tally  wounding  a  midshipman,  Mr.  Samwell,  and 
killing  Lieutenant  Watt ;  but  one  of  the  Shannons. 
long  nines  was  pointed  at  the  top  and  cleared  it  out,, 
being  assisted  by  the  English  main-topmen,  under 
Midshipman  Coshnahan.  At  the  same  time  the 
men  in  the  Chesapeake' s  main-top  were  driven  out  of 
it  by  the  fire  of  the  Shannon  s  foretopmen,  under 
Midshipman  Smith.  Lieutenant  George  Budd,  who 


1 86  NAVAL   WAR   OF    1 8  12. 

was  on  the  main-deck,  now  for  the  first  time  learned 
that  the  English  had  boarded,  as  the  upper-deck 
men  came  crowding  down,  and  at  once  called  on 
his  people  to  follow  him ;  but  the  foreigners  and 
novices  held  back,  and  only  a  few  of  the  veterans 
followed  him  up.  As  soon  as  he  reached  the  spar- 
deck,  Budd,  followed  by  only  a  dozen  men,  attacked 
the  British  as  they  came  along  the  gangways,  re^ 
pulsing  them  for  a  moment,  and  killing  the  British 
purser,  Aldham,  and  captain's  clerk,  Dunn  ;  but  the 
handful  of  Americans  were  at  once  cut  down  or 
dispersed,  Lieutenant  Budd  being  wounded  and 
knocked  down  the  main  hatchway.  "  The  enemy," 
writes  Captain  Broke,  "  fought  desperately,  but  in 
disorder."  Lieutenant  Ludlow,  already  mortally 
wounded,  struggled  up  on  deck,  followed  by  two  or 
three  men,  but  was  at  once  disabled  by  a  sabre  cut. 
On  the  forecastle  a  few  seamen  and  marines  turned 
to  bay.  Captain  Broke  was  still  leading  his  men 
with  the  same  brilliant  personal  courage  he  had  all 
along  shown.  Attacking  the  first  American,  who 
was  armed  with  a  pike,  he  parried  a  blow  from  it, 
and  cut  down  the  man ;  attacking  another  he  was 
himself  cut  down,  and  only  saved  by  the  seaman 
Mindham,  already  mentioned,  who  slew  his  assail 
ant.  One  of  the  American  marines,  using  his 
clubbed  musket,  killed  an  Englishman,  and  so  stub 
born  was  the  resistance  of  the  little  group  that  for 
a  moment  the  assailants  gave  back>  having  lost  sev 
eral  killed  and  wounded  ;  but  immediately  afterward 
they  closed  in  and  slew  their  foes  to  the  last  man. 
The  British  fired  a  volley  or  two  down  the  hatch 
way,  in  response  to  a  couple  of  shots  fired  up ;  all 
resistance  was  at  an  end,  and  at  6.05,  just  fifteen 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  l8/ 

minutes  after  the  first  gun  had  been  fired,  and  not 
five  after  Captain  Broke  had  come  aboard,  the  colors 
of  the  Chesapeake  were  struck.  Of  her  crew  of  379 
men,  61  were  killed  or  mortally  wounded,  including 
her  captain,  her  first  and  fourth  lieutenants,  the 
lieutenant  of  marines,  the  master  (White),  boat 
swain  (Adams),  and  three  midshipmen,  and  85 
severely  and  slightly  wounded,  including  both  her 
other  lieutenants,  five  midshipmen,  and  the  chap 
lain  ;  total,  148  ;  the  loss  falling  almost  entirely  upon 
the  American  portion  of  the  crew. 

Of  the  Shannon  s  men,  33  were  killed  outright  or 
died  of  their  wounds,  including  her  first  lieutenant, 
purser,  captain's  clerk,  and  one  midshipman,  and  50 
wounded,  including  the  captain  himself  and  the 
boatswain  ;  total,  83. 

The  Chesapeake  was  taken  into  Halifax,  where 
Captain  Lawrence  and  Lieutenant  Ludlow  were 
both  buried  with  military  honors.  Captain  Broke 
was  made  a  baronet,  very  deservedly,  and  Lieuten 
ants  Wallis  and  Falkiner  were  both  made  com 
manders. 

The  British  writers  accuse  some  of  the  American 
crew  of  treachery ;  the  Americans,  in  turn,  accuse 
the  British  of  revolting  brutality.  Of  course  in 
such  a  fight  things  are  not  managed  with  urbane 
courtesy,  and,  moreover,  writers  are  prejudiced. 
Those  who  would  like  to  hear  one  side  are  referred 
to  James ;  if  they  wish  to  hear  the  other,  to  the 
various  letters  from  officers  published  in  "  Niles' 
Register,"  especially  vol.  v,  p.  142. 

Neither  ship  had  lost  a  spar,  but  all  the  lower 
masts,  especially  the  two  mizzen-masts,  were  badly 
wounded.  The  Americans  at  that  period  were  fond 


188 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    1 8 12. 


of  using  bar  shot,  which  were  of  very  questionable 
benefit,  being  useless  against  a  ship's  hull,  though 
said  to  be  sometimes  of  great  help  in  unrigging  an 
antagonist  from  whom  one  was  desirous  of  escaping, 
as  in  the  case  of  the  President  and  Endymion. 


S.50  , 


5.53 


S.56 


S.04 


S.  QQ 


.5.56 


5.53 


S.SO 


"  CHESAPEAKE  "  STRUCK  BY 


STRUCK  BY 


29  eighteen-pound  shot, 

25  thirty-two-pound  shot, 

2  nine- pound  shot, 

306  grape, 

362  shot. 


12  eighteen-pound  shot, 

13  thirty-two-pound  shot, 

14  bar  shot, 
119  grape, 

158  shot. 


It  is  thus  seen  that  the  Shannon  received  from 
shot  alone  only  about  half  the  damage  the  Chesa 
peake  did  ;  the  latter  was  thoroughly  beaten  at  the 
guns,  in  spite  of  what  some  American  authors  say 
to  the  contrary.  And  her  victory  was  not  in  the 
slightest  degree  to  be  attributed  to,  though  it  may 


NAVAL   WAR    OF    l8l2.  189 

have  been  slightly  hastened  by,  accident.  Training 
and  discipline  won  the  victory,  as  often  before  ;  only 
in  this  instance  the  training  and  discipline  were 
against  us. 

It  is  interesting  to  notice  that  the  Chesapeake  bat 
tered  the  Shannon's  hull  far  more  than  either  the 
Java,  Giierrierc,  or  Macedonian  did  the  hulls  of  their 
opponents,  and  that  she  suffered  less  in  return  (not 
in  loss  but  in  damage)  than  they  did.  The  Chesa 
peake  was  a  better  fighter  than  either  the  Java, 
Guerriere,  or  Macedonian,  and  could  have  captured 
any  one  of  them.  The  Shannon  of  course  did  less 
damage  than  any  of  the  American  44's,  probably 
just  about  in  the  proportion  of  the  difference  in 
force. 

Almost  all  American  writers  have  treated  the 
capture  of  the  Chesapeake  as  if  it  was  due  simply  to 
a  succession  of  unfortunate  accidents  ;  for  example, 
Cooper,  with  his  usual  cheerful  optimism,  says  that 
the  incidents  of  the  battle,  excepting  its  short  dura 
tion,  are  "  altogether  the  results  of  the  chances  of 
war,"  and  that  it  was  mainly  decided  by  "  fortuitous 
events  as  unconnected  with  any  particular  merit 
on  the  one  side  as  they  are  with  any  particular  de 
merit  on  the  other."  '  Most  naval  men  consider  it 
a  species  of  treason  to  regard  the  defeat  as  due  to 
any  thing  but  extraordinary  ill  fortune.  And  yet  no 
disinterested  reader  can  help  acknowledging  that 
the  true  reason  of  the  defeat  was  the  very  simple 
one  that  the  Shannon  fought  better  than  the  Chesa- 

1  The  worth  of  such  an  explanation  is  very  aptly  gauged  in  General 
Alexander  S.  Webb's  "  The  Peninsula  ;  McClellan's  Campaign  of 
1862"  (New  York,  1881),  p.  35,  where  he  speaks  of  "  those  unforeseen 
or  uncontrollable  agencies  which  are  vaguely  described  as  the  '  for 
tune  of  war,'  but  which  usually  prove  to  be  the  superior  ability  or 
resources  of  the  antagonist." 


NAVAL   WAR    OF    l8l2. 

peake.  It  has  often  been  said  that  up  to  the  mo 
ment  when  the  ships  came  together  the  loss  and 
'damage  suffered  by  each  were  about  the  same.  This 
is  not  true,  and  even  if  it  was,  would  not  affect  the 
question.  The  heavy  loss  on  board  the  Shannon 
did  not  confuse  or  terrify  the  thoroughly  trained 
men  with  their  implicit  reliance  on  their  leaders  ; 
and  the  experienced  officers  were  ready  to  defend 
any  point  that  was  menaced.  An  equal  or  greater 
amount  of  loss  aboard  the  Chesapeake  disheartened 
and  confused  the  raw  crew,  who  simply  had  not  had 
the  time  or  chance  to  become  well  disciplined. 
Many  of  the  old  hands,  of  course,  kept  their  wits 
and  their  pluck,  but  the  novices  and  the  disaffected 
did  not.  Similarly  with  the  officers  ;  some,  as  the 
Court  of  Inquiry  found,  had  not  kept  to  their  posts, 
and  all  being  new  to  each  other  and  the  ship,  could 
not  show  to  their  best.  There  is  no  doubt  that  the 
Chesapeake  was  beaten  at  the  guns  before  she  was 
boarded.  Had  the  ships  not  come  together,  the 
fight  wrould  have  been  longer,  the  loss  greater,  and 
more  nearly  equal ;  but  the  result  would  have  been 
the  same.  Cooper  says  that  the  enemy  entered 
with  great  caution,  and  so  slowly  that  twenty 
resolute  men  could  have  repulsed  him.  It  was  no 
proof  of  caution  for  Captain  Broke  and  his  few 
followers  to  leap  on  board,  unsupported,  and  then 
they  only  waited  for  the  main  body  to  come  up ; 
and  no  twenty  men  could  have  repulsed  such 
boarders  as  followed  Broke.  The  fight  was  another 
lesson,  with  the  parties  reversed,  to  the  effect  that 
want  of  training  and  discipline  is  a  bad  handicap. 
Had  the  Chesapeake *s  crew  been  in  service  as  many 
months  as  the  Shannon  s  had  been  vears,  such  a 


NAVAL   WAR    OF    l8l2.  igi 

captain  as  Lawrence  would  have  had  his  men  per 
fectly  in  hand  ;  they  would  not  have  been  cowed 
by  their  losses,  nor  some  of  the  officers  too  de 
moralized  to  act  properly,  and  the  material  advan 
tages  which  the  Chesapeake  possessed,  although 
not  very  great,  would  probably  have  been  enough 
to  give  her  a  good  chance  of  victory.  It  is  well 
worth  noticing  that  the  only  thoroughly  disci 
plined  set  of  men  aboard  (all,  according  to  James 
himself,  by  the  way,  native  Americans),  namely,  the 
marines,  did  excellently,  as  shown  by  the  fact  that 
three  fourths  of  their  number  were  among  the 
killed  and  wounded.  The  foreigners  aboard  the 
Chesapeake  did  not  do  as  well  as  the  Americans, 
but  it  is  nonsense  to  ascribe  the  defeat  in  any  way 
to  them  ;  it  was  only  rendered  rather  more  disas 
trous  by  their  actions.  Most  of  the  English  au 
thors  give  very  fair  accounts  of  the  battle,  except 
that  they  hardly  allude  to  the  peculiar  disadvan 
tages  under  which  the  Chesapeake  suffered  when 
she  entered  into  it.  Thus,  James  thinks  the  Java 
was  unprepared  because  she  had  only  been  to  sea 
six  weeks;  but  does  not  lay  any  weight  on  the  fact 
that  the  CJiesapeakc  had  been  out  only  as  many 
hours. 

Altogether  the  best  criticism  on  the  fight  is  that 
written  by  M.  de  la  Graviere.1  "  It  is  impossible  to 
avoid  seeing  in  the  capture  of  the  Chesapeake  a  new 
proof  of  the  enormous  power  of  a  good  organiza 
tion,  when  it  has  received  the  consecration  of  a  few 
years'  actual  service  on  the  sea.  On  this  occasion, 
in  effect,  two  captains  equally  renowned,  the  honor 
of  two  navies,  were  opposed  to  each  other  on  two 

1  "  Guerres  Maritimes,"  ii,  272. 


192  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

ships  of  the  same  tonnage  and  number  of  guns. 
Never  had  the  chances  seemed  better  balanced,  but 
Sir  Philip  Broke  had  commanded  the  Shannon  for 
nearly  seven  years,  while  Captain  Lawrence  had 
only  commanded  the  Chesapeake  for  a  few  days. 
The  first  of  these  frigates  had  cruised  for  eighteen 
months  on  the  coast  of  America  ;  the  second  was 
leaving  port.  One  had  a  crew  long  accustomed  to 
habits  of  strict  obedience ;  the  other  was  manned 
by  men  who  had  just  been  engaged  in  mutiny.  The 
Americans  were  wrong  to  accuse  fortune  on  this 
occasion.  Fortune  was  not  fickle,  she  was  merely 
logical.  The  Shannon  captured  the  Chesapeake  on 
the  first  of  June,  1813,  but  on  the  I4th  of  Septem 
ber,  1806,  the  day  when  he  took  command  of  his 
frigate,  Captain  Broke  had  begun  to  prepare  the 
glorious  termination  to  this  bloody  affair." 

Hard  as  it  is  to  breathe  a  word  against  such  a 
man  as  Lawrence,  a  very  Bayard  of  the  seas,  who 
was  admired  as  much  for  his  dauntless  bravery  as  he 
was  loved  for  his  gentleness  and  uprightness,  it 
must  be  confessed  that  he  acted  rashly.  And  after 
he  had  sailed,  it  was,  as  Lord  Howard  Douglass  has 
pointed  out,  a  tactical  error,  however  chivalric,  to 
neglect  the  chance  of  luffing  across  the  Shannon  s 
stern  to  rake  her ;  exactly  as  it  was  a  tactical  error 
of  his  equally  chivalrous  antagonist  to  have  let  him 
have  such  an  opportunity.  Hull  would  not  have 
•committed  either  error,  and  would,  for  the  matter  of 
that,  have  been  an  overmatch  for  either  com 
mander.  But  it  must  always  be  remembered  that 
Lawrence's  encounters  with  the  English  had  not 
been  such  as  to  give  him  a  high  opinion  of  them. 
The  only  foe  he  had  fought  had  been  inferior  in 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  193 

strength,  it  is  true,  but  had  hardly  made  any  effec 
tive  resistance.  Another  sloop,  of  equal,  if  not  su 
perior  force,  had  tamely  submitted  to  blockade  for 
several  days,  and  had  absolutely  refused  to  fight. 
And  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  Chesapeake,  un 
prepared  though  she  was,  would  have  been  an  over 
match  for  the  Guerriere,  Macedonian,  or  Java. 
Altogether  it  is  hard  to  blame  Lawrence  for  going 
out,  and  in  every  other  respect  his  actions  never 
have  been,  nor  will  be,  mentioned,  by  either  friend 
or  foe,  without  the  warmest  respect.  But  that  is 
no  reason  for  insisting  that  he  was  ruined  purely 
by  an  adverse  fate.  We  will  do  far  better  to  recol 
lect  that  as  much  can  be  learned  from  reverses  as 
from  victories.  Instead  of  flattering  ourselves  by 
saying  the  defeat  was  due  to  chance,  let  us  try  to  find 
out  what  the  real  cause  was,  and  then  take  care  that 
it  does  not  have  an  opportunity  to  act  again.  A 
little  less  rashness  would  have  saved  Lawrence  s 
life  and  his  frigate,  while  a  little  more  audacity  on 
one  occasion  would  have  made  Commodore 
Chauncy  famous  for  ever.  And  whether  a  lesson 
is  to  be  learned  or  not,  a  historian,  should  remem 
ber  that  his  profession  is  not  that  of  a  panegyrist. 
The  facts  of  the  case  unquestionably  are  that 
Captain  Broke,  in  fair  fight,  within  sight  of  the 
enemy's  harbor,  proved  conqueror  over  a  nominally 
equal  and  in  reality  slightly  superior  force ;  and 
that  this  is  the  only  single-ship  action  of  the  war  in 
which  the  victor  was  weaker  in  force  than  his  op 
ponent.  So  much  can  be  gathered  by  reading  only 
the  American  accounts.  Moreover  accident  had 
little  or  nothing  to  do  with  the  gaining  of  the 
victory.  The  explanation  is  perfectly  easy ;  Law- 


194  NAVAL  WAR   OF    l8l2. 

rence  and  Broke  were  probably  exactly  equal  in 
almost  every  thing  that  goes  to  make  up  a  first- 
class  commander,  but  one  had  trained  his  crew  for 
seven  years,  and  the  other  was  new  to  the  ship,  to 
the  officers,  and  to  the  men,  and  the  last  to  each 
other.  The  Chesapeake  s  crew  must  have  been  of 
fine  material,  or  they  would  not  have  fought  so  well 
as  they  did. 

So  much  for  the  American  accounts.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  capture  of  the  Chesapeake  was, 
and  is,  held  by  many  British  historians  to  "  con 
clusively  prove "  a  good  many  different  things ; 
such  as,  that  if  the  odds  were  anything  like  equal, 
a  British  frigate  could  always  whip  an  American, 
that  in  a  hand-to-hand  conflict  such  would  invariably 
be  the  case,  etc.;  and  as  this  was  the  only  single-ship 
action  of  the  war  in  which  the  victor  was  the  in 
ferior  in  force,  most  British  writers  insist  that  it  re 
flected  more  honor  on  them  than  all  the  frigate 
actions  of  1812  put  together  did  on  the  Americans. 

These  assertions  can  be  best  appreciated  by  ref 
erence  to  a  victory  won  by  the  French  in  the  year 
of  the  Battle  of  the  Nile.  On  the  I4th  of  December, 
1798,  after  two  hours'  conflict,  the  French  24-gun 
corvette  Bayonnaise  captured,  by  boarding,  the  Eng 
lish  32-gun  frigate  Ambuscade.  According  to  James 
the  Ambuscade  threw  at  a  broadside  262  pounds  of 
shot,  and  was  manned  by  190  men,  while  the  Bayon 
naise  threw  150  pounds,  and  had  on  board  supernu 
meraries  and  passenger  soldiers  enough  to  make  in 
all  250  men.  According  to  the  French  historian 
Rouvier1  the  broadside  force  was  246  pounds 

1  "  Histoire  des  Marins  Frar^ais  sous  la  Republique,"  par  Charles 
Rouvier,  Lieutenant  de  Vaisseau,  Paris,  1868. 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  195 

against  80  pounds;  according  to  Troude '  it  was  270 
pounds  against  112.  M.  L£on  Gu£rin,  in  his  volumi 
nous  but  exceedingly  prejudiced  and  one-sided 
work,2  makes  the  difference  even  greater.  At  any 
rate  the  English  vessel  was  vastly  the  superior  in 
force,  and  was  captured  by  boarding,  after  a  long 
and  bloody  conflict  in  which  she  lost  46,  and  her 
antagonist  over  50,  men.  During  all  the  wars  waged 
with  the  Republic  and  the  Empire,  no  English 
vessel  captured  a  French  one  as  much  superior  to 
itself  as  the  Ambuscade  was  to  the  Bayonnaise,  pre 
cisely  as  in  the  war  of  1812  no  American  vessel 
captured  a  British  opponent  as  much  superior  to 
itself  as.  the  Chesapeake  was  to  the  Shannon.  Yet 
no  sensible  man  can  help  acknowledging,  in  spite  of 
these  and  a  few  other  isolated  instances,  that  at  that 
time  the  French  were  inferior  to  the  English,  and 
the  latter  to  the  Americans. 

It  is  amusing  to  compare  the  French  histories  of 
the  English  with  the  English  histories  of  the 
Americans,  and  to  notice  the  similarity  of  the  argu 
ments  they  use  to  detract  from  their  opponents' 
fame.  Of  course  I  do  not  allude  to  such  writers  as 
Lord  Howard  Douglass  or  Admiral  de  la  Graviere, 
but  to  men  like  William  James  and  Leon  Guerin, 
or  even  O.  Troude.  James  is  always  recounting  how 
American  ships  ran  away  from  British  ones,  and 
Guerin  tells  as  many  anecdotes  of  British  ships 
who  fled  from  French  foes.  James  reproaches  the 
Americans  for  adopting  a  "  Parthian  "  mode  of  war 
fare,  instead  of  "  bringing  to  in  a  bold  and  becoming 

1  "  Batailles  Navales." 

2  "  Histoire  Maritime  de  France  "  (par  Leon  Guerin,  Historien  titu- 
laire  de  la  Marine,  Membre  de  la  Legion  d'  Honneur),  vi,  142  (Paris, 

1852). 


196  NAVAL   W^R    OF    l8l2. 

manner  "  Precisely  the  same  reproaches  are  used 
by  the  French  writers,  who  assert  that  the  English 
would  not  fight  "  fairly,"  but  acquired  an  advantage 
by  manoeuvring.  James  lays  great  stress  on  the 
American  long  guns  ;  so  does  Lieutenant  Rouvier 
on  the  British  carronades.  James  always  tells  how 
the  Americans  avoided  the  British  ships,  when  the 
crews  of  the  latter  demanded  to  be  led  aboard  ; 
Troude  says  the  British  always  kept  at  long  shot, 
while  the  French  sailors  "demanderent,  a  grands 
cris,  1'  abordage."  James  says  the  Americans  "  hes 
itated  to  grapple  "  with  their  foes  "  unless  they  pos 
sessed  a  twofold  superiority";  Guerin  that  the 
English  "  never  dared  attack  "  except  when  they  pos 
sessed  "  une  superiorite  enorme."  The  British  sneer 
at  the  "  mighty  dollar  "  ;  the  French  at  the  "eternal 
guinea."  The  former  consider  Decatur's  name  as 
"sunk"  to  the  level  of  Porter's  or  Bainbridge's ; 
the  latter  assert  that  the  "  presumptuous  Nelson  " 
was  inferior  to  any  of  the  French  admirals  of  the 
time  preceding  the  Republic.  Says  James:  "The 
Americans  only  fight  well  when  they  have  the 
superiority  of  force  on  their  side  "  ;  and  Lieutenant 
Rouvier:  '*  Never  have  the  English  vanquished  us 
with  an  undoubted  inferiority  of  force." 

On  June  12,  1813,  the  small  cutter  Surveyor,  of 
6  12-pound  carronades,  was  lying  in  York  River,  in 
the  Chesapeake,  under  the  command  of  Mr.  William 
S.  Travis;  her  crew  consisted  of  but  15  men.1  At 
nightfall  she  was  attacked  by  the  boats  of  the 
Narcissus  frigate,  containing  about  50  men,  under 
the  command  of  Lieutenant  John  Creerie.2  None 

1  Letter  of  W.  S.  Travis,  June  16,  1813. 
*  James,  vi,  334. 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  197 

of  the  carronades  could  be  used  ;  but  Mr.  Travis 
made  every  preparation  that  he  could  for  defence. 
The  Americans  waited  till  the  British  were  within 
pistol  shot  before  they  opened  their  fire  ;  the  latter 
dashed  gallantly  on,  however,  and  at  once  carried 
the  cutter.  But  though  brief,  the  struggle  was 
bloody ;  5  of  the  Americans  were  wounded,  and 
of  the  British  3  were  killed  and  7  wounded.  Lieu 
tenant  Creerie  considered  his  opponents  to  have 
shown  so  much  bravery  that  he  returned  Mr.  Travis 
his  sword,  with  a  letter  as  complimentary  to  him  as 
it  was  creditable  to  the  writer.1 

As  has  been  already  mentioned,  the  Americans 
possessed  a  large  force  of  gun-boats  at  the  beginning 
of  the  war.  Some  of  these  were  fairly  sea-worthy 
vessels,  of  90  tons  burden,  sloop-  or  schooner-rigged, 
and  armed  with  one  or  two  long,  heavy  guns,  and 
sometimes  with  several  light  carronades  to  repel 
boarders.2  Gun-boats  of  this  kind,  together  with  the 
few  small  cutters  owned  by  the  government,  were 
serviceable  enough.  They  were  employed  all  along 

1  The  letter,  dated  June  I3th,  is  as  follows  :  "Your  gallant  and 
desperate  attempt  to  defend  your  vessel  against  more  than  double 
your  number,  on  the  night  of  the  I2th  instant,  excited  such  admira 
tion  on  the  part  of  your  opponents  as  I  have  seldom  witnessed,  and 
induced  me  to  return  you  the  sword  you  had  so  nobly  used,  in  testi 
mony  of  mine.      Our  poor  fellows  have  suffered  severely,  occasioned 
chiefly,  if  not  solely,  by  the  precautions  you  had  taken  to  prevent  sur 
prise.      In  short,  I  am  at  a  loss  which  to  admire  most,  the  previous 
arrangement  aboard  the  Surveyor,  or  the  determined  manner  in  which 
her  deck  was  disputed  inch  by  inch.      I  am,  sir,"  etc. 

2  According  to  a  letter  from  Captain   Hugh  G.  Campbell  (in  the 
Naval  Archives,    "Captains'   Letters,"   1812,   vol.    ii,    Nos.   21   and 
192),  the  crews  were  distributed  as  follows  :  ten  men  and  a  boy  to  a 
long  32,  seven  men  and  a  boy  to  a  long  9,  and  five  men  and  a  boy  to 
a  carronade.  exclusive  of  petty  officers.     Captain  Campbell  complains 
of  the  scarcity  of  men,  and  rather  naively  remarks  that  he  is  glad  the 
marines  have  been  withdrawn  from  the  gun-boats,  as  this  may  make 
the  commanders  of  the  latter  keep  a  brighter  lookout  than  formerly. 


IQ&  NAVAL  WAR   OF    l8l2. 

the  shores  of  Georgia  and  the  Carolinas,  and  in  Long 
Island  Sound,  in  protecting  the  coasting  trade  by 
convoying  parties  of  small  vessels  from  one  port  to 
another,  and  preventing  them  from  being  molested 
by  the  boats  of  any  of  the  British  frigates.  They 
also  acted  as  checks  upon  the  latter  in  their  descents 
upon  the  towns  and  plantations,  occasionally  capt 
uring  their  boats  and  tenders,  and  forcing  them  to 
be  very  cautious  in  their  operations.  They  were 
very  useful  in  keeping  privateers  off  the  coast,  and 
capturing  them  when  they  came  too  far  in.  The 
exploits  of  those  on  the  southern  coast  will  be  men 
tioned  as  they  occurred.  Those  in  Long  Island 
Sound  never  came  into  collision  with  the  foe,  except 
for  a  couple  of  slight  skirmishes  at  very  long  range; 
but  in  convoying  little  fleets  of  coasters,  and  keeping 
at  bay  the  man-of-war  boats  sent  to  molest  them, 
they  were  invaluable  ;  and  they  also  kept  the  Sound 
clear  of  hostile  privateers. 

Many  of  the  gun-boats  were  much  smaller  than 
those  just  mentioned,  trusting  mainly  to  their 
sweeps  for  motive  power,  and  each  relying  for  of 
fence  on  one  long  pivot  gun,  a  12-  or  i8-pounder. 
In  the  Chesapeake  there  was  a  quite  a  large  num 
ber  of  these  small  gallies,  with  a  few  of  the  larger 
kind,  and  here  it  was  thought  that  by  acting  to 
gether  in  flotillas  the  gun-boats  might  in  fine 
weather  do  considerable  damage  to  the  enemy's 
fleet  by  destroying  detached  vessels,  instead  of  con 
fining  themselves  to  the  more  humble  tasks  in  which 
their  brethren  elsewhere  were  fairly  successful.  At 
this  period  Denmark,  having  lost  all  her  larger 
ships  of  war,  was  confining  herself  purely  to  gun- 
brigs.  These  were  stout  little  crafts,  with  heavy 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  199 

guns,  which,  acting  together,  and  being  handled  with 
spirit  and  skill,  had  on  several  occasions  in  calm 
weather  captured  small  British  sloops,  and  had  twice 
so  injured  frigates  as  to  make  their  return  to  Great 
Britain  necessary;  while  they  themselves  had  fre 
quently  been  the  object  of  successful  cutting-out 
expeditions.  Congress  hoped  that  our  gun-boats 
would  do  as  well  as  the  Danish ;  but  for  a  variety  of 
reasons  they  failed  utterly  in  every  serious  attack 
that  they  made  on  a  man-of-war,  and  were  worse 
than  useless  for  all  but  the  various  subordinate  em 
ployments  above  mentioned.  The  main  reason  for 
this  failure  was  in  the  gun-boats  themselves.  They 
were  utterly  useless  except  in  perfectly  calm 
weather,  for  in  any  wind  the  heavy  guns  caused 
them  to  careen  over  so  as  to  make  it  difficult  to 
keep  them  right  side  up,  and  impossible  to  fire. 
Even  in  smooth  water  they  could  not  be  fought  at 
anchor,  requiring  to  be  kept  in  position  by  means  of 
sweeps ;  and  they  were  very  unstable,  the  recoil  of 
the  guns  causing  them  to  roll  so  as  to  make  it  diffi 
cult  to  aim  with  any  accuracy  after  the  first  dis 
charge,  while  a  single  shot  hitting  one  put  it  hors  de 
combat.  This  last  event  rarely  happened,  however, 
for  they  were  not  often  handled  with  any  approach 
to  temerity,  and,  on  the  contrary,  usually  made  their 
attacks  at  a  range  that  rendered  it  as  impossible  to 
inflict  as  to  receive  harm.  It  does  not  seem  as  if  they 
were  very  well  managed  ;  but  they  were  such  ill-con 
ditioned  craft  that  the  best  officers  might  be  pardoned 
for  feeling  uncomfortable  in  them.  Their  operations 
throughout  the  war  offer  a  painfully  ludicrous  com 
mentary  on  Jefferson's  remarkable  project  of  having 
our  navy  composed  exclusively  of  such  craft. 


200  NAVAL   WAR   OF    1 8 12. 

The  first  aggressive  attempt  made  with  the  gun 
boats  was  characteristically  futile.  On  June  2Oth 
15  of  them,  under  Captain  Tarbell,  attacked  the 
Junon,  38,  Captain  Sanders,  then  lying  becalmed  in 
Hampton  Roads,  with  the  Barossa,  36,  and  Laures- 
tinus,  24,  near  her.  The  gun-boats,  while  still  at 
very  long  range,  anchored,  and  promptly  drifted 
round  so  that  they  couldn't  shoot.  Then  they  got 
under  way,  and  began  gradually  to  draw  nearer  to 
the  Junon.  Her  defence  was  very  feeble ;  after 
some  hasty  and  ill-directed  vollies  she  endeavored 
to  beat  out  of  the  way.  But  meanwhile,  a  slight 
breeze  having  sprung  up,  the  Barossa,  Captain  Sher- 
riff,  approached  near  enough  to  take  a  hand  in  the 
affair,  and  at  once  made  it  evident  that  she  was  a 
more  dangerous  foe  than  the  Junon,  though  a  lighter 
ship.  As  soon  as  they  felt  the  effects  of  the  breeze 
the  gun-boats  became  almost  useless,  and,  the  Baros 
sa  s  fire  being  animated  and  well  aimed,  they  with 
drew.  They  had  suffered  nothing  from  the  Junon, 
but  during  the  short  period  she  was  engaged,  the 
Barossa  had  crippled  one  boat  and  slightly  damaged 
another;  one  man  was  killed  and  two  wounded. 
The  Barossa  escaped  unscathed  and  the  Junon  was 
but  slightly  injured.  Of  the  combatants,  the  Bar 
ossa  was  the  only  one  that  came  off  with  credit,  the 
Junon  behaving,  if  any  thing,  rather  worse  than  the 
gun-boats.  There  was  no  longer  any  doubt  as  to 
the  amount  of  reliance  to  be  placed  on  the  latter.1 

1  Though  the  flotilla  men  did  nothing  in  the  boats,  they  acted  with 
the  most  stubborn  bravery  at  the  battle  of  Bladensburg.  The  Brit 
ish  Lieutenant  Graig,  himself  a  spectator,  thus  writes  of  their  deeds 
on  that  occasion  ("  Campaign  at  Washington,"  p.  119).  '  Of  the  sail 
ors,  however,  it  would  be  injustice  not  to  speak  in  the  terms  which 
their  conduct  merits.  They  were  employed  as  gunners,  and  not  only 
did  they  serve  their  guns  with  a  quickness  and  precision  which  as- 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  2OI 

On  June  20,  1813,  a  British  force  of  three  74'$,  one 
64,  four   frigates,  two   sloops,  and   three  transports 
was  anchored  off  Craney   Island.      On    the   north 
west  side  of  this  island  was  a  battery  of   i8-pound- 
ers,  to  take  charge  of  which  Captain  Cassin,  com 
manding  the   naval  forces  at   Norfolk,  sent  ashore 
one    hundred    sailors    of    the    Constellation,    under 
the  command  of  Lieutenants  Neale,  Shubrick,  and 
Saunders,  and  fifty  marines  under  Lieutenant  Breck- 
enbridge.1     On  the  morning  of  the  22d   they  were 
attacked  by  a  division  of   15   boats,  containing  700 
men,5  seamen,   marines,  chasseurs,   and   soldiers   of 
the   iO2d  regiment,  the  whole  under  the  command 
of  Captain  Pechell,  of  the  San  Domingo,  74.     Cap 
tain  Hanchett  led  the  attack  in  the  Diadem  s  launch. 
The  battery's   guns   were   not   fired    till   the  British 
were  close   in,  when   they  opened   with  destructive 
effect.     While   still    some   seventy  yards   from   the 
guns  the  Diadems  launch  grounded,  and  the  attack 
was  checked.     Three  of  the  boats  were  now  sunk  by 
shot,  but   the   water  was   so   shallow   that   they  re 
mained   above   water ;   and  while   the   fighting  was 
still  at  its  height,  some  of  the  Constellation  s  crew, 
headed  by  Midshipman  Tatnall,  waded  out  and  took 
possession   of   them.3     A   few   of   their   crew   threw 
away  their  arms  and  came  ashore  with  their  captors  ; 
others  escaped   to   the   remaining  boats,  and  imme- 

tonished  their  assailants,  but  they  stood  till  some  of  them  were  actu 
ally  bayoneted  with  fuses  in  their  hands  ;  nor  was  it  till  their  leader 
was  wounded  and  taken,  and  they  saw  themselves  deserted  on  all 
sides  by  the  soldiers,  that  they  quitted  the  field."  Certainly  such 
men  could  not  be  accused  of  lack  of  courage.  Something  else  is 
needed  to  account  for  the  failure  of  the  gun-boat  system. 

1  Letter  of  Captain  John  Cassin,  June  23,  1813. 

a  James,  vi,  337. 

'"Life  of  Commodore  Josiah  Tatnall,"  by  Charles  C.  Jones,  Jr. 
(Savannah,  1878),  p.  17. 


202  NAVAL   WAR    OF    l8l2. 

diately  afterward  the  flotilla  made  off  in  disorder, 
having  lost  91  men.  The  three  captured  barges 
were  large,  strong  boats,  one  called  the  Centipede 
being  fifty  feet  long,  and  more  formidable  than 
many  of  the  American  gun-vessels.  The  Constella 
tion  s  men  deserve  great  credit  for  their  defence,  but 
the  British  certainly  did  not  attack  with  their  usual 
obstinacy.  When  the  foremost  boats  were  sunk,  the 
water  was  so  shallow  and  the  bottom  so  good  that  the 
Americans  on  shore,  as  just  stated,  at  once  waded 
out  to  them  ;  and  if  in  the  heat  of  the  fight  Tatnall 
and  his  seamen  could  get  out  to  the  boats,  the  700 
British  ought  to  have  been  able  to  get  in  to  the  bat 
tery,  whose  150  defenders  would  then  have  stood  no 
chance.1 

On  July  14,  1813,  the  two  small  vessels  Scorpion 
and  Asp,  the  latter  commanded  by  Mr.  Sigourney, 
got  under  way  from  out  of  the  Yeocomico  Creek,2 
and  at  10  A.  M.  discovered  in  chase  the  British  brig- 
sloops  Contest,  Captain  James  Rattray,  and  Mohawk, 
Captain  Henry  D.  Byng.3  The  Scorpion  beat  up 
the  Chesapeake,  but  the  dull-sailing  Asp  had  to  re- 
enter  the  creek ;  the  two  brigs  anchored  off  the  bar 

1  James  comments  on  this  repulse  as   "  a  defeat  as  discreditable  to 
those  that  caused  it  as  honorable  to  those  that  suffered  in  it."   "  Unlike 
most  other  nations,  the  Americans  in  particular,  the  British,  when  en 
gaged  in  expeditions  of  this  nature,  always  rest  their  hopes  of  success 
upon  valor  rather  than  on  numbers."     These  comments  read  particu 
larly  well  when  it  is  remembered  that  the  assailants  outnumbered  the 
assailed   in  the  proportion  of  5  to  I.     It  is  monotonous  work  to  have 
to  supplement  a  history  by  a  running  commentary  on  James'  mistakes 
and  inventions  ;  but  it  is  worth  while  to  prove  once  for  all  the  utter 
unreliability  of  the   author  who  is  accepted   in  Great  Britain  as  the 
great  authority  about  the  war.     Still,  James  is  no  worse  than  his  com 
peers.      In   the  American  Coggeshall's    "  History  of   Privateers,"  the 
misstatements  are  as  gross  and  the  sneers  in  as  poor  taste — the  Brit 
ish,  instead  of  the  Americans,  being  the  objects. 

2  Letter  of  Midshipman  McClintock,  July  15,  1813. 
"James,  vi,  343 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  2O3 

and  hoisted  out  their  boats,  under  the  command  of 
Lieutenant  Rodger  C.  Curry;  whereupon  the  Asp 
cut  her  cable  and  ran  up  the  creek  some  distance. 
Here  she  was  attacked  by  three  boats,  which  Mr. 
Sigourney  and  his  crew  of  twenty  men,  with  two  light 
guns,  beat  off ;  but  they  were  joined  by  two  others,  and 
the  five  carried  the  Asp,  giving  no  quarter.  Mr. 
Sigourney  and  10  of  his  men  were  killed  or  wounded, 
while  the  British  also  suffered  heavily,  having  4 
killed  and  7  (including  Lieutenant  Curry)  wounded. 
The  surviving  Americans  reached  the  shore,  rallied 
under  Midshipman  H.  McClintock  (second  in  com 
mand),  and  when  the  British  retired  after  setting  the 
Asp  on  fire,  at  once  boarded  her,  put  out  the  flames, 
and  got  her  in  fighting  order ;  but  they  were  not 
again  molested. 

On  July  29th,  while  the  Junon,  38,  Captain  Sand 
ers,  and  Martin,  18,  Captain  Senhouse,  were  in  Del 
aware  Bay,  the  latter  grounded  on  the  outside  of 
Crow's  Shoal ;  the  frigate  anchored  within  support 
ing  distance,  and  while  in  this  position  the  two  ships 
were  attacked  by  the  American  flotilla  in  those 
waters,  consisting  of  eight  gun-boats,  carrying  each 
25  men  and  one  long  32,  and  two  heavier  block- 
sloops,1  commanded  by  Lieutenant  Samuel  Angus. 
The  flotilla  kept  at  such  a  distance  that  an  hour's 
cannonading  did  no  damage  whatever  to  anybody ; 
and  during  that  time  gun-boat  No.  121,  Sailing- 
master  Shead,  drifted  a  mile  and  a  half  away  from 
her  consorts.  Seeing  this  the  British  made  a  dash 
at  her,  in  7  boats,  containing  140  men,  led  by  Lieu 
tenant  Philip  Westphal.  Mr.  Shead  anchored  and 
made  an  obstinate  defence  ,  but  at  the  first  discharge 

1  Letter  of  Lieutenant  Angus,  July  30,  1813. 


204  NAVAL   WAR    OF    l8l2. 

the  gun's  pintle  gave  way,  and  the  next  time  it  was 
fired  the  gun-carriage  was  almost  torn  to  pieces. 
He  kept  up  a  spirited  fire  of  small  arms,  in  reply  to 
the  boat-carronades  and  musketry  of  the  assailants; 
but  the  latter  advanced  steadily  and  carried  the 
gun-boat  by  boarding,  7  of  her  people  being 
wounded,  while  7  of  the  British  were  killed  and  13 
wounded.1  The  defence  of  No.  121  was  very  cred 
itable,  but  otherwise  the  honor  of  the  day  was  cer 
tainly  with  the  British  ;  whether  because  the  gun 
boats  were  themselves  so  worthless  or  because  they 
were  not  handled  boldly  enough,  they  did  no  dam 
age,  even  to  the  grounded  sloop,  that  would  seem 
to  have  been  at  their  mercy.2 

On  June  i8th  the  American  brig-sloop  Argus, 
commanded  by  Lieutenant  William  Henry  Allen, 
late  first  of  the  United  States,  sailed  from  New  York 
for  France,  with  Mr.  Crawford,  minister  for  that 
country,  aboard,  and  reached  L'Orient  on  July  nth, 
having  made  one  prize  on  the  way.  On  July  I4th 
she  again  sailed,  and  cruised  in  the  chops  of  the 
Channel,  capturing  and  burning  ship  after  ship,  and 
creating  the  greatest  consternation  among  the  Lon 
don  merchants ;  she  then  cruised  along  Cornwall 
and  got  into  St.  George's  Channel,  where  the  work 
of  destruction  went  on.  The  labor  was  very  severe 
and  harassing,  the  men  being  able  to  get  very  little 
rest.3  On  the  night  of  August  I3th,  a  brig  laden 

1  Letter  of  Mr.  Shead,  Aug.  5,  1813. 

"*  The  explanation  possibly  lies  in  the  fact  that  the  gun-boats  had 
worthless  powder.  In  the  Naval  Archives  there  is  a  letter  from  Mr. 
Angus  ("  Masters'  Commandant  Letters,"  1813,  No.  3  ;  see  also  No. 


QI),  in  which  he  says  that  the  frigate's  shot  passed  over  them,  while 

also  encloses  a  copy  c 
paper,  signed  by  the  other  gun-boat  officers,  which  runs  :    "  We,  the 


theirs  could  not  even  reach  the  sloop.      He  also  encloses  a  copy  of  a 


officers  of  the  vessels  comprising  the  Delaware  flotilla,  protest  against 
the  powder  as  being  unfit  for  service." 

3  Court  of  Inquiry  into  loss  of  Argus,    1815. 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    1 8 12.  205 

with  wine  from  Oporto  was  captured  and  burnt,  and 
unluckily  many  of  the  crew  succeeded  in  getting  at 
some  of  the  cargo.  At  5  A.  M.  on  the  I4th  a  large 
brig-of-war  was  discovered  standing  down  under  a 
cloud  of  canvas.1  This  was  the  British  brig-sloop  Peli 
can,  Captain  John  Fordyce  Maples,  which,  from 
information  received  at  Cork  three  days  previous, 
had  been  cruising  especially  after  the  Argus,  and 
had  at  last  found  her  ;  St.  David's  Head  bore  east 
five  leagues  (lat.  52°  15'  N.  and  5°  50'  W.). 

The  small,  fine-lined  American  cruiser,  with  her 
lofty  masts  and  long  spars,  could  easily  have  escaped 
from  her  heavier  antagonist ;  but  Captain  Allen  had 
no  such  intention,  and,  finding  he  could  not  get  the 
weather-gage,  he  shortened  sail  and  ran  easily  along 
on  the  starboard  tack,  while  the  Pelican  came  down 
on  him  with  the  wind  (which  was  from  the  south) 
nearly  aft.  At  6  A.  M.  the  Argus  wore  and  fired  her 
port  guns  within  grape  distance,  the  Pelican  respond 
ing  with  her  starboard  battery,  and  the  action  be 
gan  with  great  spirit  on  both  sides.2  At  6.04  a 
round  shot  carried  off  Captain  Allen's  leg,  in 
flicting  a  mortal  wound,  but  he  stayed  on  deck 
till  he  fainted  from  loss  of  blood.  Soon  the 
British  fire  carried  away  the  main-braces,  main 
spring-stay,  gaff,  and  try-sail  mast  of  the  Argus ; 
the  first  lieutenant,  Mr.  Watson,  was  wounded 
in  the  head  by  a  grape-shot  and  carried  below  ;  the 
second  lieutenant,  Mr.  U.  H.  Allen  (no  relation  of 
the  captain),  continued  to  fight  the  ship  with  great 
skill.  The  Pelican  s  fire  continued  very  heavy,  the 
Argus  losing  her  spritsail-yard  and  most  of  the 

1  Letter  of  Lieutenant  Watson,  March  2,  1815. 
'Letter  of  Captain   Maples  to  Admiral  Thornborough,   Aug.  14, 
1813. 


206  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

standing  rigging  on  the  port  side  of  the  foremast. 
At  6.14  Captain  Maples  bore  up  to  pass  astern  of 
his  antagonist,  but  Lieutenant  Allen  luffed  into  the 
wind  and  threw  the  main-top-sail  aback,  getting  into 
a  beautiful  raking  position  1 ;  had  the  men  at  the 
guns  done  their  duty  as  well  as  those  on  the  quar 
ter-deck  did  theirs,  the  issue  of  the  fight  would  have 
been  very  different  ;  but,  as  it  was,  in  spite  of  her 
favorable  position,  the  raking  broadside  of  the  Ar 
gus  did  little  damage.  Two  or  three  minutes  after 
ward  the  Argus  lost  the  use  of  her  after-sails  through 
having  her  preventer-main-braces  and  top-sail  tie 
shot  away,  and  fell  off  before  the  wind,  when  the 
Pelican  at  6.18  passed  her  stern,  raking  her  heavily, 
and  then  ranged  up  on  her  starboard  quarter.  In  a 
few  minutes  the  wheel-ropes  and  running-rigging  of 
every  description  were  shot  away,  and  the  Argus  be 
came  utterly  unmanageable.  The  Pelican  continued 
raking  her  with  perfect  impunity,  and  at  6.35  passed 
her  broadside  and  took  a  position  on  her  starboard 
bow,  when  at  6.45  the  brigs  fell  together,  and  the 
British  "  were  in  the  act  of  boarding  when  the 
Argus  struck  her  colors,"2  at  6.45  A.M.  The 
Pelican  carried,  besides  her  regular  armament,  two 
long  6's  as  stern-chasers,  and  her  broadside  weight 
of  metal  was  thus  : 3 

i  x     6 
i  x     6 

I     X     12 

8  x  32 
or  280  Ibs.  against  the  Argus': 

I     X     12 

^ 9  x  24 

1  Letter  of  Lieutenant  Watson.  3  Letter  of  Captain  Maples. 

sjames,  vi,  320. 


NAVAL   WAR    OF    1 8 12.  2O/ 

or,  subtracting  as  usual  7  per  cent,  for  light  weight 
of  metal,  210  Ibs.  The  Pelicans  crew  consisted  of 
but  1 16  men,  according  to  the  British  account, 
though  the  American  reports  make  it  much  larger. 
The  Argus  had  started  from  New  York  with  137 
men,  but  having  manned  and  sent  in  several  prizes, 
her  crew  amounted,  as  near  as  can  be  ascertained, 
to  104.  Mr.  Low  in  his  "  Naval  History,"  published 
just  after  the  event,  makes  it  but  99.  James  makes 
it  121 ;  as  he  placed  the  crew  of  the  Enterprise  at 
125,  when  it  was  really  102  ;  that  of  the  Hornet  at 
162,  instead  of  135  ;  of  the  Peacock  at  185,  instead 
of  166 ;  of  the  Nautilus  at  106  instead  of  95^ 
etc.,  etc.,  it  is  safe  to  presume  that  he  has  over 
estimated  it  by  at  least  20,  which  brings  the  number 
pretty  near  to  the  American  accounts.  The  Pelican 
lost  but  two  men  killed  and  five  wounded.  Captain 
Maples  had  a  narrow  escape,  a  spent  grape-shot 
striking  him  in  the  chest  with  some  force,  and  then 
falling  on  the  deck.  One  shot  had  passed  through 
the  boatswain's  and  one  through  the  carpenter's 
cabin  ;  her  sides  were  filled  with  grape-shot,  and  her 
rigging  and  sails  much  injured  ;  her  foremast, 
main-top-mast,  and  royal  masts  were  slightly 
wounded,  and  two  of  her  carronades  dismounted. 

The  injuries  of  the  Argus  have  already  been  de 
tailed  ;  her  hull  and  lower  masts  were  also  tolerably 
well  cut  up.  Of  her  crew,  Captain  Allen,  two  mid 
shipmen,  the  carpenter,  and  six  seamen  were  killed  or 
mortally  wounded ;  her  first  lieutenant  and  13  sea 
men  severely  and  slightly  wounded  :  total,  10  killed 
and  14  wounded. 

In  reckoning  the  comparative  force,  I  include  the 
Englishman's  six-pound  stern-chaser,  which  could 


.208 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 


not  be  fired  in  broadside  with  the  rest  of  the  guns, 
because  I  include  the  Argus  12-pound  bow-chaser, 
which  also  could  not  be  fired  in  broadside,  as  it  was 
crowded  into  the  bridle-port.  James,  of  course, 
carefully  includes  the  latter,  though  leaving  out  the 
former. 


COMPARISON. 


Weight 


Argut 

Pelican 


Argus 

Pelican 


6.35 


rons.     No.  Guns.      Metal. 

Men.          Loss. 

298 
467 

10                210 
II                280 

104             24 
116              7 

Comparative 
Force. 

Commparative 
Loss  inflicted. 

.82 

.29 

1.  00 

1.  00 

6.25 


S.IS 


ARGUS 

e.vo  A. 


6.45 


Of  all  the  single-ship  actions  fought  in  the  war 
this  is  the  least  creditable  to  the  Americans.  The 
odds  in  force,  it  is  true,  were  against  the  Argus, 
about  in  the  proportion  of  10  to  8,  but  this  is 
neither  enough  to  account  for  the  loss  inflicted  be 
ing  as  10  to  3,  nor  for  her  surrendering  when  she 
had  been  so  little  ill  used.  It  was  not  even  as  if 
her  antagonist  had  been  an  unusually  fine  vessel  of 
her  class.  The  Pelican  did  not  do  as  well  as  either 
the  Frolic  previously,  or  the  Reindeer  afterward, 
though  perhaps  rather  better  than  the  Avon,  Pen- 

in,  or  Peacock.     With  a  comparatively  unmanage- 


NAVAL  WAR   OF    l8l2.  209 

able  antagonist,  in  smooth  water,  she  ought  to  have 
sunk  her  in  three  quarters  of  an  hour.  But  the  Pel 
ican 's  not  having  done  particularly  well  merely 
makes  the  conduct  of  the  Americans  look  worse  ;  it 
is  just  the  reverse  of  the  Chesapeake  s  case,  where, 
paying  the  highest  credit  to  the  British,  we  still 
thought  the  fight  no  discredit  to  us.  Here  we  can 
indulge  no  such  reflection.  The  officers  did  well, 
but  the  crew  did  not.  Cooper  says:  "The  enemy 
was  so  much  heavier  that  it  may  be  doubted  whether 
the  Argus  would  have  captured  her  antagonist  un 
der  any  ordinary  circumstances."  This  I  doubt; 
such  a  crew  as  the  Wasp's  or  Home? s  probably 
would  have  been  successful.  The  trouble  with  the 
guns  of  the  Argus  was  not  so  much  that  they  were 
too  small,  as  that  they  did  not  hit;  and  this  seems 
all  the  more  incomprehensible  when  it  is  remem 
bered  that  Captain  Allen  is  the  very  man  to  whom 
Commodore  Decatur,  in  his  official  letter,  attributed 
the  skilful  gun-practice  of  the  crew  of  the  frigate 
United  States.  Cooper  says  that  the  powder  was 
bad  ;  and  it  has  also  been  said  that  the  men  of  the 
Argus  were  over-fatigued  and  were  drunk,  in  which 
case  they  ought  not  to  have  been  brought  into  ac 
tion.  Besides  unskilfulness,  there  is  another  very 
serious  count  against  the  crew.  Had  the  Pelican 
been  some  distance  from  the  Argus,  and  in  a  posi 
tion  where  she  could  pour  in  her  fire  with  perfect 
impunity  to  herself,  when  the  surrender  took  place, 
it  would  have  been  more  justifiable.  But,  on  the 
contrary,  the  vessels  were  touching,  and  the  British 
boarded  just  as  the  colors  were  hauled  down  ;  it  was 
certainly  very  disgraceful  that  the  Americans  did 
not  rally  to  repel  them,  for  they  had  still  four  fifths 


210  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

of  their  number  absolutely  untouched.  They  cer 
tainly  ought  to  have  succeeded,  for  boarding  is  a  dif 
ficult  and  dangerous  experiment ;  and  if  they  had 
repulsed  their  antagonists  they  might  in  turn  have 
carried  the  Pelican.  So  that,  in  summing  up  the 
merits  of  this  action,  it  is  fair  to  say  that  both  sides 
showed  skilful  seamanship  and  unskilful  gunnery ; 
that  the  British  fought  bravely  and  that  the  Ameri 
cans  did  not. 

It  is  somewhat  interesting  to  compare  this  fight, 
where  a  weaker  American  sloop  was  taken  by  a 
stronger  British  one,  with  two  or  three  others,  where 
both  the  comparative  force  and  the  result  were  re 
versed.  Comparing  it,  therefore,  with  the  actions 
between  the  Hornet  and  Peacock  (British),  the  Wasp 
and  Avon,  and  the  Peacock  (American)  and  Epervier, 
we  get  four  actions,  in  one  of  which,  the  first-named, 
the  British  were  victorious,  and  in  the  other  three 
the  Americans. 

Comparative    Comparative  Loss    Per  cent. 
Force.  Inflicted.  Loss. 

Pelican  (British)  i.oo  i.oo  .06 

Argus  (American)  .82  .29  .23 

Hornet  (American)  i.oo  i.oo  .02 

Peacock  (British)  .83  .07  .31 

Wasp  (American)  i.oo  I.oo  .02 

Avon  (British)  .80  .07  .33 

Peacock  (American)  i.oo  I.oo  .01^ 

Epervier  (British)  .81  .08  .20 

It  is  thus  seen  that  in  these  sloop  actions  the 
superiority  of  force  on  the  side  of  the  victor  was 
each  time  about  the  same.  The  Argus  made  a 
much  more  effectual  resistance  than  did  either  the 


NAVAL  WAR   OF    l8l2.  211 

Peacock,  Avon,  or  Epervier,  while  the  Pelican  did  her 
work  in  poorer  form  than  either  of  the  victorious 
American  sloops  ;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  the  resist 
ance  of  the  Argus  did  not  by  any  means  show  as 
much  bravery  as  was  shown  in  the  defence  of  the 
Peacock  or  Avon,  although  rather  more  than  in  the 
case  of  the  Epervier. 

This  is  the  only  action  of  the  war  where  it  is  al 
most  impossible  to  find  out  the  cause  of  the  inferi 
ority  of  the  beaten  crew.  In  almost  all  other  cases 
we  find  that  one  crew  had  been  carefully  drilled,  and 
so  proved  superior  to  a  less-trained  antagonist ;  but 
it  is  incredible  that  the  man,  to  whose  exertions 
when  first  lieutenant  of  the  States  Commodore  De- 
catur  ascribes  the  skilfulness  of  that  ship's  men, 
should  have  neglected  to  train  his  own  crew ;  and 
this  had  the  reputation  of  being  composed  of  a  fine 
set  of  men.  Bad  powder  would  not  account  for  the 
surrender  of  the  Argus  when  so  little  damaged.  It 
really  seems  as  if  the  men  must  have  been  drunk  or 
over-fatigued,  as  has  been  so  often  asserted.  Of 
course  drunkenness  would  account  for  the  defeat, 
although  not  in  the  least  altering  its  humiliating 
character. 

"  Et  tu  quoque "  is  not  much  of  an  argument; 
still  it  may  be  as  well  to  call  to  mind  here  two  en 
gagements  in  which  British  sloops  suffered  much 
more  discreditable  defeats  than  the  Argus  did. 
The  figures  are  taken  from  James  ;  as  given  by  the 
French  historians  they  make  even  a  worse  showing 
for  the  British. 

A  short  time  before  our  war  the  British  brig  Car 
nation,  1 8,  had  been  captured,  by  boarding,  by  the 
French  brig  Palinure,  16,  and  the  British  brig  A  lac- 


212  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

rity,  1 8,  had  been  captured,  also  by  boarding,  by  the 
corvette  Abeille,  20. 

The  following  was  the  comparative  force,  etc.,  of 
the  combatants: 

Weight  Metal.         No.  Crew.  Loss. 

Carnation  262  117  40 

Palinure  174  100  20 

Alacrity  262  100  18 

Abeille  260  130  19 

In  spite  of  the  pride  the  British  take  in  their 
hand-to-hand  prowess  both  of  these  ships  were  capt 
ured  by  boarding.  The  Carnation  was  captured  by 
a  much  smaller  force,  instead  of  by  a  much  larger 
one,  as  in  the  case  of  the  Argus ;  and  if  the  Argus 
gave  up  before  she  had  suffered  greatly,  the  Alacrity 
surrendered  when  she  had  suffered  still  less.  French 
historians  asserted  that  the  capture  of  the  two  brigs 
proved  that  "  French  valor  could  conquer  British 
courage " ;  and  a  similar  opinion  was  very  com 
placently  expressed  by  British  historians  after  the 
defeat  of  the  Argus.  All  that  the  three  combats 
really  "  proved "  was,  that  in  eight  encounters 
between  British  and  American  sloops  the  Americans 
were  defeated  once ;  and  in  a  far  greater  number  of 
encounters  between  French  and  British  sloops  the 
British  were  defeated  twice.  No  one  pretends  that 
either  navy  was  invincible ;  the  question  is,  which 
side  averaged  best  ? 

At  the  opening  of  the  war  we  possessed  several 
small  brigs  ;  these  had  originally  been  fast,  handy 
little  schooners,  each  armed  with  12  long  sixes,  and 


NAVAL  WAR   OF    1 8 12.  213 

with  a  crew  of  60  men.  As  such  they  were  effective 
enough;  but  when  afterward  changed  into  brigs, 
each  armed  with  a  couple  of  extra  guns,  and  given 
40  additional  men,  they  became  too  slow  to  rim, 
without  becoming  strong  enough  to  fight.  They 
carried  far  too  many  guns  and  men  for  their  size, 
and  not  enough  to  give  them  a  chance  with  any  re 
spectable  opponent ;  and  they  were  almost  all  ig- 
nominiously  captured.  The  single  exception  was 
the  brig  Enterprise.  She  managed  to  escape  capt 
ure,  owing  chiefly  to  good  luck,  and  once  fought  a 
victorious  engagement,  thanks  to  the  fact  that  the 
British  possessed  a  class  of  vessels  even  worse  than 
our  own.  She  was  kept  near  the  land  and  finally 
took  up  her  station  off  the  eastern  coast,  where  she 
did  good  service  in  chasing  away  or  capturing  the 
various  Nova  Scotian  or  New  Brunswick  privateers, 
which  were  smaller  and  less  formidable  vessels  than 
the  privateers  of  the  United  States,  and  not  cal 
culated  for  fighting. 

By  crowding  guns  into  her  bridle-ports,  and  over 
manning  herself,  the  Enterprise,  now  under  the 
command  of  Lieutenant  William  Burrows,  mounted 
14  eighteen-pound  carronades  and  2  lonn;  o's,  with 
102  men.  On  September  5th,  while  standing  along 
shore  near  Penguin  Point,  a  few  miles  to  the  east 
ward  of  Portland,  Me.,  she  discovered,  at  anchor 
inside,  a  man-of-war  brig '  which  proved  to  be 
H.M.S.  Boxer,  Captain  Samuel  Blyth,  of  12  carron 
ades,  eighteen-pounders  and  two  long  sixes,  with 
but  66  men  aboard,  12  of  her  crew  being  absent.1 

1  Letter  from  Lieutenant  Edward  R.  McCall  to  Commodore  Hull, 
September  5,  1813. 

"James,  "Naval  Occurrences,"  264.  The  American  accounts 
give  the  Boxer  104  men,  on  very  insufficient  grounds.  Similarly, 


214  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

The  Boxer  at  once  hoisted  three  British  ensigns  and 
bore  up  for  the  Enterprise,  then  standing  in  on  the 
starboard  tack ;  but  when  the  two  brigs  were  still  4 
miles  apart  it  fell  calm.  At  midday  a  breeze  sprang 
up  from  the  southwest,  giving  the  American  the 
weather-gage,  but  the  latter  manoeuvred  for  some 
time  to  windward  to  try  the  comparative  rates  of 
sailing  of  the  vessels.  At  3  P.  M.  Lieutenant  Bur- 
rows  hoisted  three  ensigns,  shortened  sail,  and 
edged  away  toward  the  enemy,  who  came  gallantly 
on.  Captain  Blyth  had  nailed  his  colors  to  the 
mast,  telling  his  men  they  should  never  be  struck 
while  he  had  life  in  his  body.1  Both  crews  cheered 
loudly  as  they  neared  each  other,  and  at  3.15,  the 
two  brigs  being  on  the  starboard  tack  not  a  half 
pistol-shot  apart,  they  opened  fire,  the  American 
using  the  port,  and  the  English  the  starboard,  bat 
tery.  Both  broadsides  were  very  destructive, 
each  of  the  commanders  falling  at  the  very  begin 
ning  of  the  action.  Captain  Blyth  was  struck  by 
an  eighteen-pound  shot  while  he  was  standing  on 
the  quarter-deck ;  it  passed  completely  through  his 
body,  shattering  his  left  arm  and  killing  him  on  the 
spot.  The  command,  thereupon,  devolved  on  Lieu 
tenant  David  McCreery,  At  almost  the  same  time 
his  equally  gallant  antagonist  fell.  Lieutenant  Bur 
rows,  while  encouraging  his  men,  laid  hold  of  a  gun- 
tackle  fall  to  help  the  crew  of  a  carronade  run  out 
the  gun  ;  in  doing  so  he  raised  one  leg  against  the 
bulwark,  when  a  canister  shot  struck  his  thigh, 
glancing  into  his  body  and  inflicting  a  fearful 

James  gives  the  Enterprise  123  men.  Each  side  will  be  considered 
authority  for  its  own  force  and  loss. 

1  "  Naval  Chronicle,"  vol.  xxxii,  p.  462. 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    1 8 12.  215 

wound.1  In  spite  of  the  pain  he  refused  to  be 
carried  below,  and  lay  on  the  deck,  crying  out  that 
the  colors  must  never  be  struck.  Lieutenant  Ed 
ward  McCall  now  took  command.  At  3.30  the  En 
terprise  ranged  ahead,  rounded  to  on  the  starboard 
tack,  and  raked  the  Boxer  with  the  starboard 
guns.  At  3.35  the  Boxer  lost  her  main-top-mast 
and  top-sail  yard,  but  her  crew  still  kept  up  the 
fight  bravely,  with  the  exception  of  four  men  who 
deserted  their  quarters  and  were  afterward  court- 
martialed  for  cowardice.2  The  Enterprise  now  set 
her  fore-sail  and  took  position  on  the  enemy's  star 
board  bow,  delivering  raking  fires  ;  and  at  3.45  the 
latter  surrendered,  when  entirely  unmanageable  and 
defenceless.  Lieutenant  Burrows  would  not  go 
below  until  he  had  received  the  sword  of  his  adver 
sary,  when  he  exclaimed,  "  1  am  satisfied,  I  die  con 
tented." 


EHTEKPRISE 


J.f5- 


Both  brigs  had  suffered  severely,  especially  the 
Boxer,  which  had  been  hulled  repeatedly,  had  three 
eighteen-pound  shot  through  her  foremast,  her  top 
gallant  forecastle  almost  cut  away,  and  several  of 
her  guns  dismounted.  Three  men  were  killed  and 

'Cooper,  "Naval  History,"  vol.  li,  p.  259. 

'Minutes  of  court-martial  held  aboard   H.M.S.  Surprise,  January 
8,  1814. 


2l6  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

seventeen  wounded,  four  mortally.  The  Enterprise 
had  been  hulled  by  one  round  and  many  grape  ;  one 
1 8-pound  ball  had  gone  through  her  foremast,  and 
another  through  her  main-mast,  and  she  was  much 
cut  up  aloft.  Two  of  her  men  were  killed  and  ten 
wounded,  two  of  them  (her  commander  and  Mid 
shipman  Kervin  Waters)  mortally.  The  British 
court-martial  attributed  the  defeat  of  the  Boxer  "  to 
a  superiority  in  the  enemy's  force,  principally  in  the 
number  of  men,  as  well  as  to  a  greater  degree  of 
skill  in  the  direction  of  her  fire,  and  to  the  destruc 
tive  effects  of  the  first  broadside."  But  the  main 
element  was  the  superiority  in  force,  the  difference 
in  loss  being  very  nearly  proportional  to  it ;  both 
sides  fought  with  equal  bravery  and  equal  skill. 
This  fact  was  appreciated  by  the  victors,  for  at  a 
naval  dinner  given  in  New  York  shortly  afterward, 
one  of  the  toasts  offered  was :  "  The  crew  of  the 
Boxer  ;  enemies  by  law,  but  by  gallantry  brothers." 
The  two  commanders  were  both  buried  at  Portland, 
with  all  the  honors  of  war.  The  conduct  of  Lieu 
tenant  Burrows  needs  no  comment.  He  was  an 
officer  greatly  beloved  and  respected  in  the  service. 
Captain  Blyth,  on  the  other  side,  had  not  only 
shown  himself  on  many  occasions  to  be  a  man  of 
distinguished  personal  courage,  but  was  equally 
noted  for  his  gentleness  and  humanity.  He  had 
been  one  of  Captain  Lawrence's  pall-bearers,  and 
but  a  month  previous  to  his  death  had  received  a 
public  note  of  thanks  from  an  American  colonel, 
for  an  act  of  great  kindness  and  courtesy.1 

The  Enterprise,  under  Lieut.-Com.  Renshaw,  now 
cruised  off  the  southern  coast,  where  she  made  sev- 

1  "  Naval  Chronicle,"  xxxii,  466. 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  21 J 

eral  captures.  One  of  them  was  a  heavy  British 
privateer,  the  Mars,  of  14  long  nines  and  75  men, 
which  struck  after  receiving  a  broadside  that  killed 
and  wounded  4  of  her  crew.  The  Enterprise  was 
chased  by  frigates  on  several  occasions  ;  being  once 
forced  to  throw  overboard  all  her  guns  but  two,  and 
escaping  only  by  a  shift  in  the  wind.  Afterward, 
as  she  was  unfit  to  cruise,  she  was  made  a  guard- 
ship  at  Charlestown  ;  for  the  same  reason  the  Boxer 
was  not  purchased  into  the  service. 

On  October  4th  some  volunteers  from  the  New 
port  flotilla  captured,  by  boarding,  the  British  priva 
teer  Dart?  after  a  short  struggle  in  which  two  of  the 
assailants  were  wounded  and  several  of  the  priva- 
teersmen,  including  the  first  officer,  were  killed. 

On  December  4th,  Commodore  Rodgers,  still  in 
command  of  the  President,  sailed  again  from  Provi 
dence,  Rhode  Island.  On  the  25th,  in  lat.  19°  N.  and 
long.  35°  W.,  the  President,  during  the  night,  fell  in 
with  two  frigates,  and  came  so  close  that  the  head 
most  fired  at  her,  when  she  made  off.  These  were 
thought  to  be  British,  but  were  in  reality  the  two 
French  4O-gun  frigates  Nymphe  and  Meduse,  one 
month  out  of  Brest.  After  this  little  encounter 
Rodgers  headed  toward  the  Barbadoes,  and  cruised 
to  windward  of  them. 

On  the  whole  the  ocean  warfare  of  18*3  was  de 
cidedly  in  favor  of  the  British,  except  during  the 
first  few  months.  The  Hornet's  fight  with  the 
Peacock  was  an  action  similar  to  those  that  took 
place  in  1812,  and  the  cruise  of  Porter  was  unique 

1  Letter  of  Mr.  Joseph  Nicholson,  Oct.  5,  1813. 


218  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

in  our  annals,  both  for  the  audacity  with  which  it 
was  planned,  and  the  success  with  which  it  was 
executed.  Even  later  in  the  year  the  Argus  and 
the  President  made  bold  cruises  in  sight  of  the 
British  coasts,  the  former  working  great  havoc 
among  the  merchant-men.  But  by  that  time  the 
tide  had  turned  strongly  in  favor  of  our  enemies. 
From  the  beginning  of  summer  the  blockade  was 
kept  up  so  strictly  that  it  was  with  difficulty  any  of 
our  vessels  broke  through  it  ;  they  were  either 
chased  back  or  captured.  In  the  three  actions  that 
occurred,  the  British  showed  themselves  markedly 
superior  in  two,  and  in  the  third  the  combatants 
fought  equally  well,  the  result  being  fairly  decided 
by  the  fuller  crew  and  slightly  heavier  metal  of  the 
Enterprise.  The  gun-boats,  to  which  many  had 
looked  for  harbor  defence,  proved  nearly  useless, 
and  were  beaten  off  with  ease  whenever  they  made 
an  attack. 

The  lessons  taught  by  all  this  were  the  usual 
ones.  Lawrence's  victory  in  the  Hornet  showed 
the  superiority  of  a  properly  trained  crew  to  one 
that  had  not  been  properly  trained  ;  and  his  defeat 
in  the  Chesapeake  pointed  exactly  the  same  way, 
demonstrating  in  addition  the  folly  of  taking  a  raw 
levy  out  of  port,  and,  before  they  have  had  the 
slightest  chance  of  getting  seasoned,  pitting  them 
against  skilled  veterans.  The  victory  of  the  Enter 
prise  showed  the  wisdom  of  having  the  odds  in  men 
and  metal  in  our  favor,  when  our  antagonist  was 
otherwise  our  equal ;  it  proved,  what  hardly  needed 
proving,  that,  whenever  possible,  a  ship  should  be 
so  constructed  as  to  be  superior  in  force  to  the  foes 
it  would  be  likely  to  meet.  As  far  as  the  capture  of 


NAVAL  WAR   OF    l8l2.  2 19 

the  Argus  showed  any  thing,  it  was  the  advantage 
of  heavy  metal  and  the  absolute  need  that  a  crew 
should  fight  with  pluck.  The  failure  of  the  gun 
boats  ought  to  have  taught  the  lesson  (though  it 
did  not)  that  too  great  economy  in  providing  the 
means  of  defence  may  prove  very  expensive  in  the 
end,  and  that  good  officers  and  men  are  powerless 
when  embarked  in  worthless  vessels.  A  similar 
point  was  emphasized  by  the  strictness  of  the 
blockade,  and  the  great  inconvenience  it  caused  ; 
namely,  that  we  ought  to  have  had  ships  powerful 
enough  to  break  it. 

We  had  certainly  lost   ground   during  this  year; 
fortunately  we  regained  it  during  the  next  two. 


BRITISH  VESSELS   SUNK  OR  TAKEN. 
Name.  Guns.  Tonnage. 

Peacock  20  477 

Boxer  14  181 

Highflyer  6  96 

40  754 


AMERICAN  VESSELS  SUNK  OR  TAKEN. 
Name.                  Guns.  Tonnage. 

Chesapeake        50  1,265 

Argus  20  298 

Viper  10  148 

80  1,711 


220  NAVAL  WAR   OF    l8l2. 

VESSELS   BUILT   OR  ..-PURCHASED. 

Name.  Rig.  Guns.      Tonnage,       Where  Built. 


Rattlesnake    Brig  14 

Alligator       Schooner     4 
Asp  Sloop  3 


278    Medford,  Pa. 
80 
56 


PRIZES   MADE. 


Name  of  Ship. 

President 

Congress 

Chesapeake 

Essex 

Hornet 

Argus 

Small  craft 


No.  of  Prizes. 
13 

4 
6 

14 
3 

21 

18 


Cost. 
,OOO 

2,6OO 


79 


CHAPTER  VI. 

1813. 

ON   THE   LAKES. 

ONTARIO — Comparison  of  the  rival  squadrons — Chauncy  takes  York  and 
Fort  George— Yeo  is  repulsed  at  Sackett's  Harbor,  but  keeps  command  of  the 
lake— Chauncy  sails— Yeo's  partial  victory  off  Niagara— Indecisive  action  off 
the  Genesee — Chauncy's  partial  victory  off  Burlington,  which  gives  him  the 
command  of  the  lake — ERIE — Perry's  success  in  creating  a  fleet — His  victory 
— CHAMPLAIN — Loss  of  the  Growler  and  Eagle — Summary. 

ONTARIO. 

WINTER  had  almost  completely  stopped 
preparations  on  the  American  side.  Bad 
weather  put  an  end  to  all  communication  with  Al 
bany  or  New  York,  and  so  prevented  the  transit  of 
stores,  implements,  etc.  It  was  worse  still  with  the 
men,  for*  the  cold  and  exposure  so  thinned  them  out 
that  the  new  arrivals  could  at  first  barely  keep  the 
ranks  filled.  It  was,  moreover,  exceedingly  difficult 
to  get  seamen  to  come  from  the  coast  to  serve  on 
the  lakes,  where  work  was  hard,  sickness  prevailed, 
and  there  was  no  chance  of  prize-money.  The  Brit 
ish  government  had  the  great  advantage  of  being 
able  to  move  its  sailors  where  it  pleased,  while  in 
the  American  service,  at  that  period,  the  men  en 
listed  for  particular  ships,  and  the  only  way  to  get 
them  for  the  lakes  at  all  was  by  inducing  portions 
of  crews  to  volunteer  to  follow  their  officers  thither.1 

Cooper,  ii,  357.  One  of  James' most  comical  misstatements  is 
that  on  the  lakes  the  American  sailors  were  all  "  picked  men."  On 

221 


222  NAVAL   WAR    OF    1 8 12. 

However,  the  work  went  on  in  spite  of  interruptions. 
Fresh  gangs  of  shipwrights  arrived,  and,  largely  ow 
ing  to  the  energy  and  capacity  of  the  head  builder, 
Mr.  Henry  Eckford  (who  did  as  much  as  any  naval 
officer  in  giving  us  an  effective  force  on  Ontario), 
the  Madison  was  equipped,  a  small  despatch  sloop, 
The  Lady  of  the  Lake  prepared,  and  a  large  new 
ship,  the  General  Pike,  28,  begun,  to  mount  13  guns 
in  each  broadside  and  2  on  pivots. 

Meanwhile  Sir  George  Prevost,  the  British  com 
mander  in  Canada,  had  ordered  two  24-gun  ships  to 
be  built,  and  they  were  begun  ;  but  he  committed 
the  mistake  of  having  one  laid  down  in  Kingston 
and  the  other  in  York,  at  the  opposite  end  of 
the  lake.  Earle,  the  Canadian  commodore,  having 
proved  himself  so  incompetent,  was  removed  ;  and 
in  the  beginning  of  May  Captain  Sir  James  Lu^ 
cas  Yeo  arrived,  to  act  as  commander-in-chief  of 
the  naval  forces,  together  with  four  captains,  eight 
lieutenants,  twenty-four  midshipmen,  and  about  450 
picked  seamen,  sent  out  by  the  home  government 
especially  for  service  on  the  Canada  lakes.1 

The  comparative  force  of  the  two  fleets  or  squad 
rons  it  is  hard  to  estimate.  I  have  already  spoken 
of  the  difficulty  in  finding  out  what  guns  were 
mounted  on  any  given  ship  at  a  particular  time, 
and  it  is  even  more  perplexing  with  the  crews.  A 
schooner  would  make  one  cruise  with  but  thirty 

p.  367,  for  example,  in  speaking  of  the  battle  of  Lake  Erie  he  says  : 
"  Commodore  Perry  had  picked  crews  to  all  his  vessels."  As  a  mat 
ter  of  fact  Perry  had  once  sent  in  his  resignation  solely  on  account  of 
the  very  poor  quality  of  his  crews,  and  had  with  difficulty  been  in 
duced  to  withdraw  it.  Perry's  crews  were  of  hardly  average  ex 
cellence,  but  then  the  average  American  sailor  was  a  very  good 
specimen. 

1  James,  vi,  353. 


NAVAL   WAR    OF    l8l2. 


223 


hands  ;  on  the  next  it  would  appear  with  fifty,  a 
number  of  militia  having  volunteered  as  marines. 
Finding  the  militia  rather  a  nuisance,  they  would 
be  sent  ashore,  and  on  her  third  cruise  the  schooner 
would  substitute  half  a  dozen  frontier  seamen  in 
their  place.  It  was  the  same  with  the  larger  ves 
sels.  The  Madison  might  at  one  time  have  her  full 
complement  of  200  men  ;  a  month's  sickness  would 
ensue,  and  she  would  sail  with  but  150  effectives. 
The  Pikes  crew  of  300  men  at  one  time  would 
shortly  afterward  be  less  by  a  third  in  consequence 
of  a  draft  of  sailors  being  sent  to  the  upper  lakes. 
So  it  is  almost  impossible  to  be  perfectly  accurate  ; 
but,  making  a  comparison  of  the  various  authorities 
from  Lieutenant  Emmons  to  James,  the  following 
tables  of  the  forces  may  be  given  as  very  nearly  cor 
rect.  In  broadside  force  I  count  every  pivot  gun, 
and  half  of  those  that  were  not  on  pivots. 

CHAUNCY'S  SQUADRON. 


Name. 
Pike, 
Madison, 

Oneida, 

Rig.      Tonnage, 
ship              875 

593 
brig             243 

Hamilton, 

schooner     112 

Scourge, 

IIO 

Conquest, 

82 

Tompkins, 

96 

Julia, 

82 

Growler, 

81 

Broadside 


Armament. 


875 

300 

360 

28  long  24*5 

593 

200 

364 

24  short  32*5 

243 

100 

172 

1  6   "  24*5. 

112 

50 

80 

{I  long  32 
I   "  24 
8   "   6's 

IIO 

50 

80 

j  i  "  32 
(  8  short  I2's 

!i  long  32: 

82 

40 

56 

I   "   12 

4  '  '   6's 

(  I  "  32 

96 

40 

62 

\   I       12 

(  6  "   6's 

82 

35 

44 

j  I  "  32 

\   I   "   12 

81 

35 

44 

i  i  ••  32 

1   I   "   12 

224 


NAVAL   WAR  OF    l8l2. 


Broadside 


Name. 

Rig.      Tonnage. 

Crew. 

Metal  ;  Ibs. 

Armament. 

Ontario, 

schooner 

53 

35 

44 

(     I 
(     i 

long  32 

"       12 

fair  A  merican  ,      '  * 

53 

30 

36 

\l 

"     24 

12 

Pert, 

11 

50 

25 

24 

1 

"       24 

Asp, 

« 

57 

25 

24 

I 

24 

Lady  of  the  Lake,  " 

89 

15 

9 

I 

"      9 

14 


2,576 


980         1,399 


This  is  not  materially  different  from  James'  ac 
count  (p.  356),  which  gives  Chauncy  114  guns,  1,193 
men,  and  2,121  tons.  The  Lady  of  the  Lake,  how 
ever,  was  never  intended  for  any  thing  but  a  despatch 
boat,  and  the  Scourge  and  Hamilton  were  both  lost 
before  Chauncy  actually  came  into  collision  with 
Yeo.  Deducting  these,  in  order  to  compare  the 
two  foes,  Chauncy  had  left  11  vessels  of  2,265  tons, 
with  865  men  and  92  guns  throwing  a  broadside  of 
1,230  pounds. 


Name. 


Wolfe, 


YEO'S   SQUADRON. 

Broadside 
Rig.    Tonnage.    Crew.      Metal;  Ibs. 


ship       637 


510 


2,091 


220 

200 

100 

100 

80 

70 
770 


392 


153 
172 

87 

1,374 


Armament. 

{I   long  24 
8     "     i8's 
4  short  68's 
10  32's 

(    3  long  i8's 
•<    2  short  68's 
(  16     "     32's 
j    2  long  iS's 
(  12  short  32's 
(    2  long    9*s 
(12  short  24's 
2  long  I2's 
10  short  32's 

{i  long  24 
i  "  9 
6  short  iS's 


92 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  225 

This  differs  but  slightly  from  James,  who  gives 
Yeo  92  guns  throwing  a  broadside  of  1,374  pounds, 
but  only  717  men.  As  the  evidence  in  the  court- 
martial  held  on  Captain  Barclay,  and  the  official  ac 
counts  (on  both  sides)  of  Macdonough's  victory, 
convict  him  of  very  much  underrating  the  force  in 
men  of  the  British  on  Erie  and  Champlain,  it  can 
be  safely  assumed  that  he  has  underestimated  the 
force  in  men  on  Lake  Ontario.  By  comparing  the 
tonnage  he  gives  to  Barclay's  and  Downie's  squad 
rons  with  what  it  really  was,  we  can  correct  his  ac 
count  of  Yeo's  tonnage. 

The  above  figures  would  apparently  make  the  two 
squadrons  about  equal,  Chauncy  having  95  men 
more,  and  throwing  at  a  broadside  144  pounds  shot 
less  than  his  antagonist.  But  the  figures  do  not  by  any 
means  show  all  the  truth.  The  Americans  greatly 
excelled  in  the  number  and  calibre  of  their  long 
guns.  Compared  thus,  they  threw  at  one  discharge 
694  pounds  of  long-gun  metal  and  536  pounds  of 
carronade  metal  ;  while  the  British  only  threw  from 
their  long  guns  180  pounds,  and  from  their  carron- 
ades  1,194.  This  unequal  distribution  of  metal  was 
very  much  in  favor  of  the  Americans.  Nor  was 
this  all.  The  Pike,  with  her  1 5  long  24*5  in  battery, 
was  an  overmatch  for  any  one  of  the  enemy's  vessels, 
and  bore  the  same  relation  to  them  that  the  Con- 
fiance,d,\.  a  later  date,  did  to  Macdonough's  squadron. 
She  should  certainly  have  been  a  match  for  the 
Wolfe  and  Melville  together,  and  the  Madison  and 
Oneida  for  the  Royal  George  and  Sydney  Smith.  In 
fact,  the  three  heavy  American  vessels  ought  to 
have  been  an  overmatch  for  the  four  heaviest  of  the 
British  squadron,  although  these  possessed  the  nom- 


226  NAVAL   WAR   OF    1 8 12. 

inal  superiority.  And  in  ordinary  cases  the  eight 
remaining  American  gun-vessels  would  certainly 
seem  to  be  an  overmatch  for  the  two  British 
schooners,  but  it  is  just  here  that  the  difficulty  of 
comparing  the  forces  comes  in.  When  the  water 
was  very  smooth  and  the  wind  light,  the  long  32*5 
and  24*5  of  the  Americans  could  play  havoc  with 
the  British  schooners,  at  a  distance  which  would 
render  the  carronades  of  the  latter  useless.  But  the 
latter  were  built  for  war,  possessed  quarters  and 
were  good  cruisers,  while  Chauncy's  schooners  were 
merchant  vessels,  without  quarters,  crank,  and  so 
loaded  down  with  heavy  metal  that  whenever  it  blew 
at  all  hard  they  could  with  difficulty  be  kept  from 
upsetting,  and  ceased  to  be  capable  even  of  defend 
ing  themselves.  When  Sir  James  Yeo  captured  two 
of  them  he  would  not  let  them  cruise  with  his  other 
vessels  at  all,  but  sent  them  back  to  act  as  gun 
boats,  in  which  capacity  they  were  serving  when  re 
captured  ;  this  is  a  tolerable  test  of  their  value  com 
pared  to  their  opponents.  Another  disadvantage 
that  Chauncy  had  to  contend  with,  was  the  differ 
ence  in  the  speed  of  the  various  vessels.  The  Pike 
and  Madison  were  fast,  \veatherly  ships ;  but  the 
Oneida  was  a  perfect  slug,  even  going  free,  and 
could  hardly  be  persuaded  to  beat  to  windward  at 
all.  In  this  respect  Yeo  was  much  better  off  ;  his 
six  ships  were  regular  men-oi  war,  with  quarters, 
all  of  them  seaworthy,  and  fast  enough  to  be  able 
to  act  with  uniformity,  and  not  needing  to  pay 
much  regard  to  the  weather.  His  force  could  act  as 
a  unit  ;  but  Chauncy's  could  not.  Enough  wind  to 
make  a  good  working  breeze  for  his  larger  vessels 
put  all  his  smaller  ones  hors  de  combat ;  and  in 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  2>J 

weather  that  suited  the  latter,  the  former  could  not 
move  about  at  all.  When  speed  became  necessary 
the  two  ships  left  the  brig  hopelessly  behind,  and 
either  had  to  do  without  her,  or  else  perhaps  let  the 
critical  moment  slip  by  while  waiting  for  her  to 
come  up.  Some  of  the  schooners  sailed  quite  as 
slowly ;  and  finally  it  was  found  out  that  the  only 
way  to  get  all  the  vessels  into  action  at  once  was  to 
have  one  half  the  fleet  tow  the  other  half.  It  was 
certainly  difficult  to  keep  the  command  of  the  lake 
when,  if  it  came  on  to  blow,  the  commodore  had  to 
put  into  port  under  penalty  of  seeing  a  quarter 
of  his  fleet  founder  before  his  eyes.  These  conflict 
ing  considerations  render  it  hard  to  pass  judgment ; 
but  on  the  whole  it  would  seem  as  if  Chauncy  was 
the  superior  in  force,  for  even  if  his  schooners  were 
not  counted,  his  three  square-rigged  vessels  were  at 
least  a  match  for  the  four  square-rigged  British  ves 
sels,  and  the  two  British  schooners  would  not  have 
counted  very  much  in  such  a  conflict.  In  calm 
weather  he  was  certainly  the  superior.  This  only 
solves  one  of  the  points  in  which  the  official  letters 
of  the  two  commanders  differ:  after  every  meeting 
each  one  insists  that  he  was  inferior  in  force,  that 
the  weather  suited  his  antagonist,  and  that  the  latter 
ran  away,  and  got  the  worst  of  it  ;  all  of  which  will 
be  considered  further  on. 

In  order  to  settle  toward  which  side  the  balance  of 
success  inclined,  we  must  remember  that  there  were 
two  things  the  combatants  were  trying  to  do  viz.: 

(i)  To  damage  the  enemy  directly  by  capturing 
or  destroying  his  vessels.  This  was  the  only  object 
we  had  in  view  in  sending  out  ocean  cruisers,  but  on 
the  lakes  it  was  subordinated  to : — 


228  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

(2)  Getting  the  control  of  the  lake,  by  which  in 
valuable  assistance  could  be  rendered  to  the  army. 
The  most  thorough  way  of  accomplishing  this,  of 
course,  was  by  destroying  the  enemy's  squadron  ; 
but  it  could  also  be  done  by  building  ships  too  pow 
erful  for  him  to  face,  or  by  beating  him  in  some  en 
gagement  which,  although  not  destroying  his  fleet, 
would  force  him  to  go  into  port.  If  one  side  was 
stronger,  then  the  weaker  party  by  skilful  manoeu 
vring  might  baffle  the  foe,  and  rest  satisfied  by 
keeping  the  sovereignty  of  the  lake  disputed ;  for, 
as  long  as  one  squadron  was  not  undisputed  master  it 
could  not  be  of  much  assistance  in  transporting 
troops,  attacking  forts,  or  otherwise  helping  the  mil 
itary. 

In  1813  the  Americans  gained  the  first  point  by 
being  the  first  to  begin  operations.  They  were 
building  a  new  ship,  afterward  the  Pike,  at  Sack- 
ett's  Harbor;  the  British  were  building  two  new 
ships,  each  about  two  thirds  the  force  of  the  Pike, 
one  at  Toronto  (then  called  York),  one  at  Kingston. 
Before  these  were  built  the  two  fleets  were  just  on 
a  par ;  the  destruction  of  the  Pike  would  give  the 
British  the  supremacy ;  the  destruction  of  either 
of  the  British  ships,  provided  the  Pike  were 
saved,  would  give  the  Americans  the  supremacy. 
Both  sides  had  already  committed  faults.  The 
Americans  had  left  Sackett's  Harbor  so  poorly  de 
fended  and  garrisoned  that  it  invited  attack,  while 
the  British  had  fortified  Kingston  very  strongly,  but 
had  done  little  for  York,  and,  moreover,  ought  not 
to  have  divided  their  forces  by  building  ships  in  dif 
ferent  places. 

Commodore    Chauncy's  squadron   was  ready  foi 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  229 

service  on  April  iQth,  and  on  the  25th  he  made  sail 
with   the  Madison,  Lieutenant-Commander  Elliott, 
floating  his  own  broad  pennant,  Oneida,  Lieutenant 
Woolsey,  Hamilton,  Lieutenant  McPherson,  Scourge, 
Mr.    Osgood,     Tompkins,    Lieutenant    Brown,    Con 
quest,    Lieutenant    Pettigrew,    Growler,    Mr.    Mix, 
Julia,    Mr.    Trant,   Asp,  Lieutenant    Smith,   Pert, 
Lieutenant  Adams,  American,  Lieutenant  Chauncy, 
Ontario,  Mr.  Stevens,  Lady  of  the  Lake,   Mr.  Hinn, 
and   Raven,    transport,    having   on    board    General 
Dearborn  and   1700  troops,  to   attack  York,  which 
was  garrisoned   by  about  700  British  regulars  and 
Canadian  militia  under  Major-General  Sheafe.     The 
new   24-gun  ship   was  almost   completed,   and    the 
Gloucester   lo-gun   brig   was   in   port;   the   guns  of 
both   vessels  were    used    in    defence    of    the    port. 
The  fleet  arrived  before  York  early  on  April  27th, 
and    the    debarkation     began    at     about    8    A.  M. 
The  schooners  beat  up  to  the  fort  under  a  heavy 
cannonade,  and   opened  a  spirited   fire   from   their 
long  guns ;    while    the  troops    went    ashore    under 
the    command    of    Brigadier- General    Pike.      The 
boats  were   blown    to   leeward  by  the    strong   east 
wind,  and  were  exposed  to  a  galling  fire,  but  landed 
the  troops  under  cover  of  the  grape  thrown  by  the 
vessels.     The  schooners   now   beat   up  to  within  a 
quarter   of   a  mile    from    the    principal  work,    and 
opened  heavily  upon  it,    while    at  the  same    time 
General  Pike  and   the  main  body  of  the  troops  on 
shore   moved   forward    to   the    assault,   using  their 
bayonets  only.     The  British  regulars  and   Canadian 
militia,   outnumbered   three   to   one  (including    the 
American  sailors)  and  with  no  very  good  defensive 
works,  of  course  had  to  give  way,  having  lost  heav- 


230  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

ily,  especially  from  the  fire  of  the  vessels.     An  ex 
plosion    immediately  afterward  killed  or  wounded 
250  of  the  victors,  including  General   Pike.      The 
Americans  lost,  on  board  the  fleet,  4  killed,   includ 
ing   midshipmen    Hatfield    and    Thompson,   and   8 
wounded1;  and    of    the    army,2    14   killed    and    32 
wounded  by  the  enemy's  fire,  and  52  killed  and  180 
wounded  by  the  explosion  :  total  loss,  288.  The  Brit 
ish  regulars  lost  130  killed  and  wounded,  including  40 
by  the  explosion  3 ;  together  with  50  Canadians  and 
Indians,   making  a  total  of  180,   besides  290  prison 
ers.     The   24-gun  ship  was  burned,  her  guns  taken 
away,  and  •  the   Gloucester  sailed  back  to   Sackett's 
Harbor  with  the   fleet.     Many  military  and  naval 
stores  were  destroyed,   and  much   more  shipped  to 
the  Harbor.     The  great  fault   that  the  British  had 
committed  was  in  letting  the  defences  of  so  impor 
tant  a  place  remain  so   poor,  and  the  force   in  it  so 
small.     It  was  impossible   to  resist  very  long  when 
Pike's  troops  were   landed,  and  the  fleet  in  position. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  Americans  did  the  work  in 
good  style  ;  the  schooners  were  finely  handled,  firing 
with  great   precision  and   completely  covering  the 
troops,  who,  in  turn,  were  disembarked  and  brought 
into  action  very  handsomely. 

After  being  detained  in  York  a  week  by  bad 
weather  the  squadron  got  out,  and  for  the  next 
fortnight  was  employed  in  conveying  troops  and 
stores  to  General  Dearborn.  Then  it  was  deter 
mined  to  make  an  attack  on  Fort  George,  where  the 
British  General  Vincent  was  stationed  with  from 

1  Letter  of  Commodore  Chauncy,  April  28,  1813. 

2  James,  "  Military  Occurrences"  (London,  1818)  vol.  i,  p.  151. 

3  Lossing's  "  Field-Book  of  the  War  of  1812,"  p.  581.   The  accounts 
vrrv  somewhat. 


NAVAL   WAR    OF    l8l2.  231 

1,000'  to  i,8ooa  regulars,  600  militia,  and  about 
100  Indians.  The  American  troops  numbered 
about  4,500,  practically  under  the  command  of  Col 
onel  Scott.  On  May  26th  Commodore  Chauncy 
carefully  reconnoitred  the  place  to  be  attacked,  and 
in  the  night  made  soundings  along  the  coast,  and 
laid  buoys  so  as  to  direct  the  small  vessels,  who 
were  to  do  the  fighting.  At  3  A.  M.  on  the  2/th  the 
signal  was  made  to  weigh,  the  heavy  land  artillery 
being  on  the  Madison,  and  the  other  troops  on  the 
Oncida,  the  Lady  of  the  Lake,  and  in  batteaux, 
many  of  which  had  been  captured  at  York.  The 
Julia,  Growler,  and  Ontario  moved  in  and  attacked 
a  battery  near  the  light-house,  opening  a  cross-fire 
which  silenced  it.  The  troops  were  to  be  disem 
barked  farther  along  the  lake,  near  a  battery  of  one 
long  24,  managed  by  Canadian  militia.  The  Con 
quest  and  Tompkins  swept  in  under  fire  to  this  bat 
tery,  and  in  10  minutes  killed  or  drove  off  the  ar 
tillerymen,  who  left  the  gun  spiked,  and  then 
opened  on  the  British.  "  The  American  ships  with 
their  heavy  discharges  of  round  and  grape  too  well 
succeeded  in  thinning  the  British  ranks."  Mean 
while  the  troop-boats,  under  Captain  Perry  and 
Colonel  Scott  dashed  in,  completely  covered  by  a 
heavy  fire  of  grape  directed  point-blank  at  the  foe 
by  the  Hamilton,  Scourge,  and  Asp.  "  The  fire  from 
the  American  shipping  committed  dreadful  havoc 
among  the  British,  and  rendered  their  efforts  to  op 
pose  the  landing  of  the  enemy  ineffectual."  Col 
onel  Scott's  troops,  thus  protected,  made  good  their 
landing  and  met  the  British  regulars ;  but  the  latter 

'James,  "  Military  Occurrences,"  i,  p.  151.  a  Lossing,  596. 

3  James,  "  Military  Occurrences,"  i,  p.  151.  * Loc.  cit. 


232  NAVAL   WAR    OF    l8l2. 

were  so  terribly  cut  up  by  the  tremendous  dis 
charges  of  grape  and  canister  from  the  schooners, 
that  in  spite  of  their  gallantry  and  discipline  they 
were  obliged  to  retreat,  blowing  up  and  abandoning 
the  fort.  One  sailor  was  killed  and  two  wounded1 ; 
seventeen  soldiers  were  killed  and  forty-five 
wounded  2 ;  making  the  total  American  loss  sixty- 
five.  Of  the  British  regulars  52  were  killed,  44 
wounded,  and  262  "wounded  and  missing,"3  in 
addition  to  about  forty  Canadians  and  Indians  hors 
de  combat  and  nearly  500  militia  captured  ;  so  that 
in  this  very  brilliant  affair  the  assailants  suffered 
hardly  more  than  a  fifth  of  the  loss  in  killed  and 
wounded  that  the  assailed  did  ;  which  must  be 
attributed  to  the  care  with  which  Chauncy  had  re 
connoitred  the  ground  and  prepared  the  attack,  the 
excellent  handling  of  the  schooners,  and  the  exceed 
ingly  destructive  nature  of  their  fire.  The  British 
batteries  were  very  weak,  and,  moreover,  badly 
served.  Their  regular  troops  fought  excellently  ;  it 
was  impossible  for  them  to  stand  against  the  fire  of 
the  schooners,  which  should  have  been  engaged  by 
the  batteries  on  shore  ;  and  they  were  too  weak  in 
numbers  to  permit  the  American  army  to  land  and 
then  attack  it  when  away  from  the  boats.  The 
Americans  were  greatly  superior  in  force,  and  yet 
deserve  very  much  credit  for  achieving  their  object 
so  quickly,  with  such  slight  loss  to  themselves,  and 
at  such  a  heavy  cost  to  the  foe.  The  effect  of  the 
victory  was  most  important,  the  British  evacuating 
the  whole  Niagara  frontier,  and  leaving  the  river  in 
complete  possession  of  the  Americans  for  the  time 

1  Letter  of  Commodore  Chauncy,  May  29,  1813. 
3  Letter  of  General  Dearborn,  May  27,  1813. 
'Letter  of  Brig,-Gen.  Vincent,  May  28,  1813. 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  233 

being.  This  offered  the  opportunity  for  despatch 
ing  Captain  Perry  up  above  the  falls  to  take  out 
one  captured  brig  (the  Caledonia]  and  four  pur 
chased  schooners,  which  had  been  lying  in  the 
river  unable  to  get  past  the  British  batteries  into 
Lake  Erie.  These  five  vessels  were  now  carried 
into  that  lake,  being  tracked  up  against  the  current 
by  oxen,  to  become  a  most  important  addition  to 
the  American  force  upon  it. 

While  Chauncy's  squadron  was  thus  absent  at 
the  west  end  of  the  lake  the  Wolfe,  24,  was  launched 
and  equipped  at  Kingston,  making  the  British  force 
on  the  lake  superior  to  that  of  the  Americans. 
Immediately  Sir  George  Prevost,  and  Sir  James 
Lucas  Yeo,  the  commanders-in-chief  of  the  land  and 
water  forces  in  the  Canadas,  decided  to  strike  a 
blow  at  Sackett's  Harbor  and  destroy  the  General 
Pike,  28,  thus  securing  to  themselves  the  superiority 
for  the  rest  of  the  season.  Accordingly  they  em 
barked  on  May  27th,  in  the  Wolfe,  Royal  George, 
Moira,  Prince  Regent,  Simco,  and  Seneca,  with  a 
large  number  of  gun-boats,  barges,  and  batteaux  ; 
and  on  the  next  day  saw  and  attacked  a  brigade  of 
19  boats  transporting  troops  to  Sackett's  Harbor, 
under  command  of  Lieutenant  Aspinwall.  Twelve 
boats  were  driven  ashore,  and  70  of  the  men  in  them 
captured  ;  but  Lieutenant  Aspinwall  and  JOG  men 
succeeded  in  reaching  the  Harbor,  bringing  up  the 
total  number  of  regulars  there  to  500  men,  General 
Brown  having  been  summoned  to  take  the  chief 
command.  About  400  militia  also  came  in,  but 
were  of  no  earthly  service.  There  were,  however, 
200  Albany  volunteers,  under  Colonel  Mills,  who 
could  be  relied  on.  The  defences  were  miserably  in- 


234  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

adequate,  consisting  of  a  battery  of  one  long  gun, 
and  a  block-house. 

On  the  29th  Sir  George  Prevost  and  800  regulars 
landed,  being  covered  by  the  gun-boats  under  Sir 
James  Lucas  Yeo.  The  American  militia  fled  at 
once,  but  the  regulars  and  volunteers  held  their 
ground  in  and  around  the  block-house.  "At  this 
point  the  further  energies  of  the  [British]  troops 
became  unavailing.  The  [American]  block-house 
and  stockade  could  not  be  carried  by  assault  nor  re 
duced  by  field-pieces,  had  we  been  provided  with 
them  ;  the  fire  of  the  gun-boats  proved  insufficient 
to  attain  that  end  ;  light  and  adverse  winds  con 
tinued,  and  our  larger  vessels  were  still  far  off."1 
The  British  reembarked  precipitately.  The  Ameri 
can  loss  amounted  to  23  killed  and  114  wounded; 
that  of  the  British  to  52  killed  and  211  wounded,2 
most  of  the  latter  being  taken  prisoners.  During 
the  fight  some  of  the  frightened  Americans  set  fire 
to  the  store-houses,  the  Pike  and  the  Gloucester ; 
the  former  were  consumed,  but  the  flames  were  ex 
tinguished  before  they  did  any  damage  to  either  of 
the  vessels.  This  attack  differed  especially  from 
those  on  Fort  George  and  York,  in  that  the  attack 
ing  force  was  relatively  much  weaker;  still  it  ought 
to  have  been  successful.  But  Sir  George  could  not 
compare  as  a  leader  with  Col.  Scott  or  Gen.  Pike  ; 
and  Sir  James  did  not  handle  the  gun-boats  by  any 
means  as  well  as  the  Americans  did  their  schooners 
in  similar  attacks.  The  admirers  of  Sir  James  lay 
the  blame  on  Sir  George,  and  vice  versa ;  but  in 
reality  neither  seems  to  have  done  particularly  well. 

1  Letter  of  Adj. -Gen.  Baynes,  May  30,  1813. 
*  James,  "  Military  Occurrences,"  p.  173. 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  235 

At  any  rate  the  affair  was  the  reverse  of  creditable 
to  the  British. 

The  British  squadron  returned  to  Kingston,  and 
Chauncy,  having  heard  that  they  were  out,  came 
down  the  lake  and  went  into  port  about  June  2d. 
So  far  the  Americans  had  had  all  the  success,  and 
had  controlled  the  lake  ;  but  now  Yeo's  force  was 
too  formidable  to  be  encountered  until  the  Pike  was 
built,  and  the  supremacy  passed  undisputed  into 
his  hands,  while  Chauncy  lay  in  Sackett's  Harbor. 
Of  course  with  the  Pike  soon  to  be  built,  Yeo's  un- 
contested  superiority  could  be  of  but  short  dura 
tion  ;  but  he  used  his  time  most  actively.  He 
sailed  from  Kingston  on  the  3d  of  June,  to  coop 
erate  with  the  British  army  at  the  head  of  the 
lake,  and  intercept  all  supplies  going  to  the  Amer 
icans.  On  the  8th  he  discovered  a  small  camp  of  the 
latter  near  Forty  Mile  Creek,  and  attacked  it  with 
the  Beresford,  Sydney  Smith,  and  gun-boats,  oblig 
ing  the  Americans  to  leave  their  camp,  while  their 
equipages,  provisions,  stores,  and  batteaux  fell  into 
the  hands  of  the  British,  whose  troops  occupied  the 
post,  thus  assisting  in  the  series  of  engagements 
which  ended  in  the  humiliating  repulse  of  General 
Wilkinson's  expedition  into  Canada.  On  the  I3th 
two  schooners  and  some  boats  bringing  supplies  to 
the  Americans  were  captured,  and  on  the  i6th  a 
depot  of  provisions  at  the  Genesee  River  shared  the 
same  fate.  On  the  I9th  a  party  of  British  soldiers 
were  landed  by  the  fleet  at  Great  Sodas,  and  took 
off  600  barrels  of  flour.  Yeo  then  returned  to 
Kingston,  where  he  anchored  on  the  2/th{  having 
done  good  service  in  assisting  the  land  forces.1  As  a 

1  Letter  of  Sir  James  Lucas  Yeo  to  Mr.  Croker,  June.  29,  1813. 


236  NAVAL    WAR    OF    I  8 12. 

small  compensation,  on  the  iSth  of  the  same  month 
the  Lady  of  the  Lake,  Lieut.  Wolcott  Chauncy, 
captured  off  Presqu'  Isle  the  British  schooner  Lady 
Murray,  containing  I  ensign,  15  soldiers,  and  6 
sailors,  together  with  stores  and  ammunition.1 

During  the  early  part  of  July  neither  squadron 
put  out.  in  force  ;  although  on  the  first  of  the  month 
Commodore  Yeo  made  an  abortive  attempt  to  sur 
prise  Sackett's  Harbor,  but  abandoned  it  when 
it  was  discovered.  Meanwhile  the  Americans 
were  building  a  new  schooner,  the  Sylph,  and  the 
formidable  corvette  Pike  was  made  ready  to  sail  by 
July  2ist.  On  the  same  day  the  entire  American 
squadron,  or  fleet,  sailed  up  to  the  head  of  the  lake, 
and  reached  Niagara  on  the  2/th.  Here  Col.  Scott 
and  some  of  his  regulars  were  embarked,  and  on  the 
3Oth  a  descent  was  made  upon  York,  where  1 1  trans 
ports  were  destroyed,  5  cannon,  a  quantity  of  flour, 
and  some  ammunition  carried  off,  and  the  barracks 
burned.  On  the  3d  of  August  the  troops  were  dis 
embarked  at  the  Niagara,  and  1 1 1  officers  and  men 
were  sent  up  to  join  Perry  on  Lake  Erie.  As  this 
left  the  squadron  much  deranged  150  militia  were 
subsequently  lent  it  by  General  Boyd,  but  they 
proved  of  no  assistance  (beyond  swelling  the  num 
ber  of  men  Yeo  captured  in  the  Growler  and  Julia 
from  70  individuals  to  80),  and  were  again  landed. 

Commodore  Yeo  sailed  with  his  squadron  from 
Kingston  on  Aug.  2d,  and  on  the  /th  the  two  fleets 
for  the  first  time  came  in  sight  of  one  another,  the 
Americans  at  anchor  off  Fort  Niagara,  the  British 
six  miles  to  windward,  in  the  W.  N.  W.  Chauncy's 

1  Letter  of  Lieut.  Wolcott  Chauncy  to  Com.  Chauncy,  June  18, 
1813. 


NAVAL   WAR    OF    l8l2.  257 

squadron  contained  one  corvette,  one  ship  sloop,  one 
brig  sloop,  and  ten  schooners,  manned  by  about  965 
men,  and  throwing  at  a  broadside  1,390  Ibs.  of  shot, 
nearly  800  of  which  were  from  long  guns.  Yeo's  in 
cluded  two  ship  sloops,  two  brig  sloops,  and  two 
schooners,  manned  by  770  men,  and  throwing  at  a 
broadside  1,374  Ibs.,  but  180  being  from  long  guns. 
But  Yeo's  vessels  were  all  built  with  bulwarks,  while 
ten  of  Chauncy's  had  none  ;  and,  moreover,  his  vessels 
could  all  sail  and  manoeuvre  together,  while,  as  al 
ready  remarked,  one  half  of  the  American  fleet  spent 
a  large  part  of  its  time  towing  the  other  half.  The 
Pike  would  at  ordinary  range  be  a  match  for  the 
Wolfe  and  Melville  together  ;  yet  in  actual  weight  of 
metal  she  threw  less  than  the  former  ship  alone.  In 
calm  weather  the  long  guns  of  the  American 
schooners  gave  them  a  great  advantage  ;  in  rough 
weather  they  could  not  be  used  at  all.  Still,  on  the 
whole,  it  could  fairly  be  said  that  Yeo  was  advanc 
ing  to  attack  a  superior  fleet. 

All  through  the  day  of  the  7th  the  wind  blew 
light  and  variable,  and  the  two  squadrons  went 
through  a  series  of  manoeuvres,  nominally  to  bring 
on  an  action.  As  each  side  flatly  contradicts  the 
other  it  is  hard  to  tell  precisely  what  the  manoeuvres 
were ;  each  captain  says  the  other  avoided  him  and 
that  he  made  all  sail  in  chase.  At  any  rate  it  was 
just  the  weather  for  Chauncy  to  engage  in. 

That  night  the  wind  came  out  squally  ;  and  about 
i  A.  M.  on  the  morning  of  the  8th  a  heavy  gust  struck 
the  Hamilton  and  Scourge,  forcing  them  to  careen 
over  till  the  heavy  guns  broke  loose,  and  they 
foundered,  but  16  men  escaping, — which  accident 
did  not  open  a  particularly  cheerful  prospect  to 


238  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

the  remainder  of  the  schooners.  Chauncy's  force 
was,  by  this  accident,  reduced  to  a  numerical 
equality  with  Yeo's,  having  perhaps  a  hundred 
more  men,1  and  throwing  144  Ibs.  less  shot  at  a 
broadside.  All  through  the  two  succeeding  days 
the  same  manoeuvring  went  on  ;  the  question  as  to 
which  avoided  the  fight  is  simply  one  of  veracity 
between  the  two  commanders,  and  of  course  each 
side,  to  the  end  of  time,  will  believe  its  own  leader. 
But  it  is  not  of  the  least  consequence,  as  neither 
accomplished  any  thing. 

On  the  loth  the  same  tedious  evolutions  were 
continued,  but  at  7  P.  M.  the  two  squadrons  were 
tolerably  near  one  another,  Yeo  to  windward,  the 
breeze  being  fresh  from  the  S.  W.  Commodore 
Chauncy  formed  his  force  in  two  lines  on  the  port 
tack,  while  Commodore  Yeo  approached  from  be 
hind  and  to  windward,  in  single  column,  on  the  same 
tack.  Commodore  Chauncy's  weather  line  was 
formed  of  the  Julia,  Growler,  Pert,  Asp,  Ontario, 
and  American,  in  that  order,  and  the  lee  line  of  the 
Pike,  Oneida,  Madison,  Tompkins,  and  Conquest. 
Chauncy  formed  his  weather  line  of  the  smaller  ves 
sels,  directing  them,  when  the  British  should  en 
gage,  to  edge  away  and  form  to  leeward  of  the 
second  line,  expecting  that  Sir  James  would  follow 
them  down.  At  1 1  the  weather  line  opened  fire  at 
very  long  range;  at  11.15  it  was  returned,  and  the 

1  This  estimate  as  to  men  is  a  mere  balancing  of  probabilities.  If 
James  underestimates  the  British  force  on  Ontario  as  much  as  he  has 
on  Erie  and  Champlain,  Yeo  had  as  many  men  as  his  opponent. 
Chauncy,  in  one  of  his  letters  (preserved  with  the  other  manuscript 
letters  in  the  Naval  Archives),  says  :  "  I  enclose  the  muster-rolls  of 
all  my  ships,"  but  I  have  not  been  able  to  find  them,  and  in  any 
event  the  complements  were  continually  changing  completely.  The 
point  is  not  important,  as  each  side  certainly  had  plenty  of  men  on 
this  occasion. 


:V 


240  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

action  became  general  and  harmless;  at  11.30  the 
weather  line  bore  up  and  passed  to  leeward,  except 
the  Julia  and  Growler,  which  tacked.  The  Brit 
ish  ships  kept  their  luff  and  cut  off  the  two  that 
had  tacked  ;  while  Commodore  Chauncy's  lee  line 
"  edged  away  two  points,  to  lead  the  enemy  down, 
not  only  to  engage  him  to  more  advantage,  but  to 
lead  him  from  the  Julia  and  Growler."  '  Of  course 
the  enemy  did  not  come  down,  and  the  Julia  and 
Growler  were  not  saved.  Yeo  kept  on  till  he  had 
cut  off  the  two  schooners,  fired  an  ineffectual  broad 
side  at  the  other  ships,  and  tacked  after  the  Growler 
and  Julia.  Then,  when  too  late,  Chauncy  tacked 
also,  and  stood  after  him.  The  schooners,  mean 
while,  kept  clawing  to  windward  till  they  were 
overtaken,  and,  after  making  a  fruitless  effort  to  run 
the  gauntlet  through  the  enemy's  squadron  by  put 
ting  before  the  wind,  were  captured.  Yeo's  ac 
count  is  simple  :  "  Came  within  gunshot  of  Pike  and 
Madison,  when  they  immediately  bore  up,  fired  their 
stern-chase  guns,  and  made  all  sail  for  Niagara,  leav 
ing  two  of  their  schooners  astern,  which  we  capt 
ured."5  The  British  had  acted  faultlessly,  and  the 
honor  and  profit  gained  by  the  encounter  rested  en 
tirely  with  them.  On  the  contrary,  neither  Chauncy 
nor  his  subordinates  showed  to  advantage. 

Cooper  says  that  the  line  of  battle  was  "  sin 
gularly  well  adapted  to  draw  the  enemy  down," 
and  "  admirable  for  its  advantages  and  ingenuity." 
In  the  first  place  it  is  an  open  question  whether 
the  enemy  needed  drawing  down  ;  on  this  occasion 
he  advanced  boldly  enough.  The  formation  may 

1  Letter  of  Commodore  Isaac  Chauncy,  Aug.  13,  1813. 

2  Letter  of  Sir  James  Lucas  Yeo,  Aug.  10,  1813. 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    1 8 12.  24! 

have  been  ingenious,  but  it  was  the  reverse  of  ad 
vantageous.  It  would  have  been  far  better  to  have 
had  the  strongest  vessels  to  windward,  and  the 
schooners,  with  their  long  guns,  to  leeward,  where 
they  would  not  be  exposed  to  capture  by  any 
accident  happening  to  them.  Moreover,  it  does 
not  speak  well  for  the  discipline  of  the  fleet,  that 
two  commanders  should  have  directly  disobeyed 
orders.  And  when  the  two  schooners  did  tack, 
and  it  was  evident  that  Sir  James  would  cut 
them  off,  it  was  an  extraordinary  proceeding  for 
Chauncy  to  "  edge  away  two  points 
to  lead  the  enemy  from  the  Growler  and  Julia." 
It  is  certainly  a  novel  principle,  that  if  part  of  a 
force  is  surrounded  the  true  way  to  rescue  it  is  to 
run  away  with  the  balance,  in  hopes  that  the  enemy 
will  follow.  Had  Chauncy  tacked  at  once,  Sir 
James  would  have  been  placed  between  two  fires, 
and  it  would  have  been  impossible  for  him  to  capt 
ure  the  schooners.  As  it  was,  the  British  com 
mander  had  attacked  a  superior  force  in  weather 
that  just  suited  it,  and  yet  had  captured  two  of  its 
vessels  withour  suffering  any  injury  beyond  a  few 
shot  holes  in  the  sails.  The  action,  however,  was  in 
no  way  decisive.  All  next  day,  the  nth,  the  fleets 
were  in  sight  of  one  another,  the  British  to  wind 
ward,  but  neither  attempted  to  renew  the  engage 
ment.  The  wind  grew  heavier,  and  the  villainous 
little  American  schooners  showed  such  strong  ten 
dencies  to  upset,  that  two  had  to  run  into  Niagara 
Bay  to  anchor.  With  the  rest  Chauncy  ran  down 
the  lake  to  Sackett's  Harbor,  which  he  reached  on 
the  1 3th,  provisioned  his  squadron  for  five  weeks, 
and  that  same  evening  proceeded  up  the  lake  again. 


24-2  NAVAL  WAR   OF    1 8 12. 

The  advantage  in  this  action  had  been  entirely 
with  the  British,  but  it  is  simple  nonsense  to  say, 
-as  one  British  historian  does,  that  "  on  Lake  Onta 
rio,  therefore,  we  at  last  secured  a  decisive  predom 
inance,  which  we  maintained  until  the  end  of  the 
war."  *  This  "  decisive  "  battle  left  the  Americans 
just  as  much  in  command  of  the  lake  as  the  Brit 
ish  ;  and  even  this  very  questionable  "  predomi 
nance  "  lasted  but  six  weeks,  after  which  the  Brit 
ish  squadron  was  blockaded  in  port  most  of  the 
time.  The  action  has  a  parallel  in  that  fought  on 
the  22d  of  July,  1805,  by  Sir  Robert  Calder's  fleet 
of  15  sail  of  the  line  against  the  Franco-Spanish 
fleet  of  20  sail  of  the  line,  under  M.  Villeneuve.2 
The  two  fleets  engaged  in  a  fog,  and  the  English 
captured  two  ships,  when  both  sides  drew  off,  and 
remained  in  sight  of  each  other  the  next  day  with 
out  either  renewing  the  action.  "  A  victory  there 
fore  it  was  that  Sir  Robert  Calder  had  gained,  but  not 
a  '  decisive  '  nor  a  '  brilliant  '  victory."  3  This  is  ex 
actly  the  criticism  that  should  be  passed  on  Sir 
James  Lucas  Yeo's  action  of  the  loth  of  August. 

From  the  I3th  of  August  to  the  loth  of  Septenru 
ber  both  fleets  were  on  the  lake  most  of  the  time, 
each  commodore  stoutly  maintaining  that  he  was 
chasing  the  other  ;  and  each  expressing  in  his  let- 

"  History  of  the  British  Navy,"  by  Charles  Duke  Yonge  (London, 
1866),  vol.  iii,  p.  24.  It  is  apparently  not  a  work  of  any  authority, 
hut  I  quote  it  as  showing  probably  the  general  feeling  of  British 
writers  about  the  action  and  its  results,  which  can  only  proceed  from 
extreme  partizanship  and  ignorance  of  the  subject. 

9  "  Batailles  Navales  de  la  France,"  par  O.  Troude,  iii,  352.  It 
seems  rather  ridiculous  to  compare  these  lake  actions,  fought  between 
small  flotillas,  with  the  gigantic  contests  which  the  huge  fleets  of 
Europe  waged  in  contending  for  tue  supremacy  of  the  ocean  ;  but 
the  difference  is  one  of  degree  and  not  of  kind,  and  they  serve  well 
enough  for  purposes  of  illustration  or  comparison. 

3  James'  "Naval  History,"  iv,  14. 


NAVAL   WAR  OF    l8l2.  243 

ters  his  surprise  and  disgust  that  his  opponent 
should  be  afraid  of  meeting  him  "  though  so  much 
superior  in  force."  The  facts  are  of  course  diffi 
cult  to  get  at,  but  it  seems  pretty  evident  that  Yeo 
was  determined  to  engage  in  heavy,  and  Chauncy 
in  light,  weather ;  and  that  the  party  to  leeward 
generally  made  off.  The  Americans  had  been  re-in- 
forced  by  the  Sylph  schooner,  of  300  tons  and  70 
men,  carrying  four  long  32*3  on  pivots,  and  six  long 
6's.  Theoretically  her  armament  would  make  her 
formidable ;  but  practically  her  guns  were  so 
crowded  as  to  be  of  little  use,  and  the  next  year  she 
was  converted  into  a  brig,  mounting  24-pound  car- 
ronades. 

On  the  nth  of  September  a  partial  engagement, 
at  very  long  range,  in  light  weather,  occurred  near 
the  mouth  of  the  Genesee  River  ;  the  Americans 
suffered  no  loss  whatever,  while  the  British  had  one 
midshipman  and  three  seamen  killed  and  seven 
wounded,  and  afterward  ran  into  Amherst  Bay. 
One  of  their  brigs,  the  Melville,  received  a  shot  so 
far  under  water  that  to  get  at  and  plug  it,  the  guns 
had  to  be  run  in  on  one  side  and  out  on  the  other. 
Chauncy  describes  it  as  a  running  fight  of  3J-  hours, 
the  enemy  then  escaping  into  Amherst  Bay.1  James 
(p.  38)  says  that  "  At  sunset  a  breeze  sprang  up 
from  the  westward,  when  Sir  James  steered  for  the 
American  fleet  ;  but  the  American  commodore 
avoided  a  close  action,  and  thus  the  affair  ended." 
This  is  a  good  sample  of  James'  trustworthiness  ; 
his  account  is  supposed  to  be  taken  from  Commo 
dore  Yeo's  letter,2  which  says :  "  At  sunset  a  breeze 

1  Letter  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  Sept.  13,  1813. 
'  Letter  to  Admiral  Warren,  Sept.  12,  1813. 


244  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

sprang  up  from  the  westward,  when  I  steered  for 
the  False  Duck  Islands,  under  which  the  enemy 
•could  not  keep  the  weather-gage,  but  be  obliged 
to  meet  us  on  equal  terms.  This,  however,  he 
carefully  avoided  doing."  In  other  words  Yeo  did 
not  steer  for  but  away  from  Chauncy.  Both  sides 
admit  that  Yeo  got  the  worst  of  it  and  ran  away, 
and  it  is  only  a  question  as  to  whether  Chauncy  fol 
lowed  him  or  not.  Of  course  in  such  light  weather 
Chauncy's  long  guns  gave  him  a  great  advantage. 
He  had  present  10  vessels ;  the  Pike,  Madison, 
Oneida,  Sylph,  Tompkins,  Conquest,  Ontario,  Pert, 
American,  and  Asp,  throwing  1.288  Ibs.  of  shot,  with 
a  total  of  98  guns.  Yeo  had  92  guns,  throwing  at  a 
broadside  1,374  Ibs.  Nevertheless,  Chauncy  told 
but  part  of  the  truth  in  writing  as  he  did:  "  I  was 
much  disappointed  at  Sir  James  refusing  to  fight 
me,  as  he  was  so  much  superior  in  point  of  force, 
both  in  guns  and  men,  having  upward  of  20  guns 
more  than  we  have,  and  heaves  a  greater  weight  of 
shot."  His  inferiority  in  long  guns  placed  Yeo  at 
a  great  disadvantage  in  such  a  very  light  wind  ;  but 
in  his  letter  he  makes  a  marvellous  admission 
of  how  little  able  he  was  to  make  good  use  of  even 
what  he  had.  He  says  :  "  I  found  it  impossible  to 
bring  them  to  close  action.  We  remained  in  this 
mortifying  situation  five  hours,  having  only  six  guns 
in  all  the  squadron  that  would  reach  the  enemy 
(not  a  carronade  being  fired)."  Now  according  to 
James  himself  ("  Naval  Occurrences,"  p.  297)  he  had 
in  his  squadron  2  long  24*3,  13  long  i8's,  2  long 
I2's,  and  3  long  9*3,  and,  in  a  fight  of  five  hours,  at 
very  long  range,  in  smooth  water,  it  was  a  proof 
of  culpable  incompetency  on  his  part  that  he  did 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  245 

not  think  of  doing  what  Elliott  and  Perry  did  in 
similar  circumstances  on  Lake  Erie — substitute  all 
his  long  guns  for  some  of  the  carronades  on  the 
engaged  side.  Chauncy  could  place  in  broadside  7 
long  32*5,  1 8  long  24/5,  4  long  I2's,  8  long  6's ;  so  he 
could  oppose  37  long  guns,  throwing  752  Ibs.  of 
shot,  to  Yeo's  20  long  guns,  throwing  333  Ibs.  of 
shot.  The  odds  were  thus  more  than  two  to  one 
against  the  British  in  any  case  ;  and  their  com 
mander's  lack  of  resource  made  them  still  greater. 
But  it  proved  a  mere  skirmish,  with  no  decisive 
results. 

The  two  squadrons  did  not  come  in  contact  again 
till  on  the  28th,  in  York  Bay.  The  Americans  had 
the  weather-gage,  the  wind  being  fresh  from  the 
east.  Yeo  tacked  and  stretched  out  into  the  lake, 
while  Chauncy  steered  directly  for  his  centre. 
When  the  squadrons  were  still  a  league  apart  the 
British  formed  on  the  port  tack,  with  their  heavy 
vessels  ahead  ;  the  Americans  got  on  the  same  tack 
and  edged  down  toward  them,  the  Pike  ahead,  tow 
ing  the  Asp ;  the  Tompkins^  under  Lieut.  Bolton 
Finch,  next ;  the  Madison  next,  being  much  re 
tarded  by  having  a  schooner  in  tow ;  then  the  Sylph, 
with  another  schooner  in  tow,  the  Oneida,  and  the 
two  other  schooners.  The  British,  fearing  their 
sternmost  vessels  would  be  cut  off,  at  12. 10  came 
round  on  the  starboard  tack,  beginning  with  the 
Wolfe,  Commodore  Yeo,  and  Royal  George,  Captain 
William  Howe  Mulcaster,  which  composed  the  van  of 
the  line.  They  opened  with  their  starboard  guns  as 
soon  as  they  came  round.  When  the  Pike  was 
a-beam  of  the  Wolfe,  which  was  past  the  centre  of 
the  British  line,  the  Americans  bore  up  in  succes 
sion  for  their  centre. 


246  .NAVAL   WAR   OF    1 8 12. 

The  Madison  was  far  back,  and  so  was  the  Sylph 
neither  having  cast  off  their  tows  ;  so  the  whole 
brunt  of  the  action  fell  on  the  Pike,  Asp,  and  Tomp- 
kins.  The  latter  kept  up  a  most  gallant  and  spirited 
fire  till  her  foremast  was  shot  away.  But  already 
the  Pike  had  shot  away  the  Wolfe  s  main-top-mast 
and  main-yard,  and  inflicted  so  heavy  a  loss  upon 


-  I 


PIKE: 


ROYAL    GEORGE 

•^ 

WOLFE  ^ 


4 


her  that  Commodore  Yeo,  not  very  heroically,  put 
dead  before  the  wind,  crowding  all  the  canvas  he 
could  on  her  forward  spars,  and  she  ran  completely 
past  all  her  own  vessels,  who  of  course  crowded  sail 
after  her.  The  retreat  of  the  commodore  was  most 
ably  covered  by  the  Royal  George,  under  Captain 
Mulcaster,  who  was  unquestionably  the  best  British 


NAVAL   WAR    OF    l8l2.  247 

officer  on  the  lake.  He  luffed  up  across  the  com 
modore's  stern,  and  delivered  broadsides  in  a  man 
ner  that  won  the  admiration  even  of  his  foes.  The 
Madison  and  SylpJi,  having  the  schooners  in  tow, 
could  not  overtake  the  British  ships,  though  the 
Sylph  opened  a  distant  fire  ;  the  Pike  kept  on  after 
them,  but  did  not  cast  off  the  Asp,  and  so  did  not 
gain  ;  and  at  3.15  the  pursuit  was  relinquished,1 
when  the  enemy  were  running  into  the  entirely 
undefended  port  of  Burlington  Bay,  whence  escape 
would  have  been  impossible.  The  Tompkins  had 
lost  her  foremast,  and  the  Pike  her  foretop-gallant 
mast,  with  her  bowsprit  and  main-mast  wounded  ; 
and  of  her  crew  five  men  were  killed  or  wounded, 
almost  all  by  the  guns  of  the  Royal  George.  These 
were  the  only  injuries  occasioned  by  the  enemy's 
fire,  but  the  Pikes  starboard  bow-chaser  burst, 
killing  or  wounding  22  men,  besides  blowing  up  the 
top-gallant  forecastle,  so  that  the  bow  pivot  gun 
could  not  be  used.  Among  the  British  ships,  the 
Wolfe  lost  her  main-top-mast,  mizzen-top-mast,  and 
main-yard,  and  the  Royal  George  her  foretop-mast ; 
both  suffered  a  heavy  loss  in  killed  and  wounded, 
according  to  the  report  of  the  British  officers  cap 
tured  in  the  transports  a  few  days  afterward. 

As  already  mentioned,  the  British  authorities  no 
longer  published  accounts  of  their  defeats,  so  Com 
modore  Yeo's  report  on  the  action  was  not  made 
public.  Brenton  merely  alludes  to  it  as  follows 
(vol.  ii,  p.  503):  "The  action  of  the  28th  of  Sep 
tember,  1813,  in  which  Sir  James  Yeo  in  the  Wolfe 
had  his  main-  and  mizzen-top-masts  shot  away,  arid 
was  obliged  to  put  before  the  wind,  gave  Mulcaster 

1  Letter  of  Commodore  Chauncy,  Sept.  28,  1813. 


248  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

an  opportunity  of  displaying  a  trait  of  valor  and 
seamanship  which  elicited  the  admiration  of  friends 
-and  foes,  when  he  gallantly  placed  himself  between 
his  disabled  commodore  and  a  superior  enemy." 
James  speaks  in  the  vaguest  terms.  He  first  says, 
"  Commodore  Chauncy,  having  the  weather-gage, 
kept  his  favorite  distance,"  which  he  did  because 
Commodore  Yeo  fled  so  fast  that  he  could  not  be  over 
taken  ;  then  James  mentions  the  injuries  the  Wolfe 
received,  and  says  that  "  it  was  these  and  not,  as  Mr. 
Clark  says,  '  a  manoeuvre  of  the  commodore's '  that 
threw  the  British  in  confusion."  In  other  words,  it 
was  the  commodore's  shot  and  not  his  manoeuvring 
that  threw  the  British  into  confusion — a  very  futile 
distinction.  Next  he  says  that  "  Commodore 
Chauncy  would  not  venture  within  carronade 
range,"  whereas  he  was  within  carronade  range  of 
the  Wolfe  and  Royal  George,  but  the  latter  did  not 
wait  for  the  Madison  and  Oneida  to  get  within  range 
with  their  carronades  The  rest  of  his  article  is 
taken  up  with  exposing  the  absurdities  of  some  of 
the  American  writings,  miscalled  histories,  which 
appeared  at  the  close  of  the  war.  His  criticisms  on 
these  are  very  just,  but  afford  a  funny  instance  of 
the  pot  calling  the  kettle  black.  This  much  is  clear, 
that  the  British  were  beaten  and  forced  to  flee, 
when  but  part  of  the  American  force  was  engaged. 
But  in  good  weather  the  American  force  was  so 
superior  that  being  beaten  would  have  been  no  dis 
grace  to  Yeo,  had  it  not  been  for  the  claims  ad 
vanced  both  by  himself  and  his  friends,  that  on  the 
whole  he  was  victorious  over  Chauncy.  The  Wolfe 
made  any  thing  but  an  obstinate  fight,  leaving 
almost  all  the  work  to  the  gallant  Mulcaster,  in  the 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    1 8 12.  249 

Royal  George,  who  shares  with  Lieutenant  Finch  of 
the  Tompkins  most  of  the  glory  of  the  day.  The 
battle,  if  such  it  may  be  called,  completely  estab 
lished  Chauncy's  supremacy,  Yeo  spending  most  of 
the  remainder  of  the  season  blockaded  in  Kingston. 
So  Chauncy  gained  a  victory  which  established  his 
control  over  the  lakes ;  and,  moreover,  he  gained  it 
by  fighting  in  succession,  almost  single-handed,  the 
two  heaviest  ships  of  the  enemy.  But  gaining  the 
victory  was  only  what  should  have  been  expected 
from  a  superior  force.  The  question  is,  did  Chauncy 
use  his  force  to  the  best  advantage?  And  it  can 
not  be  said  that  he  did.  When  the  enemy  bore  up 
it  was  a  great  mistake  not  to  cast  off  the  schooners 
which  were  being  towed.  They  were  small  craft, 
not  of  much  use  in  the  fight,  and  they  entirely  pre 
vented  the  Madison  from  taking  any  part  in  the 
contest,  and  kept  the  Sylph  at  a  great  distance  ;  and 
by  keeping  the  Asp  in  tow  the  Pike,  which  sailed 
faster  than  any  of  Yeo's  ships,  was  distanced  by 
them.  Had  she  left  the  Asp  behind  and  run  in  to 
engage  the  Royal  George  she  could  have  mastered, 
or  at  any  rate  disabled,  her;  and  had  the  swift 
Madison  cast  off  her  tow  she  could  also  have  taken 
an  effective  part  in  the  engagement.  If  the  Pike 
could  put  the  British  to  flight  almost  single-handed, 
how  much  more  could  she  not  have  done  when 
assisted  by  the  Madison  and  Oneida  ?  The  cardinal 
error,  however,  was  made  in  discontinuing  the 
chase.  The  British  were  in  an  almost  open  road 
stead,  from  which  they  could  not  possibly  escape. 
Commodore  Chauncy  was  afraid  that  the  wind 
would  come  up  to  blow  a  gale,  and  both  fleets 
would  be  thrown  ashore ;  and,  moreover,  he  ex- 


250  NAVAL    WAR    OF    l8l2. 

pected  to  be  able  to  keep  a  watch  over  the  enemy, 
and  to  attack  him  at  a  more  suitable  time.  But  he 
utterly  failed  in  this  last;  and  had  the  American 
squadron  cast  off  their  tows  and  gone  boldly  in,  they 
certainly  ought  to  have  been  able  to  destroy  or 
capture  the  entire  British  force  before  a  gale  could 
blow  up.  Chauncy  would  have  done  well  to  keep  in 
mind  the  old  adage,  so  peculiarly  applicable  to 
naval  affairs:  "  L'  audace  !  toujours  1' audace  !  et 
encore  1'  audace ! "  Whether  the  fault  was  his  or 
that  of  his  subordinates,  it  is  certain  that  while  the 
victory  of  the  28th  of  September  definitely  settled 
the  supremacy  of  the  lake  in  favor  of  the  Americans, 
yet  this  victory  was  by  no  means  so  decided  as 
it  should  have  been,  taking  into  account  his  supe 
riority  in  force  and  advantage  in  position,  and  the 
somewhat  spiritless  conduct  of  his  foe. 

Next  day  a  gale  came  on  to  blow,  which  lasted 
till  the  evening  of  the  3 1st.  There  was  no  longer 
any  apprehension  of  molestation  from  the  British, 
so  the  troop  transports  were  sent  down  the  lake  by 
themselves,  while  the  squadron  remained  to  watch 
Yeo.  On  Oct.  2d  he  was  chased,  but  escaped  by 
his  better  sailing;  and  next  day  false  information 
induced  Chauncy  to  think  Yeo  had  eluded  him  and 
passed  down  the  lake,  and  he  accordingly  made 
sail  in  the  direction  of  his  supposed  flight.  On  the 
5th,  at  3  P.  M.,  while  near  the  False  Ducks,  seven  ves 
sels  were  made  out  ahead,  which  proved  to  be  Brit 
ish  gun-boats,  engaged  in  transporting  troops.  All 
sails  was  made  after  them;  one  was  burned,  another 
escaped,  and  five  were  captured ,  the  Mary,  Drum- 
mond,  Lady  Gore,  Con  fiance,  and  Hamilton? — the 

1  Letter  of  Commodore  Chauncy,  Oct.  8,  1813. 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  251 

two  latter  being  the  rechristened  Julia  and  Growler. 
Each  gun-vessel  had  from  one  to  three  guns,  and 
they  had  aboard  in  all  264  men,  including  seven 
naval  (three  royal  and  four  provincial)  and  ten  mili 
tary  officers.  These  prisoners  stated  that  in  the 
action  of  the  28th  the  Wolfe  and  Royal  George  had 
lost  very  heavily. 

After  this  Yeo  remained  in  Kingston,  blockaded 
there  by  Chauncy  for  most  of  the  time ;  on  Nov. 
loth  he  came  out  and  was  at  once  chased  back  into 
port  by  Chauncy,  leaving  the  latter  for  the  rest  of 
the  season  entirely  undisturbed.  Accordingly, 
Chauncy  was  able  to  convert  his  small  schooners 
into  transports.  On  the  i/th  these  transports  were 
used  to  convey  1,100  men  of  the  army  of  General 
Harrison  from  the  mouth  of  the  Genesee  to 
Sackett's  Harbor,  while  Chauncy  blockaded  Yeo  in 
Kingston.  The  duty  of  transporting  troops  and 
stores  went  on  till  the  2/th,  when  every  thing  had 
been  accomplished  ;  and  a  day  or  two  afterward 
navigation  closed. 

As  between  the  Americans  and  British,  the  suc 
cess  of  the  season  was  greatly  in  favor  of  the  former. 
They  had  uncontested  control  over  the  lake  from 
April  iQth  to  June  3d,  and  from  Sept.  28th  to 
Nov.  29th,  in  all  107  days ;  while  their  foes  only 
held  it  from  June  3d  to  July  2ist,  or  for  48  days; 
and  from  that  date  to  Sept.  28th,  for  69  days,  the 
two  sides  were  contending  for  the  mastery.  York 
and  Fort  George  had  been  taken,  while  the  attack 
on  Sackett's  Harbor  was  repulsed.  The  Americans 
lost  but  two  schooners,  both  of  which  were 
recaptured  ;  while  the  British  had  one  24-gun-ship 
nearly  ready  for  launching  destroyed,  and  one  10 


252  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

gun  brig  taken,  and  the  loss  inflicted  upon  each 
other  in  transports,  gun-boats,  store-houses,  stores, 
etc.,  was  greatly  in  favor  of  the  former.  Chauncy's 
fleet,  moreover,  was  able  to  co-operate  with  the  army 
for  over  twice  the  length  of  time  Yeo's  could  (107 
days  to  48). 

It  is  more  difficult  to  decide  between  the  respec 
tive  merits  of  the  two  commanders.  We  had  shown 
so  much  more  energy  than  the  Anglo-Canadians 
that  at  the  beginning  of  the  year  we  had  overtaken 
them  in  the  building  race,  arid  the  two  fleets  were 
about  equally  formidable.  The  Madison  and  Oneida 
were  not  quite  a  match  for  the  Royal  George  and 
Sydney  Smith  (opposing  12  32-pound  and  8  24-pound 
carronades  to  2  long  i8's,  I  long  12,  I  68-pound 
and  13  32-pound  carronades);  and  our  ten  gun- 
schooners  would  hardly  be  considered  very  much 
of  an  overmatch  for  the  Melville,  Moira,  and  Beres- 
ford.  Had  Sir  James  Yeo  been  as  bold  and  ener 
getic  as  Barclay  or  Mulcaster  he  would  certainly 
not  have  permitted  the  Americans,  when  the  forces 
were  so  equal,  to  hold  uncontested  sway  over  the 
lake,  and  by  reducing  Fort  George,  to  cause  disaster 
to  the  British  land  forces.  It  would  certainly  have 
been  better  to  risk  a  battle  with  equal  forces,  than 
to  wait  till  each  fleet  received  an  additional  ship, 
which  rendered  Chauncy's  squadron  the  superior  by 
just  about  the  superiority  of  the  Pike  to  the  Wolfe. 
Again,  Yeo  did  not  do  particularly  well  in  the  re 
pulse  before  Sackett's  Harbor  ;  in  the  skirmish  off 
Genesee  river  he  showed  a  marked  lack  of  resource  ; 
and  in  the  action  of  the  28th  of  September  (popularly 
called  the  "  Burlington  Races  "  from  the  celerity 
of  his  retreat)  he  evinced  an  amount  of  caution  that 


NAVAL    WAR    OF    l8l2.  253 

verged  toward  timidity,  in  allowing  the  entire  brunt 
of  the  fighting  to  fall  on  Mulcaster  in  the  Royal 
George,  a  weaker  ship  than  the  Wolfe.  On  the 
other  hand,  he  gave  able  co-operation  to  the  army 
while  he  possessed  control  of  the  lake  ;  he  made  a 
most  gallant  and  successful  attack  on  a  superior 
force  on  the  loth  of  August ;  and  for  six  weeks  sub 
sequently  by  skilful  manoeuvring  he  prevented  this 
same  superior  force  from  acquiring  the  uncontested 
mastery.  It  was  no  disgrace  to  be  subsequently 
blockaded  ;  but  it  is  very  ludicrous  in  his  admirers 
to  think  that  he  came  out  first  best. 

Chauncy  rendered  able  and  invaluable  assistance 
to  the  army  all  the  while  that  he  had  control  of  the 
water ;  his  attacks  on  York  and  Fort  George  were 
managed  with  consummate  skill  and  success,  and  on 
the  28th  of  September  he  practically  defeated  the 
opposing  force  with  his  own  ship  alone.  Neverthe 
less  he  can  by  no  means  be  said  to  have  done  the 
best  he  could  with  the  materials  he  had.  His 
stronger  fleet  was  kept  two  months  in  check  by  a 
weaker  British  fleet.  When  he  first  encountered  the 
foe,  on  August  loth,  he  ought  to  have  inflicted 
such  a  check  upon  him  as  would  at  least  have  con 
fined  him  to  port  and  given  the  Americans  imme 
diate  superiority  on  the  lake  ;  instead  of  which  he 
suffered  a  mortifying,  although  not  at  all  disastrous, 
defeat,  which  allowed  the  British  to  contest  the 
supremacy  with  him  for  six  weeks  longer.  On  the 
28th  of  September,  when  he  only  gained  a  rather 
barren  victory,  it  was  nothing  but  excessive  caution 
that  prevented  him  from  utterly  destroying  his  foe. 
Had  Perry  on  that  day  commanded  the  American 
fleet  there  would  have  been  hardly  a  British  ship 


254  NAVAL   WAR   OF    1 8 12. 

left  on  Ontario.  Chauncy  was  an  average  com 
mander;  and  the  balance  of  success  inclined  to  the 
side  of  the  Americans  only  because  they  showed 
greater  energy  and  skill  in  shipbuilding,  the  crews 
and  commanders  on  both  sides  being  very  nearly 
equal. 

LAKE   ERIE. 

Captain  Oliver  Hazard  Perry  had  assumed  com 
mand  of  Erie  and  the  upper  lakes,  acting  under 
Commodore  Chauncy.  With  intense  energy  he  at 
once  began  creating  a  naval  force  which  should  be 
able  to  contend  successfully  with  the  foe.  As  al 
ready  said,  the  latter  in  the  beginning  had  exclusive 
control  of  Lake  Erie;  but -the  Americans  had  cap 
tured  the  Caledonia,  brig,  and  purchased  three 
schooners,  afterward  named  the  Soiners,  Tigress,  and 
Ohio,  and  a  sloop,  the  Trippe.  These  at  first  were 
blockaded  in  the  Niagara,  but  after  the  fall  of  Fort 
George  and  retreat  of  the  British  forces,  Captain 
Perry  was  enabled  to  get  them  out,  tracking  them 
up  against  the  current  by  the  most  arduous  labor. 
They  ran  up  to  Presque  Isle  (now  called  Erie),  where 
two  2O-gun  brigs  were  being  constructed  under  the 
directions  of  the  indefatigable  captain.  Three  other 
schooners,  the  Ariel,  Scorpion,  and  Porcupine,  were 
also  built. 

The  harbor  of  Erie  was  good  and  spacious,  but 
had  a  bar  on  which  there  was  less  than  seven  feet  of 
water.  Hitherto  this  had  prevented  the  enemy  from 
getting  in  ;  now  it  prevented  the  two  brigs  from 
getting  out.  Captain  Robert  Heriot  Barclay  had 
been  appointed  commander  of  the  British  forces  on 
Lake  Erie ;  and  he  was  having  built  at  Amherst- 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  255 

burg  a  2O-gun  ship.  Meanwhile  he  blockaded 
Perry's  force,  and  as  the  brigs  could  not  cross  the 
bar  with  their  guns  in,  or  except  in  smooth  water, 
they  of  course  could  not  do  so  in  his  presence.  He 
kept  a  close  blockade  for  some  time  ;  but  on  the'  2d 
of  August  he  disappeared.  Perry  at  once  hurried 
forward  every  thing ;  and  on  the  4th,  at  2  P.  M.,  one 
brig,  the  Lawrence,  was  towed  to  that  point  of  the 
bar  where  the  water  was  deepest.  Her  guns  were 
whipped  out  and  landed  on  the  beach,  and  the  brig 
got  over  the  bar  by  a  hastily  improvised  "  camel." 

"  Two  large  scows,  prepared  for  the  purpose,  were 
hauled  along-side,  and  the  work  of  lifting  the  brig 
proceeded  as  fast  as  possible.  Pieces  of  massive 
timber  had  been  run  through  the  forward  and  after 
ports,  and  when  the  scows  were  sunk  to  the  water's 
edge,  the  ends  of  the  timbers  were  blocked  up,  sup 
ported  by  these  floating  foundations.  The  plugs 
were  now  put  in  the  scows,  and  the  water  was 
pumped  out  of  them.  By  this  process  the  brig  was 
lifted  quite  two  feet,  though  when  she  was  got  on 
the  bar  it  was  found  that  she  still  drew  too  much 
water.  It  became  necessary,  in  consequence,  to 
cover  up  every  thing,  sink  the  scows  anew,  and. 
block  up  the  timbers  afresh,  This  duty  occupied: 
the  whole  night."1 

Just  as  the  Lawrence  had  passed  the  bar,  at  8 
A.  M.  on  the  5th,  the  enemy  reappeared,  but  too 
late ;  Captain  Barclay  exchanged  a  few  shots  with 
the  schooners  and  then  drew  off.  The  Niagara 
crossed  without  difficulty.  There  were  still  not 
enough  men  to  man  the  vessels,  but  a  draft  arrived 
from  Ontario,  and  many  of  the  frontiersmen  volun- 

1  Cooper,  ii,  389.      Perry's  letter  of  Aug.  5th  is  very  brief. 


256  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

teered,  while  soldiers  also  were  sent  on  board.  The 
squadron  sailed  on  the  1 8th  in  pursuit  of  the  enemy, 
whose  ship  was  now  ready.  After  cruising  about 
some  time  the  Ohio  was  sent  down  the  lake,  and 
the  other  ships  went  into  Put-in  Bay.  On  the  Qth 
of  September  Captain  Barclay  put  out  from  Am- 
herstburg,  being  so  short  of  provisions  that  he  felt 
compelled  to  risk  an  action  with  the  superior  force 
opposed.  On  the  loth  of  September  his  squadron 
was  discovered  from  the  mast-head  of  the  Lawrence 
in  the  northwest.  Before  going  into  details  of  the 
action  we  will  examine  the  force  of  the  two  squad 
rons,  as  the  accounts  vary  considerably. 

The  tonnage  of  the  British  ships,  as  already 
stated,  we  know  exactly,  they  having  been  all  care 
fully  appraised  and  measured  by  the  builder  Mr. 
Henry  Eckford,  and  two  sea-captains.  We  also 
know  the  dimensions  of  the  American  ships.  The 
Lawrence  and  Niagara  measured  480  tons  apiece. 
The  Caledonia,  brig,  was  about  the  size  of  the 
Hunter,  or  180  tons.1  The  Tigress,  Somers,  and 
Scorpion  were  subsequently  captured  by  the  foe  and 
were  then  said  to  measure,  respectively,  96,  94,  and 
86  tons  ;  in  which  case  they  were  larger  than  simi 
lar  boats  on  Lake  Ontario.  The  ^4rzV/ was  about 
the  size  of  the  Hamilton ;  the  Porcupine  and  Trippe 
about  the  size  of  the  Asp  and  Pert.  As  for  the  guns, 
Captain  Barclay  in  his  letter  gives  a  complete  ac 
count  of  those  on  board  his  squadron.  He  has  also 
given  a  complete  account  of  the  American  guns, 
which  is  most  accurate,  and,  if  any  thing,  underes 
timates  them.  At  least  Emmons  in  his  "  History  " 
gives  the  Trippe  a  long  32,  while  Barclay  says  she 
had  only  a  long  24;  and  Lossing  in  his  '-Field- 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  257 

Book  "  says  (but  I  do  not  know  on  what  authority) 
that  the  Caledonia  had  3  long  24*5,  while  Barclay 
gives  her  2  long  24/3  and  one  32-pound  carronade  ; 
and  that  the  Somers  had  two  long  32*3,  while  Bar 
clay  gives  her  one  long  32  and  one  24-pound  carron 
ade.  I  shall  take  Barclay's  account,  which  corre 
sponds  with  that  of  Emmons ;  the  only  difference 
being  that  Emmons  puts  a  24-pounder  on  the 
Scorpion  and  a  32  on  the  Trippc,  while  Barclay  re 
verses  this.  I  shall  also  follow  Emmons  in  giving 
the  Scorpion  a  32-pound  carronade  instead  of  a  24. 
It  is  more  difficult  to  give  the  strength  of  the  re 
spective  crews.  James  says  the  Americans  had  580, 
all  "  picked  men."  They  were  just  as  much  picked 
men  as  Barclay's  were,  and  no  more ;  that  is,  the 
ships  had  "  scratch "  crews.  Lieutenant  Emmons 
gives  Perry  490  men ;  and  Lossing  says  he  "  had 
upon  his  muster-roll  490  names."  In  vol.  xiv,  p.  566, 
of  the  American  State  Papers,  is  a  list  of  the  prize- 
monies  owing  to  each  man  (or  to  the  survivors 
of  the  killed),  which  gives  a  grand  total  of  532 
men,  including  136  on  the  Lawrence  and  155  on  the 
Niagara,  45  of  whom  were  volunteers — frontiers 
men.  Deducting  these  we  get  487  men,  which  is 
pretty  near  Lieutenant  Emmons'  490.  Possibly 
Lieutenant  Emmons  did  not  include  these  volun 
teers ;  and  it  may  be  that  some  of  the  men  whose 
names  were  down  on  the  prize  list  had  been  so  sick 
that  they  were  left  on  shore.  Thus  Lieutenant 
Yarnall  testified  before  a  Court  of  Inquiry  in  1815, 
that  there  were  but  131  men  and  boys  of  every  de 
scription  on  board  the  Lawrence  in  the  action  ;  and 
the  Niagara  was  said  to  have  had  but  140.  Lieu 
tenant  Yarnall  also  said  that  "  but  103  men  on 


258  NAVAL   WAR   OF    1 8 12. 

board  the  Lawrence  were  fit  for  duty"  ;  as  Captain 
Perry  in  his  letter  said  that  31  were  unfit  for  duty, 
this  would  make  a  total  of  134.  So  I  shall  follow 
the  prize-money  list  ;  at  any  rate  the  difference  in 
number  is  so  slight  as  to  be  immaterial.  Of  the  532 
men  whose  names  the  list  gives,  45  were  volunteers, 
or  landsmen,  from  among  the  surrounding  inhabi 
tants  ;  158  were  marines  or  soldiers  (I  do  not  know 
which,  as  the  list  gives  marines,  soldiers,  and  pri 
vates,  and  it  is  impossible  to  tell  which  of  the 
two  former  heads  include  the  last) ;  and  329  were 
officers,  seamen,  cooks,  pursers,  chaplains,  and  super 
numeraries.  Of  the  total  number,  there  were  on 
the  day  of  action,  according  to  Perry's  report,  116 
men  unfit  for  duty,  including  31  on  board  the  Law 
rence,  28  on  board  the  Niagara,  and  57  on  the  small 
vessels. 

All  the  later  American  writers  put  the  number 
of  men  in  Barclay's  fleet  precisely  at  "  502,"  but  I 
have  not  been  able  to  find  out  the  original  au 
thority.  James  ("  Naval  Occurrences,"  p.  289)  says 
the  British  had  but  345,  consisting  of  50  seamen, 
85  Canadians,  and  210  soldiers.  But  the  letter  of 
Adjutant-General  E.  Bayne,  Nov.  24,  1813,  states 
that  there  were  250  soldiers  aboard  Barclay's 
squadron,  of  whom  23  were  killed,  49  wounded, 
and  the  balance  (178)  captured  ;  and  James  him 
self  on  a  previous  page  (284)  states  that  there  were 
IO2  Canadians  on  Barclay's  vessels,  not  counting 
the  Detroit,  and  we  know  that  Barclay  originally 
joined  the  squadron  with  19  sailors  from  the 
Ontario  fleet,  and  that  subsequently  50  sailors 
came  up  from  the  Dover.  James  gives  at  the  end 
of  his  "  Naval  Occurrences "  some  extracts  from 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  259 

the  court-martial  held  on  Captain  Barclay.  Lieut. 
Thomas  Stokes,  of  the  Queen  Charlotte,  there  testi 
fied  that  he  had  on  board  ''between  120  and  130 
men,  officers  and  all  together,"  of  whom  "  16  came 
up  from  the  Dover  three  days  before."  James,  on 
p.  284,  says  her  crew  already  consisted  of  no  men; 
adding  these  16  gives  us  126  (almost  exactly  "  be 
tween  1 20  and  130").  Lieutenant  Stokes  also  tes 
tified  that  the  Detroit  had  more  men  on  account  of 
being  a  larger  and  heavier  vessel  ;  to  give  her  150 
is  perfectly  safe,  as  her  heavier  guns  and  larger 
size  would  at  least  need  24  men  more  than  the 
Queen  Charlotte.  James  gives  the  Lady  Prevost 
76,  Hunter  39,  Little  Belt  15,  and  Chippeway  13 
men,  Canadians  and  soldiers,  a  total  of  143  ;  sup 
posing  that  the  number  of  British  sailors  placed  on 
them  was  proportional  to  the  amount  placed  on 
board  the  Queen  Charlotte,  we  could  add  21.  This 
would  make  a  grand  total  of  440  men,  which  must 
certainly  be  near  the  truth.  This  number  is  cor 
roborated  otherwise  :  General  Bayne,  as  already 
quoted,  says  that  there  were  aboard  250  soldiers,  of 
whom  72  were  killed  or  wounded.  Barclay  reports 
a  total  loss  of  135,  of  whom  63  must  therefore  have 
been  sailors  or  Canadians,  and  if  the  loss  suffered 
by  these  bore  the  same  proportion  to  their  whole 
number  as  in  the  case  of  the  soldiers,  there  ought 
to  have  been  219  sailors  and  Canadians,  making  in 
all  469  men.  It  can  thus  be  said  with  certainty 
that  there  were  between  440  and  490  men  aboard, 
and  I  shall  take  the  former  number,  though  I  have 
no  doubt  that  this  is  too  small.  But  it  is  not  a 
point  of  very  much  importance,  as  the  battle  was 
fought  largely  at  long  range,  where  the  number  of 


260 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    1 8 12. 


men,  provided  there  were  plenty  to  handle  the  sails 
and  guns,  did  not  much  matter.  The  following 
statement  of  the  comparative  force  must  therefore 
be  very  nearly  accurate  : 


PERRY'S  SQUADRON. 


Total         Crew 

Broad 

Name.            Rig. 

Tons. 

Crew.        fit  for 

side:           Armament. 

Duty. 

Ibs. 

Lawrence,       brig 

480 

136               105 

,00        j     2  long   I2's 
\  i8short32's 

Niagara,            '  ' 

480 

155               127 

,00       j    2  long  I2's 
\  18  short  32's 

Caledonia,         " 

1  80 

53' 

j    2  long  24's 
(     I  short  32 

Ariel,           schooner 

112 

36 

48             4  long   I2's 

Scorpion, 

86 

35 

4        \        short  32 

Somers  , 

94 

30^         I8« 

56        j        long  24 
\        short  32 

Porcupine,         " 

83 

25 

32                long  32 

Tigress, 

96 

27 

32                   "     32 

Trippe,           sloop 

60 

35  J 

24            i       '     24 

9  vessels, 

1,671 

532           (416) 

936  Ibs. 

During  the  action,  however,  the  Lawrence  and 
Niagara  each  fought  a  long  12  instead  of  one  of 
the  carronades  on  the  engaged  side,  making  a 
broadside  of  896  Ibs.,  288  Ibs.  being  from  long  guns. 


Name. 


Detroit, 


Queen  Charlotte, 


BARCLAY'S  SQUADRON. 

Rig.        Tons. 

ship  490         150         138 


Broadside; 
Crew.  Ibs.  Armament. 


40O          126 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  26 1 


Broadside; 

Name. 

Rig. 

Tons. 

Crew. 

Ibs. 

Armament. 

{I  long  9 

Lady  Prevost, 

schooner 

230 

86 

75 

2      "     6's 

10  short    I2's 

f   4  long  6's 

Hunter, 

brig 

1  80 

45 

30 

1     2     "   4-s 

~\      2       '"     2*S 

[    2  short    I2's 

Chippcway, 

schooner 

70 

15 

9 

i  long  9 

Little  Belt, 

sloop 

90 

18 

18 

(      I       "       12 
|      2       "          6'S 

6  vessels,  1,460         440         459  Ibs. 

These  six  vessels  thus  threw  at  a  broadside  459 
Ibs.,  of  which  195  were  from  long  guns. 

The  superiority  of  the  Americans  in  long-gun 
metal  was  therefore  nearly  as  three  is  to  two,  and  in 
carronade  metal  greater  than  two  to  one.  The  chief 
fault  to  be  found  in  the  various  American  accounts 
is  that  they  sedulously  conceal  the  comparative 
weight  of  metal,  while  carefully  specifying  the 
number  of  guns.  Thus,  Lossing  says :  "  Barclay 
had  35  long  guns  to  Perry's  15,  and  possessed 
greatly  the  advantage  in  action  at  a  distance"; 
which  he  certainly  did  not.  The  tonnage  of  the 
fleets  is  not  so  very  important ;  the  above  tables 
are  probably  pretty  nearly  right.  It  is,  I  suppose, 
impossible  to  tell  exactly  the  number  of  men  in  the 
two  crews.  Barclay  almost  certainly  had  more 
than  the  440  men  I  have  given  him,  but  in  all  like 
lihood  some  of  them  were  unfit  for  duty,  and  the 
number  of  his  effectives  was  most  probably  some 
what  less  than  Perry's.  As  the  battle  was  fought 
in  such  smooth  water,  and  part  of  the  time  at  long 
range,  this,  as  already  said,  does  not  much  matter. 
The  Niagara  might  be  considered  a  match  for  the 
Detroit,  and  the  Lawrence  and  Caledonia  for  the  five 


262  NAVAL   WAR    OF    l8l2. 

other  British  vessels ;  so  the  Americans  were  cer 
tainly  very  greatly  superior  in  force. 

At  daylight  on  Sept.  loth  Barclay's  squadron 
was  discovered  in  the  N.  W.,  and  Perry  at  once  got 
under  weigh  ;  the  wind  soon  shifted  to  the  N.  E., 
giving  us  the  weather-gage,  the  breeze  being  very 
light.  Barclay  lay  to  in  a  close  column,  heading  to 
the  S.  W.  in  the  following  order  :  Chippeway,  Mas 
ter's  Mate  J.  Campbell ;  Detroit,  Captain  R.  H. 
Barclay ;  Hunter,  Lieutenant  G.  Bignell  ;  Queen 
Charlotte,  Captain  R.  Finnis  ;  Lady  Prevost,  Lieu 
tenant  Edward  Buchan  ;  and  Little  Belt,  by  whom 
commanded  is  not  said.  Perry  came  down  with 
the  wind  on  his  port  beam,  and  made  the  attack  in 
column  ahead,  obliquely.  First  in  order  came  the 
Ariel,  Lieut.  John  H.  Packet,  and  Scorpion,  Sailing- 
Master  Stephen  Champlin,  both  being  on  the  weath 
er  bow  of  the  Lawrence,  Captain  O.  H.  Perry  ;  next 
came  the  Caledonia,  Lieut.  Daniel  Turner  ;  Niagara, 
Captain  Jesse  D.  Elliott;  Somers,  Lieutenant  A. 
H.  M.  Conklin ;  Porcupine,  Acting  Master  George 
Serrat ;  Tigress,  Sailing-Master  Thomas  C.  Almy, 
and  Trippe,  Lieutenant  Thomas  Holdup.1 

As,  amid  light  and  rather  baffling  winds,  the 
American  squadron  approached  the  enemy,  Perry's 
straggling  line  formed  an  angle  of  about  fifteen  de 
grees  with  the  more  compact  one  of  his  foes.  At 

1  The  accounts  of  the  two  commanders  tally  almost  exactly.  Bar 
clay's  letter  is  a  model  of  its  kind  for  candor  and  generosity.  Let 
ter  of  Captain  R.  H.  Barclay  to  Sir  James,  Sept.  2,  1813  ;  of  Lieu 
tenant  Inglis  to  Captain  Barclay,  Sept.  loth  ;  of  Captain  Perry  to 
the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  Sept.  loth  and  Sept.  I3th,  and  to  General 
Harrison,  Sept.  nth  and  Sept.  I3th.  I  have  relied  mainly  on  Los- 
sing's  "  Field-Book  of  the  War  of  1812  "  (especially  for  the  diagrams 
furnished  him  by  Commodore  Champlin),  on  Commander  Ward's 
"  Naval  Tactics,"  p.  76,  and  on  Cooper's  "Naval  History."  Ex 
tracts  from  the  court-martial  on  Captain  Barclay  are  given  in  James' 
"  .Vaval  Occurrences,"  Ixxxiii. 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  263 

11.45  the  Detroit  opened  the  action  by  a  shot  from 
her  long  24,  which  fell  short;  at  11.50  she  fired  a 
second  which  went  crashing  through  the  Lawrence, 
and  was  replied  to  by  the  Scorpion  s  long  32.  At 
11.55  the  Lawrence,  having  shifted  her  port  bow- 
chaser,  opened  with  both  the  long  I2's,  and  at  meridi 
an  began  with  her  carronades,  but  the  shot  from 
the  latter  all  fell  short.  At  the  same  time  the  ac 
tion  became  general  on  both  sides,  though  the  rear 
most  American  vessels  were  almost  beyond  the 
range  of  their  own  guns,  and  quite  out  of  range  of 
the  guns  of  their  antagonists.  Meanwhile  the  Law 
rence  was  already  suffering  considerably  as  she 
bore  down  on  the  enemy.  It  was  twenty  min 
utes  before  she  succeeded  in  getting  within  good 
carronade  range,  and  during  that  time  the  action 
at  the  head  of  the  line  was  between  the  long  guns 
of  the  Cfiippeway  and  Detroit,  throwing  123  pounds, 
and  those  of  the  Scorpion,  Ariel,  and  Lawrence, 
throwing  104  pounds.  As  the  enemy's  fire  was 
directed  almost  exclusively  at  the  Lawrence  she 
suffered  a  great  deal.  The  Caledonia,  Niagara,  and 
Somers  were  meanwhile  engaging,  at  long  range, 
the  Hunter  and  Queen  Charlotte,  opposing  from 
their  long  guns  96  pounds  to  the  39  pounds  of  their 
antagonists,  while  from  a  distance  the  three  other 
American  gun-vessels  engaged  the  Prevost  and  Lit 
tle  Belt.  By  12.20  the  Lawrence  had  worked  down 
to  close  quarters,  and  at  12.30  the  action  was  going 
on  with  great  fury  between  her  and  her  antagonists, 
within  canister  range.  The  raw  and  inexperienced 
American  crews  committed  the  same  fault  the  Brit 
ish  so  often  fell  into  on  the  ocean,  and  overloaded 
their  carronades.  In  consequence,  that  of  the  Scor- 


264  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

pion  upset  down  the  hatchway  in  the  middle  of  the 
action,  and  the  sides  of  the  Detroit  were  dotted  with 
marks  from  shot  that  did  not  penetrate.  One  of 
the  Ariel's  long  I2's  also  burst.  Barclay  fought  the 
Detroit  exceedingly  well,  her  guns  being  most  ex 
cellently  aimed,  though  they  actually  had  to  be  dis 
charged  by  flashing  pistols  at  the  touchholes,  so  de 
ficient  was  the  ship's  equipment.  Meanwhile  the 
Caledonia  came  down  too,  but  the  Niagara  was 
wretchedly  handled,  Elliott  keeping  at  a  distance 
which  prevented  the  use  either  of  his  carronades  or 
of  those  of  the  Queen  Charlotte,  his  antagonist  ;  the 
latter,  however,  suffered  greatly  from  the  long  guns 
of  the  opposing  schooners,  and  lost  her  gallant  com 
mander,  Captain  Finnis,  and  first  lieutenant,  Mr. 
Stokes,  who  were  killed  early  in  the  action  ;  her 
next  in  command,  Provincial  Lieutenant  Irvine, 
perceiving  that  he  could  do  no  good,  passed  the 
Hunter  and  joined  in  the  attack  on  the  Lawrence, 
at  close  quarters.  The  Niagara,  the  most  efficient 
and  best-manned  of  the  American  vessels,  was  thus 
almost  kept  out  of  the  action  by  her  captain's  mis 
conduct.  At  the  end  of  the  line  the  fight  went  on 
at  long  range  between  the  Somers,  Tigress,  Porcupine, 
and  Trippe  on  one  side,  and  Little  Belt  and  Lady 
Prevost  on  the  other;  the  Lady  Prevost  making  a 
very  noble  fight,  although  her  12-pound  carronades 
rendered  her  almost  helpless  against  the  long  guns 
of  the  Americans.  She  was  greatly  cut  up,  her 
commander,  Lieutenant  Buchan,  was  dangerously, 
and  her  acting  first  lieutenant,  Mr.  Roulette,  se 
verely  wounded,  and  she  began  falling  gradually  to 
leeward. 

The  fighting  at  the  head  of  the  line  was  fierce  and 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    1 8 12.  26$ 

bloody  to  an  extraordinary  degree.  The  Scorpion, 
Ariel,  Lawrence,  and  Caledonia,  all  of  them  handled 
with  the  most  determined  courage,  were  opposed  to 
the  Chippeway,  Detroit,  Queen  CJiarlotte,  and  Hunter, 
which  were  fought  to  the  full  as  bravely.  At  such 
close  quarters  the  two  sides  engaged  on  about  equal 
terms,  the  Americans  being  superior  in  weight  of 
metal,  and  inferior  in  number  of  men.  But  the  Law 
rence  had  received  such  damage  in  working  down  as 
to  make  the  odds  against  Perry.  On  each  side  al 
most  the  whole  fire  was  directed  at  the  opposing 
large  vessel  or  vessels  ;  in  consequence  the  Queen 
Charlotte  was  almost  disabled,  and  the  Detroit  was 
also  frightfully  shattered,  especially  by  the  raking  fire 
of  the  gun-boats,  her  first  lieutenant,  Mr.  Garland, 
being  mortally  wounded,  and  Captain  Barclay  so  se 
verely  injured  that  he  was  oliged  to  quit  the  deck, 
leaving  his  ship  in  the  command  of  Lieutenant 
George  Inglis.  But  on  board  the  Lawrence  matters 
had  gone  even  worse,  the  combined  fire  of  her  adver 
saries  having  made  the  grimmest  carnage  on  her 
decks.  Of  the  103  men  who  were  fit  for  duty  when 
she  began  the  action,  83,  or  over  four  fifths,  were 
killed  or  wounded.  The  vessel  was  shallow,  and  the 
ward-room,  used  as  a  cockpit,  to  which  the  wounded 
were  taken,  was  mostly  above  water,  and  the  shot 
came  through  it  continually,  killing  and  wounding 
many  men  under  the  hands  of  the  surgeon. 

The  first  lieutenant,  Yarnall,  was  three  times 
wounded,  but  kept  to  the  deck  through  all  ;  the  only 
other  lieutenant  on  board,  Brooks,  of  the  marines, 
was  mortally  wounded.  Every  brace  and  bowline 
was  shot  away,  and  the  brig  almost  completely  dis 
mantled  ;  her  hull  was  shattered  to  pieces,  many 


266  NAVAL    WAR   OF    l8l2. 

shot  going  completely  through  it,  and  the  guns  on 
the  engaged  side  were  by  degrees  all  dismounted. 
Perry  kept  up  the  fight  with  splendid  courage.  As 
the  crew  fell  one  by  one,  the  commodore  called 
down  through  the  skylight  for  one  of  the  surgeon's 
assistants ;  and  this  call  was  repeated  and  obeyed 
till  none  were  left;  then  he  asked,  "  Can  any  of  the 
wounded  pull  a  rope?"  and  three  or  four  of  them 
crawled  up  on  deck  to  lend  a  feeble  hand  in  placing 
the  last  guns.  Perry  himself  fired  the  last  effective 
heavy  gun,  assisted  only  by  the  purser  and  chaplain, 
A  man  who  did  not  possess  his  indomitable  spirit 
would  have  then  struck.  Instead,  however,  al 
though  failing  in  the  attack  so  far,  Perry  merely  de 
termined  to  win  by  new  methods,  and  remodelled 
the  line  accordingly.  Mr.  Turner,  in  the  Caledonia, 
when  ordered  to  close,  had  put  his  helm  up,  run 
down  on  the  opposing  line,  and  engaged  at  very 
short  range,  though  the  brig  was  absolutely  without 
quarters.  The  Niagara  had  thus  become  the  next 
in  line  astern  of  the  Lawrence,  and  the  sloop  Trippe, 
having  passed  the  three  schooners  in  front  of  her, 
was  next  ahead.  The  Niagara  now,  having  a 
breeze,  steered  for  the  head  of  Barclay's  line,  pass 
ing  over  a  quarter  of  a  mile  to  windward  of  the 
Lawrence,  on  her  port  beam.  She  was  almost  unin 
jured,  having  so  far  taken  very  little  part  in  the 
combat,  and  to  her  Perry  shifted  his  flag.  Leaping 
into  a  row  boat,  with  his  brother  and  four  seamen, 
he  rowed  to  the  fresh  brig,  where  he  arrived  at  2.30, 
and  at  once  sent  Elliott  astern  to  hurry  up  the  three 
schooners.  The  Trippe  was  now  very  near  the  Cale 
donia.  The  Lawrence,  having  but  14  sound  men 
left,  struck  her  colors,  but  could  not  be  taken  pos 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  267 

session  of  before  the  action  re-commenced.  She 
drifted  astern,  the  Caledonia  passing  between  her 
and  her  foes.  At  2.45,  the  schooners  having  closed 
up,  Perry,  in  his  fresh  vessel,  bore  up  to  break  Bar 
clay's  line. 

The  British  ships  had  fought  themselves  to  a 
standstill.  The  Lady  Prevost  was  crippled  and 
sagged  to  leeward,  though  ahead  of  the  others. 
The  Detroit  and  Queen  Charlotte  were  so  disabled 
that  they  could  not  effectually  oppose  fresh  antag 
onists.  There  could  thus  be  but  little  resistance  to 
Perry,  as  the  Niagara  stood  down,  and  broke  the 
British  line,  firing  her  port  guns  into  the  Chippeway, 
Little  Belt,  and  Lady  Prevost,  and  the  starboard  ones 
into  the  Detroit,  Queen  Charlotte,  and  Hunter,  raking 
on  both  sides.  Too  disabled  to  tack,  the  Detroit 
and  CJiarlotte  tried  to  wear,  the  latter  running  up  to 
leeward  of  the  former ;  and,  both  vessels  having 
every  brace  and  almost  every  stay  shot  away,  they 
fell  foul.  The  Niagara  luffed  athwart  their  bows, 
within  half  pistol-shot,  keeping  up  a  terrific  dis 
charge  of  great  guns  and  musketry,  while  on  the 
other  side  the  British  vessels  were  raked  by  the 
Caledonia  and  the  schooners  so  closely  that  some  of 
their  grape  shot,  passing  over  the  foe,  rattled 
through  Perry's  spars.  Nothing  further  could  be 
done,  and  Barclay's  flag  was  struck  at  3  P.  M.,  after 
three  and  a  quarter  hours'  most  gallant  and  desper 
ate  fighting.  The  Chippeway  and  Little  Belt  tried  to 
escape,  but  were  overtaken  and  brought  to  respec 
tively  by  the  Trippe  and  Scorpion,  the  commander 
of  the  latter,  Mr.  Stephen  Champlin,  firing  the  last, 
as  he  had  the  first,  shot  of  the  battle.  "  Captain 
Perry  has  behaved  in  the  most  humane  and  atten- 


268  NAVAL    WAR    OF    l8l2. 

tive  manner,  not  only  to  myself  and  officers,  but  to 
all  the  wounded,"  writes  Captain  Barclay. 

The  American  squadron  had  suffered  severely, 
more  than  two  thirds  of  the  loss  falling  upon  the 
Lawrence,  which  was  reduced  to  the  condition  of  a 
perfect  wreck,  her  starboard  bulwarks  being  com 
pletely  beaten  in.  She  had,  as  already  stated,  22 
men  killed,  including  Lieutenant  of  Marines  Brooks 
and  Midshipman  Lamb  ;  and  61  wounded,  includ 
ing  Lieutenant  Yarnall,  Midshipman  (acting  second 
lieutenant)  Forrest,  Sailing-Master  Taylor,  Purser 
Hambleton,  and  Midshipmen  Swartout  and  Clax- 
ton.  The  Niagara  lost  2  killed  and  25  wounded 
(almost  a  fifth  of  her  effectives),  including  among 
the  latter  the  second  lieutenant,  Mr.  Edwards,  and 
Midshipman  Cummings.  The  Caledonia  had  3,  the 
Somers  2,  and  Trippe  2,  men  wounded.  The  Ariel 
had  I  killed  and  3  wounded  ;  the  Scorpion  2  killed, 
including  Midshipman  Lamb.  The  total  loss  was 
123;  27  were  killed  and  96  wounded,  of  whom  3 
died. 

The  British  loss,  falling  most  heavily  on  the  De 
troit  and  Queen  Charlotte,  amounted  to  41  killed  (in 
cluding  Capt.  S.  J.  Garden,  R.  N.,  and  Captain  R. 
A.  Finnis),  and  94  wounded  (including  Captain  Bar 
clay  and  Lieutenants  Stokes,  Buchan,  Roulette,  and 
Bignall)  :  in  all  135.  The  first  and  second  in  com 
mand  on  every  vessel  were  killed  or  wounded,  a 
sufficient  proof  of  the  desperate  nature  of  the  de 
fence. 

The  victory  of  Lake  Erie  was  most  important, 
both  in  its  material  results  and  in  its  moral  effect. 
It  gave  us  complete  command  of  all  the  upper 
lakes,  prevented  any  fears  of  invasion  from  that 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 


269 


quarter,  increased  our  prestige  with  the  foe  and 
our  confidence  in  ourselves,  and  ensured  the  con 
quest  of  upper  Canada ;  in  all  these  respects  its 

The  following  diagrams  will  serve  to  explain  the  movements.. , 


ft 


P 


270 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    1 8 12. 


CHJPPEWW 


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NAVAL  WAR   OF    1 8 12.  2/1 

importance  has  not  been  overrated.  But  the 
"  glory  "  acquired  by  it  most  certainly  has  been  es 
timated  at  more  than  its  worth.  Most  Americans, 
even  the  well  educated,  if  asked  which  was  the 
most  glorious  victory  of  the  war,  would  point  to 
this  battle.  Captain  Perry's  name  is  more  widely 
known  than  that  of  any  other  commander.  Every 
school-boy  reads  about  him,  if  of  no  other  sea-cap 
tain  ;  yet  he  certainly  stands  on  a  lower  grade  than 
either  Hull  or  Macdonough,  and  not  a  bit  higher 
than  a  dozen  others.  On  Lake  Erie  our  seamen 
displayed  great  courage  and  skill ;  but  so  did  their 
antagonists.  The  simple  truth  is,  that,  where  on 
both  sides  the  officers  and  men  were  equally  brave 
and  skilful,  the  side  which  possessed  the  superiority 
in  force,  in  the  proportion  of  three  to  two,  could 
not  well  help  winning.  The  courage  with  which  the 
Lawrence  was  defended  has  hardly  ever  been  sur 
passed,  and  may  fairly  be  called  heroic  ;  but  equal 
praise  belongs  to  the  men  on  board  the  Detroit, 
who  had  to  discharge  the  great  guns  by  flashing 
pistols  at  the  touchholes,  and  yet  made  such  a 
terribly  effective  defence.  Courage  is  only  one  of 
the  many  elements  which  go  to  make  up  the  char 
acter  of  a  first-class  commander ;  something  more 
than  bravery  is  needed  before  a  leader  can  be  really 
called  great. 

There  happened  to  be  circumstances  which  ren 
dered  the  bragging  of  our  writers  over  the  victory 
somewhat  plausible.  Thus  they  could  say  with  an 
appearance  of  truth  that  the  enemy  had  63  guns  to 
our  54,  and  outnumbered  us.  In  reality,  as  well  as 
can  be  ascertained  from  the  conflicting  evidence,  he 
was  inferior  in  number;  but  a  few  men  more  or  less 


272  NAVAL  WAR   OF    1 8 12. 

mattered  nothing.  Both  sides  had  men  enough  to 
work  the  guns  and  handle  the  ships,  especially  as  the 
fight  was  in  smooth  water,  and  largely  at  long  range. 
The  important  fact  was  that  though  we  had  nine 
guns  less,  yet,  at  a  broadside,  they  threw  half  as 
much  metal  again  as  those  of  our  antagonist.  With 
such  odds  in  our  favor  it  would  have  been  a  disgrace 
to  have  been  beaten.  The  water  was  too  smooth  for 
our  two  brigs  to  show  at  their  best ;  but  this  very 
smoothness  rendered  our  gun-boats  more  formidable 
than  any  of  the  British  vessels,  and  the  British  testi 
mony  is  unanimous,  that  it  was  to  them  the  defeat 
was  primarily  due.  The  American  fleet  came  into 
action  in  worse  form  than  the  hostile  squadron,  the 
ships  straggling  badly,  either  owing  to  Perry  having 
formed  his  line  badly,  or  else  to  his  having  failed  to 
train  the  subordinate  commanders  how  to  keep 
their  places.  The  Niagara  was  not  fought  well  at 
first,  Captain  Elliott  keeping  her  at  a  distance  that 
prevented  her  from  doing  any  damage  to  the  ves 
sels  opposed,  which  were  battered  to  pieces  by  the 
gun-boats  without  the  chance  of  replying.  It  cer 
tainly  seems  as  if  the  small  vessels  at  the  rear  of  the 
line  should  have  been  closer  up,  and  in  a  position  to 
render  more  effectual  assistance ;  the  attack  was 
made  in  too  loose  order,  and,  whether  it  was  the 
fault  of  Perry  or  of  his  subordinates,  it  fails  to 
reflect  credit  on  the  Americans.  Cooper,  as  usual, 
praises  all  concerned  ;  but  in  this  instance  not  with 
very  good  judgment.  He  says  the  line-of-battle 
was  highly  judicious,  but  this  may  be  doubted.  The 
weather  was  peculiarly  suitable  for  the  gun-boats, 
with  their  long,  heavy  guns  ;  and  yet  the  line-of- 
battle  was  so  arranged  as  to  keep  them  in  the  rear, 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  273 

and  let  the  brunt  of  the  assault  fall  on  the  Law 
rence,  with  her  short  carronades.  Cooper  again 
praises  Perry  for  steering  for  the  head  of  the  enemy's 
line,  but  he  could  hardly  have  done  any  thing  else. 
In  this  battle  the  firing  seems  to  have  been  equally 
skilful  on  both  sides,  the  Detroit ' s  long  guns  being 
peculiarly  well  served ;  but  the  British  captains 
manoeuvred  better  than  their  foes  at  first,  and  sup 
ported  one  another  better,  so  that  the  disparity  in 
damage  done  on  each  side  was  not  equal  to  the  dis 
parity  in  force.  The  chief  merit  of  the  American 
commander  and  his  followers  was  indomitable  cour 
age,  and  determination  not  to  be  beaten.  This  is  no 
slight  merit  ;  but  it  may  well  be  doubted  if  it  would 
have  ensured  victory  had  Barclay's  force  been  as 
strong  as  Perry's.  Perry  made  a  headlong  attack  ; 
his  superior  force,  whether  through  his  fault  or  his 
misfortune  can  hardly  be  said,  being  brought  into 
action  in  such  a  manner  that  the  head  of  the  line 
was  crushed  by  the  inferior  force  opposed.  Being 
literally  hammered  out  of  his  own  ship,  Perry 
brought  up  its  powerful  twin-sister,  and  the  already 
shattered  hostile  squadron  was  crushed  by  sheer 
weight.  The  manoeuvres  which  marked  the  close  of 
the  battle,  and  which  ensured  the  capture  of  all  the 
opposing  ships,  were  unquestionably  very  fine. 

The  British  ships  were  fought  as  resolutely  as  their 
antagonists,  not  being  surrendered  till  they  were 
crippled  and  helpless,  and  almost  all  the  officers,  and 
a  large  proportion  of  the  men  placed  hors  de  combat. 
Captain  Barclay  handled  his  ships  like  a  first-rate 
seaman.  It  was  impossible  to  arrange  them  so  as 
to  be  superior  to  his  antagonist,  for  the  latter's 
force  was  of  such  a  nature  that  in  smooth  water  his 


2/4  NAVAL   WAR   OF    1 8 12. 

gun-boats  gave  him  a  great  advantage,  while  in  any 
sea  his  two  brigs  were  more  than  a  match  for  the 
whole  British  squadron.  In  short,  our  victory  was 
due  to  our  heavy  metal.  As  regards  the  honor  of 
the  affair,  in  spite  of  the  amount  of  boasting  it  has 
given  rise  to,  I  should  say  it  was  a  battle  to  be 
looked  upon  as  in  an  equally  high  degree  creditable 
to  both  sides.  Indeed,  if  it  were  not  for  the  fact 
that  the  victory  was  so  complete,  it  might  be  said 
that  the  length  of  the  contest  and  the  trifling  dis 
parity  in  loss  reflected  rather  the  most  credit  on 
the  British.  Captain  Perry  showed  indomitable 
pluck,  and  readiness  to  adapt  himself  to  circum 
stances  ;  but  his  claim  to  fame  rests  much  less  on 
his  actual  victory  than  on  the  way  in  which  he  pre 
pared  the  fleet  that  was  to  win  it.  Here  his  energy 
and  activity  deserve  all  praise,  not  only  for  his 
success  in  collecting  sailors  and  vessels  and  in 
building  the  two  brigs,  but  above  all  for  the  man 
ner  in  which  he  succeeded  in  getting  them  out  on 
the  lake.  On  that  occasion  he  certainly  out-gener- 
alled  Barclay  ;  indeed  the  latter  committed  an  error 
that  the  skill  and  address  he  subsequently  showed 
could  not  retrieve.  But  it  will  always  be  a  source 
of  surprise  that  the  American  public  should  have 
so  glorified  Perry's  victory  over  an  inferior  force, 
and  have  paid  comparatively  little  attention  to 
Macdonough's  victory,  which  really  was  won  against 
decided  odds  in  ships,  men,  and  metal. 

There  are  always  men  who  consider  it  unpatriotic 
to  tell  the  truth,  if  the  truth  is  not  very  flattering; 
but,  aside  from  the  morality  of  the  case,  we  never 
can  learn  how  to  produce  a  certain  effect  unless  we 
know  rightly  what  the  causes  were  that  produced  a 


NAVAL  WAR   OF    1 8 12.  275 

similar  effect  in  times  past.  Lake  Erie  teaches  us 
the  advantage  of  having  the  odds  on  our  side  ;  Lake 
Champlain,  that,  even  if  they  are  not,  skill  can  still 
counteract  them.  It  is  amusing  to  read  some  of  the 
pamphlets  written  "  in  reply  "  to  Cooper's  account 
of  this  battle,  the  writers  apparently  regarding  him 
as  a  kind  of  traitor  for  hinting  that  the  victory  was 
not  "Nelsonic,"  "  unsurpassed,"  etc.  The  arguments 
are  stereotyped :  Perry  had  9  fewer  guns,  and  also 
fewer  men  than  the  foe.  This  last  point  is  the  only 
one  respecting  which  there  is  any  doubt.  Taking 
sick  and  well  together,  the  Americans  unquestion 
ably  had  the  greatest  number  in  crew  ;  but  a  quar 
ter  of  them  were  sick.  Even  deducting  these  they 
were  still,  in  all  probability,  more  numerous  than 
their  foes. 

But  it  is  really  not  a  point  of  much  consequence, 
as  both  sides  had  enough,  as  stated,  to  serve  the 
guns  and  handle  the  ships.  In  sea-fights,  after  there 
are  enough  hands  for  those  purposes  additional 
ones  are  not  of  so  much  advantage.  I  have  in  all 
my  accounts  summed  up  as  accurately  as  possible 
the  contending  forces,  because  it  is  so  customary 
with  British  writers  to  follow  James'  minute  and  in 
accurate  statements,  that  I  thought  it  best  to  give 
every  thing  exactly;  but  it  was  really  scarcely  neces 
sary,  and,  indeed,  it  is  impossible  to  compare  forces 
numerically.  Aside  from  a  few  exceptional  cases, 
the  number  of  men,  after  a  certain  point  was 
reached,  made  little  difference.  For  example,  the 
Java  would  fight  just  as  effectually  with  377  men, 
the  number  James  gives  her,  as  with  426,  the  num 
ber  I  think  she  really  had.  Again,  my  figures  make 
the  Wasp  slightly  superior  in  force  to  the  Frolic,  as 


276  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

she  had  25  men  the  most;  but  in  reality,  as  the 
battle  was  fought  under  very  short  sail,  and  decided 
purely  by  gunnery,  the  difference  in  number  of  crew 
was  not  of  the  least  consequence.  The  Hornet  had 
nine  men  more  than  the  Penguin,  and  it  would  be 
absurd  to  say  that  this  gave  her  much  advantage. 
In  both  the  latter  cases,  the  forces  were  practi 
cally  equal,  although,  numerically  expressed,  the 
odds  were  in  favor  of  the  Americans.  The  exact 
reverse  is  the  case  in  the  last  action  of  the  Constitu 
tion.  Here,  the  Levant  and  Cyane  had  all  the  men 
they  required,  and  threw  a  heavier  broadside  than 
their  foe.  Expressed  in  numbers,  the  odds  against 
them  were  not  great,  but  numbers  could  not  express 
the  fact  that  carronades  were  opposed  to  long  guns, 
and  two  small  ships  to  one  big  one.  Again,  though 
in  the  action  on  Lake  Champlain  numbers  do  show 
a  slight  advantage  both  in  weight  of  metal  and  num 
ber  of  men  on  the  British  side,  they  do  not  make 
the  advantage  as  great  as  it  really  was,  for  they  do 
not  show  that  the  British  possessed  a  frigate  with  a 
main-deck  battery  of  24-pounders,  which  was  equal 
to  the  two  chief  vessels  of  the  Americans,  exactly  as 
the  Constitution  was  superior  to  the  Cyane  and  Le 
vant?  And  on  the  same  principles  I  think  that 

1  It  must  always  be  remembered  that  these  rules  cut  both  ways. 
British  writers  are  very  eloquent  about  the  disadvantage  in  which  car 
ronades  placed  the  Cyane  and  Levant,  but  do  not  hint  that  the  Essex 
suffered  from  a  precisely  similar  cause,  in  addition  to  her  other 
misfortunes  ;  either  they  should  give  the  Constitiition  more  credit  or 
the  Phoebe  less.  So  the  Confiance,  throwing  480  pounds  of  metal  at 
a  broadside,  was  really  equal  to  both  the  Eagle  and  Saratoga,  who 
jointly  threw  678.  From  her  long  guns  she  threw  384  pounds,  from 
her  carronades  96.  Their  long  guns  threw  168,  their  carronades  510. 
Now  the  32-pound  carronade  mounted  on  the  spar-deck  of  a  38-gun 
frigate,  was  certainly  much  less  formidable  than  the  long  18  on 
the  main-deck  ;  indeed,  it  probably  ranked  more  nearly  with  a 
long  12,  in  the  ordinary  chances  of  war  (and  it  must  be  remembered 
that  Downie  was  the  attacking  party  and  chose  his  own  position,  so 


NAVAL   WAR    OF    l8l2.  2// 

every  fair-minded  man  must  admit  the  great  superi 
ority  of  Perry's  fleet  over  Barclay's,  though  the  ad 
vantage  was  greater  in  carronades  than  in  long  guns. 
But  to  admit  this  by  no  means  precludes  us  from 
taking  credit  for  the  victory.  Almost  all  the  victo 
ries  gained  by  the  English  over  the  Dutch  in  the 
i/th  century  were  due  purely  to  great  superiority  in 
force.  The  cases  have  a  curious  analogy  to  this  lake 
battle.  Perry  won  with  54  guns  against  Barclay's 
63  ;  but  the  odds  were  largely  in  his  favor.  Blake 
won  a  doubtful  victory  on  the  i8th  of  February, 
1653,  with  80  ships  against  Tromp's  70;  but  the 
English  vessels  were  twice  the  size  of  the  Dutch, 
and  in  number  of  men  and  weight  of  metal 
greatly  their  superior.  The  English  were  excellent 
fighters,  but  no  better  than  the  Dutch,  and  none  of 
their  admirals  of  that  period  deserve  to  rank  with 
De  Ruyter.  Again,  the  great  victory  of  La  Hogue 
was  won  over  a  very  much  smaller  French  fleet, 
after  a  day's  hard  fighting,  which  resulted  in  the  capt 
ure  of  one  vessel !  This  victory  was  most  exult- 
ingly  chronicled,  yet  it  was  precisely  as  if  Perry 
had  fought  Barclay  all  day  and  only  succeeded  in 
capturing  the  Little  Belt.  Most  of  Lord  Nelson's 
successes  were  certainly  won  against  heavy  odds 
by  his  great  genius  and  the  daring  skill  of  the 
captains  who  served  under  him  ;  but  the  battle  of 
the  Baltic,  as  far  as  the  fighting  went,  reflected  as 
much  honor  on  the  defeated  Danes  as  on  the 

far  as  Macdonough's  excellent  arrangements  would  let  him).  So  that 
in  comparing  the  forces,  the  carronades  should  not  be  reckoned  for 
more  than  half  the  value  of  the  long  guns,  and  we  get,  as  a  mere  ap 
proximation,  384  -f  48  =  432,  against  168  -f-  255  =  423.  At  any 
rate,  British  writers,  as  well  as  Americans,  should  remember  that  if 
the  Constitution  was  greatly  superior  to  her  two  foes,  then  the  Con- 
fiance  was  certainly  equal  to  the  Eagle  and  Saratoga  ;  and  vica  versa. 


2/8  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

mighty  sea-chief  who  conquered  them.  Many  a 
much-vaunted  victory,  both  on  sea  and  land,  has 
really  reflected  less  credit  on  the  victors  than  the 
battle  of  Lake  Erie  did  on  the  Americans.  And  it 
must  always  be  remembered  that  a  victory,  honor 
ably  won,  if  even  over  a  weaker  foe,  does  reflect 
credit  on  the  nation  by  whom  it  is  gained.  It  was 
creditable  to  us  as  a  nation  that  our  ships  were  bet 
ter  made  and  better  armed  than  the  British  frigates, 
exactly  as  it  was  creditable  to  them  that  a  few  years 
before  their  vessels  had  stood  in  the  same  relation 
to  the  Dutch  ships.1  Jt  was  greatly  to  our  credit 
that  we  had  been  enterprising  enough  to  fit  out  such 
an  effective  little  flotilla  on  Lake  Erie,  and  for  this 
Perry  deserves  the  highest  praise.2 

Before  leaving  the  subject  it  is  worth  while  mak 
ing  a  few  observations  on  the  men  who  composed 
the  crews.  James,  who  despised  a  Canadian  as 
much  as  he  hated  an  American,  gives  as  one  excuse 
for  the  defeat,  the  fact  that  most  of  Barclay's  crew 
were  Canadians,  whom  he  considers  to  be  "  sorry 
substitutes."  On  each  side  the  regular  sailors,  from 
the  seaboard,  were  not  numerous  enough  to  permit 
the  battle  to  be  fought  purely  by  them.  Barclay 
took  a  number  of  soldiers  of  the  regular  army,  and 
Perry  a  number  of  militia,  aboard  ;  the  former  had 
a  few  Indian  sharp-shooters,  the  latter  quite  a  num- 

1  After  Lord  Duncan's  victory  at  Camperdown,  James  chronicled 
the  fact  that  all  the  captured  line-of-battle  ships  were  such  poor  craft 
as  not  to  be  of  as  much  value  as  so  many  French  frigates.       This  at 
least  showed  that  the  Dutch  sailors  must  have  done  well  to  have  made 
such  a  bloody  and  obstinate  fight  as  they  did,  with  the  materials  they 
had.       According  to  his  own  statements  the  loss  was  about  propor 
tional  to  the  forces  in  action.       It  was  another  parallel  to  Perry's  vic 
tory. 

2  Some  of  my  countrymen  will  consider  this  but  scant  approbation, 
to  which  the  answer  must  be  that  a  history  is  not  a  panegyric. 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  279 

her  of  negroes.  A  great  many  men  in  each  fleet 
were  lake  sailors,  frontiersmen,  and  these  were  the 
especial  objects  of  James'  contempt ;  but  it  may  be 
doubted  if  they,  thoroughly  accustomed  to  lake 
navigation,  used  to  contests  with  Indians  and 
whites,  naturally  forced  to  be  good  sailors,  and  skil 
ful  in  the  use  of  rifle  and  cannon,  were  not,  when 
trained  by  good  men  and  on  their  own  waters,  the 
very  best  possible  material.  Certainly  the  battle  of 
Lake  Erie,  fought  mainly  by  Canadians,  was  better 
contested  than  that  of  Lake  Champlain,  fought 
mainly  by  British. 

The  difference  between  the  American  and  British 
seamen  on  the  Atlantic  was  small,  but  on  the  lakes 
what  little  there  was  disappeared.  A  New  Eng- 
lander  and  an  Old  Englander  differed  little  enough, 
but  they  differed  more  than  a  frontiersman  born 
north  of  the  line  did  from  one  born  south  of  it. 
These  last  two  resembled  one  another  more  nearly 
than  either  did  the  parent.  There  had  been  no 
long-established  naval  school  on  the  lakes,  and  the 
British  sailors  that  came  up  there  were  the  best  of 
their  kind  ;  so  the  combatants  were  really  so  evenly 
matched  in  courage,  skill,  and  all  other  fighting 
qualities,  as  to  make  it  impossible  to  award  the 
palm  to  either  for  these  attributes.  The  dogged  ob 
stinacy  of  the  fighting,  the  skilful  firing  and  ma 
noeuvring,  and  the  daring  and  coolness  with  which 
cutting-out  expeditions  were  planned  and  executed, 
were  as  marked  on  one  side  as  the  other.  The  only 
un-English  element  in  the  contest  was  the  presence 
among  the  Canadian  English  of  some  of  the  de 
scendants  of  the  Latin  race  from  whom  they  had 
conquered  the  country.  Otherwise  the  men  were 


280  NAVAL   WAR   OF    1 8 12. 

equally  matched,  but  the  Americans  owed  their 
success — for  the  balance  of  success  was  largely  on 
their  side — to  the  fact  that  their  officers  had  been 
trained  in  the  best  and  most  practical,  although  the 
smallest,  navy  of  the  day.  The  British  sailors  on 
the  lakes  were  as  good  as  our  own,  but  no  better. 
None  of  their  commanders  compare  with  Mac- 
donough. 

Perry  deserves  all  praise  for  the  manner  in  which 
he  got  his  fleet  ready ;  his  victory  over  Barclay 
was  precisely  similar  to  the  quasi-victories  of  Blake 
over  the  Dutch,  which  have  given  that  admiral 
such  renown.  Blake's  success  in  attacking  Spanish 
and  Algerian  forts  is  his  true  title  to  fame.  In 
his  engagements  with  the  Dutch  fleets  (as  well 
as  in  those  of  Monk,  after  him)  his  claim  to  merit 
is  no  greater  and  no  less  than  Perry's.  Each  made 
a  headlong  attack,  with  furious,  stubborn  courage, 
and  by  dint  of  sheer  weight  crushed  or  disabled  a 
greatly  inferior  foe.  In  the  fight  that  took  place 
on  Feb.  18,  1653,  De  Ruyter's  ship  carried  but  34 
guns,1  and  yet  with  it  he  captured  the  Prosperous  of 
54;  which  vessel  was  stronger  than  any  in  the  Dutch 
fleet.  The  fact  that  Blake's  battles  were  gener 
ally  so  indecisive  must  be  ascribed  to  the  fact  that 
his  opponents  were,  though  inferior  in  force,  supe 
rior  in  skill.  No  decisive  defeat  was  inflicted  on 
the  Dutch  until  Tromp's  death.  Perry's  operations 
were  on  a  very  small,  and  Blake's  on  a  very  large, 
scale;  but  whereas  Perry  left  no  antagonists  to 
question  his  claim  to  victory,  Blake's  successes  were 

1  "La  Vie  etLes  Actions  Memorablesde  Lt.-Amiral  Michel  De  Ruy- 
ter"  (Amsterdam,  1677),  p.  23.  By  the  way,  why  is  Tromp  always 
called  Van  Tromp  by  English  writers  ?  It  would  be  quite  as  correct 
for  a  Frenchman  to  speak  of  MacNelson. 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  28 1 

sufficiently  doubtful  to  admit  of  his  antagonists  in 
almost  every  instance  claiming  that  they  had  won,  or 
else  that  it  was  a  draw.  Of  course  it  is  absurd  to  put 
Perry  and  Blake  on  a  par,  for  one  worked  with  a 
fleet  forty  times  the  strength  of  the  other's  flotilla  ; 
but  the  way  in  which  the  work  was  done  was  very 
similar.  And  it  must  always  be  remembered  that 
when  Perry  fought  this  battle  he  was  but  27  years 
old  ;  and  the  commanders  of  his  other  vessels  were 
younger  still. 

CHAMPLAIN. 

The  commander  on  this  lake  at  this  time  was 
Lieutenant  Thomas  Macdonough,  who  had  super 
seded  the  former  commander,  Lieutenant  Sydney 
Smith, — whose  name  was  a  curious  commentary  on 
the  close  inter-relationship  of  the  two  contesting 
peoples.  The  American  naval  force  now  consisted 
of  two  sloops,  the  Growler  and  Eagle,  each  mount 
ing  ii  guns,  and  six  galleys,  mounting  one  gun 
each.  Lieutenant  Smith  was  sent  down  with  his 
two  sloops  to  harass  the  British  gun-boats,  which 
were  stationed  round  the  head  of  Sorel  River, 
the  outlet  to  Lake  Champlain.  On  June  3d  he 
chased  three  gun-boats  into  the  river,  the  wind 
being  aft,  up  to  within  sight  of  the  fort  of  Isle-aux- 
noix.  A  strong  British  land-force,  under  Major- 
General  Taylor,  now  came  up  both  banks  of  the 
narrow  stream,  and  joined  the  three  gun-boats  in 
attacking  the  sloops.  The  latter  tried  to  beat  up 
the  stream,  but  the  current  was  so  strong  and  the 
wind  so  light  that  no  headway  could  be  made. 
The  gun-boats  kept  out  of  range  of  the  sloop's 
guns,  while  keeping  up  a  hot  fire  from  their  long 


282  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

24*3,  to  which  no  reply  could  be  made  ;  but  the 
galling  fire  of  the  infantry  who  lined  the  banks  was 
responded  to  by  showers  of  grape.  After  three 
hours'  conflict,  at  12.30,  a  24-pound  shot  from  one 
of  the  galleys  struck  the  Eagle  under  her  starboard 
quarter,  and  ripped  out  a  whole  plank  under  water. 
She  sank  at  once,  but  it  was  in  such  shoal  water 
that  she  did  not  settle  entirely,  and  none  of  the 
men  were  drowned.  Soon  afterward  the  Growler 
had  her  forestay  and  main-boom  shf/t  away,  and, 
becoming  unmanageable,  ran  ashore  and  was  also 
captured.  The  Growler  had  I. killed  and  8  wounded, 
the  Eagle  1 1  wounded ;  their  united  crews,  includ 
ing  34  volunteers,  amounted  to  112  men.  The 
British  gun-boats  suffered  no  loss ;  of  the  troops  on 
shore  three  were  wounded,  one  dangerously,  by 
grape.1  Lieutenant  Smith  had  certainly  made  a 
very  plucky  fight,  but  it  was  a  great  mistake  to  get 
cooped  up  in  a  narrow  channel,  with  wind  and 
current  dead  against  him.  It  was  a  very  creditable 
success  to  the  British,  and  showed  the  effectiveness 
of  well-handled  gun-boats  under  certain  circum 
stances.  The  possession  of  these  two  sloops  gave 
the  command  of  the  lake  to  the  British.  Mac- 
donough  at  once  set  about  building  others,  but  with 
all  his  energy  the  materials  at  hand  were  so  defi 
cient  that  he  could  not  get  them  finished  in  time. 
On  July  3 1st,  1,000  British  troops,  under  Col.  J. 
Murray,  convoyed  by  Captain  Thomas  Everard, 
with  the  sloops  Chubb  and  Finch  (late  Growler  and 
Eagle)  and  three  gun-boats,  landed  at  Plattsburg 
and  destroyed  all  the  barracks  and  stores  both  there 

letter  from  Major  General  Taylor  (British)  to  Major-General 
Stone.  June  3,  1813.  Lossing  says  the  loss  of  the  British  was  "prob 
ably  at  least  one  hundred," — on  what  authority,  if  any,  I  do  not  know. 


NAVAL  WAR   OF    l8l2. 


283 


and  at  Saranac.  For  some  reason  Colonel  Murray 
left  so  precipitately  that  he  overlooked  a  picket  of 
20  of  his  men,  who  were  captured ;  then  he  made 
descents  on  two  or  three  other  places,  and  returned 
to  the  head  of  the  lake  by  Aug.  3d.  Three  days 
afterward,  on  Aug.  6th,  Macdonough  completed  his 
three  sloops,  the  President,  Montgomery,  and  Preble, 
of  7  guns  each,  and  also  six  gun-boats ;  which  force 
enabled  him  to  prevent  any  more  plundering  ex 
peditions  taking  place  that  summer,  and  to  convoy 
Hampton's  troops  when  they  made  an  abortive 
effort  to  penetrate  into  Canada  by  the  Sorel  River 
on  Sept.  2 ist. 

BRITISH   LOSS   ON   THE   LAKES   DURING    1813. 


Name. 

Tons. 

Guns. 

Remarks. 

Ship, 

6OO 

24 

Burnt  on  stocks. 

Gloucester, 

1  80 

IO 

Taken  at  York. 

Mary, 

80 

3 

Burnt. 

Drummond, 

80 

3 

Captured. 

Lady  Gore, 

80 

3 

u 

Schooner, 

80 

3 

" 

Detroit, 

49° 

19 

14 

Queen  Charlotte, 

400 

17 

u 

Lady  Prevost, 

230 

13 

** 

Hunter, 

180 

10 

" 

Chippeway, 

70 

i 

* 

Little  Belt, 

9° 

3 

* 

12  vessels, 

2,560 

109 

AMERICAN 

LOSS.* 

Name. 

Tons. 

Guns. 

Remarks. 

Growler^ 

112 

II 

Captured. 

Eagle, 

no 

II 

" 

2  vessels, 

222 

22 

1  Excluding  the  Growler  and  Julia,  which  were  recaptured. 


CHAPTER    VII. 
1814. 

ON   THE   OCEAN. 

Strictness  of  the  blockade— Cruise  of  Rodgers— Cruise  of  the  Constitution— 
Her  unsuccessful  chase  of  La  Pique— Attack  on  the  A  lligator—Thc  Essex  capt 
ured — The  Frolic  captured — The  Peacock  captures  the  Epervier — Commodore 
Barney's  flotilla— The  British  in  the  Chesapeake— The  Wasp  captures  the  Rein 
deer  and  sinks  the  Anon — Cruise  and  loss  of  the  Adams — The  privateer  Gen- 
eral  Armstrong—  The  privateer  Prince  de  Neufchatel — Loss  of  the  gun-boats 
in  Lake  Borgne — Fighting  near  New  Orleans — Summary. 

DURING  this  year  the  blockade  of  the  Amer 
ican  coast  was  kept  up  with  ever  increasing 
rigor.  The  British  frigates  hovered  like  hawks  off 
every  seaport  that  was  known  to  harbor  any  fight 
ing  craft ;  they  almost  invariably  went  in  couples,  to 
support  one  another  and  to  lighten,  as  far  as  was 
possible,  the  severity  of  their  work.  On  the  northern 
coasts  in  particular,  the  intense  cold  of  the  furious 
winter  gales  rendered  it  no  easy  task  to  keep  the  as 
signed  stations;  the  ropes  were  turned  into  stiff  and 
brittle  bars,  the  hulls  were  coated  with  ice,  and 
many,  both  of  men  and  officers,  were  frost-bitten  and 
crippled.  But  no  stress  of  weather  could  long  keep 
the  stubborn  and  hardy  British  from  their  posts. 
With  ceaseless  vigilance  they  traversed  continually 
the  allotted  cruising  grounds,  capturing  the  priva 
teers,  harrying  the  coasters,  and  keeping  the  more 
powerful  ships  confined  to  port ;  "  no  American 
frigate  could  proceed  singly  to  sea  without  immi 
nent  risk  of  being  crushed  by  the  superior  force  of 

284 


NAVAL  WAR   OF    1 8 12.  285 

the  numerous  British  squadrons." '  But  the  sloops 
of  war,  commanded  by  officers  as  skilful  as  they 
were  daring,  and  manned  by  as  hardy  seamen  as 
ever  sailed  salt  water,  could  often  slip  out ;  generally 
on  some  dark  night,  when  a  heavy  gale  was  blowing, 
they  would  make  the  attempt,  under  storm  canvas, 
and  with  almost  invariable  success.  The  harder  the 
weather,  the  better  was  their  chance;  once  clear  of  the 
coast  the  greatest  danger  ceased,  though  throughout 
the  cruise  the  most  untiring  vigilance  was  needed. 
The  new  sloops  that  I  have  mentioned  as  being  built 
proved  themselves  the  best  possible  vessels  for  this 
kind  of  work  ;  they  were  fast  enough  to  escape 
from  most  cruisers  of  superior  force,  and  were  over- 
matches  for  any  British  flush-decked  ship,  that  is, 
for  any  thing  below  the  rank  of  the  frigate-built 
corvettes  of  the  Cyanes  class.  The  danger  of  re 
capture  was  too  great  to  permit  of  the  prizes  being 
sent  in,  so  they  were  generally  destroyed  as  soon  as 
captured  ;  and  as  the  cruising  grounds  were  chosen 
right  in  the  track  of  commerce,  the  damage  done 
and  consternation  caused  were  very  great. 

Besides  the  numerous  frigates  cruising  along  the 
coast  in  couples  or  small  squadrons,  there  were  two 
or  three  places  that  were  blockaded  by  a  heavier 
force.  One  of  these  was  New  London,  before 
which  cruised  a  squadron  under  the  direction  of  Sir 
Thomas  Hardy,  in  the  74  gun-ship  Ramillies.  Most 
of  the  other  cruising  squadrons  off  the  coast  con 
tained  razees  or  two-deckers.  The  boats  of  the 
Hogue,  74,  took  part  in  the  destruction  of  some 
coasters  and  fishing-boats  at  Pettipauge  in  April  ; 
and  those  of  the  Superb,  74,  shared  in  a  similar  expe- 

1  Captain  Broke's  letter  of  challenge  to  Captain  Lawrence. 


286  NAVAL   WAR   OF    1 8 12. 

dition  against  Wareham  in  June.1  The  command 
on  the  coast  of  North  America  was  now  given  to 
Vice-Admiral  Sir  Alexander  Cochrane.  The  main 
British  force  continued  to  lie  in  the  Chesapeake, 
where  about  50  sail  were  collected.  During  the 
first  part  of  this  year  these  were  under  the  com 
mand  of  Sir  Robert  Barrie,  but  in  May  he  was  re 
lieved  by  Rear-Admiral  Cockburn.2 

The  President,  44,  Commodore  Rodgers,  at  the  be 
ginning  of  1814  was  still  out,  cruising  among  the 
Barbadoes  and  West  Indies,  only  making  a  few 
prizes  of  not  much  value.  She  then  turned  toward 
the  American  coast,  striking  soundings  near  St. 
Augustine,  and  thence  proceeding  north  along  the 
coast  to  Sandy  Hook,  which  was  reached  on  Feb. 
i8th.  The  light  was  passed  in  the  night,  and 
shortly  afterward  several  sail  were  made  out,  when 
the  President  was  at  once  cleared  for  action.3  One 
of  these  strange  sail  was  the  Loire,  38  (British),  Capt. 
Thomas  Brown,  which  ran  down  to  close  the  Presi 
dent,  unaware  of  her  force;  but  on  discovering  her 
to  be  a  44,  hauled  to  the  wind  and  made  off.4  The 
President  did  not  pursue,  another  frigate  and  a  gun- 
brig  being  in  sight.5  This  rencontre  gave  rise  to 
nonsensical  boastings  on  both  sides  ;  one  American 
writer  calls  the  Loire  the  Plantagenet,  74;  James,  on 
the  other  hand,  states  that  the  President  was  afraid 
to  engage  the  38-gun  frigate,  and  that  the  only  rea 
son  the  latter  declined  the  combat  was  because  she 
was  short  of  men.  The  best  answer  to  this  is  a 
quotation  from  his  own  work  (vol.  vi,  p.  402),  that 

1  James,  vi,  474.  '*  James,  vi,  437. 

3  Letter  of  Commodore  Rodgers,  Feb.  20,  1814. 

4  James,  vi,  412.  6  "  Naval  Monument,"  p.  235. 


NAVAL   WAR    OF    I  Si  2.  287 

"the  admiralty  had  issued  an  order  that  no  18- 
pounder  frigate  was  voluntarily  to  engage  one  of 
the  24-pounder  frigates  of  America."  Coupling  this 
order  with  the  results  of  the  combats  that  had 
already  taken  place  between  frigates  of  these  classes, 
it  can  always  be  safely  set  down  as  sheer  bravado 
when  any  talk  is  made  of  an  American  44  refusing 
to  give  battle  to  a  British  38  ;  and  it  is  even  more 
absurd  to  say  that  a  British  line-of-battle  ship  would 
hesitate  for  a  minute  about  engaging  any  frigate. 

On  Jan.  1st,  the  Constitution,  which  had  been 
lying  in  Boston  harbor  undergoing  complete  repairs, 
put  out  to  sea  under  the  command  of  Capt.  Charles 
Stewart.  The  British  38-gun  frigate  NympJie  had 
been  lying  before  the  port,  but  she  disappeared  long 
before  the  Constitution  was  in  condition,  in  obedi 
ence  to  the  order  already  mentioned.  Capt.  Stew 
art  ran  down  toward  the  Barbadoes,  and  on  the  I4th 
of  February  captured  and  destroyed  the  British 
14-gun  schooner  Pictou,  with  a  crew  of  75  men. 
After  making  a  few  other  prizes  and  reaching  the 
coast  of  Guiana  she  turned  homeward,  and  on  the 
23d  of  the  same  month  fell  in,  at  the  entrance  to 
the  Mona  passage,  with  the  British  36-gun  frigate 
Pique  (late  French  Pallas],  Captain  Maitland.  The 
Constitution  at  once  made  sail  for  the  Pique,  steering 
free ; J  the  latter  at  first  hauled  to  the  wind  and 
waited  for  her  antagonist,  but  when  the  latter  was 
still  3  miles  distant  she  made  out  her  force  and  im 
mediately  made  all  sail  to  escape  ;  the  Constitution, 
however,  gained  steadily  till  8  P.  M.,  when  the  night 
and  thick  squally  weather  caused  her  to  lose  sight 
of  the  chase.  Captain  Maitland  had  on  board  the 

1  Letter  of  Capt.  Stewart,  April  8,  1814. 


288  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

prohibitory  order  issued  by  the  admiralty,1  and 
acted  correctly.  His  ship  was  altogether  too  light 
for  his  antagonist.  James,  however,  is  not  satisfied 
with  this,  and  wishes  to  prove  that  both  ships  were 
desirous  of  avoiding  the  combat.  He  says  that 
Capt.  Stewart  came  near  enough  to  count  "  13  ports 
and  a  bridle  on  the  Pique  s  main-deck,"  and  •"  saw  at 
once  that  she  was  of  a  class  inferior  to  the  Guerrtire 
or  Java,"  but  "  thought  the  Piques  i8's  were  24*3, 
and  therefore  did  not  make  an  effort  to  bring  her 
to  action."  He  portrays  very  picturesquely  the 
grief  of  the  Pique's  crew  when  they  find  they  are 
not  going  to  engage  ;  how  they  come  aft  and  re 
quest  to  be  taken  into  action  ;  how  Captain  Mait- 
land  reads  them  his  instructions,  but  "  fails  to  per- 
suade  them  that  there  had  been  any  necessity  of 
issuing  them  "  ;  and,  finally,  how  the  sailors,  over 
come  by  woe  and  indignation,  refuse  to  take  their 
supper-time  grog, — which  was  certainly  remarkable. 
As  the  Constitution  had  twice  captured  British  frig 
ates  "  with  impunity,"  according  to  James  himself, 
is  it  likely  that  she  would  now  shrink  from  an  en 
counter  with  a  ship  which  she  "  saw  at  once  was  of 
an  inferior  class"  to  those  already  conquered? 
Even  such  abject  cowards  as  James'  Americans 
would  not  be  guilty  of  so  stupid  an  action.  Of 
course  neither  Capt.  Stewart  nor  any  one  else  sup 
posed  for  an  instant  that  a  36-gun  frigate  was  armed 
with  24-pounders. 

It  is  worth  while  mentioning  as  an  instance  of 
how  utterly  untrustworthy  James  is  in  dealing  with 
American  affairs,  that  he  says  (p.  476)  the  Constitu 
tion  had  now  "  what  the  Americans  would  call  a  bad 

1  James,  vi,  477. 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  289 

crew,"  whereas,  in  her  previous  battles,  all  her  men 
had  been  "  picked."  Curiously  enough,  this  is  the 
exact  reverse  of  the  truth.  In  no  case  was  an 
American  ship  manned  with  a  "  picked  "  crew,  but 
the  nearest  approach  to  such  was  the  crew  the  Con 
stitution  carried  in  this  and  the  next  cruise,  when 
"  she  probably  possessed  as  fine  a  crew  as  ever 
manned  a  frigate.  They  were  principally  New 
England  men,  and  it  has  been  said  of  them  that 
they  were  almost  qualified  to  fight  the  ship  without 
her  officers."  l  The  statement  that  such  men,  com 
manded  by  one  of  the  bravest  and  most  skilful  cap 
tains  of  our  navy,  would  shrink  from  attacking  a 
greatly  inferior  foe,  is  hardly  worth  while  denying; 
and,  fortunately,  such  denial  is  needless,  Captain 
Stewart's  account  being  fully  corroborated  in  the 
"  Memoir  of  Admiral  Durham,"  written  by  his 
nephew,  Captain  Murray,  London,  1846. 

The  Constitution  arrived  off  the  port  of  Marble- 
head  on  April  3d,  and  at  7  A.  M.  fell  in  with  the 
two  British  38-gun  frigates  Junon,  Captain  Upton, 
and  Tenedos,  Captain  Parker.  "  The  American 
frigate  was  standing  to  the  westward  with  the 
wind  about  north  by  west  and  bore  from  the  two 
British  frigates  about  northwest  by  west.  The  Ju 
non  and  Tenedos  quickly  hauled  up  in  chase,  and  the 
Constitution  crowded  sail  in  the  direction  of  Marble- 
head.  At  9.30,  finding  the  Tenedos  rather  gaining 
upon  her,  the  Constitution  started  her  water  and 
threw  overboard  a  quantity  of  provisions  and  other 
articles.  At  11.30  she  hoisted  her  colors,  and  the 
two  British  frigates,  who  were  now  dropping  slowly 
in  the  chase,  did  the  same.  At  1.30  P.M.  the  Con- 

1  Cooper,  ii,  463. 


2QO  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

stitution  anchored  in  the  harbor  of  Marblehead. 
Captain  Parker  was  anxious  to  follow  her  into  the 
"port,  which  had  no  defences  ;  but  the  Tenedos  was 
recalled  by  a  signal  from  the  Junon"  '  Shortly  af 
terward  the  Constitution  again  put  out,  and  reached 
Boston  unmolested. 

On  Jan.  29,  1814,  the  small  U.  S.  coasting 
schooner  Alligator,  of  4  guns  and  40  men,  Sailing- 
master  R.  Basset,  was  lying  at  anchor  in  the  mouth 
of  Stone  River,  S.  C.,  when  a  frigate  and  a  brig 
were  perceived  close  inshore  near  the  breakers- 
Judging  from  their  motions  that  they  would  at 
tempt  to  cut  him  out  when  it  was  dark,  Mr.  Basset 
made  his  preparations  accordingly.2  At  half-past 
seven  six  boats  were  observed  approaching  cautious 
ly  under  cover  of  the  marsh,  with  muffled  oars;  on 
being  hailed  they  cheered  and  opened  with  boat 
carronades  and  musketry,  coming  on  at  full  speed; 
whereupon  the  Alligator  cut  her  cable  and  made 
sail,  the  wind  being  light  from  the  southwest ;  while 
the  crew  opened  such  a  heavy  fire  on  the  as 
sailants,  who  were  then  not  thirty  yards  off,  that 
they  stopped  the  advance  and  fell  astern.  At  this 
moment  the  Alligator  grounded,  but  the  enemy  had 
suffered  so  severely  that  they  made  no  attempt  to 
renew  the  attack,  rowing  off  down  stream.  On 
board  the  Alligator  two  men  were  killed  and  two 
wounded,  including  the  pilot,  who  was  struck  down 
by  a  grape-shot  while  standing  at  the  helm  ;  and 
her  sails  and  rigging  were  much  cut.  The  extent  of 
the  enemy's  loss  was  never  known  ;  next  day  one  of 
his  cutters  was  picked  up  at  North  Edisto,  much  in- 

1  James,  vi,  479. 

2  Letter  of  Sailing-master  Basset,  Jan,  31,  1814. 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  29 1 

jured  and  containing  the  bodies  of  an  officer  and  a 
seaman.1  For  his  skill  and  gallantry  Mr.  Basset  was 
promoted  to  a  lieutenancy,  and  for  a  time  his 
exploit  put  a  complete  stop  to  the  cutting-out  ex 
peditions  along  that  part  of  the  coast.  The  Alliga 
tor  herself  sank  in  a  squall  on  July  1st,  but  was 
afterward  raised  and  refitted. 

It  is  much  to  be  regretted  that  it  is  almost  im 
possible  to  get  at  the  British  account  of  any  of 
these  expeditions  which  ended  successfully  for  the 
Americans  ;  all  such  cases  are  generally  ignored  by 
the  British  historians  ;  so  that  I  am  obliged  to  rely 
solely  upon  the  accounts  of  the  victors,  who,  with 
the  best  intentions  in  the  world,  could  hardly  be 
perfectly  accurate. 

At  the  close  of  1813  Captain  Porter  was  still 
cruising  in  the  Pacific. 

Early  in  January  the  Essex,  now  with  255  men 
aboard,  made  the  South  American  coast,  and  on  the 
1 2th  of  that  month  anchored  in  the  harbor  of  Val 
paraiso.  She  had  in  company  a  prize,  re-christened 
the  Essex  Junior,  with  a  crew  of  60  men,  and  20 
guns,  10  long  sixes  and  10  eighteen-pound  carron- 
ades.  Of  course  she  could  not  be  used  in  a  combat 
with  regular  cruisers. 

On  Feb.  8th,  the  British  frigate  Phoebe,  36,  Cap 
tain  James  Hilyar,  accompanied  by  the  Cherub,  18, 
Captain  Thomas  Tudor  Tucker,  the  former  carrying 
300  and  the  latter  140  men,2  made  their  appearance, 
and  apparently  proposed  to  take  the  Essex  by  a 
coup  de  main.  They  hauled  into  the  harbor  on  a 
wind,  the  Cherub  falling  to  leeward  ;  while  the  Phoebe 

'Letter  from  Commander  J.  H.  Dent,  Feb.  21,  1814. 
3  They  afterward  took  on  board  enough  men  from  British  merchant- 
vessels  to  raise  their  complements  respectively  to  320  and  180. 


2Q2  NAVAL  WAR   OF    1 8 12. 

made  the  port  quarter  of  the  Essex,  and  then,  put 
ting  her  helm  down,  luffed  up  on  her  starboaad  bow, 
but  10  or  15  feet  distant.  Porter's  crew  were  all  at 
quarters,  the  powder-boys  with  slow  matches  ready 
to  discharge  the  guns,  the  boarders  standing  by, 
cutlass  in  hand,  to  board  in  the  smoke ;  every  thing 
was  cleared  for  action  on  both  frigates.  Captain 
Hilyar  now  probably  saw  that  there  was  no  chance 
of  carrying  the  Essex  by  surprise,  and,  standing  on 
the  after-gun,  he  inquired  after  Captain  Porter's 
health ;  the  latter  returned  the  inquiry,  but  warned 
Hilyar  not  to  fall  foul.  The  British  captain  then 
braced  back  his  yards,  remarking  that  if  he  did  fall 
aboard  it  would  be  purely  accidental.  "  Well,"  said 
Porter,  "  you  have  no  business  where  you  are  ;  if 
you  touch  a  rope-yarn  of  this  ship  I  shall  board  in 
stantly."  '  The  Pkcebe,  in  her  then  position,  was 
completely  at  the  mercy  of  the  American  ships,  and 
Hilyar,  greatly  agitated,  assured  Porter  that  he 
meant  nothing  hostile  ;  and  the  Pkcebe  backed  down, 
her  yards  passing  over  those  of  the  Essex  without 
touching  a  rope,  and  anchored  half  a  mile  astern. 
Shortly  afterward  the  two  captains  met  on  shore, 
when  Hilyar  thanked  Porter  for  his  behavior,  and, 
on  his  inquiry,  assured  him  that  after  thus  owing 
his  safety  to  the  latter's  forbearance,  Porter  need  be 
under  no  apprehension  as  to  his  breaking  the  neu 
trality. 

The  British  ships  now  began  a  blockade  of  the 
port.  On  Feb.  27th,  the  Phcebe  being  hove  to  close 
off  the  port,  and  the  Cherub  a  league  to  leeward,  the 
former  fired  a  weather-gun  ;  the  Essex  interpreting 
this  as  a  challenge,  took  the  crew  of  the  Essex  Jun- 

1  "  Life  of  Farragut,"  p.  33. 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  293 

ior  aboard  and  went  out  to  attack  the  British  frig 
ate.  But  the  latter  did  not  await  the  combat ;  she 
bore  up,  set  her  studding-sails,  and  ran  down  to  the 
Cherub.  The  American  officers  were  intensely  irri 
tated  over  this,  and  American  writers  have  sneered 
much  at  "  a  British  36  refusing  combat  with  an 
American  32."  But  the  armaments  of  the  two  frig 
ates  were  so  wholly  dissimilar  that  it  is  hard  to 
make  comparison.  When  the  fight  really  took 
place,  the  Essex  was  so  crippled  and  the  water  so 
smooth  that  the  British  ships  fought  at  their  own 
distance  ,  and  as  they  had  long  guns  to  oppose  to 
Porter's  carronades,  this  really  made  the  Cherub 
more  nearly  suited  to  contend  with  the  Essex  than 
the  latter  was  to  fight  the  PJicebe.  But  when  the 
Essex  in  fairly  heavy  weather,  with  the  crew  of  the 
Essex  Junior  aboard,  was  to  windward,  the  circum 
stances  were  very  different ;  she  carried  as  many 
men  and  guns  as  the  Phoebe,  and  in  close  combat,  or 
in  a  hand-to-hand  struggle,  could  probably  have 
taken  her.  Still,  Hilyar's  conduct  in  avoiding 
Porter  except  when  the  Cherub  was  in  company  was 
certainly  over-cautious,  and  very  difficult  to  explain 
in  a  man  of  his  tried  courage. 

On  March  27th  Porter  decided  to  run  out  of  the 
harbor  on  the  first  opportunity,  so  as  to  draw  away 
his  two  antagonists  in  chase,  and  let  the  Essex 
Junior  escape.  This  plan  had  to  be  tried  sooner 
than  was  expected.  The  two  vessels  were  always 
ready,  the  Essex  only  having  her  proper  comple 
ment  of  255  men  aboard.  On  the  next  day,  the 
28th,  it  came  on  to  blow  from  the  south,  when  the 
Essex  parted  her  port  cable  and  dragged  the  star 
board  anchor  to  leeward,  so  she  got  under  way,  and 


294  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

made  sail ;  by  several  trials  it  had  been  found  that 
she  was  faster  than  the  Phoebe,  and  that  the  Cherub 
was  very  slow  indeed,  so  Porter  had  little  anxiety 
about  his  own  ship,  only  fearing  for  his  consort. 
The  British  vessels  were  close  in  with  the  weather- 
most  point  of  the  bay,  but  Porter  thought  he  could 
weather  them,  and  hauled  up  for  that  purpose.  Just 
as  he  was  rounding  the  outermost  point,  which,  if 
accomplished,  would  have  secured  his  safety,  a 
heavy  squall  struck  the  Essex,  and  when  she  was 
nearly  gunwale  under,  the  main-top-mast  went  by 
the  board.  She  now  wore  and  stood  in  for  the 
harbor,  but  the  wind  had  shifted,  and  on  account  of 
her  crippled  condition  she  could  not  gain  it ;  so  she 
bore  up  and  anchored  in  a  small  bay,  three  miles 
from  Valparaiso,  and  half  a  mile  from  a  detached 
Chilian  battery  of  one  gun,  the  Essex  being  within 
pistol-shot  of  the  shore.1  The  Phoebe  and  Cherub 
now  bore  down  upon  her,  covered  with  ensigns, 
union-jacks,  and  motto  flags ;  and  it  became  evident 
that  Hilyar  did  not  intend  to  keep  his  word,  as 
soon  as  he  saw  that  Porter  was  disabled.  So  the 
Essex  prepared  for  action,  though  there  could  be 
no  chance  whatever  of  success.  Her  flags  were 
flying  from  every  mast,  and  every  thing  was  made 
ready  as  far  as  was  possible.  The  attack  was  made 
before  springs  could  be  got  on  her  cables.  She  was 
anchored  so  near  the  shore  as  to  preclude  the  possi 
bility  of  Captain  Hilyar's  passing  ahead  of  her2 ;  so 
his  two  ships  came  cautiously  down,  the  Cherub 
taking  her  position  on  the  starboard  bow  of  the 
Essex,  and  the  Phoebe  under  the  latter's  stern.  The 

1  Letter  of  Captain  David  Porter,  July  3,  1814. 
*  Letter  of  Captain  James  Hilyar,  March  30,  1814. 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    1 8 12.  295 

attack  began  at  4  P.  M.1  Some  of  the  bow-guns  of 
the  American  frigate  bore  upon  the  Cherub,  and, 
as  soon  as  she  found  this  out,  the  sloop  ran  down 
and  stationed  herself  near  the  Phcebe.  The  latter 
had  opened  with  her  broadside  of  long  i8's,  from  a 
position  in  which  not  one  of  Porter's  guns  could 
reach  her.  Three  times  springs  were  got  on  the 
cables  of  the  Essex,  in  order  to  bring  her  round  till 
her  broadside  bore  ;  but  in  each  instance  they  were 
shot  away,  as  soon  as  they  were  hauled  taut.  Three 
long  I2's  were  got  out  of  the  stern-ports,  and  with 
these  an  animated  fire  was  kept  up  on  the  two 
British  ships,  the  aim  being  especially  to  cripple 
their  rigging.  A  good  many  of  Porter's  crew  were 
killed  during  the  first  five  minutes,  before  he  could 
bring  any  guns  to  bear ;  but  afterward  he  did  not 
suffer  much,  and  at  4.20,  after  a  quarter  of  an  hour's 
fight  between  the  three  long  I2's  of  the  Essex,  and 
the  whole  36  broadside  guns  of  the  Phcebe  and 
Cherub,  the  latter  were  actually  driven  off.  They 
wore,  and  again  began  with  their  long  guns  ;  but, 
these  producing  no  visible  effect,  both  of  the 
British  ships  hauled  out  of  the  fight  at  4.30.  "  Hav 
ing  lost  the  use  of  main-sail,  jib,  and  main-stay, 
appearances  looked  a  little  inauspicious,"  writes 
Captain  Hilyar.  But  the  damages  were  soon  re 
paired,  and  his  two  ships  stood  back  for  the  crippled 
foe.  Both  stationed  themselves  on  her  port-quarter, 
the  Phcebe  at  anchor,  with  a  spring,  firing  her  broad 
side,  while  the  Cherub  kept  under  way,  using  her 
long  bow-chasers.  Their  fire  was  very  destructive, 
for  they  were  out  of  reach  of  the  Essex  s  carron- 

1  Mean  time.  Porter  says  3.54;  Hilyar,  a  few  minutes  past  4. 
The  former  says  the  first  attack  lasted  half  an  hour  ;  the  latter,  but 
10  minutes.  I  accordingly  make  it  20. 


296  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

ades,  and  not  one  of  her  long  guns  could  be  brought 
to  bear  on  them.  Porter  now  cut  his  cable,  at 
'5.20,  and  tried  to  close  with  his  antagonists.  After 
many  ineffectual  efforts  sail  was  made.  The  flying- 
jib  halyards  were  the  only  serviceable  ropes  uncut. 
That  sail  was  hoisted,  and  the  foretop-sail  and  fore 
sail  let  fall,  though  the  want  of  sheets  and  tacks 
rendered  them  almost  useless.  Still  the  Essex 
drove  down  on  her  assailants,  and  for  the  first  time 
got  near  enough  to  use  her  carronades;  for  a  minute 
or  two  the  firing  was  tremendous,  but  after  the 
first  broadside  the  Cherub  hauled  out  of  the  fight  in 
great  haste,  and  during  the  remainder  of  the  action 
confined  herself  to  using  her  bow-guns  from  a  dis 
tance.  Immediately  afterward  the  Phoebe  also 
edged  off,  and  by  her  superiority  of  sailing,  her  foe 
being  now  almost  helpless,  was  enabled  to  choose 
her  own  distance,  and  again  opened  from  her  long 
i8's,  out  of  range  of  Porter's  carronades.1  The 
carnage  on  board  the  Essex  had  now  made  her 
decks  look  like  shambles.  One  gun  was  manned 
three  times,  fifteen  men  being  slain  at  it ;  its  cap 
tain  alone  escaped  without  a  wound.  There  were 
but  one  or  two  instances  of  flinching  ;  the  wounded, 
many  of  whom  were  killed  by  flying  splinters  while 
under  the  hands  of  the  doctors,  cheered  on  their 
comrades,  and  themselves  worked  at  the  guns  like 
fiends  as  long  as  they  could  stand.  At  one  of  the 
bow-guns  was  stationed  a  young  Scotchman,  named 

1  American  writers  often  sneer  at  Hilyar  for  keeping  away  from  the 
£ssex,  and  out  of  reach  of  her  short  guns  ;  but  his  conduct  was 
eminently  proper  in  this  respect.  It  was  no  part  of  his  duty  to  fight 
the  Essex  at  the  distance  which  best  suited  her ;  but,  on  the  con 
trary,  at  that  which  least  suited  her.  He,  of  course,  wished  to  win 
the  victory  with  the  least  possible  loss  to  himself,  and  acted  accord 
ingly.  His  conduct  in  the  action  itself  could  not  be  improved  upon. 


NAVAL    WAR   OF    l8l2.  2Q/ 

Bissly,  who  had  one  leg  shot  off  close  by  the  groin. 
Using  his  handkerchief  as  a  tourniquet,  he  said, 
turning  to  his  American  shipmates  :  "  I  left  my 
own  country  and  adopted  the  United  States,  to 
fight  for  her.  I  hope  I  have  this  day  proved 
myself  worthy  of  the  country  of  my  adoption.  I 
am  no  longer  of  any  use  to  you  or  to  her,  so  good- 
by ! "  With  these  words  he  leaned  on  the  sill  of 
the  port,  and  threw  himself  overboard.1  Among 
the  very  few  men  who  flinched  was  one  named 
William  Roach  ;  Porter  sent  one  of  his  midshipmen 
to  shoot  him,  but  he  was  not  to  be  found.  He  was 
discovered  by  a  man  named  William  Call,  whose 
leg  had  been  shot  off  and  was  hanging  by  the  skin, 
and  who  dragged  the  shattered  stump  all  round  the 
bag-house,  pistol  in  hand,  trying  to  get  a  shot  at 
him.  Lieut.  J.  G.  Cowell  had  his  leg  shot  off  above 
the  knee,  and  his  life  might  have  been  saved  had  it 
been  amputated  at  once ;  but  the  surgeons  already 
had  rows  of  wounded  men  waiting  for  them,  and 
-when  it  was  proposed  to  him  that  he  should  be 
attended  to  out  of  order,  he  replied  :  "  No,  doctor, 
none  of  that ;  fair  play  's  a  jewel.  One  man's  life  is 
as  dear  as  another's ;  I  would  not  cheat  any  poor 
fellow  out  of  his  turn."  So  he  stayed  at  his  post, 
and  died  from  loss  of  blood. 

Finding  it  hopeless  to  try  to  close,  the  Essex  stood 
for  the  land,  Porter  intending  to  run  her  ashore  and 
burn  her.  But  when  she  had  drifted  close  to  the 
bluffs  the  wind  suddenly  shifted,  took  her  flat  aback 
and  paid  her  head  off  shore,  exposing  her  to  a  raking 
fire.  At  this  moment  Lieutenant  Downes,  com 
manding  the  Junior,  pulled  out  in  a  boat,  through 

1  This  and  most  of  the  other  anecdotes  are  taken  from  the  invalu* 
able  "  Life  of  Farragut,"  pp.  37-46. 


298  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

all  the  fire,  to  see  if  he  could  do  any  thing.  Three 
of  the  men  with  him,  including  an  old  boatswain's 
mate,  named  Kingsbury,  had  come  out  expressly  "to 
share  the  fate  of  their  old  ship  " ;  so  they  remained 
aboard,  and,  in  their  places,  Lieutenant  Downes  took 
some  of  the  wounded  ashore,  while  the  Cherub  kept 
up  a  tremendous  fire  upon  him.  The  shift  of  the 
wind  gave  Porter  a  faint  hope  of  closing ;  and  once 
more  the  riddled  hulk  of  the  little  American  frigate 
was  headed  for  her  foes.  But  Hilyar  put  his  helm  up 
to  avoid  close  quarters ;  the  battle  was  his  already, 
and  the  cool  old  captain  was  too  good  an  officer  to 
leave  any  thing  to  chance.  Seeing  he  could  not 
close,  Porter  had  a  hawser  bent  on  the  sheet-anchor 
and  let  go.  This  brought  the  ship's  head  round, 
keeping  her  stationary ;  and  from  such  of  her  guns 
as  were  not  dismounted  and  had  men  enough  left  to 
man  them,  a  broadside  was  fired  at  the  Phcebe.  The 
wind  was  now  very  light,  and  the  Phoebe,  whose  main- 
and  mizzen-masts  and  main-yard  were  rather  seri 
ously  wounded,  and  who  had  suffered  a  great  loss  of 
canvas  and  cordage  aloft,  besides  receiving  a  num 
ber  of  shot  between  wind  and  water,1  and  was  thus 
a  good  deal  crippled,  began  to  drift  slowly  to  leeward. 
It  was  hoped  that  she  would  drift  out  of  gun-shot, 
but  this  last  chance  was  lost  by  the  parting  of  the 
hawser,  which  left  the  Essex  at  the  mercy  of  the 
British  vessels.  Their  fire  was  deliberate  and  de 
structive,  and  could  only  be  occasionally  replied  to 
by  a  shot  from  one  of  the  long  I2's  of  the  Essex. 
The  ship  caught  fire,  and  the  flames  came  bursting 

1  Captain  Hilyar's  letter.  James  says  the  Phoebe  had  7  shot  be 
tween  wind  and  water,  and  one  below  the  water-line.  Porter  says  she 
had  1 8  12-pound  shot  below  the  water-line.  The  latter  statement 
must  have  been  an  exaggeration  ;  and  James  is  probably  farther 
wrong  still. 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  299 

up  the  hatchway,  and  a  quantity  of  powder  ex 
ploded  below.  Many  of  the  crew  were  knocked 
overboard  by  shot,  and  drowned ;  others  leaped 
into  the  water,  thinking  the  ship  was  about  to  blow 
up,  and  tried  to  swim  to  the  land.  Some  succeeded  ; 
among  them  was  one  man  who  had  sixteen  or  eigh 
teen  pieces  of  iron  in  his  leg,  scales  from  the  muz 
zle  of  his  gun.  The  frigate  had  been  shattered  to 
pieces  above  the  water-line,  although  from  the 
smoothness  of  the  sea  she  was  not  harmed  enough 
below  it  to  reduce  her  to  a  sinking  condition.1  The 
carpenter  reported  that  he  alone  of  his  crew  was  fit 
for  duty ;  the  others  were  dead  or  disabled.  Lieu 
tenant  Wilmer  was  knocked  overboard  by  a  splinter, 
and  drowned  ;  his  little  negro  boy,  "  Ruff,"  came  up 
on  deck,  and,  hearing  of  the  disaster,  deliberately 
leaped  into  the  sea  and  shared  his  master's  fate. 
Lieutenant  Odenheimer  was  also  knocked  overboard, 
but  afterward  regained  the  ship.  A  shot,  glancing 
upward,  killed  four  of  the  men  who  were  standing 
by  a  gun,  striking  the  last  one  in  the  head  and  scat 
tering  his  brains  over  his  comrades.  The  only 
commissioned  officer  left  on  duty  was  Lieutenant 
Decatur  McKnight.  The  sailing-master,  Barnwell, 
when  terribly  wounded,  remained  at  his  post  till  he 
fainted  from  loss  of  blood.  Of  the  255  men  aboard 
the  Essex  when  the  battle  began,  58  had  been  killed, 
66  wounded,  and  31  drowned  ("missing"),  while  24 
had  succeeded  in  reaching  shore.  But  76  men  were 
left  unwounded,  and  many  of  these  had  been  bruised 
or  otherwise  injured.  Porter  himself  was  knocked 
down  by  the  windage  of  a  passing  shot.  While  the 
young  midshipman,  Farragut,was  on  the  ward-room 

1  An  exactly  analogous  case  to  that  of  the  British  sloop  Reindeer. 


300  NAVAL   WAR    OF    l8l2. 

ladder,  going  below  for  gun-primers,  the  captain  of 
the  gun  directly  opposite  the  hatchway  was  struck 
full  in  the  face  by  an  1 8-pound  shot,  and  tumbled 
back  on  him.  They  fell  down  the  hatch  together, 
Farragut  being  stunned  for  some  minutes.  Later, 
while  standing  by  the  man  at  the  wheel,  an  old 
quartermaster  named  Francis  Bland,  a  shot  coming 
over  the  fore-yard  took  off  the  quartermaster's  right 
leg,  carrying  away  at  the  same  time  one  of  Farra- 
gut's  coat  tails.  The  old  fellow  was  helped  below, 
but  he  died  for  lack  of  a  tourniquet,  before  he  could 
be  attended  to. 

Nothing  remained  to  be  done,  and  at  6.20  the 
Essex  surrendered  and  was  taken  possession  of.  The 
Phoebe  had  lost  4  men  killed,  including  her  first 
lieutenant,  William  Ingram,  and  7  wounded ;  the 
Cherub,  \  killed,  and  3,  including  Captain  Tucker, 
wounded.  Total,  5  killed  and  10  wounded.1  The 
difference  in  loss  was  natural,  as,  owing  to  their  hav 
ing  long  guns  and  the  choice  of  position,  the  British 
had  been  able  to  fire  ten  shot  to  the  Americans' 
one. 

The  conduct  of  the  two  English  captains  in  at 
tacking  Porter  as  soon  as  he  was  disabled,  in  neutral 
waters,  while  they  had  been  very  careful  to  abstain 
from  breaking  the  neutrality  while  he  was  in  good 
condition,  does  not  look  well ;  at  the  best  it  shows 
that  Hilyar  had  only  been  withheld  hitherto  from 
the  attack  by  timidity,  and  it  looks  all  the  worse 
when  it  is  remembered  that  Hilyar  owed  his  ship's 

J  James  says  that  most  of  the  loss  was  occasioned  by  the  first  three 
broadsides  of  the  Essex;  this  is  not  surprising,  as  in  all  she  hardly 
fired  half  a  dozen,  and  the  last  were  discharged  when  half  of  the  guns 
had  been  disabled,  and  there  were  scarcely  men  enough  to  man  the 
remainder.  Most  of  the  time  her  resistance  was  limited  to  firing 
such  of  her  six  long  guns  as  would  bear. 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  30 1 

previous  escape  entirely  to  Porter's  forbearance  on 
a  former  occasion  when  the  British  frigate  was  en 
tirely  at  his  mercy,  and  that  the  British  captain  had 
afterward  expressly  said  that  he  would  not  break  the 
neutrality.  Still,  the  British  in  this  war  did  not  act 
very  differently  from  the  way  we  ourselves  did  on 
one  or  two  occasions  in  the  Civil  War, — witness  the 
capture  of  the  Florida.  And  after  the  battle  was 
once  begun  the  sneers  which  most  of  our  historians, 
as  well  as  the  participators  in  the  fight,  have  show 
ered  upon  the  British  captains  for  not  foregoing  the 
advantages  which  their  entire  masts  and  better  ar 
tillery  gave  them  by  coming  to  close  quarters,  are 
decidedly  foolish.  Hilyar's  conduct  during  the  battle, 
as  well  as  his  treatment  of  the  prisoners  afterward, 
was  perfect,  and  as  a  minor  matter  it  may  be  men 
tioned  that  his  official  letter  is  singularly  just  and 
fair-minded.  Says  Lord  Howard  Douglass  ' :  "  The 
action  displayed  all  that  can  reflect  honor  on  the 
science  and  admirable  conduct  of  Captain  Hilyar 
and  his  crew,  which,  without  the  assistance  of  the 
Cherub,  would  have  insured  the  same  termination. 
Captain  Porter's  sneers  at  the  respectful  distance 
the  Phccbe  kept  are  in  fact  acknowledgments  of  the 
ability  with  which  Captain  Hilyar  availed  himself  of 
the  superiority  of  his  arms  ;  it  was  a  brilliant  affair." 
While  endorsing  this  criticism,  it  may  be  worth  while 
to  compare  it  with  some  of  the  author's  comments 
upon  the  other  actions,  as  that  between  Decatur  and 
the  Macedonian.  To  make  the  odds  here  as  great 
against  Garden  as  they  were  against  Porter,  it  would 
be  necessary  to  suppose  that  the  Macedonian  had 
lost  her  main-top-mast,  had  but  six  long  i8's  to  op- 

"  Naval  Gunnery,"  p.  149. 


302  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

pose  to  her  antagonist's  24*3,  and  that  the  latter  was 
assisted  by  the  corvette  Adams  ;  so  that  as  a  matter 
of  fact  Porter  fought  at  fully  double  or  treble  the 
disadvantage  Garden  did,  and,  instead  of  surrender 
ing  when  he  had  lost  a  third  of  his  crew,  fought  till 
three  fifths  of  his  men  were  dead  or  wounded,  and, 
moreover,  inflicted  greater  loss  and  damage  on  his 
antagonists  than  Garden  did.  If,  then,  as  Lord 
Douglass  says,  the  defence  of  the  Macedonian  brill 
iantly  upheld  the  character  of  the  British  navy  for 
courage,  how  much  more  did  that  of  the  Essex  show 
for  the  American  navy;  and  if  Hilyar's  conduct  was 
"  brilliant/'  that  of  Decatur  was  more  so. 

This  was  an  action  in  which  it  is  difficult  to  tell 
exactly  how  to  award  praise.  Captain  Hilyar  deserves 
it,  for  the  coolness  and  skill  with  which  he  made  his 
approaches  and  took  his  positions  so  as  to  destroy  his 
adversary  with  least  loss  to  himself,  and  also  for  the 
precision  of  his  fire.  The  Cherub's  behavior  was 
more  remarkable  for  extreme  caution  than  for  any 
thing  else.  As  regards  the  mere  fight,  Porter  cer 
tainly  did  every  thing  a  man  could  do  to  contend 
successfully  with  the  overwhelming  force  opposed  to 
him,  and  the  few  guns  that  were  available  were 
served  with  the  utmost  precision.  As  an  exhibition 
of  dogged  courage  it  has  never  been  surpassed  since 
the  time  when  the  Dutch  captain,  Klaesoon,  after 
fighting  two  long  days,  blew  up  his  disabled  ship, 
devoting  himself  and  all  his  crew  to  death,  rather 
than  surrender  to  the  hereditary  foes  of  his  race, 
and  was  bitterly  avenged  afterward  by  the  grim 
"  sea-beggars  "  of  Holland  ;  the  days  when  Drake 
singed  the  beard  of  the  Catholic  king,  and  the  small 
English  craft  were  the  dread  and  scourge  of  the 


NAVAL   WAR    OF    1 8 12.  303 

great  floating  castles  of  Spain.  Any  man  reading 
Farragut's  account  is  forcibly  reminded  of  some  of 
the  deeds  of  "  derring  do  "  in  that,  the  heroic  age  of 
the  Teutonic  navies.  Captain  Hilyar  in  his  letter 
says  :  "  The  defence  of  the  Essex,  taking  into  con 
sideration  our  superiority  of  force  and  the  very  dis 
couraging  circumstance  of  her  having  lost  her  main 
top-mast  and  being  twice  on  fire,  did  honor  to  her 
brave  defenders,  and  most  fully  evinced  the  courage 
of  Captain  Porter  and  those  under  his  command. 
Her  colors  were  not  struck  until  the  loss  in  killed 
and  wounded  was  so  awfully  great  and  her  shattered 
condition  so  seriously  bad  as  to  render  all  further 
resistance  unavailing."  He  also  bears  very  candid 

1  James  (p.  419)  says  :  "  The  Essex,  as  far  as  is  borne  out  by  proof 
(the  only  safe  way  where  an  American  is  concerned),  had  24  men 
killed  and  45  wounded.  But  Capt.  Porter,  thinking  by  exaggerating 
his  loss  to  prop  up  his  fame,  talks  of  58  killed  and  mortally  wounded, 
39  severely,  27  slightly,"  etc.,  etc.  This  would  be  no  more  worthy  of 
notice  than  any  other  of  his  falsifications,  were  it  not  followed  by  va 
rious  British  writers.  Hilyar  states  that  he  has  161  prisoners,  has 
found  23  dead,  that  3  wounded  were  taken  off,  between  20  and  30 
reached  the  shore,  and  that  the  "remainder  are  either  killed  or 
wounded."  It  is  by  wilfully  preserving  silence  about  this  last  sen 
tence  that  James  makes  out  his  case.  It  will  be  observed  that  Hilyar 
enumerates  161+23+3+25  (say)  or  212,  and  says  the  remainder  were 
either  killed  or  wounded  ;  Porter  having  255  men  at  first,  this  remain 
der  was  43.  Hilyar  stating  that  of  his  161  prisoners,  42  were  wounded,, 
his  account  thus  gives  the  Americans  in  killed  and  wounded.  James" 
silence  >about  Hilyar's  last  sentence  enables  him  to  make  the  loss  but: 
69,  and  his  wilful  omission  is  quite  on  a  par  with  the  other  mean 
nesses  and  falsehoods  which  utterly  destroy  the  reliability  of  his  work.. 
By  Hilyar's  own  letter  it  is  thus  seen  that  Porter's  loss  in  killed  and 
wounded  was  certainly  in,  perhaps  116,  or  if  Porter  had,  as  James 
says,  265  men,  126.  There  still  remain  some  discrepancies  between, 
the  official  accounts,  which  can  be  compared  in  tabular  form  : 

Hilyar.       Porter. 

Prisoners  unwounded,  119  75  prisoners  unwounded. 

wounded,  42  27  slightly  wounded. 

Taken  away  wounded,  3  39         "         severely        " 

Those  who  reached  shore,  25  58  killed. 

Remainder  killed  or  wounded,    43  31  missing. 

Killed,  23  25  reached  shore. 

a55  255 


304  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

testimony  to  the  defence  of  the  Essex  having  been 
effective  enough  to  at  one  time  render  the  result 
doubtful,  saying  :  "  Our  first  attack  *  *  *  pro 
duced  no  visible  effect.  Our  second  *  *  *  was 
not  more  successful ;  and  having  lost  the  use  of  our 
main-sail,  jib,  and  main-stay,  appearances  looked  a 
little  inauspicious."  Throughout  the  war  no  ship 
was  so  desperately  defended  as  the  Essex,  taking 
into  account  the  frightful  odds  against  which  she 
fought,  which  always  enhances  the  merit  of  a  de 
fence.  The  Lawrence,  which  suffered  even  more, 
was  backed  by  a  fleet ;  the  Frolic  was  overcome  by 
an  equal  foe ;  and  the  Reindeer  fought  at  far  less  of 
a  disadvantage,  and  suffered  less.  None  of  the  frig 
ates,  British  or  American,  were  defended  with  any 
thing  like  the  resolution  she  displayed. 

But  it  is  perhaps  permissible  to  inquire  whether 
Porter's  course,  after  the  accident  to  his  top-mast  oc 
curred,  was  altogether  the  best  that  could  have  been 
taken.  On  such  a  question  no  opinion  could  have 
been  better  than  Farragut's,  although  of  course  his 
judgment  was  ex  post  facto,  as  he  was  very  young  at 
the  time  of  the  fight. 

"  In  the  first  place,  I  consider  our  original  and 
greatest  error  was  in  attempting  to  regain  the 

The  explanation  probably  is  that  Hilyar's  "42  wounded"  do  not 
include  Porter's  "  27  slightly  wounded,"  and  that  his  "  161  prison 
ers"  include  Porter's  "  25  who  reached  shore,"  and  his  "  25  who 
reached  shore"  comes  under  Porter's  "31  missing."  This  would 
make  the  accounts  nearly  tally.  At  any  rate  in  Porter's  book  are  to 
be  found  the  names  of  all  his  killed,  wounded,  and  missing;  and 
their  relatives  received  pensions  from  the  American  government, 
which,  if  the  returns  were  false,  would  certainly  have  been  a  most 
elaborate  piece  of  deception.  It  is  far  more  likely  that  Hilyar  was 
mistaken  ;  or  he  may  have  counted  in  the  Essex  Junior's  crew,  which 
would  entirely  account  for  the  discrepancies.  In  any  event  it  must 
be  remembered  that  he  makes  the  American  killed  and  wounded  in 
(Porter,  124),  and  not  69,  as  James  says.  The  latter's  statement  is 
wilfully  false,  as  he  had  seen  Hilyar's  letter. 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  305 

anchorage ;  being  greatly  superior  in  sailing  powers 
we  should  have  borne  up  and  run  before  the  wind. 
If  we  had  come  in  contact  with  the  Phoebe  we  should 
have  carried  her  by  boarding ;  if  she  avoided  us,  as 
she  might  have  done  by  her  greater  ability  to  ma 
noeuvre,  then  we  should  have  taken  her  fire  and 
passed  on,  leaving  both  vessels  behind  until  we  had 
replaced  our  top-mast,  by  which  time  they  would 
have  been  separated,  as  unless  they  did  so  it  would 
have  been  no  chase,  the  Cherub  being  a  dull  sailer. 

"  Secondly,  when  it  was  apparent  to  everybody 
that  we  had  no  chance  of  success  under  the  circum 
stances,  the  ship  should  have  been  run  ashore,  throw 
ing  her  broadside  to  the  beach  to  prevent  raking,  and 
fought  as  long  as  was  consistent  with  humanity, 
and  then  set  on  fire.  But  having  determined  upon 
anchoring  we  should  have  bent  a  spring  on  to  the 
ring  of  the  anchor,  instead  of  to  the  cable,  where  it 
was  exposed,  and  could  be  shot  away  as  fast  as  put 
on." 

But  it  must  be  remembered  that  when  Porter 
decided  to  anchor  near  shore,  in  neutral  water,  he 
could  not  anticipate  Hilyar's  deliberate  and  treach 
erous  breach  of  faith.  I  do  not  allude  to  the  mere 
disregard  of  neutrality.  Whatever  international 
moralists  may  say,  such  disregard  is  a  mere  ques 
tion  of  expediency.  If  the  benefits  to  be  gained  by 
attacking  a  hostile  ship  in  neutral  waters  are  such 
as  to  counterbalance  the  risk  of  incurring  the 
enmity  of  the  neutral  power,  why  then  the  attack 
ought  to  be  made.  Had  Hilyar,  when  he  first  made 
his  appearance  off  Valparaiso,  sailed  in  with  his  two 
ships,  the  men  at  quarters  and  guns  out,  and  at 
once  attacked  Porter,  considering  the  destruction 


306  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

of  the  Essex  as  outweighing  the  insult  to  Chili,  why 
his  behavior  would  have  been  perfectly  justifiable. 
In  fact  this  is  unquestionably  what  he  intended  to 
do ;  but  he  suddenly  found  himself  in  such  a  posi 
tion,  that  in  the  event  of  hostilities,  his  ship  would 
be  the  captured  one,  and  he  owed  his  escape  purely 
to  Porter's  over-forbearance,  under  great  provocation. 
Then  he  gave  his  word  to  Porter  that  he  would  not 
infringe  on  the  neutrality  ;  and  he  never  dared  to 
break  it,  until  he  saw  Porter  was  disabled  and 
almost  helpless  !  This  may  seem  strong  language 
to  use  about  a  British  officer,  but  it  is  justly  strong. 
Exactly  as  any  outsider  must  consider  Warrington's 
attack  on  the  British  brig  Nautilus  in  1815,  as  a 
piece  of  needless  cruelty  ;  so  any  outsider  must  con 
sider  Hilyar  as  having  most  treacherously  broken 
faith  with  Porter. 

After  the  fight  Hilyar  behaved  most  kindly  and 
courteously  to  the  prisoners ;  and,  as  already  said, 
he  fought  his  ship  most  ably,  for  it  would  have 
been  quixotic  to  a  degree  to  forego  his  advantages. 
But  previous  to  the  battle  his  conduct  had  been 
over-cautious.  It  was  to  be  expected  that  the 
Essex  would  make  her  escape  as  soon  as  practicable, 
and  so  he  should  have  used  every  effort  to  bring  her 
to  action.  Instead  of  this  he  always  declined  the 
fight  when  alone  ;  and  he  owed  his  ultimate  success 
to  the  fact  that  the  Essex  instead  of  escaping,  as  she 
could  several  times  have  done,  stayed,  hoping  to 
bring  the  Pkcebe  to  action  single-handed.  It  must 
be  remembered  that  the  Essex  was  almost  as  weak 
compared  to  the  Phcebe,  as  the  Cherub  was  com 
pared  to  the  Essex.  The  latter  was  just  about  mid 
way  between  the  British  ships,  as  may  be  seen  by 


NAVAL  WAR   OF    l8l2. 


307 


the  following  comparison.  In  the  action  the  Essex 
fought  all  six  of  her  long  I2's,  and  the  Cherub  both 
her  long  9*3,  instead  of  the  corresponding  broadside 
carronades  which  the  ships  regularly  used.  This 
gives  the  Essex  a  better  armament  than  she  would 
have  had  righting  her  guns  as  they  were  regularly 
used  ;  but  it  can  be  seen  how  great  the  inequality 
still  was.  It  must  also  be  kept  in  mind,  that  while 
in  the  battles  between  the  American  44/3  and 
British  38*3,  the  short  weight  24-pounders  of  the 
former  had  in  reality  no  greater  range  or  accuracy 
than  the  full  weight  i8's  of  their  opponents,  in  this 
case  the  Phoebe  s  full  weight  i8's  had  a  very  much 
greater  range  and  accuracy  than  the  short  weight 
I2's  of  the  Essex. 


COMPARATIVE   FORCE. 


Phoebe, 


Cherub, 


Men. 

Broadside  Guns. 

Weight. 

Tctal 

320 

13  long  l8's 

234  Ibs. 

I       "      12 

12    " 

I       "       9 

9  «« 

(255) 

7  short  32*5 

224  " 

I       "      18 

18  " 

(242) 

23  guns, 

497  Ibs. 

I8o 

2  long     g's 

1  8  Ibs. 

(18) 

2  short  i8's 

36" 

9      "     32's 

288  " 

(324) 

13  guns, 

342  Ibs. 

500  men, 

36  guns, 

839  Ibs.,  metal. 

j  273  long.     ) 
I  566  short.   J 

Essex,        255 


6  long  ,2,         661 
17  short  32  s         504"  weight. 


255  men, 


23  guns, 


570  Ibs. 


308  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

All  accounts  agree  as  to  the  armament  of  the 
Essex.  I  have  taken  that  of  the  Phcebc  and  Cherub 
from  James  ;  but  Captain  Porter's  official  letter,  and 
all  the  other  American  accounts  make  the  Phoebe's 
broadside  15  long  i8's  and  8  short  32*5,  and  give  the 
Cheriib,  in  all,  18  short  32*3,  8  short  24*5,  and  two 
long  nines.  This  would  make  their  broadside  904 
Ibs.,  288  long,  616  short.  I  would  have  no  doubt 
that  the  American  accounts  were  right  if  the  ques 
tion  rested  solely  on  James'  veracity ;  but  he  proba 
bly  took  his  figures  from  official  sources.  At  any 
rate,  remembering  the  difference  between  long  guns 
and  carronades,  it  appears  that  the  Essex  was 
really  nearly  intermediate  in  force  between  the 
Phoebe  and  the  Cherub.  The  battle  being  fought, 
with  a  very  trifling  exception,  at  long  range,  it  was 
in  reality  a  conflict  between  a  crippled  ship  throw 
ing  a  broadside  of  66  Ibs.  of  metal,  and  two  ships 
throwing  273  Ibs.,  who  by  their  ability  to  manoeuvre 
could  choose  positions  where  they  could  act  with 
full  effect,  while  their  antagonist  could  not  return  a 
shot.  Contemporary  history  does  not  afford  a 
single  instance  of  so  determined  a  defence  against 
such  frightful  odds. 

The  official  letters  of  Captains  Hilyar  and  Porter 
agree  substantially  in  all  respects ;  the  details  of  the 
fight,  as  seen  in  the  Essex,  are  found  in  the  "Life  of 
Farragut."  But  although  the  British  captain  does 
full  justice  to  his  foe,  British  historians  have  univer 
sally  tried  to  belittle  Porter's  conduct.  It  is  much 
to  be  regretted  that  we  have  no  British  account 
worth  paying  attention  to  of  the  proceedings  before 
the  fight,  when  the  Phoebe  declined  single  combat 
with  the  Essex.  James,  of  course,  states  that  the 


NAVAL    WAR    OF    l8l2.  309 

Phoebe  did  not  decline  it,  but  he  gives  no  authority, 
and  his  unsupported  assertion  would  be  valueless 
even  if  uncontradicted.  His  account  of  the  action 
is  grossly  inaccurate  as  he  has  inexcusably  garbled 
Hilyar's  report.  One  instance  of  this  I  have  already 
mentioned,  as  regards  Hilyar's  account  of  Porter's 
loss.  Again,  Hilyar  distinctly  states  that  the  Essex 
was  twice  on  fire,  yet  James  (p.  418)  utterly  denies 
this,  thereby  impliedly  accusing  the  British  captain 
of  falsehood.  There  is  really  no  need  of  the  cor- 
roboration  of  Porter's  letter,  but  he  has  it  most 
fully  in  the  "  Life  of  Farragut,"  p.  37:  "  The  men 
came  rushing  up  from  below,  many  with  their 
clothes  burning,  which  were  torn  from  them  as 
quickly  as  possible,  and  those  for  whom  this  could 
not  be  done  were  told  to  jump  overboard  and  quench 
the  flames.  *  *  *  One  man  swam  to  shore  with 
scarcely  a  square  inch  of  his  body  which  had  not 
been  burned,  and,  although  he  was  deranged  for 
some  days,  he  ultimately  recovered,  and  afterward 
served  with  me  in  the  West  Indies."  The  third  un 
founded  statement  in  James'  account  is  that  buck 
ets  of  spirits  were  found  in  all  parts  of  the  main 
deck  of  the  Essex,  and  that  most  of  the  prisoners 
were  drunk  No  authority  is  cited  for  this,  and 
there  is  not  a  shadow  of  truth  in  it.  He  ends  by 
stating  that  "  few  even  in  his  own  country  will  vent 
ure  to  speak  well  of  Captain  David  Porter."  After 
these  various  paragraphs  we  are  certainly  justified 
in  rejecting  James'  account  in  toto.  An  occasional 
mistake  is  perfectly  excusable,  and  gross  ignorance 
of  a  good  many  facts  does  not  invalidate  a  man's 
testimony  with  regard  to  some  others  with  which  he 
is  acquainted  ;  but  a  wilful  and  systematic  perver- 


310  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

sion  of  the  truth  in  a  number  of  cases  throws  a  very 
strong  doubt  on  a  historian's  remaining  statements, 
unless  they  are  supported  by  unquestionable  au 
thority. 

But  if  British  historians  have  generally  given  Por 
ter  much  less  than  his  due,  by  omitting  all  reference 
to  the  inferiority  of  his  guns,  his  lost  top-mast,  etc., 
it  is  no  worse  than  Americans  have  done  in  similar 
cases.  The  latter,  for  example,  will  make  great  al 
lowances  in  the  case  of  the  Essex  for  her  having 
carronades  only,  but  utterly  fail  to  allude  to  the  Cy- 
ane  and  Levant  as  having  suffered  under  the  same 
disadvantage.  They  should  remember  that  the  rules 
cut  both  ways. 

The  Essex  having  suffered  chiefly  above  the  water- 
line,  she  was  repaired  sufficiently  in  Valparaiso  to 
enable  her  to  make  the  voyage  to  England,  where 
she  was  added  to  the  British  navy.  The  Essex 
Junior  was  disarmed  and  the  American  prisoners 
embarked  in  her  for  New  York,  on  parole.  But 
Lieutenant  McKnight,  Chaplain  Adams,  Midship 
man  Lyman,  and  1 1  seamen  were  exchanged  on  the 
spot  for  some  of  the  British  prisoners  on  board  the 
Essex  Junior.  McKnight  and  Lyman  accompanied 
the  Phoebe  to  Rio  Janeiro,  where  they  embarked  on 
a  Swedish  vessel,  were  taken  out  of  her  by  the  Wasp, 
Captain  Blakely,  and  were  lost  with  the  rest  of  the 
crew  of  that  vessel.  The  others  reached  New  York 
in  safety.  Of  the  prizes  made  by  the  Essex,  some 
were  burnt  or  sunk  by  the  Americans,  and  some  re 
taken  by  the  British.  And  so,  after  nearly  two 
years'  uninterrupted  success,  the  career  of  the  Essex 
terminated  amid  disasters  of  all  kinds.  But  at  least 
her  officers  and  crew  could  reflect  that  they  had 


NAVAL    WAR    OF    l8l2.  311 

afforded  an  example  of  courage  in  adversity  that  it 
would  be  difficult  to  match  elsewhere. 

The  first  of  the  new  heavy  sloops  of  war  that 
got  to  sea  was  the  Frolic,  Master  Commandant 
Joseph  Bainbridge,  which  put  out  early  in  Febru 
ary.  Shortly  afterward  she  encountered  a  large 
Carthagenian  privateer,  which  refused  to  surrender 
and  was  sunk  by  a  broadside,  nearly  a  hundred  of 
her  crew  being  drowned.  Before  daylight  on  the 
20th  of  April,  lat.  24°  12-'  N.,  long.  8i°25'  W.,  she 
fell  in  with  the  British  36-gun  frigate  Orpheus,  Capt. 
Pigot,  and  the  12-gun  schooner  Shelburne,  Lieut. 
Hope,  both  to  leeward.  The  schooner  soon  weath 
ered  the  Frolic,  but  of  course  was  afraid  to  close,  and 
the  American  sloop  continued  beating  to  windward, 
in  the  effort  to  escape,  for  nearly  13  hours ;  the  water 
was  started,  the  anchors  cut  away,  and  finally  the 
guns  thrown  overboard — a  measure  by  means  of 
which  both  the  Hornet,  the  Rattlesnake,  and  the 
Adams  succeeded  in  escaping  under  similar  circum 
stances, — but  all  was  of  no  avail,  and  she  was  finally 
captured.  The  court  of  inquiry  honorably  acquitted 
both  officers  and  crew.  As  was  to  be  expected 
James  considers  the  surrender  a  disgraceful  one,  be 
cause  the  guns  were  thrown  overboard.  As  I  have 
said,  this  was  a  measure  which  had  proved  success 
ful  in  several  cases  of  a  like  nature ;  the  criticism  is 
a  piece  of  petty  meanness.  Fortunately  we  have 
Admiral  Codrington's  dictum  on  the  surrender 
("  Memoirs,"  vol.  i,  p.  310),  which  he  evidently  con 
sidered  as  perfectly  honorable. 

A  sister  ship  to  the  Frolic,  the  Peacock,  Capt.  Lewis 
Warrington,  sailed  from  New  York  on  March  I2th, 


312  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

and  cruised  southward  ;  on  the  28th  of  April,  at 
seven  in  the  morning,  lat.  17°  47'  N.,  long.  80°  f 
W.,  several  sail  were  made  to  windward.1  These 
were  a  small  convoy  of  merchant-men,  bound  for  the 
Bermudas,  under  the  protection  of  the  i8-gun  brig- 
sloop  Epervier,  Capt.  Wales,  5  days  out  of  Havana, 
and  with  $118,000  in  specie  on  board.2  The  Eper 
vier  when  discovered  was  steering  north  by  east, 
the  wind  being  from  the  eastward  ;  soon  after 
ward  the  wind  veered  gradually  round  to  the  south 
ward,  and  the  Epervier  hauled  up  close  on  the  port 
tack,  while  the  convoy  made  all  sail  away,  and  the 
Peacock  came  down  with  the  wind  on  her  starboard 
quarter.  At  10  A.  M.  the  vessels  were  within  gun 
shot,  and  the  Peacock  edged  away  to  get  in  a  raking 
broadside,  but  the  Epervier  frustrated  this  by  put 
ting  her  helm  up  until  close  on  her  adversary's  bow, 
when  she  rounded  to  and  fired  her  starboard  guns, 
receiving  in  return  the  starboard  broadside  of  the 
Peacock  at  10.20  A.  M.  These  first  broadsides  took 
effect  aloft,  the  brig  being  partially  dismantled, 
while  the  Peacocks  fore-yard  was  totally  disabled  by 
two  round  shot  in  the  starboard  quarter,  which  de 
prived  the  ship  of  the  use  of  her  fore-sail  and  fore- 
top-sail,  and  compelled  her  to  run  large.  However, 
the  Epervier  eased  away3  when  abaft  her  foe's  beam, 
and  ran  off  alongside  of  her  (using  her  port  guns, 
while  the  American  still  had  the  starboard  battery 
engaged)  at  10.35.  The  Peacock ' s  fire  was  now  very 
hot,  and  directed  chiefly  at  her  adversary's  hull,  on 
which  it  told  heavily,  while  she  did  not  suffer  at  all 
in  return.  The  Epervier  coming  up  into  the  wind, 

1  Official  letter  of  Capt.  Warrington,  April  29,  1814. 

2  James,  vi,  424. 

3  According  to  some  accoums  she  at  this  time  tacked. 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  313 

owing  somewhat  to  the  loss  of  head-sail,  Capt. 
Wales  called  his  crew  aft  to  try  boarding,  but  they 
refused,  saying  "  she  's  too  heavy  for  us,"1  and  then, 
at  11.05  ^e  colors  were  hauled  down. 


PIACOCK 
//.OS 


Except  the  injury  to  her  fore-yard,  the  Peacock's 
damages  were  confined  to  the  loss  of  a  few  top-mast 
and  top-gallant  backstays,  and  some  shot-holes 
through  her  sails.  Of  her  crew,  consisting,  all  told, 

1  James,  "Naval  Occurrences,"  p.  243. 


314  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

of  166  men  and  boys,1  only  two  were  wounded,  both 
slightly.  The  Epervier,  on  the  other  hand,  had  45 
shot-holes  in  her  hull,  5  feet  of  water  in  her  hold, 
main-top-mast  over  the  side,  main-mast  nearly  in 
two,  main-boom  shot  away,  bowsprit  wounded 
severely,  and  most  of  the  fore-rigging  and  stays  shot 
away;  and  of  her  crew  of  128  men  (according  to  the 
list  of  prisoners  given  by  Captain  Warrington ; 
James  says  118,  but  he  is  not  backed  up  by  any 
official  report)  9  were  killed  and  mortally  wounded, 
and  14  severely  and  slightly  wounded.  Instead  of 
two  long  sixes  for  bow-chasers,  and  a  shifting  carron- 
ade,  she  had  two  1 8-pound  carronades  (according  to 
the  American  prize-lists ;  *  Capt.  Warrington  says 
32's).  Otherwise  she  was  armed  as  usual.  She  was, 
like  the  rest  of  her  kind,  very  "  tubby,"  being  as 
broad  as  the  Peacock,  though  10  feet  shorter  on  deck. 
Allowing,  as  usual,  7  per  cent,  for  short  weight  of 
the  American  shot,  we  get  the 

COMPARATIVE   FORCE. 

No. 
Tons.    Broadside  Guns.        Weight  Metal.        Crew.        Loss. 

Peacock         509  IT  315  166  2 

Epervier       477  9  274  128         23 

That  is,  the  relative  force  being  as  12  is  to  10,  the 
relative  execution  done  was  as  12  is  to  I,  and  the 
Epervier  surrendered  before  she  had  lost  a  fifth  of 
her  crew.  The  case  of  the  Epervier  closely  re- 

1  "  Niles'   Register,"  vi,    196,   says  only  160  ;   the  above  is  taken 
from  Warrington's  letter  of  June  1st,  preserved  with  the  other  manu 
script  letters  in  the  Naval  Archives.     The  crew  contained  about  10 
boys,  was  not  composed  of  picked  men,  and  did  not  number  185 — 
vide  James. 

2  American  State  Papers,  vol.  xiv,  p,  427. 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  315 

sembles  that  of  the  Argus.  In  both  cases  the  offi 
cers  behaved  finely  ;  in  both  cases,  too,  the  victori 
ous  foe  was  heavier,  in  about  the  same  proportion, 
while  neither  the  crew  of  the  Argus,  nor  the  crew 
of  the  Epervier  fought  with  the  determined  bravery 
displayed  by  the  combatants  in  almost  every  other 
struggle  of  the  war.  But  it  must  be  added  that  the 
Epervier  did  worse  than  the  Argus,  and  the  Peacock. 
(American)  better  than  the  Pelican.  The  gunnery  of 
the  Epervier  was  extraordinarily  poor  ;  "  the  most 
disgraceful  part  of  the  affair  was  that  our  ship  was 
cut  to  pieces  and  the  enemy  hardly  scratched." ' 
James  states  that  after  the  first  two  or  three  broad 
sides  several  carronades  became  unshipped,  and 
that  the  others  were  dismounted  by  the  fire  of  the 
Peacock ;  that  the  men  had  not  been  exercised  at 
the  guns ;  and,  most  important  of  all,  that  the  crew 
(which  contained  "  several  foreigners,"  but  was 
chiefly  British;  as  the  Argus'  was  chiefly  American) 
was  disgracefully  bad.  The  Peacock,  on  the  con 
trary,  showed  skilful  seamanship  as  well  as  excellent 
gunnery.  In  45  minutes  after  the  fight  was  over 
the  fore-yard  had  been  sent  down  and  fished,  the 
fore-sail  set  up,  and  every  thing  in  complete  order 
again ; 2  the  prize  was  got  in  sailing  order  by  dark, 
though  great  exertions  had  to  be  made  to  prevent 
her  sinking.  Mr.  Nicholson,  first  of  the  Peacock,  was 
put  in  charge  as  prize-master.  The  next  day  the 
two  vessels  were  abreast  of  Amelia  Island,  when  two 
frigates  were  discovered  in  the  north,  to  leeward. 
Capt.  Warrington  at  once  directed  the  prize  to  pro 
ceed  to  St.  Mary's,  while  he  separated  and  made 

1  "  Memoirs  of  Admiral  Codrington,"  i,  322. 

2  Letter  of  Capt.  Warrington,  April  29,  1814. 


316  NAVAL   WAR    OF    l8l2. 

sail  on  a  wind  to  the  south,  intending  to  draw  the 
frigates  after  him,  as  he  was  confident  that  the  Pea 
cock,  a  very  fast  vessel,  could  outsail  them.1  The 
plan  succeeded  perfectly,  the  brig  reaching  Savan 
nah  on  the  first  of  May,  and  the  ship  three  days 
afterward.  The  Epervier  was  purchased  for  the 
U.  S.  navy,  under  the  same  name  and  rate.  The 
Peacock  sailed  again  on  June  4th,2  going  first  north 
ward  to  the  Grand  Banks,  then  to  the  Azores  :  then 
she  stationed  herself  in  the  mouth  of  the  Irish 
Channel,  and  afterward  cruised  off  Cork,  the  mouth 
of  the  Shannon,  and  the  north  of  Ireland,  capturing 
several  very  valuable  prizes  and  creating  great  con 
sternation.  She  then  changed  her  station,  to  elude 
the  numerous  vessels  that  had  been  sent  after  her, 
and  sailed  southward,  off  Cape  Ortegal,  Cape  Finis- 
terre,  and  finally  among  the  Barbadoes,  reaching 
New  York,  Oct.  2Qth.  During  this  cruise  she  en 
countered  no  war  vessel  smaller  than  a  frigate  ;  but 
captured  14  sail  of  merchant-men,  some  containing 
valuable  cargoes,  and  manned  by  148  men. 

On  April  29th,  H.M.S.  schooner  Ballahou,  6, 
Lieut.  King,  while  cruising  off  the  American  coast 
was  captured  by  the  Perry,  privateer,  a  much 
heavier  vessel,  after  an  action  of  10  minutes'  dura 
tion. 

The  general  peace  prevailing  in  Europe  allowed 
the  British  to  turn  their  energies  altogether  to 
America;  and  in  no  place  was  this  increased  vigor 
so  much  felt  as  in  Chesapeake  Bay  where  a  great 
number  of  line-of-battle  ships,  frigates,  sloops,  and 

1  Letter  of  Capt.  Warrington,  May  4,  1814. 
3  Letter  of  Capt    Warrington,  Oct.  30,  1814. 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  317 

transports  had  assembled,  in  preparation  for  the 
assault  on  Washington  and  Baltimore.  The  de 
fence  of  these  waters  was  confided  to  Capt.  Joshua 
Barney,1  with  a  flotilla  of  gun-boats.  These  consisted 
of  three  or  four  sloops  and  schooners,  but  mainly  of 
barges,  which  were  often  smaller  than  the  ship's 
boats  that  were  sent  against  them.  These  gun 
boats  were  manned  by  from  20  to  40  men  each,  and 
each  carried,  according  to  its  size,  one  or  two  long 
24-,  1 8-,  or  12-pounders.  They  were  bad  craft  at 
best ;  and,  in  addition,  it  is  difficult  to  believe  that 
they  were  handled  to  the  fullest  advantage. 

On  June  1st  Commodore  Barney,  with  the  block 
sloop  Scorpion  and  14  smaller  "  gun-boats,"  chiefly 
row  gallies,  passed  the  mouth  of  the  Patuxent,  and 
chased  the  British  schooner  St.  Lawrence  and  seven 
boats,  under  Captain  Barrie,  until  they  took  refuge 
with  the  Dragon,  74,  which  in  turn  chased  Barney's 
flotilla  into  the  Patuxent,  where  she  blockaded  it  in 
company  with  the  Albion,  74.  They  were  afterward 
joined  by  the  Loire,  38,  Narcissus,  32,  and  Jasseur, 
1 8,  and  Commodore  Barney  moved  two  miles  up  St. 
Leonard's  Creek,  while  the  frigates  and  sloop  block 
aded  its  mouth.  A  deadlock  now  ensued  ;  the  gun 
boats  were  afraid  to  attack  the  ships,  and  the  ships' 
boats  were  just  as  afraid  of  the  gun-boats.  On  the 
8th,  Qth,  and  iith  skirmishes  occurred;  on  each 
occasion  the  British  boats  came  up  till  they  caught 
sight  of  Barney's  flotilla,  and  were  promptly  chased 
off  by  the  latter,  which,  however,  took  good  care 
not  to  meddle  with  the  larger  vessels.  Finally, 

J  He  was  born  at  Baltimore,  July  6,  1759  ;  James,  with  habitual 
accuracy,  calls  him  an  Irishman.  He  makes  Decatur,  by  the  way, 
commit  the  geographical  solecism  of  being  born  in  "  Maryland,  Vir 
ginia." 


318  NAVAL  WAR   OF    l8l2. 

Colonel  Wadsworth,  of  the  artillery,  with  two 
long  i8-pounders,  assisted  by  the  marines,  under 
'Captain  Miller,  and  a  few  regulars,  offered  to  co 
operate  from  the  shore  while  Barney  assailed  the 
two  frigates  with  the  flotilla.  On  the  26th  the  joint 
attack  took  place  most  successfully ;  the  Loire  and 
Narcissus  were  driven  off,  although  not  much  dam 
aged,  and  the  flotilla  rowed  out  in  triumph,  with  a 
loss  of  but  4  killed  and  7  wounded.  But  in  spite  of 
this  small  success,  which  was  mainly  due  to  Colonel 
Wadsworth,  Commodore  Barney  made  no  more  at 
tempts  with  his  gun-boats.  The  bravery  and  skill 
which  the  flotilla  men  showed  at  Bladensburg  prove 
conclusively  that  their  ill  success  on  the  water  was 
due  to  the  craft  they  were  in,  and  not  to  any  failing 
of  the  men.  At  the  same  period  the  French  gun 
boats  were  even  more  unsuccessful,  but  the  Danes 
certainly  did  very  well  with  theirs. 

Barney's  flotilla  in  the  Patuxent  remained  quiet 
until  August  22d,  and  then  was  burned  when  the 
British  advanced  on  Washington.  The  history  of 
this  advance,  as  well  as  of  the  unsuccessful  one  on 
Baltimore,  concerns  less  the  American  than  the 
British  navy,  and  will  be  but  briefly  alluded  to  here. 
On  August  2Oth  Major-General  Ross  and  Rear- 
Admiral  Cockburn,  with  about  5,000  soldiers  and 
marines,  moved  on  Washington  by  land  ;  while  a 
squadron,  composed  of  the  Sea/torse,  38,  Euryalus, 
36,  bombs  Devastation,  sEtna,  and  Meteor,  and  rocket- 
ship  Erebus,  under  Captain  James  Alexander  Gor 
don,  moved  up  the  Potomac  to  attack  Fort  Wash 
ington,  near  Alexandria ;  and  Sir  Peter  Parker,  in  the 
Mcnelaus,  38,  was  sent  "  to  create  a  diversion  "  above 
Baltimore.  Sir  Peter's  "diversion"  turned  out 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  319 

most  unfortunately  for  him  :  for,  having  landed  to 
attack  120  Maryland  militia,  under  Colonel  Reade, 
he  lost  his  own  life,  while  fifty  of  his  followers  were 
placed  Jwrs  de  combat  and  the  remainder  chased 
back  to  the  ship  by  the  victors,  who  had  but  three 
wounded. 

The  American  army,  which  was  to  oppose  Ross 
and  Cockburn,  consisted  of  some  seven  thousand 
militia,  who  fled  so  quickly  that  only  about  1,500 
British  had  time  to  become  engaged.  The  fight  was 
really  between  these  1,500  British  regulars  and 
the  American  flotilla  men.  These  consisted  of  78 
marines,  under  Captain  Miller,  and  370  sailors,  some 
of  whom  served  under  Captain  Barney,  who  had  a 
battery  of  two  i8's  and  three  12*3,  while  the  others 
were  armed  with  muskets  and  pikes,  and  acted  with 
the  marines.  Both  sailors  and  marines  did  nobly, 
inflicting  most  of  the  loss  the  British  suffered, 
which  amounted  to  256  men,  and  in  return  lost 
over  a  hundred  of  their  own  men,  including  the  two 
captains,  who  were  wounded  and  captured,  with  the 
guns.1  Ross  took  Washington  and  burned  the  pub 
lic  buildings ;  and  the  panic-struck  Americans  fool 
ishly  burned  the  Columbia,  44,  and  Argus,  18,  which 
were  nearly  ready  for  service. 

Captain  Gordon's  attack  on  Fort  Washington  was 
conducted  with  great  skill  and  success.  Fort  Wash 
ington  was  abandoned  as  soon  as  fired  upon,  and 
the  city  of  Alexandria  surrendered  upon  most  hu 
miliating  conditions.  Captain  Gordon  was  now 
joined  by  the  Fairy,  18,  Captain  Baker,  who 
brought  him  orders  to  return  from  Vice-Admiral 
Cochrane  ;  and  the  squadron  began  to  work  down 

1  The  optimistic  Cooper  thinks  that  two  regular  regiments  would 
have  given  the  Americans  this  battle — which  is  open  to  doubt. 


320  NAVAL   WAR   OP^    l8l2. 

the  river,  which  was  very  difficult  to  navigate. 
Commodore  Rodgers,  with  some  of  the  crew 
of  the  two  44's,  Guerrierc  and  Java,  tried  to 
bar  their  progress,  but  had  not  sufficient  means. 
On  September  1st  an  attempt  was  made  to  destroy 
the  Devastation  by  fire-ships,  but  it  failed ;  on  the 
4th  the  attempt  was  repeated  by  Commodore 
Rodgers,  with  a  party  of  some  forty  men,  but  they 
were  driven  off  and  attacked  by  the  British  boats, 
under  Captain  Baker,  who  in  turn  was  repulsed  with 
the  loss  of  his  second  lieutenant  killed,  and  some 
twenty-five  men  killed  or  wounded.  The  squadron 
also  had  to  pass  and  silence  a  battery  of  light  field- 
pieces  on  the  5th,  where  they  suffered  enough  to 
raise  their  total  loss  to  seven  killed  and  thirty-five 
wounded.  Gordon's  inland  expedition  was  thus 
concluded  most  successfully,  at  a  very  trivial  cost ; 
it  was  a  most  venturesome  feat,  reflecting  great 
honor  on  the  captains  and  crews  engaged  in  it. 

Baltimore  was  threatened  actively  by  sea  and  land 
early  in  September.  On  the  I3th  an  indecisive 
conflict  took  place  between  the  British  regulars  and 
American  militia,  in  which  the  former  came  off  with 
the  honor,  and  the  latter  with  the  profit.  The  regu 
lars  held  the  field,  losing  350  men,  including  General 
Ross ;  the  militia  retreated  in  fair  order  with  a 
loss  of  but  200.  The  water  attack  was  also  un 
successful.  At  5  A.M.  on  the  I3th  the  bomb 
vessels  Meteor,  j&tna,  Terror,  Volcano,  and  De 
vastation,  tne  rocket-ship  Erebus,  and  the  frigates 
Severn,  Euryalus,  Havannah,  and  Hebrus  opened 
on  Fort  McHenry,  some  of  the  other  forti 
fications  being  occasionally  fired  at.  A  furious  but 
harmless  cannonade  was  kept  up  between  the  forts 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  321 

and  ships  until  7  A.  M.  on  the  I4th,  when  the  British 
fleet  and  army  retired. 

I  have  related  these  events  out  of  their  natural 
order  because  they  really  had  very  little  to  do  with 
our  navy,  and  yet  it  is  necessary  to  mention  them 
in  order  to  give  an  idea  of  the  course  of  events.  The 
British  and  American  accounts  of  the  various  gun 
boat  attacks  differ  widely;  but  it  is  very  certain  that 
the  gun-boats  accomplished  little  or  nothing  of  im 
portance.  On  the  other  hand,  their  loss  amounted 
to  nothing,  for  many  of  those  that  were  sunk  were 
afterward  raised,  and  the  total  tonnage  of  those  de 
stroyed  would  not  much  exceed  that  of  the  British 
barges  captured  by  them  from  time  to  time  or  de 
stroyed  by  the  land  batteries. 

The  purchased  brig  Rattlesnake,  16,  had  been  cruis 
ing  in  the  Atlantic  with  a  good  deal  of  success ;  but 
in  lat.  40°  N.,  long.  33°  W.,  was  chased  by  a  frigate 
from  which  Lieutenant  Renshaw,  the  brig's  com 
mander,  managed  to  escape  only  by  throwing  over 
board  all  his  guns  except  two  long  nines;  and  on 
June  22d  he  was  captured  by  the  Leander,  50,  Cap 
tain  Sir  George  Ralph  Collier,  K.  C.  B. 

The  third  of  the  new  sloops  to  get  to  sea  was 
the  Wasp,  22,  Captain  Johnston  Blakely,  which  left 
Portsmouth  on  May  1st,  with  a  very  fine  crew  of  173 
men,  almost  exclusively  New  Englanders  ;  there  was 
said  not  to  have  been  a  single  foreign  seaman  on 
board.  It  is,  at  all  events,  certain  that  during  the 
whole  war  no  vessel  was  ever  better  manned  and 
commanded  than  this  daring  and  resolute  cruiser. 
The  Wasp  slipped  unperceived  through  the  block 
ading  frigates,  and  ran  into  the  mouth  of  the  Eng- 


322  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

lish  Channel,  right  in  the  thick  of  the  English  cruis 
ers  ;  here  she  remained  several  weeks,  burning  and 
scuttling  many  ships.  Finally,  on  June  28th,  it  4 
A.M.,  in  lat.  48°  36'  N.,  long.  11°  15'  W.,1  while  in 
chase  of  two  merchant-men,  a  sail  was  made  on  the 
weather-beam.  This  was  the  British  brig-sloop 
Reindeer,  18,  Captain  William  Manners,2  with  a  crew 
of  1 1 8,  as  brave  men  as  ever  sailed  or  fought  on  the 
narrow  seas.  Like  the  Peacock  (British)  the  Rein 
deer  was  only  armed  with  24-pounders,  and  Captain 
Manners  must  have  known  well  that  he  was  to  do 
battle  with  a  foe  heavier  than  himself;  but  there 
was  no  more  gallant  seaman  in  the  whole  British 
navy,  fertile  as  it  was  in  men  who  cared  but  little 
for  odds  of  size  or  strength.  As  the  day  broke,  the 
Reindeer  made  sail  for  the  Wasp,  then  lying  in  the 
west-southwest. 

The  sky  was  overcast  with  clouds,  and  the  smooth 
ness  of  the  sea  was  hardly  disturbed  by  the  light 
breeze  that  blew  out  of  the  northeast.  Captain 
Blakely  hauled  up  and  stood  for  his  antagonist,  as 
the  latter  came  slowly  down  with  the  wind  nearly 
aft,  and  so  light  was  the  weather  that  the  vessels 
kept  almost  on  even  keels.  It  was  not  till  quarter 
past  one  that  the  Wasp's  drum  rolled  out  its  loud 
challenge  as  it  beat  to  quarters,  and  a  few  minutes 
afterward  the  ship  put  about  and  stood  for  the  foe, 
thinking  to  weather  him  ;  but  at  1.50  the  brig  also 
tacked  and  stood  away,  each  of  the  cool  and  skil 
ful  captains  being  bent  on  keeping  the  weather- 
gage.  At  half  past  two  the  Reindeer  again  tacked, 
and,  taking  in  her  stay-sails,  stood  for  the  Wasp,  who 
furled  her  royals;  and,  seeing  that  she  would  be 

•  Letter  of  Captain  Blakely,  July  8,  1814.  2  James,  vi,  429. 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  323 

weathered,  at  2.50,  put  about  in  her  turn  and  ran  off, 
with  the  wind  a  little  forward  the  port  beam,  brail- 
ing  up  the  mizzen,  while  the  Reindeer  hoisted  her 
flying-jib,  to  close,  and  gradually  came  up  on  the 
Wasp's  weather-quarter.  At  17  minutes  past  three, 
when  the  vessels  were  not  sixty  yards  apart,  the 
British  opened  the  conflict,  firing  the  shifting  12- 
pound  carronade,  loaded  with  round  and  grape.  To 
this  the  Americans  could  make  no  return,  and  it 
was  again  loaded  and  fired,  with  the  utmost  deliber 
ation  ;  this  was  repeated  five  times,  and  would  have 
been  a  trying  ordeal  to  a  crew  less  perfectly  disci 
plined  than  the  Wasp's.  At  3.26  Captain  Blakely, 
finding  his  enemy  did  not  get  on  his  beam,  put  his 
helm  a-lee  and  luffed  up,  firing  his  guns  from  aft 
forward  as  they  bore.  For  ten  minutes  the  ship 
and  the  brig  lay  abreast,  not  twenty  yards  apart, 
while  the  cannonade  was  terribly  destructive.  The 
concussion  of  the  explosions  almost  deadened  what 
little  way  the  vessels  had  on,  and  the  smoke  hung 
over  them  like  a  pall.  The  men  worked  at  the 
guns  with  desperate  energy,  but  the  odds  in  weight 
of  metal  (3  to  2)  were  too  great  against  the  Reindeer, 
where  both  sides  played  their  parts  so  manfully. 
Captain  Manners  stood  at  his  post,  as  resolute  as 
ever,  though  wounded  again  and  again.  A  grape- 
shot  passed  through  both  his  thighs,  bringing  him 
to  the  deck  ;  but,  maimed  and  bleeding  to  death, 
he  sprang  to  his  feet,  cheering  on  the  seamen.  The 
vessels  were  now  almost  touching,  and  putting  his 
helm  aweather,  he  ran  the  Wasp  aboard  on  her 
port  '  quarter,  while  the  boarders  gathered  forward, 

1  Letter  of  Captain  Blakely,  July  8,  1814.  Cooper  says  starboard  ; 
it  is  a  point  of  little  importance  ;  all  accounts  agree  as  to  the  rela 
tive  positions  of  the  craft. 


324  NAVAL   WAR    OF    l8l2. 

to  try  it  with  the  steel.  But  the  Carolina  captain 
had  prepared  for  this  with  cool  confidence  ;  the 
marines  came  aft  ;  close  under  the  bulwarks 
crouched  the  boarders,  grasping  in  their  hands  the 
naked  cutlasses,  while  behind  them  were  drawn  up 
the  pikemen.  As  the  vessels  came  grinding  together 
the  men  hacked  and  thrust  at  one  another  through 
the  open  port-holes,  while  the  black  smoke  curled 
up  from  between  the  hulls.  Then  through  the 
smoke  appeared  the  grim  faces  of  the  British  sea- 
dogs,  and  the  fighting  was  bloody  enough  ;  for  the 
stubborn  English  stood  well  in  the  hard  hand  play. 
But  those  who  escaped  the  deadly  fire  of  the  top- 
men,  escaped  only  to  be  riddled  through  by  the 
long  Yankee  pikes ;  so,  avenged  by  their  own 
hands,  the  foremost  of  the  assailants  died,  and  the 
others  gave  back.  The  attack  was  foiled,  though 
the  Reindeer  s  marines  kept  answering  well  the 
American  fire.  Then  the  English  captain,  already 
mortally  wounded,  but  with  the  indomitable 
courage  that  nothing  but  death  could  conquer, 
cheering  and  rallying  his  men,  himself  sprang,  sword 
in  hand,  into  the  rigging,  to  lead  them  on  ;  and  they 
followed  him  with  a  will.  At  that  instant  a  ball 
from  the  Wasp's  main-top  crashed  through  his  skull, 
and,  still  clenching  in  his  right  hand  the  sword  he 
had  shown  he  could  wear  so  worthily,  with  his  face 
to  the  foe,  he  fell  back  on  his  own  deck  dead,  while 
above  him  yet  floated  the  flag  for  which  he  had 
given  his  life.  No  Norse  Viking,  slain  over  shield, 
ever  died  better.  As  the  British  leader  fell  and  his 
men  recoiled,  Captain  Blakely  passed  the  word  to 
board  ;  with  wild  hurrahs  the  boarders  swarmed 
over  the  hammock  nettings,  there  was  a  moment's 


NAVAL  WAR   OF    l8l2.  325 

furious  struggle,  the  surviving  British  were  slain  or 
driven  below,  and  the  captain's  clerk,  the  highest 
officer  left,  surrendered  the  brig,  at  3.44,  just  27 
minutes  after  the  Reindeer  had  fired  the  first  gun; 
and  just  18  after  the  Wasp  had  responded. 


REINDEER 

"""""•••«.. 

WAS* 


Both  ships  had  suffered  severely  in  the  short 
struggle  ;  but,  as  with  the  Shannon  and  Chesapeake, 
the  injuries  were  much  less  severe  aloft  than  in 
the  hulls.  All  the  spars  were  in  their  places.  The 
Wasp's  hull  had  received  6  round,  and  many  grape  ; 
a  24-pound  shot  had  passed  through  the  foremast ; 
and  of  her  crew  of  173,  11  were  killed  or  mortally 
wounded,  and  15  wounded  severely  or  slightly. 
The  Reindeer  was  completely  cut  to  pieces  in  a  line 
with  her  ports  ;  her  upper  works,  boats,  and  spare 
spars  being  one  entire  wreck.  Of  her  crew  of  118 
men,  33  were  killed  outright  or  died  later,  and  34 
were  wounded,  nearly  all  severely. 

COMPARATIVE   FORCE. 


Tons. 

Broadside 
Guns. 

Weight 
Metal. 

No 

Men. 

Loss. 

Wasp, 

5°9 

II 

315 

173 

26 

Reindeer, 

477 

10 

210 

118 

67 

326  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

It  is  thus  seen  that  the  Reindeer  fought  at  a 
greater  disadvantage  than  any  other  of  the  various 
British  sloops  that  were  captured  in  single  action 
during  the  war ;  and  yet  she  made  a  better  fight 
than  any  of  them  (though  the  Frolic,  and  the  Frolic 
only,  was  defended  with  the  same  desperate  cour 
age)  ;  a  pretty  sure  proof  that  heavy  metal  is  not 
the  only  factor  to  be  considered  in  accounting  for 
the  American  victories.  "  It  is  difficult  to  say 
which  vessel  behaved  the  best  in  this  short  but 
gallant  combat."  !  I  doubt  if  the  war  produced  two 
better  single-ship  commanders  than  Captain  Blakely 
and  Captain  Manners  ;  and  an  equal  meed  of  praise 
attaches  to  both  crews.  The  British  could  rightly 
say  that  they  yielded  purely  to  heavy  odds  in  men 
and  metal ;  and  the  Americans,  that  the  difference 
in  execution  was  fully  proportioned  to  the  differ 
ence  in  force.  It  is  difficult  to  know  which  to  ad 
mire  most,  the  wary  skill  with  which  each  captain 
manoeuvred  before  the  fight,  the  perfect  training 
and  discipline  that  their  crews  showed,  the  decision 
and  promptitude  with  which  Captain  Manners  tried 
to  retrieve  the  day  by  boarding,  and  the  desperate 
bravery  with  which  the  attempt  was  made ;  or  the 
readiness  with  which  Captain  Blakely  made  his 
preparations,  and  the  cool  courage  with  which  the 
assault  was  foiled.  All  people  of  the  English  stock, 
no  matter  on  which  side  of  the  Atlantic  they  live, 
if  they  have  any  pride  in  the  many  feats  of  fierce 
prowess  done  by  the  men  of  their  blood  and  race, 
should  never  forget  this  fight ;  although  we  cannot 
but  feel  grieved  to  find  that  such  men — men  of  one 
race  and  one  speech  ;  brothers  in  blood,  as  well  as 

1  Cooper,  ii,  287. 


NAVAL  WAR   OF    1 8 12.  327 

in    bravery — should    ever  have    had    to    turn    their 
weapons  against  one  another. 

The  day  after  the  conflict  the  prize's  foremast 
went  by  the  board,  and,  as  she  was  much  damaged 
by  shot,  Captain  Blakely  burned  her,  put  a  portion 
of  his  wounded  prisoners  on  board  a  neutral,  and 
with  the  remainder  proceeded  to  France,  reaching 
T  Orient  on  the  8th  day  of  July. 

On  July  4th  Sailing-master  Percival  and  30  vol 
unteers  of  the  New  York  flotilla  '  concealed  them 
selves  on  board  a  fishing-smack,  and  carried  by  sur 
prise  the  Eagle  tender,  which  contained  a  32-pound 
howitzer  and  14  men,  4  of  whom  were  wounded. 

On  July  I2th,  while  off  the  west  coast  of  South 
Africa,  the  American  brig  Syren  was  captured  after 
a  chase  of  1 1  hours  by  the  Medway,  74,  Capt.  Brine. 
The  chase  was  to  windward  during  the  whole  time, 
and  made  every  effort  to  escape,  throwing  overboard 
all  her  boats,  anchors,  cables,  and  spare  spars.2  Her 
commander,  Captain  Parker,  had  died,  and  she  was 
in  charge  of  Lieut.  N.  J.  Nicholson.  By  a  curious 
coincidence,  on  the  same  day,  July  I2th,  H.  M 
cutter  Landrail,  4,3  of  20  men,  Lieut,  Lancasterf 
was  captured  by  the  American  privateer  Syren,  a 
schooner  mounting  I  long  heavy  gun,  with  a  crew 
of  70  men  ;  the  Landrail  had  7,  and  the  Syren  3 
men  wounded. 

On  July  I4th  Gun-boat  No.  88,  Sailing-master 
George  Clement,  captured  after  a  short  skirmish  the 
tender  of  the  Tenedos  frigate,  with  her  second  lieu 
tenant,  2  midshipmen,  and  10  seamen.4 

1  Letter  of  Com.  J.  Lewis,  July  6,  1814. 

*  Letter  of  Capt.  Brine  to  Vice-Admiral  Tyler,  July  12,  1814. 

3  James,  vi,  436  ;  his  statement  is  wrong  as  regards  the  pri.raceer. 

4  Letter  of  Capt.  Isaac  Hull,  July  15,  1814. 


328  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

The  Wasp  stayed  in  1'  Orient  till  she  was  thor 
oughly  refitted,  and  had  filled,  in  part,  the  gaps  in 
her  crew,  from  the  American  privateers  in  port. 
On  Aug.  27th,  Captain  Blakely  sailed  again,  making 
two  prizes  during  the  next  three  days.  On  Sept. 
ist  she  came  up  to  a  convoy  of  10  sail  under  the 
protection  of  the  Armada,  74,  all  bound  for  Gib 
raltar;  the  swift  cruiser  hovered  round  the  mer 
chant-men  like  a  hawk,  and  though  chased  off  again 
and  again  by  the  line-of-battle  ship,  always  returned 
the  instant  the  pursuit  stopped,  and  finally  actually 
succeeded  in  cutting  off  and  capturing  one  ship, 
laden  with  iron  and  brass  cannon,  muskets,  and 
other  military  stores  of  great  value.  At  half  past 
six  on  the  evening  of  the  same  day,  in  lat.  47°  30' 
N.,  long.  11°  W.,  while  running  almost  free,  four  sail, 
two  on  the  starboard  bow,  and  two  on  the  port,  rather 
more  to  leeward,  were  made  out.1  Capt.  Blakely  at 
once  made  sail  for  the  most  weatherly  of  the  four 
ships  in  sight,  though  well  aware  that  more  than 
one  of  them  might  prove  to  be  hostile  cruisers,  and 
they  were  all  of  unknown  force.  But  the  deter 
mined  Carolinian  was  not  one  to  be  troubled  by 
such  considerations.  He  probably  had  several  men 
less  under  his  command  than  in  the  former  action, 
but  had  profited  by  his  experience  with  the  Rein 
deer  in  one  point,  having  taken  aboard  her  12- 
pounder  boat  carronade,  of  whose  efficacy  he  had 
had  very  practical  proof. 

The  chase,  the  British  brig-sloop  Avon,  18,  Cap 
tain  the  Honorable  James  Arbuthnot,2  was  steering 
almost  southwest ;  the  wind,  which  was  blowing 

1  Official  letter  of  Capt.  Blakely,  Sept.  8,  1814. 
"James,  vi,  432. 


NAVAL  WAR   OF    l8l2.  329 

the  southeast,  being  a  little  abaft  the 
port  beam.  At  7.00  the  Avon  began  making  night 
signals  with  the  lanterns,  but  the  Wasp,  disregarding 
these,  came  steadily  on  ;  at  8.38  the  Avon  fired  a 
shot  from  her  stern-chaser,1  and  shortly  afterward 
another  from  one  of  her  lee  or  starboard  guns.  At 
20  minutes  past  9,  the  Wasp  was  on  the  port  or 
weather-quarter  of  the  Avon,  and  the  vessels  inter 
changed  several  hails ;  one  of  the  American  officers 
then  came  forward  on  the  forecastle  and  ordered 
the  brig  to  heave  to,  which  the  latter  declined 
doing,  and  set  her  port  foretop-mast  studding  sail. 
The  Wasp  then,  at  9.29,  fired  the  1 2-pound  carron- 
ade  into  her,  to  which  the  Avon  responded  with  her 
stern-chaser  and  the  aftermost  port  guns.  Capt. 
Blakely  then  put  his  helm  up,  for  fear  his  adversary 
would  try  to  escape,  and  ran  to  leeward  of  her,  and 
then  ranged  up  alongside,  having  poured  a  broad 
side  into  her  quarter.  A  close  and  furious  engage 
ment  began,  at  such  short  range  that  the  only 
one  of  the  Wasp's  crew  who  was  wounded,  was  hit 
by  a  wad  ;  four  round  shot  struck  her  hull,  killing 
two  men,  and  she  suffered  a  good  deal  in  her  rig 
ging.  The  men  on  board  did  not  know  the  name 
of  their  antagonist ;  but  they  could  see  through 
the  smoke  and  the  gloom  of  the  night,  as  her  black 
hull  surged  through  the  water,  that  she  was  a  large 
brig ;  and  aloft,  against  the  sky,  the  sailors  could  be 
discerned,  clustering  in  the  tops.2  In  spite  of  the 
darkness  the  Wasp's  fire  was  directed  with  deadly 
precision  ;  the  Avons  gaff  was  shot  away  at  almost 
the  first  broadside,  and  most  of  her  main-rigging 
and  spars  followed  suit.  She  was  hulled  again  and 

1  James,  vi,  432.  a  Captain  Blakely's  letter. 


330  NAVAL  WAR   OF   l8l2. 


AVON 


10.00 


again,  often  below  water-line  ;  some  of  her  carron- 
ades  were  dismounted,  and  finally  the  main-mast 
went  by  the  board.  At  10.00,  after  31  minutes  of 
combat,  her  fire  had  been  completely  silenced  and 
Captain  Blakely  hailed  to  know  if  she  had  struck. 
No  answer  being  received,  and  the  brig  firing  a 
few  random  shot,  the  action  recommenced ;  but  at 
10.12  the  Avon  was  again  hailed,  and  this  time 
answered  that  she  had  struck.  While  lowering 
away  a  boat  to  take  possession,  another  sail  (H.  B.  M. 
brig-sloop  Castilian,  18,  Captain  Braimer)  was  seen 
astern.  The  men  were  again  called  to  quarters,  and 
every  thing  put  in  readiness  as  rapidly  as  possible ; 
but  at  10.36  two  more  sail  were  seen  (one  of  which 
was  H.  B.  M.  Tartarus,  2O1).  The  braces  being  cut 
away,  the  Wasp  was  put  before  the  wind  until  new 
ones  could  be  rove.  The  Castilian  pursued  till  she 
came  up  close,  when  she  fired  her  lee  guns  into,  or 
1  •*  N lies'  Register,"  vi,  216. 


NAVAL    WAR   OF    l8l2.  33! 

rather  over,  the  weather-quarter  of  the  Wasp,  cut 
ting  her  rigging  slightly.  Repeated  signals  of  dis 
tress  having  now  been  made  by  the  Avon  (which  had 
lost  10  men  killed  and  32  wounded),  the  Castilian 
tacked  and  stood  for  her,  and  on  closing  found  out 
she  was  sinking.  Hardly  had  her  crew  being  taken 
out  when  she  went  down. 

Counting  the  Wasp's  complement  as  full  (though 
it  was  probably  two  or  three  short),  taking  James* 
statement  of  the  crew  of  the  Avon  as  true,  including 
the  boat  carronades  of  both  vessels,  and  considering 
the  Avons  stern-chaser  to  have  been  a  six-pounder, 
we  get  the 

COMPARATIVE  FORCE. 

Weight 
Tons.      No.  Guns.     Metal.     No.  Men.        Loss. 

Wasp,         509  12  327  160  3 

Avon,          477  n  280  117         42 

It  is  self-evident  that  in  the  case  of  this  action 
the  odds,  14  to  1 1,  are  neither  enough  to  account  for 
the  loss  inflicted  being  as  14  to  I,  nor  for  the  rapidi 
ty  with  which,  during  a  night  encounter,  the  Avon 
was  placed  in  a  sinking  condition.  "  The  gallantry 
of  the  Avons  officers  and  crew  cannot  for  a  moment 
be  questioned ;  but  the  gunnery  of  the  latter  ap 
pears  to  have  been  not  one  whit  better  than,  to  the 
discredit  of  the  British  navy,  had  frequently  before 
been  displayed  in  combats  of  this  kind.  Nor,  judg 
ing  from  the  specimen  given  by  the  Castilian,  is  it 
likely  that  she  would  have  performed  any  better." ' 
On  the  other  hand,  "  Capt.  Blakely's  conduct  on  this 

1  James,  vi,  435. 


33-2  NAVAL   WAR    OF    1 8 12. 

occasion  had  all  the  merit  shown  in  the  previous  ac 
tion,  with  the  additional  claim  of  engaging  an 
enemy  under  circumstances  which  led  him  to  believe 
that  her  consorts  were  in  the  immediate  vicinity. 
The  steady,  officer-like  way  in  which  the  Avon  was 
destroyed,  and  the  coolness  with  which  he  prepared 
to  engage  the  Castilian  within  ten  minutes  after  his 
first  antagonist  had  struck,  are  the  best  encomiums 
on  this  officer's  character  and  spirit,  as  well  as  on 
the  school  in  which  he  had  been  trained."  1 

The  Wasp  now  cruised  to  the  southward  and 
westward,  taking  and  scuttling  one  or  two  prizes. 
On  Sept.  2 1st,  lat.  33°  12'  N.,  long.  14°  56'  W.,  she 
captured  the  brig  Atalanta,  8,  with  19  men,  which 
proved  a  valuable  prize,  and  was  sent  in  with  one 
of  the  midshipmen,  Mr.  Geisinger,  aboard,  as  prize- 
master,  who  reached  Savannah  in  safety  on  Nov. 
4th.  Meanwhile  the  Wasp  kept  on  toward  the 
southeast.  On  Oct.  Qth,  in  lat.  18°  35'  N.,  long. 
30°  10'  W.,  she  spoke  and  boarded  the  Swedish  brig 
Adonis,  and  took  out  of  her  Lieut.  McKnight  and 
Mr.  Lyman,  a  master's  mate,  both  late  of  the  Essex, 
on  their  way  to  England  from  Brazil. 

This  was  the  last  that  was  ever  heard  of  the  gal 
lant  but  ill-fated  Wasp.  How  she  perished  none 
ever  knew  ;  all  that  is  certain  is  that  she  was  never 
seen  again.  She  was  as  good  a  ship,  as  well  man 
ned,  and  as  ably  commanded  as  any  vessel  in  our 
little  navy ;  and  it  may  be  doubted  if  there  was  at 
that  time  any  foreign  sloop  of  war  of  her  size  and 
strength  that  could  have  stood  against  her  in  fair 
fight. 

As  I  have  said,  the   Wasp  was  manned    almost 

'Cooper,  ii,  291. 


NAVAL   WAR    OF    l8l2.  333 

exclusively  by  Americans.  James  says  they  were 
mostly  Irish  ;  the  reason  he  gives  for  the  assertion 
being  that  Capt.  Blakely  spent  the  first  16  months 
of  his  life  in  Dublin.  This  argument  is  quite  on  a 
par  with  another  piece  of  logic  which  I  cannot  resist 
noticing.  The  point  he  wishes  to  prove  is  that 
Americans  are  cowards.  Accordingly,  on  p.  475  : 
"On  her  capstan  the  Constitution  now  mounted  a 
piece  resembling  7  musket  barrels,  fixed  together 
with  iron  bands.  It  was  discharged  by  one  lock, 
and  each  barrel  threw  25  balls.  *  *  *  What 
could  have  impelled  the  Americans  to  invent  such 
extraordinary  implements  of  war  but  fear,  down 
right  fear?"  Then  a  little  further  on:  "The  men 
were  provided  with  leather  boarding-caps,  fitted  with 
bands  of  iron,  *  *  *  another  strong  symptom 
of  fear ! "  Now,  such  a  piece  of  writing  as  this  is 
simply  evidence  of  an  unsound  mind  ;  it  is  not  so 
much  malicious  as  idiotic.  I  only  reproduce  It  to 
help  prove  what  I  have  all  along  insisted  on,  that 
any  of  James'  unsupported  statements  about  the 
Americans,  whether  respecting  the  tonnage  of  the 
ships  or  the  courage  of  the  crews,  are  not  worth  the 
paper  they  are  written  on  ;  on  all  points  connected 
purely  with  the  British  navy,  or  which  can  be 
checked  off  by  official  documents  or  ships'  logs,  or 
where  there  would  be  no  particular  object  in  falsify 
ing,  James  is  an  invaluable  assistant,  from  the  dili 
gence  and  painstaking  care  he  shows,  and  the  thor 
oughness  and  minuteness  with  which  he  goes  into 
details. 

A  fair-minded  and  interesting  English  critic,1 
whose  remarks  are  generally  very  just,  seems  to  me 

1  Lord  Howard  Douglass,  "  Treatise  on  Naval  Gunnery,"  p.  416. 


334  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

to  have  erred  somewhat  in  commenting  on  this  last 
sloop  action.  He  says  that  the  Avon  was  first  crip 
pled  by  dismantling  shot  from  long  guns.  Now, 
the  Wasp  had  but  one  long  gun  on  the  side  engaged, 
and,  moreover,  began  the  action  with  the  shortest 
and  lightest  of  her  carronades.  Then  he  continues 
that  the  Avon,  like  the  Peacock,  "was  hulled  so  low 
that  the  shot-holes  could  not  be  got  at,  and  yielded 
to  this  fatal  circumstance  only."  It  certainly  cannot 
be  said  when  a  brig  has  been  dismasted,  has  had 
a  third  of  her  crew  placed  hors  de  combat,  and  has 
been  rendered  an  unmanageable  hulk,  that  she  yields 
only  because  she  has  received  a  few  shot  below  the 
water-line.  These  shot-holes  undoubtedly  hastened 
the  result,  but  both  the  Peacock  and  the  Avon  would 
have  surrendered  even  if  they  had  remained  abso 
lutely  water-tight. 

The  Adams,  28,  had  been  cut  down  to  a  sloop  of 
war  at  Washington,  and  then  lengthened  into  a 
flush-decked,  heavy  corvette,  mounting  on  each  side 
13  medium  i8's,  or  columbiads,  and  I  long  12,  with 
a  crew  of  220  men,  under  the  command  of  Capt. 
Charles  Morris,  late  first  lieut.  of  the  Constitution? 
She  slipped  out  of  the  Potomac  and  past  the  block- 
aders  on  Jan.  i8th,  and  cruised  eastward  to  the 
African  coast  and  along  it  from  Cape  Mount  to 
Cape  Palmas,  thence  to  the  Canaries  and  Cape  de 
Verd.  She  returned  very  nearly  along  the  Equator, 
thence  going  toward  the  West  Indies.  The  cruise 
was  unlucky,  but  a  few  small  prizes,  laden  with  palm- 
oil  and  ivory,  being  made.  In  hazy  weather,  on 

1  "  Autobiography  of  Commodore  Morris,"  Annapolis,  1880,  p. 
172. 


NAVAL  WAR   OF    l8l2.  33 $ 

March  25th,  a  large  Indiaman  (the  Woodbridge]  was 
captured  ;  but  while  taking  possession  the  weather 
cleared  up,  and  Capt.  Morris  found  himself  to  lee 
ward  of  25  sail,  two  of  which,  a  two-decker  and  a 
frigate,  were  making  for  him,  and  it  took  him  till  the 
next  day  to  shake  them  off.  He  entered  Savannah 
on  May  1st  and  sailed  again  on  the  8th,  standing  in 
to  the  Gulf  Stream,  between  Makanilla  and  Florida, 
to  look  out  for  the  Jamaica  fleet.  He  found  this 
fleet  on  the  24th,  but  the  discovery  failed  to  do  him 
much  good,  as  the  ships  were  under  the  convoy  of  a 
74,  two  frigates,  and  three  brigs.  The  Adams  hov 
ered  on  their  skirts  for  a  couple  of  days,  but  noth 
ing  could  be  done  with  them,  for  the  merchant-men 
sailed  in  the  closest  possible  order  and  the  six  war 
vessels  exercised  the  greatest  vigilance.  So  the 
corvette  passed  northward  to  the  Newfoundland 
Banks,  where  she  met  with  nothing  but  fogs  and 
floating  ice,  and  then  turned  her  prow  toward  Ire 
land.  On  July  4th  she  made  out  and  chased  two 
sail,  who  escaped  into  the  mouth  of  the  Shannon. 
After  this  the  Adams,  heartily  tired  of  fogs  and 
cold,  stood  to  the  southward  and  made  a  few 
prizes;  then,  in  lat.  44°  N.,  long.  10°  W.,  on  July 
1 5th,  she  stumbled  across  the  iS-pounder  36-guru 
frigate  Tigris,  Capt.  Henderson.  The  frigate  was 
to  leeward,  and  a  hard  chase  ensued.  It  was  only 
by  dint  of  cutting  away  her  anchors  and  throwing 
overboard  some  of  her  guns  that  the  Adams  held 
her  own  till  sunset,  when  it  fell  calm.  Capt  Morris 
and  his  first  lieutenant,  Mr.  Wadsworth,  had  been 
the  first  and  second  lieutenants  of  Old  Ironsides  in 
Hull's  famous  cruise,  and  they  proved  that  they  had 
not  forgotten  their  early  experience,  for  they  got 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

out  the  boats  to  tow,  and  employed  their  time  so 
well  that  by  sunrise  the  frigate  was  two  leagues 
astern.  After  18  hours'  more  chase  the  Adams 
dropped  her.  But  in  a  day  or  two  she  ran  across  a 
couple  more,  one  of  which,  an  old  bluff-bows,  was 
soon  thrown  out ;  but  the  other  was  very  fast,  and 
kept  close  on  the  corvette's  heels.  As  before,  the 
frigate  was  to  leeward.  The  Adams  had  been  built 
by  contract ;  one  side  was  let  to  a  sub-contractor  of 
economical  instincts,  and  accordingly  turned  out 
rather  shorter  than  the  other ;  the  result  was,  the 
ship  sailed  a  good  deal  faster  on  one  tack  than  on 
the  other.  In  this  chase  she  finally  got  on  her  good 
tack  in  the  night,  and  so  escaped.1  Capt.  Morris 
now  turned  homeward.  During  his  two  cruises  he 
had  made  but  10  prizes  (manned  by  161  men),  none 
of  very  great  value.  His  luck  grew  worse  and 
worse.  The  continual  cold  and  damp  produced 
scurvy,  and  soon  half  of  his  crew  were  prostrated  by 
the  disease  ;  and  the  weather  kept  on  foggy  as  ever. 
Off  the  Maine  coast  a  brig-sloop  (the  Rifleman,  Capt. 
Pearce)  was  discovered  and  chased,  but  it  escaped 
in  the  thick  weather.  The  fog  grew  heavier,  and 
early  on  the  morning  of  Aug.  i/th  the  Adams  struck 
land — literally  struck  it,  too,  for  she  grounded  on 
the  Isle  of  Haute,  and  had  to  throw  over  provisions, 
spare  spars,  etc.,  before  she  could  be  got  off.  Then 
she  entered  the  Penobscot,  and  sailed  27  miles  up  it 
to  Hampden.  The  Rifleman  meanwhile  conveyed 
intelligence  of  her  whereabouts  to  a  British  fleet, 
consisting  of  two  line-of-battle  ships,  three  frigates, 
three  sloops,  and  ten  troop  transports,  under  the 

1  This  statement  is  somewhat  traditional  ;  I  have  also  seen  it  made 
about  the  'John  Adams.  But  some  old  officers  have  told  me  positively 
that  it  occurred  to  the  Adams  on  this  cruise. 


NAVAL   WAR    OF    l8l2.  337 

joint  command  of  Rear-Admiral  Griffeth  and  Lieu 
tenant-General  Sherbrooke.1 

This  expedition  accordingly  went  into  the  Penob- 
scot  and  anchored  off  Castine.  Captain  Morris 
made  every  preparation  he  could  to  defend  his  ship, 
but  his  means  were  very  limited ;  seventy  of  his  men 
were  dead  or  disabled  by  the  scurvy  ;  the  remainder, 
many  of  them  also  diseased,  were  mustered  out,  to 
the  number  of  130  officers  and  seamen  (without 
muskets)  and  20  marines.  He  was  joined,  however, 
by  30  regulars,  and  later  by  over  300  militia  armed 
with  squirrel  guns,  ducking-  and  fowling-pieces,  etc., 
— in  all  between  500  and  550  men,2  only  180  of 
whom,  with  50  muskets  among  them,  could  be  de 
pended  upon.  On  Sept.  3d  the  British  advanced 
by  land  and  water,  the  land-force  being  under  the 
direction  of  Lieutenant-Colonel  John,  and  consisting 
of  600  troops,  80  marines,  and  80  seamen.3  The 
flotilla  was  composed  of  barges,  launches,  and  rock 
et-boats,  under  the  command  of  Captain  Barry  of 
the  Dragon,  74.  In  all  there  were  over  1,500  men. 
The  seamen  of  the  Adams,  from  the  wharf,  opened 
fire  on  the  flotilla,  which  returned  it  with  rockets  and 
carronades  ;  but  the  advance  was  checked.  Meanwhile 
the  British  land-forces  attacked  the  militia,  who 
acted  up  to  the  traditional  militia  standard,  and  re 
treated  with  the  utmost  promptitude  and  celerity, 
omitting  the  empty  formality  of  firing.  This  left 

1  James,  vi,  479.  2  "Autobiography  of  Commodore  Morris." 

3  James,  vi.  481.  Whenever  militia  are  concerned  James  has  not 
much  fear  of  official  documents  and  lets  his  imagination  run  riot ; 
he  here  says  the  Americans  had  1,400  men,  which  is  as  accurate  as  he 
generally  is  in  writing  about  this  species  of  force.  His  aim  being  to 
overestimate  the  number  of  the  Americans  in  the  various  engage 
ments,  he  always  supplies  militia  ad  libitum,  to  make  up  any  possible 
deficiency. 


338  NAVAL  WAR   OF    l8l2. 

Captain  Morris  surrounded  by  eight  times  his  num 
ber,  and  there  was  nothing  to  do  but  set  fire  to  the 
corvette  and  retreat.  The  seamen,  marines,  and 
regulars  behaved  well,  and  no  attempt  was  made  to 
molest  them.  None  of  Captain  Morris'  men  were 
hit  ;  his  loss  was  confined  to  one  sailor  and  one  ma 
rine  who  were  too  much  weakened  by  scurvy  to  re 
treat  with  the  others,  who  marched  to  Portland,  200 
miles  off.  The  British  lost  ten  men  killed  or 
wounded. 

On  Sept.  Qth  Gunboats  No.  160  and  151,  com 
manded  by  Mr.  Thomas  M.  Pendleton,  captured  off 
Sapoleo  Bar,  Ga.,  the  British  privateer  Fortune  of 
War,  armed  with  two  heavy  pivot  guns,  and  35  men. 
She  made  a  brief  resistance,  losing  two  of  her  men.1 

On  Sept.  1 5th  the  British  2O-gun  ship-sloops 
Hermes  and  Carron,  and  i8-gun  brig-sloops  Sophie 
and  Childers,  and  a  force  of  200  men  on  shore,2  at 
tacked  Fort  Bowyer,  on  Mobile  Point,  but  were  re 
pulsed  without  being  able  to  do  any  damage  what 
ever  to  the  Americans.  The  Hermes  was  sunk  and 
the  assailants  lost  about  80  men. 

On  the  26th  of  September,  while  the  privateer- 
schooner  General  Armstrong,  of  New  York,  Captain 
Samuel  C.  Reid,  of  one  long  24,  eight  long  Q'S,  and 
90  men,  was  lying  at  anchor  in  the  road  of  Fayal,  a 
British  squadron,  composed  of  the  Plantagenet,  74, 
Captain  Robert  Floyd,  Rota,  38,  Captain  Philip 
Somerville,  and  Carnation,  18,  Captain  George  Ben- 
tham,  hove  in  sight.3  One  or  more  boats  were 

1  Letter  from  Commodore   H.   E.  Campbell,  St.  Mary's,  Sept.  12, 
1814. 

2  James,  vi.  527. 

3  Letter  of  Captain  S.  C.  Reid,  Oct.  7,  1814  ;  and  of  John  B.  Dab- 
ney,  Oomul  at  Fayal,  Oct.  5,  1814. 


NAVAL  WAR   OF    l8l2.  339 

sent  in  by  the  British,  to  reconnoitre  the  schooner, 
as  they  asserted,  or,  according  to  the  American  ac 
counts,  to  carry  her  by  a  coup  de  main.  At  any 
rate,  after  repeatedly  warning  them  off,  the  priva 
teer  fired  into  them,  and  they  withdrew.  Captain 
Reid  then  anchored,  with  springs  on  his  cables, 
nearer  shore,  to  await  the  expected  attack,  which 
was  not  long  deferred.  At  8  P.  M.  four  boats  from 
the  Plantagenet  and  three  from  the  Rota,  contain 
ing  in  all  180  men,1  under  the  command  of 
Lieutenant  William  Matterface,  first  of  the  Rota, 
pulled  in  toward  the  road,  while  the  Carnation 
accompanied  them  to  attack  the  schooner  if  she 
got  under  way.  The  boats  pulled  in  under  cover 
of  a  small  reef  of  rocks,  where  they  lay  for  some 
time,  and  about  midnight  made  the  attack.  The 
Americans  opened  with  the  pivot  gun,  and  im 
mediately  afterward  with  their  long  9*3,  while  the 
boats  replied  with  their  carronades,  and,  pulling 
spiritedly  on  amidst  a  terrific  fire  of  musketry  from 
both  sides,  laid  the  schooner  aboard  on  her  bow 
and  starboard  quarter.  The  struggle  was  savage 
enough,  the  British  hacking  at  the  nettings  and  try 
ing  to  clamber  up  on  deck,  while  the  Americans 
fired  their  muskets  and  pistols  in  the  faces  of  their 
assailants  and  thrust  the  foremost  through  with 
their  long  pikes.  The  boats  on  the  quarter  were 
driven  off ;  but  on  the  forecastle  all  three  of  the 
American  lieutenants  were  killed  or  disabled,  and 
the  men  were  giving  back  when  Captain  Reid  led 
all  the  after-division  up  and  drove  the  British  back 
into  their  boats.  This  put  an  end  to  the  assault. 

'James,  vi,  509:  Both  American  accounts  say  12  boats,  with  400 
men,  and  give  the  British  loss  as  250.  According  to  my  usual  rule,  I 
take  each  side's  statement  of  its  own  force  and  loss 


340 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 


Two  boats  were  sunk,  most  of  the  wounded  being 
saved  as  the  shore  was  so  near  ;  two  others  were 
captured,  and  but  three  of  the  scattered  flotilla  re 
turned  to  the  ships.  Of  the  Americans,  2  were 
killed,  including  the  second  lieutenant,  Alexander 
O.  Williams,  and  7  were  wounded,  including  the 
first  and  third  lieutenants,  Frederick  A.  Worth  and 
Robert  Johnson.  Of  the  British,  34  were  killed  and 
86  were  wounded  ;  among  the  former  being  the 
Rotas  first  and  third  lieutenants,  William  Matter- 
face  and  Charles  R.  Norman,  and  among  the  latter 
her  second  lieutenant  and  first  lieutenant  of  marines, 
Richard  Rawle  and  Thomas  Park.  The  schooner's 
long  24  had  been  knocked  off  its  carriage  by  a  car- 
ronade  shot,  but  it  was  replaced  and  the  deck 
cleared  for  another  action.  Next  day  the  Carna 
tion  came  in  to  destroy  the  privateer,  but  was 
driven  off  by  the  judicious  use  the  latter  made  of 
her  "  Long  Tom."  But  affairs  being  now  hopeless, 
the  General  Armstrong 'was  scuttled  and  burned,  and 
the  Americans  retreated  to  the  land.  The  British 
squadron  was  bound  for  New  Orleanss  and  on  ac 
count  of  the  delay  and  loss  that  it  suffered,  it  was 
late  in  arriving,  so  that  this  action  may  be  said  to 
have  helped  in  saving  the  Crescent  City.  Few 
regular  commanders  could  have  done  as  well  as 
Captain  Reid. 

On  October  6th,  while  Gun-boat  No.  160  was 
convoying  some  coasters  from  Savannah,  it  was  car 
ried  by  a  British  tender  and  nine  boats.1  The  gun- 
vessel  was  lying  at  anchor  about  eight  leagues  from 
St.  Mary's,  and  the  boats  approached  with  muffled 
oars  early  in  the  morning.  They  were  not  discov- 

1  Letter  from  Commander  H.  C.  Campbell,  Oct  12,  1814. 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  341 

ered  till  nearly  aboard,  but  the  defence  though 
short  was  spirited,  the  British  losing  about  20  men. 
Of  the  gun-boat's  30  men  but  16  were  fit  for  action ; 
those,  under  Sailing-master  Thomas  Paine,  behaved 
well.  Mr.  Paine,  especially,  fought  with  the  great 
est  gallantry  ;  his  thigh  was  broken  by  a  grape-shot 
at  the  very  beginning,  but  he  hobbled  up  on  his 
other  leg  to  resist  the  boarders,  fighting  till  he  was 
thrust  through  by  a  pike  and  had  received  two 
sabre  cuts.  Any  one  of  his  wounds  would  have 
been  enough  to  put  an  ordinary  man  hors  de 
combat. 

On  October  nth,  another  desperate  privateer 
battle  took  place.  The  brigantine  Prince-de-Neuf- 
chatel,  Captain  Ordronaux,  of  New  York,  was  a  su 
perbly  built  vessel  of  310  tons,  mounting  17  guns, 
and  originally  possessing  a  crew  of  150  men.1  She 
had  made  a  very  successful  cruise,  having  on  board 
goods  to  the  amount  of  $300,000,  but  had  manned 
and  sent  in  so  many  prizes  that  only  40  of  her  crew 
were  left  on  board,  while  37  prisoners  were  confined 
in  the  hold.  One  of  her  prizes  was  in  company, 
but  had  drifted  off  to  such  a  distance  that  she  was 
unable  to  take  part  in  the  fight.  At  mid-day,  on 
the  nth  of  October,  while  off  Nantucket,  the 
British  frigate  Endymion,  40,  Captain  Henry  Hope, 
discovered  the  privateer  and  made  sail  in  chase.3 
At  8.30  P.  M.,  a  calm  having  come  on,  the  frigate 
despatched  5  boats,  containing  ill  men,3  under  the 

1  "  History  of  American  Privateers,"  by  George  Coggeshall,  p.  241, 
New  York,  1876, 

*  James,  vi,  p.  527. 

3  According  to  Captain  Ordronaux  ;  James  does  not  give  the  num 
ber,  but  says  28  were  killed,  37  wounded,  and  the  crew  of  the  launch 
captured.  Ten  of  the  latter  were  unwounded,  and  18  wounded  I 
do  not  know  if  he  included  these  last  among  his  "  37  wounded." 


342  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

command  of  the  first  lieutenant,  Abel  Hawkins,  to 
take  the  brigantine  ,  while  the  latter  triced  up  the 
boarding  nettings,  loaded  the  guns  with  grape  and 
bullets,  and  prepared  herself  in  every  way  for  the 
coming  encounter.  She  opened  fire  on  the  boats  as 
they  drew  near,  but  they  were  soon  alongside,  and 
a  most  desperate  engagement  ensued.  Some  of  the 
British  actually  cut  through  the  nettings  and 
reached  the  deck,  but  were  killed  by  the  privateers- 
men  ;  and  in  a  few  minutes  one  boat  was  sunk, 
three  others  drifted  off,  and  the  launch,  which  was 
under  the  brigantine's  stern,  was  taken  possession  of. 
The  slaughter  had  been  frightful,  considering  the 
number  of  the  combatants.  The  victorious  priva- 
teersmen  had  lost  7  killed,  15  badly  and  9  slightly 
wounded,  leaving  but  9  untouched  !  Of  \hzEndym- 
ions  men,  James  says  28,  including  the  first  lieuten 
ant  and  a  midshipman,  were  killed,  and  37,  including 
the  second  lieutenant  and  a  master's  mate,  wounded  ; 
"besides  which  the  launch  was  captured  and  the 
crew  made  prisoners."  I  do  not  know  if  this  means 
37  wounded,  besides  the  wounded  in  the  launch,  or 
not1;  of  the  prisoners  captured  18  were  wounded 
and  10  unhurt,  so  the  loss  was  either  28  killed,  55 
wounded,  and  10  unhurt  prisoners ;  or  else  28 
killed,  37  wounded,  and  10  prisoners;  but  whether 
the  total  was  93  or  75  does  not  much  matter.  It 
was  a  most  desperate  conflict,  and,  remembering 
how  short-handed  the  brigantine  was,  it  reflected 
the  highest  honor  on  the  American  captain  and  his 
crew. 

After  their  repulse  before   Baltimore   the  British 

1  I  think  James  does  not  include  the  wounded  in  the  launch,  as  he 
says  28  wounded  were  sent  aboard  the  Saturn  ;  this  could  hardly 
have  included  the  men  who  had  been  captured. 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  343 

concentrated  their  forces  for  an  attack  upon  New 
Orleans.  Accordingly  a  great  fleet  of  line-of-battle 
ships,  frigates,  and  smaller  vessels,  under  Vice-Ad 
miral  Cochrane,  convoying  a  still  larger  number  of 
store-ships  and  transports,  containing  the  army  of 
General  Packenham,  appeared  off  the  Chandeleur 
Islands  on  Dec.  8th.  The  American  navy  in  these 
parts  consisted  of  the  ship  Louisiana  and  schooner 
Carolina  in  the  Mississippi  river,  and  in  the  shallow 
bayous  a  few  gun-boats,  of  course  without  quarters, 
low  in  the  water,  and  perfectly  easy  of  entrance. 
There  were  also  a  few  tenders  and  small  boats.  The 
British  frigates  and  sloops  anchored  off  the  broad, 
shallow  inlet  called  Lake  Borgne  on  the  I2th  ;  on 
this  inlet  there  were  5  gun-boats  and  2  small  ten 
ders,  under  the  command  of  Lieut.  Thomas  Catesby 
Jones.  It  was  impossible  for  the  British  to  trans 
port  their  troops  across  Lake  Borgne,  as  contem 
plated,  until  this  flotilla  was  destroyed.  Accord 
ingly,  on  the  night  of  the  I2th,  42  launches,  armed 
with  24-,  1 8-,  and  12-pounder  carronades,  and  3  un 
armed  gigs,  carrying  980  seamen  and  marines,  un 
der  the  orders  of  Capt.  Lockyer,1  pushed  off  from 
the  Armide,  38,  in  three  divisions ;  the  first  under 
the  command  of  Capt.  Lockyer,  the  second  under 
Capt.  Montresor,  and  the  third  under  Capt.  Rob 
erts.2  Lieut.  Jones  was  at  anchor  with  his  boats  at 
the  Malheureux  Islands,  when  he  discovered,  on  the 
1 3th,  the  British  flotilla  advancing  toward  Port 
Christian.  He  at  once  despatched  the  Seahorse 
of  one  6-pounder  and  14  men,  under  Sailing- 
master  William  Johnston,  to  destroy  the  stores  at 
Bay  St.  Louis.  She  moored  herself  under  the  bank, 

James,  vi,  521. 
1  Letter  of  Capt.  Lockyer  to  Vice-Admiral  Cochrane,  Dec.  18,  1814. 


344  NAVAL    WAR   OF    l8l2. 

where  she  was  assisted  by  two  6-pounders.  There 
the  British  attacked  her  with  seven  of  their  smaller 
boats,  which  were  repulsed  after  sustaining  for 
nearly  half  an  hour  a  very  destructive  fire.1  How 
ever,  Mr.  Johnston  had  to  burn  his  boat  to  prevent  it 
from  being  taken  by  a  larger  force.  Meanwhile 
Lieut.  Jones  got  under  way  with  the  five  gun-vessels, 
trying  to  reach  Les  Petites  Coquilles,  near  a  small 
fort  at  the  mouth  of  a  creek.  But  as  the  wind  was 
light  and  baffling,  and  the  current  very  strong,  the 
effort  was  given  up,  and  the  vessels  came  to  anchor 
off  Malheureux  Island  passage  at  I  A.  M.  on  the 
1 4th.2  The  other  tender,  the  Alligator,  Sailing- 
master  Sheppard,  of  one  4-pounder  and  8  men,  was 
discovered  next  morning  trying  to  get  to  her  con 
sorts,  and  taken  with  a  rush  by  Capt.  Roberts  and 
his  division.  At  daybreak  Lieut.  Jones  saw  the 
British  boats  about  nine  miles  to  the  eastward,  and 
moored  his  5-gun  vessel  abreast  in  the  channel,  with 
their  boarding  nettings  triced  up,  and  every  thing 
in  readiness  ;  but  the  force  of  the  current  drifted  two 
of  them,  Nos.  156  and  163,  a  hundred  yards  down 
the  pass  and  out  of  line,  No.  156  being  the  head 
most  of  all.  Their  exact  force  was  as  follows:  No. 
156,  Lieut.  Jones,  41  men  and  5  guns(i  long  24  and 
4  12-pound  carronades)  ;  No.  163,  Sailing-master 
Geo.  Ulrick,  21  men,  3  guns  (i  long  24  and  2  12- 
pound  carronades)  ;  No.  162,  Lieut.  Robert  Speddes 
35  men,  5  guns  (i  long  24  and  4  light  sixes) ;  No.  5, 
Sailing-master  John  D.  Ferris,  36  men,  5  guns  (i 
long  24,  4  12-pound  carronades);  No.  23,  Lieut. 
Isaac  McKeever,  39  men  and  5  guns  (i  long  32  and 
4  light  sixes).  There  were  thus,  in  all,  182  men  and 

1  James,  vi,  521. 

3  Official  letter  of  Lieut.  Jones,  March  12,  1815. 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  345 

a  broadside  of  14  guns,  throwing  212  pounds  of 
shot.  The  British  forces  amounted,  as  I  have  said, 
to  980  men,  and  (supposing  they  had  equal  num 
bers  of  24*3,  i8's,  and  I2's,)  the  flotilla  threw 
seven  hundred  and  fifty-eight  pounds  of  shot.  The 
odds  of  course  were  not  as  much  against  the  Amer 
icans  as  these  figures  would  make  them,  for  they 
were  stationary,  had  some  long,  heavy  guns  and 
boarding  nettings ;  on  the  other  hand  the  fact  that 
two  of  their  vessels  had  drifted  out  of  line  was  a 
very  serious  misfortune.  At  any  rate,  the  odds 
werd  great  enough,  considering  that  he  had  British 
sailors  to  deal  with,  to  make  it  any  thing  but  a  cheer 
ful  look-out  for  Lieut.  Jones  ;  but  nowise  daunted 
by  the  almost  certain  prospect  of  defeat  the  Ameri 
can  officers  and  seamen  prepared  very  coolly  for  the 
fight.  In  this  connection  it  should  be  remembered 
that  simply  to  run  the  boats  on  shore  would  have 
permitted  the  men  to  escape,  if  they  had  chosen  to 
do  so. 

Captain  Lockyer  acted  as  coolly  as  his  antagonist. 
When  he  had  reached  a  point  just  out  of  gun-shot, 
he  brought  the  boats  to  a  grapnel,  to  let  the  sailors 
eat  breakfast  and  get  a  little  rest  after  the  fatigue 
of  their  long  row.  When  his  men  were  rested  and 
in  good  trim  he  formed  the  boats  in  open  order, 
and  they  pulled  gallantly  on  against  the  strong  cur 
rent.  At  10.50  the  Americans  opened  fire  from 
their  long  guns,  and  in  about  15  minutes  the  can 
nonade  became  general  on  both  sides.  At  11.50* 
Captain  Lockyer's  barge  was  laid  alongside  No.  156, 
and  a  very  obstinate  struggle  ensued,  "  in  which 
the  greater  part  of  the  officers  and  crew  of  the 

1  Lieut.  Jones'  letter. 


346  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

barge  were  killed  or  wounded,"  *  including  among 
the  latter  the  gallant  captain  himself,  severely,  and 
his  equally  gallant  first  lieutenant,  Mr.  Pratt,  of  the 
Seahorse  frigate,  mortally.  At  the  same  time  Lieut. 
Tatnall  (of  the  Tonnanf)  also  laid  his  barge  aboard 
the  gun-boat,  only  to  have  it  sunk ;  another  shared 
the  same  fate ;  and  the  assailants  were  for  the 
moment  repulsed.  But  at  this  time  Lieut.  Jones, 
who  had  shown  as  much  personal  bravery  during 
the  assault,  as  forethought  in  preparing  for  it,  re 
ceived  a  dangerous  and  disabling  wound,  while 
many  of  his  men  received  the  same  fate ;  the  board 
ing  nettings,  too,  had  all  been  cut  or  shot  away. 
Several  more  barges  at  once  assailed  the  boats, 
the  command  of  which  had  devolved  on  a  young 
midshipman,  Mr.  George  Parker;  the  latter,  fighting 
as  bravely  as  his  commander,  was  like  him  severely 
wounded,  whereupon  the  boat  was  carried  at  12. 10. 
Its  guns  were  turned  on  No.  163,  and  this,  the 
smallest  of  the  gun-boats,  was  soon  taken  ;  then  the 
British  dashed  at  No.  162  and  carried  it,  after  a 
very  gallant  defence,  in  which  Lieut.  Speddes  was 
badly  wounded.  No.  5  had  her  long  24  dis 
mounted  by  the  recoil,  and  was  next  carried  ;  finally, 
No.  23,  being  left  entirely  alone,  hauled  down  her 
flag  at  I2.3O.2  The  Americans  had  lost  6  killed 
and  35  wounded  ;  the  British  17  killed  and  77  (many 
mortally)  wounded.  The  greater  part  of  the  loss 
on  both  sides  occurred  in  boarding  No.  156,  and 
also  the  next  two  gun-boats. 

I  have  in  this  case,  as  usual,  taken  each  com 
mander's  account  of  his  own  force  and  loss.  Lieut. 
Jones  states  the  British  force  to  have  been  1,000, 

1  Captain  Lockyer's  letter. 

a  Minutes  of  the  Court  of  Inquiry,  held  May  15,  1851. 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  347 

which  tallies  almost  exactly  with  their  own  ac 
count  ;  but  believes  that  they  lost  300  in  killed 
and  wounded.  Captain  Lockyer,  on  the  other 
hand,  gives  the  Americans  225  men  and  three  ad 
ditional  light  guns.  But  on  the  main  points  the 
two  accounts  agree  perfectly.  The  victors  cer 
tainly  deserve  great  credit  for  the  perseverance, 
gallantry,  and  dash  they  displayed  ;  but  still  more 
belongs  to  the  vanquished  for  the  cool  skill  and 
obstinate  courage  with  which  they  fought,  al 
though  with  the  certainty  of  ultimate  defeat  be 
fore  them, — which  is  always  the  severest  test  of 
bravery.  No  comment  is  needed  to  prove  the  ef 
fectiveness  of  their  resistance.  Even  James  says 
that  the  Americans  made  an  obstinate  struggle, 
that  Lieut.  Jones  displayed  great  personal  bravery, 
and  that  the  British  loss  was  very  severe. 

On  the  night  of  Dec.  23d  Gen.  Jackson  beat  up 
the  quarters  of  the  British  encamped  on  the  bank 
of  the  Mississippi.  The  attack  was  opened  by  Capt. 
Patterson  in  the  schooner  Carolina,  14;  she  was 
manned  by  70  men,  and  mounted  on  each  side  six 
12-pound  carronades  and  one  long  12.  Dropping 
down  the  stream  unobserved,  till  opposite  the  biv 
ouac  of  the  troops  and  so  close  to  the  shore  that 
his  first  command  to  fire  was  plainly  heard  by  the 
foe,  Patterson  opened  a  slaughtering  cannonade  on 
the  flank  of  the  British,  and  kept  it  up  without 
suffering  any  loss  in  return,  as  long  as  the  attack 
lasted.  But  on  the  27th  the  British  had  their  re 
venge,  attacking  the  little  schooner  as  she  lay  at 
anchor,  unable  to  ascend  the  current  on  account  of 
the  rapid  current  and  a  strong  head-wind.  The  as 
sailants  had  a  battery  of  5  guns,  throwing  hot  shot 

Cooper,  ii,  p.  320. 


348 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    1 8 12. 


and  shell,  while  the  only  gun  of  the  schooner's  that 
would  reach  was  the  long  12.  After  half  an  hour's 
fighting  the  schooner  was  set  on  fire  and  blown  up  ; 
the  crew  escaped  to  the  shore  with  the  loss  of  7  men 
killed  and  wounded.  The  only  remaining  vessel, 
exclusive  of  some  small,  unarmed  row-boats,  was  the 
Louisiana,  16,  carrying  on  each  side  eight  long  24*3. 
She  was  of  great  assistance  in  the  battle  of  the  28th, 
throwing  during  the  course  of  the  cannonade  over 
800  shot,  and  suffering  very  little  in  return.1  After 
ward  the  American  seamen  and  marines  played  a 
most  gallant  part  in  all  the  engagements  on  shore ; 
they  made  very  efficient  artillerists. 

SUMMARY. 
The  following  vessels  were  got  ready  for  sea  during  this  year  :  * 


Name. 

Rig. 

Where   Built. 

Cost. 

c 

0> 

C 

3 

O 

c 

O 

H 

Remarks. 

Vast* 

Ship 

Newburyport 

$77,459.60 

160 

22 

509 

Built 

?rolic, 

it 

Boston 

72,094.82 

" 

" 

41 

" 

^eacock* 

H 

New  York 

75,644.36 

" 

» 

" 

" 

Intario* 

M 

Baltimore 

59,343.69 

11 

11 

11 

" 

?rie, 

M 

" 

56,174.36 

" 

" 

" 

n 

^om  Bowline, 

Schooner 

Portsmouth 

13,000.00 

90 

12 

260 

Purchased 

,ynx, 

" 

Washington 

5° 

6 

Built 

Ipervier, 

Brig 

England 

50,000.00 

130 

18 

477 

Captured 

^lambeau, 

it 

Baltimore 

14,000.00 

90 

J4 

300 

Purchased 

Spark, 

M 

it 

17,389.00 

" 

lt 

11 

'* 

Firefly* 

it 

u 

17,435.00 

" 

11 

333 

tt 

Torch, 

Schooner 

u 

13,000.00 

60 

12 

260 

4k 

Spitfire, 

«t 

M 

20,000.00 

11 

" 

286 

i( 

.Eagle* 

u 

N.  O. 

" 

l* 

270 

11 

r  Prometheus, 

u 

Philadelphia 

20,000.00 

" 

11 

290 

M 

Chippeway, 

Brig 

R.I. 

52,OOO.OO 

90 

14 

39° 

it 

Saranac, 

" 

Middleton 

26,000.00 

" 

11 

360 

it 

Boxer, 

" 

" 

26,000.00 

" 

" 

370 

l< 

despatch, 

Schooner 

23 

2 

52 

Am.  State  Papers,  xiv.  p.  828  ;  also  Emmons'  statistical  "  History. 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 


349 


The  first  5  small  vessels  that  are  bracketed  were 
to  cruise  under  Commodore  Porter;  the  next  4 
under  Commodore  Perry  ;  but  the  news  of  peace 
arrived  before  either  squadron  put  to  sea.  Some  of 
the  vessels  under  this  catalogue  were  really  almost 
ready  for  sea  at  the  end  of  1813  ;  and  some  that  I 
have  included  in  the  catalogue  of  1815  were  almost 
completely  fitted  at  the  end  of  1814, — but  this  ar 
rangement  is  practically  the  best. 

LIST   OF  VESSELS   LOST   TO   THE   BRITISH. 


Name. 


I.       DESTROYED    BY    BRITISH    ARMIES. 
Tons.  Guns. 


Columbia, 

1,508 

52 

Adams, 

760 

28 

Argus, 

509 

22 

Carolina, 

230 

14 

Destroyed  to  prevent 
them  falling  into  hands 
of  enemy. 
Destroyed  by  battery. 


3,007 


116 


2.      CAPTURED,    ETC.,    BY   BRITISH   NAVY   ON    OCEAN. 


Name.  Tons. 

Essex,  860 

Frolic,  509 

Rattlesnake,  258 
Syren,  250 


Guns. 

46  Captured  by  frigate  and  corvette. 

22  by  frigate  and  schooner. 

1 6  by  frigate. 

1 6  by  seventy-four. 


1,877       I0° 
Total,  4,884  tons.        216  guns. 

There  were  also  a  good  many  gun-boats,  which  I 
do   not  count,  because,  as  already  said,   they  were 


350  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

often  not  as  large  as  the  barges  that  were  sunk  and 
taken  in  attacking  them,  as  at  Craney  Island,  etc. 

LIST   OF   VESSELS   TAKEN   FROM    BRITISH. 

I.        CAPTURED    BY    AMERICAN    PRIVATEERS. 
Name.  Tons.  Guns. 

Ballahou,  86  4 

Landrail,  76  4 

2.       CAPTURED,    ETC.,    BY    AMERICAN    NAVY    ON    OCEAN. 
Name.  Tons.  Guns. 

Epervier  477  18  captured  by  sloop  Peacock. 

Avon,  477  20  sunk  Wasp. 

Reindeer,  477  19 

Pictou,  300  14  captured  by  frigate. 

3.       SUNK    IN    ATTACKING   FORT. 

Hermes,  500  22 

2,393  101 

Taking  into  account  the  losses  on  the  lakes,  there 
was  not  very  much  difference  in  the  amount  of  dam 
age  done  to  each  combatant  by  the  other  ;  but  both 
as  regards  the  material  results  and  the  moral  effects, 
the  balance  inclined  largely  to  the  Americans.  The 
chief  damage  done  to  our  navy  was  by  the  British 
land-forces,  and  consisted  mainly  in  forcing  us  to 
burn  an  unfinished  frigate  and  sloop.  On  the  ocean 
our  three  sloops  were  captured  in  each  case  by  an 
overwhelming  force,  against  which  no  resistance 
could  be  made,  and  the  same  was  true  of  the  capt 
ured  British  schooner.  The  Essex  certainly  gained 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  351 

as  much  hotter  as  her  opponents.  There  were  but 
three  single  ship  actions,  in  all  of  which  the  Ameri 
cans  were  so  superior  in  force  as  to  give  them  a 
very  great  advantage ;  nevertheless,  in  two  of  them 
the  victory  was  won  with  such  perfect  impunity  and 
the  difference  in  the  loss  and  damage  inflicted  was 
so  very  great,  that  I  doubt  if  the  result  would  have 
been  affected  if  the  odds  had  been  reversed.  In  the 
other  case,  that  of  the  Reindeer,  the  defeated  party 
fought  at  a  still  greater  disadvantage,  and  yet  came 
out  of  the  conflict  with  full  as  much  honor  as  the 
victor.  No  man  with  a  particle  of  generosity  in  his 
nature  can  help  feeling  the  most  honest  admiration 
for  the  unflinching  courage  and  cool  skill  displayed 
by  Capt.  Manners  and  his  crew.  It  is  worthy  of  no 
tice  (remembering  the  sneers  of  so  many  of  the 
British  authors  at  the  "  wary  circumspection  "  of  the 
Americans)  that  Capt.  Manners,  who  has  left  a  more 
honorable  name  than  any  other  British  commander 
of  the  war,  excepting  Capt.  Broke,  behaved  with 
the  greatest  caution  as  long  as  it  would  serve  his 
purpose,  while  he  showed  the  most  splendid  per 
sonal  courage  afterward.  It  is  this  combination  of 
courage  and  skill  that  made  him  so  dangerous  an 
antagonist ;  it  showed  that  the  traditional  British 
bravery  was  not  impaired  by  refusing  to  adhere  to 
the  traditional  British  tactics  of  rushing  into  a  fight 
"  bull-headed."  Needless  exposure  to  danger  de 
notes  not  so  much  pluck  as  stupidity.  Capt.  Man 
ners  had  no  intention  of  giving  his  adversary  any 
advantage  he  could  prevent.  No  one  can  help 
feeling  regret  that  he  was  killed  ;  but  if  he  was  to 
fall,  what  more  glorious  death  could  he  meet  ?  It 
must  be  remembered  that  while  paying  all  homage 


352  NAVAL  WAR   OF    l8l2. 

to  Capt.  Manners,  Capt  Blakely  did  equally  well.  It 
was  a  case  where  the  victory  between  two  comba 
tants,  equal  in  courage  and  skill,  was  decided  by  su 
perior  weight  of  metal  and  number  of  men. 

PRIZES  MADE. 

Name  of  ship.  Number  of  prizes. 

President  3 

Constitution  6 

Adams  10 

Frolic  2 

Wasp  15 

Peacock  15 

Hornet  I 

Small  craft  35 

*7 


CHAPTER     VIII. 

1814. 

ON   THE    LAKES. 

ONTARIO — The  contest  one  of  ship-building  merely — Extreme  caution  of  the 
commanders,  verging  on  timidity — Yeo  takes  Oswego,  and  blockades  Sackett's 
Harbor — British  gun-boats  captured — Chauncy  blockades  Kingston — ERIE — 
Captain  Sinclair's  unsuccessful  expedition— Daring  and  successful  cutting-out 
expeditions  of  the  British— CHAMPLAIN— Macdonough's  victory. 

ONTARIO. 

THE  winter  was  spent  by  both  parties  in  pre 
paring  more  formidable  fleets  for  the  ensuing 
summer.  All  the  American  schooners  had  proved 
themselves  so  unfit  for  service  that  they  were  con 
verted  into  transports,  except  the  Sylph,  which  was 
brig-rigged  and  armed  like  the  Oneida.  Sackett's 
Harbor  possessed  but  slight  fortifications,  and  the 
Americans  were  kept  constantly  on  the  alert, 
through  fear  lest  the  British  should  cross  over. 
Commodore  Chauncy  and  Mr.  Eckford  were  as  un 
remitting  in  their  exertions  as  ever.  In  February 
two  22-gun  brigs,  the  Jefferson  and  Jones,  and  one 
large  frigate  of  50  guns,  the  Superior,  were  laid  ; 
afterward  a  deserter  brought  in  news  of  the  enor 
mous  size  of  one  of  the  new  British  frigates,  and 
the  Superior  was  enlarged  to  permit  her  carrying  62 
guns.  The  Jefferson  was  launched  on  April  /th,  the 
Jones  on  the  loth  ;  and  the  Superior  on  May  2d, — 
an  attempt  on  the  part  of  the  British  to  blow  her 
up  having  been  foiled  a  few  days  before.  Another 

353 


354  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

frigate,  the  Mohawk,  42,  was  at  once  begun.  Neither 
guns  nor  men  for  the  first  three  ships  had  as  yet 
arrived,  but  they  soon  began  to  come  in,  as  the 
roads  got  better  and  the  streams  opened.  Chauncy 
and  Eckford,  besides  building  bhips  that  were 
literally  laid  down  in  the  forest,  and  seeing  that  they 
were  armed  with  heavy  guns,  which,  as  well  as  all 
their  stores,  had  to  be  carried  overland  hundreds  of 
miles  through  the  wilderness,  were  obliged  to  settle 
quarrels  that  occurred  among  the  men,  the  most 
serious  being  one  that  arose  from  a  sentinel's  acci 
dentally  killing  a  shipwright,  whose  companions  in 
stantly  struck  work  in  a  body.  What  was  more 
serious,  they  had  to  contend  with  such  constant 
and  virulent  sickness  that  it  almost  assumed  the 
proportions  of  a  plague.  During  the  winter  it  was 
seldom  that  two  thirds  of  the  force  were  fit  for  duty, 
and  nearly  a  sixth  of  the  whole  number  of  men  in 
the  port  died  before  navigation  opened.1 

Meanwhile  Yeo  had  been  nearly  as  active  at 
Kingston,  laying  down  two  frigates  and  a  huge  line- 
of-battle  ship,  but  his  shipwrights  did  liot  succeed 
in  getting  the  latter  ready  much  before  navigation 
closed.  The  Prince  Regent,  58,  and  Princess  Char 
lotte,  42,  were  launched  on  April  I5th.  I  shall  an 
ticipate  somewhat  by  giving  tabular  lists  of  the 
comparative  forces,  after  the  two  British  frigates, 
the  two  American  frigates,  and  the  two  American 
brigs  had  all  been  equippe  I  ind  manned.  Commo 
dore  Yeo's  original  six  cruisers  had  been  all  re 
named,  some  of  them  re-armed,  and  both  the 
schooners  changed  into  brigs.  The  Wolfe,  Royal 

1  Cooper  mentions  that  in  five  months  the  Madison  buried  a  fifth 
of  her  crew. 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    1 8 12. 


355 


George,  Melville,  Moira,  Beresford,  and  Sydney 
Smith,  were  now  named  respectively  Montreal, 
Niagara,  Star,  Charwell,  Netly,  and  Magnet.  On 
the  American  side  there  had  been  but  slight 
changes,  beyond  the  alteration  of  the  Sylyh  into  a 
brig  armed  like  the  Oneida.  Of  the  Superior  s  62 
guns,  4  were  very  shortly  sent  on  shore  again. 

CHAUNCY'S   SQUADRON. 


Broadside 

Name. 

Rig. 

Tonnage. 

Crew. 

Metal. 

Armament. 

{30  long  32's 

Superior, 

ship, 

1,580 

500 

1,050  Ibs. 

2               24'3 
26  short  42*5 

{26  long  24*8 

Mohawk, 

4  « 

1,350 

350 

554    " 

2      "     iS's 

14  short  32*5 

Pike, 

« 

875 

300 

360    " 

j  26  long  24*8 
/     2       "      24's 

fyfadison. 

44 

593 

200 

364    " 

j    2  long  I2's 
(  22  short  32*5 

Jones, 

brig, 

500 

160 

332    " 

j    2  long  I2's 
{  20  short  32*5 

Jefferson, 

44 

500 

160 

332   " 

j    2  long  I2's 
(  20  short  32*5 

Sylph, 

44 

300 

100 

180   " 

j    2  long  I2's 
(  14  short  24's 

Oneida, 

44 

243 

100 

180   " 

j     2  long  I2's 
(  14  short  24's 

8  vessels, 


5,941         1,870         3,352  Ibs.        228  guns. 


This  is  considerably  less  than  James  makes  it,  as 
he  includes  all  the  schooners,  which  were  abandoned 
as  cruisers,  and  only  used  as  transports  or  gun-boats. 
Similarly  Sir  James  had  a  large  number  of  gun 
boats,  which  are  not  included  in  his  cruising  force. 
James  thus  makes  Chauncy's  force  2,321  men,  and 
a  broadside  of  4,188  Ibs. 


356 


NAVAL  WAR   OF   l8l2. 
YEO'S   SQUADRON. 


Name.               Rig.    Tonnage. 

Crew. 

Broadside 
Metal.           Armament. 

Prince  Regent,        ship, 

1,450 

485 

872 

{32  long  24's 
4  short  68's 

22          ;      32's 

Princess  Charlotte,     " 

1,215 

315 

604 

(  26  long  24's 
"    \    2  short  68's 

(  14            32's 

Montreal, 

637 

2  2O 

258 

««    j    7  long  24's 

\  18      "     i8's 

Niagara, 

5io 

200 

332 

,«    j    2  long  I2's 
\  20  short  32*3 

Charwelli                brig, 

279 

no 

236 

,,     (     2  long  I2's 
\  14  short  32*5 

Star,                           " 

262 

no 

236 

,4    j    2  long  I2's 
\  14  short  32's 

Netty, 

216 

100 

180 

,,    j    2  long  I2's 
\  14  short  24*5 

Magnet, 

187 

80 

156 

,,    j    2  long  I2's 
(  12  short  24*3 

8  vessels, 


4,756        1,620        2,874  Ibs.     209  guns. 


This  tallies  pretty  well  with  James'  statement, 
which  (on  p.  488)  is  1,517  men,  and  a  broadside  of 
2,752  Ibs.  But  there  are  very  probably  errors  as 
regards  the  armaments  of  the  small  brigs,  which 
were  continually  changed.  At  any  rate  the  Amer 
ican  fleet  was  certainly  the  stronger,  about  in  the 
proportion  of  six  to  five.  The  disproportion  was 
enough  to  justify  Sir  James  in  his  determination 
not  to  hazard  a  battle,  although  the  odds  were  cer 
tainly  not  such  as  British  commanders  had  been 
previously  accustomed  to  pay  much  regard  to. 
Chauncy  would  have  acted  exactly  as  his  oppo 
nent  did,  had  he  been  similarly  placed.  The  odds 
against  the  British  commodore  were  too  great  to 
be  overcome,  where  the  combatants  were  otherwise 
on  a  par,  although  the  refusal  to  do  battle  against 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  357 

them  would  certainly  preclude  Yeo  from  advancing 
any  claims  to  superiority  in  skill  or  courage.  The 
Princess  Charlotte  and  Niagara  were  just  about 
equal  to  the  Mohawk  and  Madison,  and  so  were  the 
Charivell  and  Netly  to  the  Oneida  and  Sylph;  but 
both  the  Star  and  Magnet  together  could  hardly 
have  matched  either  the  Jones  or  the  Jefferson, 
while  the  main-deck  32*3  of  the  Superior  gave  her  a 
great  advantage  over  the  Prince  Regent's.  24/5,  where 
the  crews  were  so  equal ;  and  the  Pike  was  certainly 
too  heavy  for  the  Montreal.  A  decided  superiority 
in  the  effectiveness  of  both  crews  and  captains 
could  alone  have  warranted  Sir  James  Lucas  Yeo 
in  engaging,  and  this  superiority  he  certainly  did 
not  possess. 

This  year  the  British  architects  outstripped  ours 
in  the  race  for  supremacy,  and  Commodore  Yeo  put 
out  of  port  with  his  eight  vessels  long  before  the 
Americans  were  ready.  His  first  attempt  was  a  suc 
cessful  attack  on  Oswego.  This  town  is  situated  some 
60  miles  distant  from  Sackett's  Harbor,  and  is  the  first 
port  on  the  lake  which  the  stores,  sent  from  the  sea 
board  to  Chauncy,  reached.  Accordingly  it  was  a 
place  of  some  little  importance,  but  was  very  much 
neglected  by  the  American  authorities.  It  was  in 
sufficiently  garrisoned,  and  was  defended  only  by 
an  entirely  ruined  fort  of  6  guns,  two  of  them  dis 
mounted.  Commodore  Yeo  sailed  from  Kingston 
to  attack  it  on  the  3d  of  May,  having  on  board  his 
ships  a  detachment  of  1,080  troops.  Oswego  was 
garrisoned  by  less  than  300  men,1  chiefly  belonging 
to  a  light  artillery  regiment,  with  a  score  or  two  of 

1  General  order  of  Gen.  Jacob  Brown,  by  R.  Jones,  Ass.  Adj. -Gen 
eral,  May  12,  1814. 


358  NAVAL   W/.R    OF    l8l2. 

militia ;  they  were  under  the  command  of  Colonel 
Mitchell.  The  recaptured  schooner  Growler  was  in 
port,  with  7  guns  destined  for  the  Harbor ;  she 
was  sunk  by  her  commander,  but  afterward  raised 
and  carried  off  by  the  foe. 

On  the  5th  Yeo  appeared  off  Oswego  and  sent  in 
Captain  Collier  and  13  gun-boats  to  draw  the  fort's 
fire ;  after  some  firing  between  them  and  the  four 
guns  mounted  in  the  fort  (two  long  24*5,  one  long 
12,  and  one  long  6),  the  gun-boats  retired.  The 
next  day  the  attack  was  seriously  made.  The 
Princess  Charlotte,  Montreal,  and  Niagara  engaged 
the  batteries,  while  the  Charwell  and  Star  scoured 
the  woods  with  grape  to  clear  them  of  the 
militia.1  The  debarkation  of  the  troops  was  super 
intended  by  Captain  O'Connor,  and  until  it  was  ac 
complished  the  Montreal  sustained  almost  the  whole 
fire  of  the  fort,  being  set  on  fire  three  times,  and 
much  cut  up  in  hull,  masts,and  rigging.2  Under 
this  fire  800  British  troops  were  landed,  under 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Fischer,  assisted  by  200  seamen, 
armed  with  long  pikes,  under  Captain  Mulcaster. 
They  moved  gallantly  up  the  hill,  under  a  heavy 
fire,  and  carried  the  fort  by  assault  ;  Mitchell  then  fell 
back  unmolested  to  the  Falls,  about  12  miles  above 
the  town,  where  there  was  a  large  quantity  of 
stores.  But  he  was  not  again  attacked.  The  Ameri 
cans  lost  6  men  killed,  including  Lieutenant  Blaeny, 
38  wounded,  and  25  missing,  both  of  these  last  fall 
ing  into  the  enemy's  hands.  The  British  lost  22 
soldiers,  marines,  and  seamen  (including  Captain 
Hollaway)  killed,  and  73  (including  the  gallant  Cap- 

1  Letter  of  General  Gordon  Drummond,  May  7,  1814. 
a  Letter  of  Sir  James  Lucas  Yeo,  May  17,  1814. 


NAVAL   WAR    OF    l8l2.  359 

tain  Mulcaster  dangerously,  and  Captain  Popham 
slightly)  wounded,1  the  total  loss  being  95 — nearly  a 
third  of  the  American  force  engaged.  General 
Drummond,  in  his  official  letter,  reports  that  u  the 
fort  being  everywhere  almost  open,  the  whole  of 
the  garrison  *  *  *  effected  their  escape,  except 
about  60  men,  half  of  them  wounded."  No  doubt  the 
fort's  being  "  everywhere  almost  open  "  afforded 
excellent  opportunities  for  retreat ;  but  it  was  not 
much  of  a  recommendation  of  it  as  a  structure  in 
tended  for  defence. 

The  British  destroyed  the  four  guns  in  the  bat 
tery,  and  raised  the  Growler  and  carried  her  off, 
with  her  valuable  cargo  of  seven  long  guns.  They 
also  carried  off  a  small  quantity  of  ordnance  stores 
and  some  flour,  and  burned  the  barracks ;  otherwise 
but  little  damage  was  done,  and  the  Americans  re- 
occupied  the  place  at  once.  It  certainly  showed 
great  lack  of  energy  on  Commodore  Yeo's  part  that 
he  did  not  strike  a  really  important  blow  by  sending 
an  expedition  up  to  destroy  the  quantity  of  stores 
and  ordnance  collected  at  the  Falls.  But  the  attack 
itself  was  admirably  managed.  The  ships  were  well 
placed,  and  kept  up  so  heavy  a  fire  on  the  fort  as  to 
effectually  cover  the  debarkation  of  the  troops, 
which  was  very  cleverly  accomplished  ;  and  the  sol 
diers  and  seamen  behaved  with  great  gallantry  and 
steadiness,  their  officers  leading  them,  sword  in  hand, 
up  a  long,  steep  hill,  under  a  destructive  fire.  It 
was  similar  to  Chauncy's  attacks  on  York  and  Fort 
George,  except  that  in  this  case  the  assailants  suf- 

1  Letter  of  Lieut.-Col.  V.  Fischer,  May  17,  1814.  James  says 
"  1 8  killed  and  64  wounded,"  why,  I  do  not  know  ;  the  official  re 
port  of  Col.  Fischer,  as  quoted,  says :  "  Of  the  army,  19  killed  and  62 
wounded  ;  of  the  navy,  3  killed  and  n  wounded." 


360  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

fered  a  much  severer  loss  compared  to  that  inflicted 
on  the  assailed.  Colonel  Mitchell  managed  the  de 
fence  with  skill,  doing  all  he  could  with  his  insuffi 
cient  materials. 

After  returning  to  Kingston,  Yeo  sailed  with  his 
squadron  for  Sackett's  Harbor,  where  he  appeared 
on  May  iQth  and  began  a  strict  blockade.  This 
was  especially  troublesome  because  most  of  the 
guns  and  cables  for  the  two  frigates  had  not  yet  ar 
rived,  and  though  the  lighter  pieces  and  stores  could 
be  carried  over  land,  the  heavier  ones  could  only  go 
by  water,  which  route  was  now  made  dangerous  by 
the  presence  of  the  blockading  squadron.  The  very 
important  duty  of  convoying  these  great  guns  was 
entrusted  to  Captain  Woolsey,  an  officer  of  tried 
merit.  He  decided  to  take  them  by  water  to  Stony 
Creek,  whence  they  might  be  carried  by  land  to  the 
Harbor,  which  was  but  three  miles  distant;  and  on 
the  success  of  his  enterprise  depended  Chauncy's 
chances  of  regaining  command  of  the  lake.  On  the 
28th  of  May,  at  sunset,  Woolsey  left  Oswego  with 
19  boats,  carrying  21  long  32*3,  10  long  24*5,  three  42- 
pound  carronades,  and  10  cables — one  of  the  latter, 
for  the  Superior,  being  a  huge  rope  22  inches  in  cir 
cumference  and  weighing  9,600  pounds.  The  boats 
rowed  all  through  the  night,  and  at  sunrise  on  the 
29th  1 8  of  them  found  themselves  off  the  Big  Sal 
mon  River,  and,  as  it  was  unsafe  to  travel  by  day 
light,  Woolsey  ran  up  into  Big  Sandy  Creek,  8 
miles  from  the  Harbor.  The  other  boat,  contain 
ing  two  long  24*5  and  a  cable,  got  out  of  line,  ran 
into  the  British  squadron,  and  was  captured.  The 
news  she  brought  induced  Sir  James  Yeo  at  once  to 
send  out  an  expedition  to  capture  the  others.  He 


NAVAL   WAR    OF    l8l2.  361 

accordingly  despatched  Captains  Popham  and  Spils- 
bury  in  two  gun-boats,  one  armed  with  one  68- 
pound  and  one  24-pound  carronade,  and  the  other 
with  a  long  32,  accompanied  by  three  cutters  and  a 
gig,  mounting  between  them  two  long  I2's  and  two 
brass  6's,  with  a  total  of  180  men.1  They  rowed  up 
to  Sandy  Creek  and  lay  off  its  mouth  all  the  night, 
and  began  ascending  it  shortly  after  daylight  on 
the  3Oth.  Their  force,  however,  was  absurdly  inad 
equate  for  the  accomplishment  of  their  object. 
Captain  Woolsey  had  been  reinforced  by  some 
Oneida  Indians,  a  company  of  light  artillery,  and 
some  militia,  so  that  his  only  care  was,  not  to  re 
pulse,  but  to  capture  the  British  party  entire,  and 
even  this  did  not  need  any  exertion.  He  accord 
ingly  despatched  Major  Appling  down  the  river 
with  1 20  riflemen*  and  some  Indians  to  lie  in  am 
bush3.  When  going  up  the  creek  the  British  ma 
rines,  under  Lieutenant  Cox,  were  landed  on  the 
left  bank,  and  the  small-arm  men,  under  Lieuten 
ant  Brown,  on  the  right  bank  ;  while  the  two  cap 
tains  rowed  up  the  stream  between  them,  throwing 
grape  into  the  bushes  to  disperse  the  Indians.  Major 
Appling  waited  until  the  British  were  close  up, 
when  his  riflemen  opened  with  so  destructive  a 
volley  as  to  completely  demoralize  and  "  stam 
pede  "  them,  and  their  whole  force  was  captured 
with  hardly  any  resistance,  the  Americans  having 

1  James,  vi,  487  ;  while  Cooper  says  186.  James  says  the   British 
loss  was  18  killed  and  50  wounded  ;   Major  Appling  says  "  14  were 
killed,  28  wounded,  and  27  marines  and  106  sailors  captured." 

2  Letter  from  Major  D.  Appling,  May  30,  1814. 

3  Letter  of  Capt.  M.  T.  Woolsey,  June  I,  1814.    There  were  about 
60  Indians  ;  in  all,  the  American  force  amounted  to  180  men.    James 
adds  30  riflemen,  140  Indians,  and  "  a  large  body  of  militia  and  cav 
alry,  " — none  of  whom  were  present. 


362  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

only  one  man  slightly  wounded.  The  British  loss 
was  severe, — 18  killed  and  50  dangerously  wounded, 
according  to  Captain  Popham's  report,  as  quoted 
by  James;  or  "  14  killed  and  28  wounded,"  accord 
ing  to  Major  Appling's  letter.  It  was  a  very  clever 
and  successful  ambush. 

On  June  6th  Yeo  raised  the  blockade  of  the  Har 
bor,  but  Chauncy's  squadron  was  not  in  condition 
to  put  out  till  six  weeks  later,  during  which  time 
nothing  was  done  by  either  fleet,  except  that  two 
very  gallant  cutting-out  expeditions  were  success 
fully  attempted  by  Lieutenant  Francis  H.  Gregory, 
U.  S.  N.  On  June  i6th  he  left  the  Harbor,  accom 
panied  by  Sailing-masters  Vaughan  and  Dixon  and 
22  seamen,  in  three  gigs,  to  intercept  some  of  the 
enemy's  provision  schooners;  on  the  iQth  he  was 
discovered  by  the  British  gun-boat  Black  Snake,  of 
one  1 8-pound  carronade  and  18  men,  commanded 
by  Captain  H.  Landon.  Lieutenant  Gregory 
dashed  at  the  gun-boat  and  carried  it  without  the 
loss  of  a  man  ;  he  was  afterward  obliged  to  burn  it, 
but  he  brought  the  prisoners,  chiefly  royal  marines, 
safely  into  port.  On  the  1st  of  July  he  again 
started  out,  with  Messrs.  Vaughan  and  Dixon,  and 
two  gigs.  The  plucky  little  party  suffered  greatly 
from  hunger,  but  on  the  5th  he  made  a  sudden  de 
scent  on  Presque  Isle,  and  burned  a  14-gun  schooner 
just  ready  for  launching ;  he  was  off  before  the  foe 
could  assemble,  and  reached  the  Harbor  in  safety 
next  day. 

On  July  3 1st  Commodore  Chauncy  sailed  with  his 
fleet ;  some  days  previously  the  larger  British  ves 
sels  had  retired  to  Kingston,  where  a  loo-gun  two- 
decker  was  building.  Chauncy  sailed  up  to  the 


NAVAL    WAR    OF    l8l2.  303 

head  of  the  lake,  where  he  intercepted  the  small 
brig  Magnet.  The  Sylph  was  sent  in  to  destroy  her, 
but  her  crew  ran  her  ashore  and  burned  her.  The 
Jefferson^  Sylph,  and  Oneida  were  left  to  watch  some 
other  small  craft  in  the  Niagara;  the  Jones  was 
kept  cruising  between  the  Harbor  and  Oswego,  and 
with  the  four  larger  vessels  Chauncy  blockaded 
Yeo's  four  large  vessels  lying  in  Kingston.  The 
four  American  vessels  were  in  the  aggregate  of 
4,398  tons,  manned  by  rather  more  than  1,350  men, 
and  presenting  in  broadside  77  guns,  throwing  2,328 
Ibs.  of  shot.  The  four  British  vessels  measured  in 
all  about  3,812  tons,  manned  by  1,220  men,  and  pre 
senting  in  broadside  74  guns,  throwing  2,066  Ibs. 
of  shot.  The  former  were  thus  superior  by  about 
15  per  cent.,  and  Sir  James  Yeo  very  properly  de 
clined  to  fight  with  the  odds  against  him — although 
it  was  a  nicer  calculation  than  British  commanders 
had  been  accustomed  to  enter  into. 

Major-General  Brown  had  written  to  Commodore 
Chauncy  on  July  I3th  :  "  I  do  not  doubt  my  ability 
to  meet  the  enemy  in  the  field  and  to  march  in  any 
direction  over  his  country,  your  fleet  carrying  for 
me  the  necessary  supplies.  We  can  threaten  Forts 
George  and  Niagara,  and  carry  Burlington  Heights 
and  York,  and  proceed  direct  to  Kingston  and  carry 
that  place.  For  God's  sake  let  me  see  you  :  Sir 
James  will  not  fight."  To  which  Chauncy  replied  : 
"  I  shall  afford  every  assistance  in  my  power  to  co 
operate  with  the  army  whenever  it  can  be  done 
without  losing  sight  of  the  great  object  for  the  at 
tainment  of  which  this  fleet  has  been  created, — the 
capture  or  destruction  of  the  enemy's  fleet.  But 
that  I  consider  the  primary  object.  *  *  *  We 


364  NAVAL   WAR    OF    l8l2. 

are  intended  to  seek  and  fight  the  enemy's  fleet,  and 
I  shall  not  be  diverted  from  my  efforts  to  effectuate 
it  by  any  sinister  attempt  to  render  us  subordinate 
to,  or  an  appendage  of,  the  army."  That  is,  by  any 
"  sinister  attempt  "  to  make  him  co-operate  intelli 
gently  in  a  really  well-concerted  scheme  of  invasion. 
In  further  support  of  these  noble  and  independent 
sentiments,  he  writes  to  the  Sectetary  of  the  Navy 
on  August  loth.1  "  I  told  (General  Brown)  that  I 
should  not  visit  the  head  of  the  lake  unless  the  en 
emy's  fleet  did  so.  *  *  *  To  deprive  the  enemy 
of  an  apology  for  not  meeting,  me  I  have  sent  ashore 
four  guns  from  the  Superior  to  reduce  her  armament 
in  number  to  an  equality  with  the  Prince  Regent's, 
yielding  the  advantage  of  their  68-pounders.  The 
Mohawk  mounts  two  guns  less  than  the  Princess 
Charlotte,  and  the  Montreal  and  Niagara  are  equal 
to  the  Pike  and  Madison."  He  here  justifies  his  re 
fusal  to  co-operate  with  General  Brown  by  saying 
that  he  was  of  only  equal  force  with  Sir  James,  and 
that  he  has  deprived  the  latter  of  "  an  apology  "  for 
not  meeting  him.  This  last  was  not  at  all  true. 
The  Mohawk  and  Madison  were  just  about  equal  to 
the  Princess  Charlotte  and  Niagara ;  but  the  Pike 
was  half  as  strong  again  as  the  Montreal ;  and 
Chauncy  could  very  well  afford  to  "yield  the  advan 
tage  of  their  68-pounders,"  when  in  return  Sir  James 
had  to  yield  the  advantage  of  Chauncy's  long  32*3 
and  42-pound  carronades.  The  Superior  was  a  32- 
pounder  frigate,  and,  even  without  her  four  extra 
guns,  was  about  a  fouth  heavier  than  the  Prince  Re 
gent  with  her  24-pounders.  Sir  James  was  not  act 
ing  more  warily  than  Chauncy  had  acted  during 

*See  Niles,  vii,  12,  and  other  places  (under  "  Chauncy"  in  index) 


NAVAL   WAR    OF    l8l2.  365 

June  and  July,  1813.  Then  he  had  a  fleet  which 
tonned  1,701,  was  manned  by  680  men,  and  threw 
at  a  broadside  1,099  Ibs.  °f  snot »  an<^  ne  declined  to 
go  out  of  port  or  in  any  way  try  to  check  the  op 
eration  of  Yeo's  fleet  which  tonned  2,091,  was 
manned  by  770  men,  and  threw  at  a  broadside 
1,374  Ibs.  of  shot.  Chauncy  then  acted  perfectly 
proper,  no  doubt,  but  he  could  not  afford  to  sneer 
at  Yeo  for  behaving  in  the  same  way.  Whatever 
either  commander  might  write,  in  reality  he  well 
knew  that  his  officers  and  crews  were,  man  for  man, 
just  about  on  a  par  with  those  of  his  antagonists, 
and  so,  after  the  first  brush  or  two,  he  was  exceed 
ingly  careful  to  see  that  the  odds  were  not  against 
him.  Chauncy,  in  his  petulant  answers  to  Brown's 
letter,  ignored  the  fact  that  his  superiority  of 
force  would  prevent  his  opponent  from  giv 
ing  battle,  and  would,  therefore,  prevent  any 
thing  more  important  than  a  blockade  occurring. 
His  ideas  of  the  purpose  for  which  his  command 
had  been  created  were  erroneous  and  very  hurtful 
to  the  American  cause.  That  purpose  was  not,  ex 
cept  incidentally,  "  the  destruction  of  the  enemy's 
fleet "  ;  and,  if  it  was,  he  entirely  failed  to  accom 
plish  it.  The  real  purpose  was  to  enable  Canada  to 
be  successfully  invaded,  or  to  assist  in  repelling  an 
invasion  of  the  United  States.  These  services 
could  only  be  efficiently  performed  by  acting  in 
union  with  the  land-forces,  for  his  independent  ac 
tion  could  evidently  have  little  effect.  The  only  im 
portant  services  he  had  performed  had  been  in  at 
tacking  Forts  George  and  York,  where  he  had  been 
rendered  "subordinate  to,  and  an  appendage  of,  the 
army."  His  only  chance  of  accomplishing  any 


366  NAVAL   WAR   OF    1 8 12. 

thing  lay  in  similar  acts  of  cooperation,  and  he  re 
fused  to  do  these.  Had  he  acted  as  he  ought  to  have 
done,  and  assisted  Brown  to  the  utmost,  he  would 
certainly  have  accomplished  much  more  than  he  did, 
and  might  have  enabled  Brown  to  assault  Kingston, 
when  Yeo's  fleet  would  of  course  have  been  capt 
ured.  The  insubordination,  petty  stickling  for  his 
own  dignity,  and  lack  of  appreciation  of  the  neces 
sity  of  acting  in  concert  that  he  showed,  were  the 
very  faults  which  proved  most  fatal  to  the  success 
of  our  various  land  commanders  in  the  early  part 
of  the  war.  Even  had  Chauncy's  assistance  availed 
nothing,  he  could  not  have  accomplished  less  than 
he  did.  He  remained  off  Kingston  blockading 
Yeo,  being  once  or  twice  blown  off  by  gales.  He 
sent  Lieutenant  Gregory,  accompanied  by  Midship 
man  Hart  and  six  men,  in  to  reconnoitre  on  August 
25th  ;  the  lieutenant  ran  across  two  barges  contain 
ing  30  men,  and  was  captured  after  the  midshipman 
had  been  killed  and  the  lieutenant  and  four  men 
wounded.  On  September  2ist  he  transported 
General  Izard  and  3,000  men  from  Sackett's  Harbor 
to  the  Genesee  ;  and  then  again  blockaded  Kingston 
until  the  two-decker  was  nearly  completed,  when 
he  promptly  retired  to  the  Harbor. 

The  equally  cautious  Yeo  did  not  come  out  on 
the  lake  till  Oct.  i$th;  he  did  not  indulge  in  the 
empty  and  useless  formality  of  blockading  his  an 
tagonist,  but  assisted  the  British  army  on  the  Niag 
ara  frontier  till  navigation  closed,  about  Nov.  2 1st. 
A  couple  of  days  before,  Midshipman  McGowan 
headed  an  expedition  to  blow  up  the  two-decker 
(named  the  S/.  Lawrence)  with  a  torpedo,  but  was 
discovered  by  two  of  the  enemy's  boats,  which  he 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  367 

captured  and  brought  in  ;  the  attempt  was  aban 
doned,  because  the  St.  Lawrence  was  found  not  to 
be  lying  in  Kingston. 

For  this  year  the  material  loss  again  fell  heavi 
est  on  the  British,  amounting  to  one  14-gun  brig 
burned  by  her  crew,  one  lo-gun  schooner  burned 
on  the  stocks,  three  gun-boats,  three  cutters,  and 
one  gig  captured  ;  while  in  return  the  Amer 
icans  lost  one  schooner  loaded  with  seven  guns, 
one  boat  loaded  with  two,  and  a  gig  captured 
and  four  guns  destroyed  at  Oswego.  In  men  the 
British  loss  was  heavier  still  relatively  to  that  of 
the  Americans,  being  in  killed,  wounded,  and  pris 
oners  about  300  to  80.  But  in  spite  of  this  loss  and 
damage,  which  was  too  trivial  to  be  of  any  account 
to  either  side,  the  success  of  the  season  was  with  the 
British,  inasmuch  as  they  held  command  over  the 
lake  for  more  than  four  months,  during  which  time 
they  could  cooperate  with  their  army ;  while  the 
Americans  held  it  for  barely  two  months  and  a  half. 
In  fact  the  conduct  of  the  two  fleets  on  Lake  On 
tario  during  the  latter  part  of  the  war  was  almost 
farcical.  As  soon  as  one,  by  building,  acquired  the 
superiority,  the  foe  at  once  retired  to  port,  where  he 
waited  until  he  had  built  another  vessel  or  two,, 
when  he  came  out,  and  the  other  went  into  port  in 
turn.  Under  such  circumstances  it  was  hopeless 
ever  to  finish  the  contest  by  a  stand-up  sea-fight, 
each  commander  calculating  the  chances  with  mathe 
matical  exactness.  The  only  hope  of  destroying" 
the  enemy's  fleet  was  by  cooperating  with  the  land- 
forces  in  a  successful  attack  on  his  main  post,  when 
he  would  be  forced  to  be  either  destroyed  or  to 
fight — and  this  cooperation  Chauncy  refused  to  give. 


368  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

He  seems  to  have  been  an  excellent  organizer,  but 
he  did  not  use  (certainly  not  in  the  summer  of  1813) 
his  materials  by  any  means  to  the  best  advantage. 
He  was  hardly  equal  to  his  opponent,  and  the  latter 
seems  to  have  been  little  more  than  an  average  offi 
cer.  Yeo  blundered  several  times,  as  in  the  attack 
on  Sackett's  Harbor,  in  not  following  up  his  advan 
tage  at  Oswego,  in  showing  so  little  resource  in  the 
action  off  the  Genesee,  etc.,  and  he  was  not  troubled 
by  any  excess  of  daring;  but  during  the  period 
when  he  was  actually  cruising  against  Chauncy  on 
the  lake  he  certainly  showed  to  better  advantage 
than  the  American  did.  With  an  inferior  force  he 
won  a  partial  victory  over  his  opponent  off  Niagara, 
and  then  kept  him  in  check  for  six  weeks ;  while 
Chauncy,  with  his  superior  force,  was  not  only  par 
tially  defeated  once,  but,  when  he  did  gain  a  partial 
victory,  failed  to  take  advantage  of  it. 

In  commenting  upon  the  timid  and  dilatory  tac 
tics  of  the  two  commanders  on  Ontario,  however,  it 
must  be  remembered  that  the  indecisive  nature  of 
the  results  attained  had  been  often  paralleled  by  the 
numerous  similar  encounters  that  took  place  on  the 
ocean  during  the  wars  of  the  preceding  century.  In 
the  War  of  the  American  Revolution,  the  English 
fought  some  19  fleet  actions  with  the  French,  Dutch, 
and  Spaniards ;  one  victory  was  gained  over  the 
French,  and  one  over  the  Spaniards,  while  the  17 
others  were  all  indecisive,  both  sides  claiming  the 
victory,  and  neither  winning  it.  Of  course,  some  of 
them,  though  indecisive  as  regards  loss  and  damage, 
were  strategetical  victories :  thus,  Admiral  Arbuthnot 
beat  back  Admiral  Barras  off  the  Chesapeake,  in 
March  of  1781  ;  and  near  the  same  place  in  Septem- 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  369 

her  of  the  same  year  the  French  had  their  revenge 
in  the  victory  (one  at  least  in  its  results)  of  the 
Conte  de  Grasse  over  Sir  Thomas  Graves.  In  the 
five  desperate  and  bloody  combats  which  De  Suff- 
rein  waged  with  Sir  Edward  Hughes  in  the  East 
Indies,  the  laurels  were  very  evenly  divided.  These 
five  conflicts  were  not  rendered  indecisive  by  any 
overwariness  in  manoeuvring,  for  De  Suffrein's  at 
tacks  were  carried  out  with  as  much  boldness  as  skill, 
and  his  stubborn  antagonist  was  never  inclined  to 
baulk  him  of  a  fair  battle  ;  but  the  two  hardy  fighters 
were  so  evenly  matched  that  they  would  pound  one 
another  till  each  was  helpless  to  inflict  injury.  Very 
different  were  the  three  consecutive  battles  that  took 
place  in  the  same  waters,  on  the  25th  of  April,  1758, 
the  3d  of  August,  1758,  and  on  the  loth  of  Septem 
ber,  1759,  between  Pocock  and  d' Ache,1  where,  by 
skilful  manoeuvring,  the  French  admiral  saved  his 
somewhat  inferior  force  from  capture,  and  the  Eng 
lish  admiral  gained  indecisive  victories.  M.  Riviere, 
after  giving  a  most  just  and  impartial  account  of  the 
battles,  sums  up  with  the  following  excellent  criti 
cism.2 

"  It  is  this  battle,  won  by  Hawke,  the  2Oth  of 
November,  1757,  and  the  combats  of  Pocock  and 
d'  Ache,  from  which  date  two  distinct  schools  in  the 
naval  affairs  of  the  i8th  century  :  one  of  these  was 
all  for  promptness  and  audacity,  which  were  regarded 
as  the  indispensable  conditions  for  victory ;  the 
other,  on  the  contrary,  praised  skilful  delays  and 
able  evolutions,  and  created  success  by  science 

1  "La  Marine  Fran^aise  sous  le  Regne  de  Louis  XV,"  par  Henri  Ri 
viere,  Lieutenant  de  Vaisseau,  Chevalier  de  la  Legion  d'  Honneur. 
(Paris  et  Toulon,  1859),  pp.  385  and  439. 

2  Ibid. ,  p.  425.    I  pay  more  attention  to  the  sense  than  to  the  letter 
in  my  translation. 


370  NAVAL   WAR   OF    1 8 12. 

united  to  prudence.  *  *  *  But  these  two  schools 
were  true  only  according  to  circumstances,  not  ab 
solutely.  When  two  fleets  of  equal  worth  are 
facing  one  another,  as  in  the  War  of  the  American 
Revolution,  then  tactics  should  come  into  play,  and 
audacity  would  often  be  mere  foolhardiness.  If  it 
happens,  on  the  other  hand,  as  in  the  Republic,  or 
during  the  last  years  of  Louis  XV,  that  an  irresolute 
fleet,  without  organization,  has  to  contend  with  a 
fleet  prepared  in  every  way,  then,  on  the  part  of 
this  last,  audacity  is  wisdom  and  prudence  would  be 
cowardice,  for  it  would  give  an  enemy  who  distrusts 
himself  time  to  become  more  hardy.  The  only 
school  always  true  is  that  one  which,  freed  from  all 
routine,  produces  men  whose  genius  will  unite  in 
one,  in  knowing  how  to  apply  them  appropriately, 
the  audacity  which  will  carry  off  victory,  and  the 
prudence  which  knows  how  to  obtain  it  in  preparing 
for  it." 

These  generalizations  are  drawn  from  the  results 
of  mighty  battles,  but  they  apply  just  as  well  to  the 
campaigns  carried  on  on  a  small  scale,  or  even  to 
single-ship  actions.  Chauncy,  as  already  said,  does 
not  deserve  the  praise  which  most  American  his 
torians,  and  especially  Cooper,  have  lavished  on 
him  as  well  as  on  all  our  other  officers  of  that 
period.  Such  indiscriminate  eulogy  entirely  de 
tracts  from  the  worth  of  a  writer's  favorable  criti 
cisms.  Our  average  commander  was,  I  firmly 
believe,  at  that  time  superior  to  the  average  com 
mander  of  any  other  nation  ;  but  to  get  at  this 
average  we  must  include  Chauncy,  Rodgers,  and 
Angus,  as  well  as  Hull,  Macdonough,  Perry,  Porter, 
Bainbridge,  Biddle,  Lawrence,  and  Warrington. 


NAVAL  WAR   OF    1 8 12.  371 

Sir  James  Yeo  did  to  the  full  as  well  as  his  op 
ponent,  and  like  him  was  a  good  organizer;  but  he 
did  little  enough.  His  campaigns  must  be  con 
sidered  as  being  conducted  well  or  ill  according  as 
he  is  believed  to  have  commanded  better  men  than 
his  opponent,  or  not.  If,  as  many  British  writers 
contend,  his  crews  were  an  overmatch  for  the 
Americans,  man  for  man,  even  to  a  slight  degree, 
then  Yeo's  conduct  was  very  cowardly ;  if,  on  the 
contrary,  the  officers  and  men  of  the  two  fleets  were 
on  a  par,  then  he  acted  properly  and  outgeneralled 
his  opponent.  It  is  to  be  regretted  that  most  of 
the  histories  written  on  the  subject,  on  either  side 
of  the  Atlantic,  should  be  of  the  "  hurrah  "  order  of 
literature,  with  no  attempt  whatever  to  get  at  the 
truth,  but  merely  to  explain  away  the  defeats  or 
immensely  exaggerate  the  victories  suffered  or 
gained  by  their  own  side. 

ERIE  AND    THE    UPPER   LAKES. 

Hitherto  the  vessels  on  these  lakes  (as  well  as  on 
Ontario)  had  been  under  the  command  of  Com 
modore  Chauncy  ;  but  they  were  now  formed  into 
a  separate  department,  under  Captain  Arthur  Sin 
clair.  The  Americans  had,  of  course,  complete 
supremacy,  and  no  attempt  was  seriously  made  to 
contest  it  with  them  ;  but  they  received  a  couple  of 
stinging,  if  not  very  important,  defeats.  It  is  rather 
singular  that  here  the  British,  who  began  with  a 
large  force,  while  there  was  none  whatever  to 
oppose  it,  should  have  had  it  by  degrees  completely 
annihilated ;  and  should  have  then,  and  not  till 
then,  when  apparently  rendered  harmless,  have 
turned  round  and  partially  revenged  themselves  by 


3/2  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

two  cutting-out  expeditions  which  were   as  boldly 
executed  as  they  were  skilfully  planned. 

Captain  Sinclair  sailed  into  Lake  Huron  with  the 
Niagara,  Caledonia,  Ariel,  Scorpion,  and  Tigress, 
and  on  July  2Oth  burnt  the  fort  and  barracks  of  St. 
Joseph,  which  were  abandoned  by  their  garrison. 
On  Aug:  4th  he  arrived  off  the  fort  of  Machilimaci- 
nac  (Mackinaw),  which  was  situated  on  such  an 
eminence  that  the  guns  of  the  vessels  could  not 
reach  it.  Accordingly,  the  troops  under  Col. 
Croghan  were  landed,  covered  by  the  fire  of  the 
schooners,  very  successfully ;  but  when  they  tried 
to  carry  the  fort  they  were  driven  back  with  the 
loss  of  70  men.  Thence  Sinclair  sailed  to  the  Nat- 
tagawassa  Creek,  attacked  and  destroyed  a  block 
house  three  miles  up  it,  which  mounted  three  light 
guns,  and  also  a  schooner  called  the  Nancy ;  but 
the  commander  of  the  schooner,  Lieutenant 
Worsely,  with  his  crew,  escaped  up  the  river.  Captain 
Sinclair  then  departed  for  Lake  Erie,  leaving  the 
Scorpion,  Lieutenant  Turner,  and  Tigress,  Sailing- 
master  Champlin,  to  blockade  the  Nattagawassa. 
News  was  received  by  the  British  from  a  party  of 
Indians  that  the  two  American  vessels  were  five 
leagues  apart,  and  it  was  at  once  resolved  to  at 
tempt  their  capture.  On  the  first  of  September,  in 
the  evening,  four  boats  started  out,  one  manned  by 
20  seamen,  under  Lieutenant  Worsley,  the  three 
others  by  72  soldiers  under  Lieutenants  Bulger, 
Armstrong,  and  Raderhurst  of  the  army — in  all  92 
men  and  two  guns,  a  6-  and  a  3-pounder.  A  num 
ber  of  Indians  accompanied  the  expedition  but  took 
no  part  in  the  fighting.  At  sunset  on  the  2d  the 
boats  arrived  at  St.  Mary's  Strait,  and  spent  24 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  373 

hours  in  finding  out  where  the  American  schooners 
were.  At  6  P.  M.  on  the  36,  the  nearest  vessel,  the 
Tigress,  was  made  out,  six  miles  off,  and  they  pulled 
for  her.  It  was  very  dark,  and  they  were  not  discov 
ered  till  they  had  come  within  fifty  yards,  when 
Champlin  at  once  fired  his  long  24  at  them  ;  before 
it  could  be  reloaded  the  four  boats  had  dashed  up, 
those  of  Lieutenants  Worsely  and  Armstrong 
placing  themselves  on  the  starboard,  and  those  of 
Lieutenants  Bulger  and  Raderhurst  on  the  port 
side.  There  was  a  short,  sharp  struggle,  and  the 
schooner  was  carried.  Of  her  crew  of  28  men,  3 
were  killed  and  five,  including  Mr.  Champlin,  dan 
gerously  wounded.  The  assailants  lost  three  sea 
men  killed,  Lieutenant  Bulger,  seven  soldiers  and 
several  seamen  wounded.1  "The  defence  of  this 
vessel,"  writes  Lieut.  Bulger,  "  did  credit  to  her 
officers,  who  were  all  severely  wounded."  Next 
day  the  prisoners  were  sent  on  shore  ;  and  on  the 
5th  the  Scorpion  was  discovered  working  up  to  join 
her  consort,  entirely  ignorant  of  what  had  hap 
pened.  She  anchored  about  2  miles  from  the  Ti 
gress  ;  and  next  morning  at  6  o'clock  the  latter  slip 
ped  her  cable  and  ran  down  under  the  jib  and  fore 
sail,  the  American  ensign  and  pendant  still  flying. 
When  within  10  yards  of  the  Scorpion,  the  con 
cealed  soldiers  jumped  up,  poured  a  volley  into  her 
which  killed  2  and  wounded  2  men,  and  the  next 
moment  carried  her,  her  surprised  crew  of  30  men 
making  no  resistance.  The  whole  affair  reflected 
great  credit  on  the  enterprise  and  pluck  of  the  Brit 
ish  without  being  discreditable  to  the  Americans. 

1  Letter  of  Lieutenant  A.  H.  Bulger,  Sept.  7,  1814.  James  says 
only  3  killed  and  8  wounded  ;  but  Lieutenant  Bulger  distinctly  says, 
in  addition,  "and  several  seamen  wounded." 


3/4  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

It  was  like  Lieut.  Elliott's  capture    of  the  Detroit 
and  Caledonia. 

Meanwhile  a  still  more  daring  cutting-out  expedi 
tion  had  taken  place  at  the  foot  of  Lake  Erie.  The 
three  American  schooners,  Ohio,  Somers,  and  Porcu 
pine,  each  with  30  men,  under  Lieut.  Conkling,  were 
anchored  just  at  the  outlet  of  the  lake,  to  cover  the 
flank  of  the  works  at  Fort  Erie.  On  the  night  of 
August  1 2th,  Capt.  Dobbs,  of  the  Charwell,  and 
Lieut.  Radcliffe,  of  the  Netly,  with  75  seamen  and 
marines  from  their  two  vessels,  which  were  lying  off 
Fort  Erie,  resolved  to  attempt  the  capture  of  the 
schooners.  The  seamen  carried  the  captain's  gig 
upon  their  shoulders  from  Queenstown  to  French 
man's  Creek,  a  distance  of  20  miles  ;  thence,  by  the 
aid  of  some  militia,  5  batteaux  as  well  as  the  gig 
were  carried  8  miles  across  the  woods  to  Lake  Erie, 
and  the  party  (whether  with  or  without  the  militia  I 
do  not  know)  embarked  in  them.  Between  1 1  and  12 
the  boats  were  discovered  a  short  distance  ahead  of 
the  Somers  and  hailed.  They  answered  "  provision 
boats,"  which  deceived  the  officer  on  deck,  as  such 
boats  had  been  in  the  habit  of  passing  and  repassing 
continually  during  the  night.  Before  he  discovered 
his  mistake  the  boats  drifted  across  his  hawse,  cut  his 
cables,  and  ran  him  aboard  with  a  volley  of  mus 
ketry,  which  wounded  two  of  his  men,  and  before 
the  others  could  get  on  deck  the  schooner  was  capt 
ured.  In  another  moment  the  British  boats  were 
alongside  the  Ohio,  Lieut.  Conkling's  vessel.  Here 
the  people  had  hurried  on  deck,  and  there  was  a 
moment's  sharp  struggle,  in  which  the  assailants  lost 
Lieut.  Radcliffe  and  one  seaman  killed  and  six 
seamen  and  marines  wounded  ;  but  on  board  the 


NAVAL   WAR    OF    l8l2.  375 

Ohio  Lieut.  Conkling  and  Sailing-master  M.  Cally 
were  shot  down,  one  seaman  killed,  and  four  wound 
ed,  and  Captain  Dobbs  carried  her,  sword  in  hand. 
The  Porcupine  was  not  molested,  and  made  no 
effort  to  interfere  with  the  British  in  their  retreat ; 
so  they  drifted  down  the  rapids  with  their  two 
prizes  and  secured  them  below.  The  boldness  of 
this  enterprise  will  be  appreciated  when  it  is  re 
membered  that  but  75  British  seamen  (unless  there 
were  some  militia  along),  with  no  artillery,  attacked 
and  captured  two  out  of  three  fine  schooners,  armed 
each  with  a  long  32  or  24,  and  an  aggregate  of  90 
men  ;  and  that  this  had  been  done  in  waters  where 
the  gig  and  five  batteaux  of  the  victors  were  the 
only  British  vessels  afloat. 

CHAMPLAIN. 

This  lake,  which  had  hitherto  played  but  an  in 
conspicuous  part,  was  now  to  become  the  scene  of 
the  greatest  naval  battle  of  the  war.  A  British 
army  of  ii,ooomen  under  Sir  George  Prevost  un 
dertook  the  invasion  of  New  York  by  advancing  up 
the  western  bank  of  Lake  Champlain.  This  ad* 
vance  was  impracticable  unless  there  was  a  suffi. 
ciently  strong  British  naval  force  to  drive  back  the 
American  squadron  at  the  same  time.  Accordingly^ 
the  British  began  to  construct  a  frigate,  the  Con* 
fiance,  to  be  added  to  their  already  existing  force, 
which  consisted  of  a  brig,  two  sloops,  and  12  or  14 
gun-boats.  The  Americans  already  possessed  a 
heavy  corvette,  a  schooner,  a  small  sloop,  and  10 
gun-boats  or  row-galleys  ;  they  now  began  to  build 
a  large  brig,  the  Eagle,  which  was  launched  about 
the  i6th  of  August.  Nine  days  later,  on  the  25th, 


NAVAL  WAR    OF    l8l2. 


the  Con  fiance  was  launched.  The  two  squadrons 
were  equally  deficient  in  stores,  etc.;  the  Confiance 
having  locks  to  her  guns,  some  of  which  could  not 
be  used,  while  the  American  schooner  Ticonderoga 
had  to  fire  her  guns  by  means  of  pistols  flashed  at 
the  touchholes  (like  Barclay  on  Lake  Erie).  Mac- 
donough  and  Downie  were  hurried  into  action  be 
fore  they  had  time  to  prepare  themselves  thor 
oughly  ;  but  it  was  a  disadvantage  common  to  both, 
and  arose  from  the  nature  of  the  case,  which  called 
for  immediate  action.  The  British  army  advanced 
slowly  toward  Plattsburg,  which  was  held  by  Gener 
al  Macomb  with  less  than  2,000  effective  American 
troops.  Captain  Thomas  Macdonough,  the  Ameri 
can  commodore,  took  the  lake  a  day  or  two  before 
his  antagonist,  and  came  to  anchor  in  Plattsburg 
harbor.  The  British  fleet,  under  Captain  George 
Downie,  moved  from  Isle-aux-Noix  on  Sept.  8th, 
and  on  the  morning  of  the  nth  sailed  into  Platts 
burg  harbor. 

The  American  force  consisted  of  the  ship  Sara 
toga,  Captain  T.  Macdonough,  of  about  734  tons,1 
carrying  eight  long  24-pounders,  six  42-pound  and 
twelve  32-pound  carronades  ;  the  brig  Eagle,  Captain 
Robert  Henly,  of  about  500  tons,  carrying  eight  long 
i8's  and  twelve  32-pound  carronades;  schooner 
Ticonderoga  Lieut.-Com.  Stephen  Cassin,  of  about 

JIn  the  Naval  Archives  ("  Masters'-Commandant  Letters,"  1814, 
I,  No.  134)  is  a  letter  from  Macdonough  in  which  he  states  that  the 
Saratoga  is  intermediate  in  size  between  the  Pike,  of  875,  and  the 
Madison,  of  593  tons  ;  this  would  make  her  734,  The  Eagle  was 
very  nearly  the  size  of  the  Lawrence  or  Niagara,  on  Lake  Erie. 
The  Ticonderoga  was  originally  a  small  steamer,  but  Commodore 
Macdonough  had  her  schooner-rigged,  because  he  found  that  her 
machinery  got  out  of  order  on  almost  every  trip  that  she  took.  Her 
tonnage  is  only  approximately  known,  but  she  was  of  the  same  size 
as  the  Linnet. 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  377 

350  tons  carrying  eight  long  12-pounders,  four 
long  i8-pounders,  and  five  32-pound  carronades; 
sloop  Preble,  Lieutenant  Charles  Budd,  of  about 
80  tons,  mounting  seven  long  Q'S  ;  the  row- 
galleys  Borer,  Centipede,  Nettle,  Allen,  Viper,  and 
Burrows,  each  of  about  70  tons,  and  mounting  one 
long  24-  and  one  short  i8-pounder;  and  the  row- 
galleys  Wilmer,  Ludlow,  Aylwin,  and  Ballard,  each 
of  about  40  tons,  and  mounting  one  long  12. 
James  puts  down  the  number  of  men  on  board  the 
squadron  as  950, — merely  a  guess,  as  he  gives  no 
authority.  Cooper  says  "  about  850  men,  including 
officers,  and  a  small  detachment  of  soldiers  to  act 
as  marines."  Lossing  (p.  866,  note  i)  says  882  in 
all.  Vol.  xiv  of  the  "  American  State  Papers  "  con 
tains  on  p.  572  the  prize-money  list  presented  by 
the  purser,  George  Beale,  Jr.  This  numbers  the 
men  (the  dead  being  represented  by  their  heirs  or 
executors)  up  to  915,  including  soldiers  and  seamen, 
but  many  of  the  numbers  are  omitted,  probably 
owing  to  the  fact  that  their  owners,  though  belonging 
on  board,  happened  to  be  absent  on  shore,  or  in  the 
hospital ;  so  that  the  actual  number  of  names  tallies 
very  closely  with  that  given  by  Lossing ;  and  ac 
cordingly  I  shall  take  that.1  The  total  number  of 
men  in  the  galleys  (including  a  number  of  soldiers, 
as  there  were  not  enough  sailors)  was  350.  The 

'In  the  Naval  Archives  are  numerous  letters  from  Macdonough,  in 
which  he  states  continually  that,  as  fast  as  they  arrive,  he  substitutes, 
sailors  for  the  soldiers  with  which  the  vessels  were  originally  manned.. 
Men  were  continually  being  sent  ashore  on  account  of  sickness.  In 
the  Bureau  of  Navigation  is  the  log-book  of  ."  sloop-of-war  Surprise* 
Captain  Robert  Henly  "  (Surprise  was  the  name  the  Eagte  origi 
nally  vent  by).  It  mentions  from  time  to  time  that  men  were  buried 
and  sent  ashore  to  the  hospital  (five  being  sent  ashore  on  September 
2d) ;  and  finally  mentions  that  the  places  of  the  absent  were  partially 
filled  by  a  draft  of  21  soldiers,  to  act  as  marines.  The  notes  on  ths 
day  of  battle  are  very  brief. 


378  NAVAL  WAR   OF    l8l2. 

exact  proportions  in  which  this  force  was  distrib 
uted  among  the  gun-boats  can  not  be  tohl,  but  it 
may  be  roughly  said  to  be  41  in  each  large  galley- 
and  26  in  each  small  one.  The  complement  of  the 
Saratoga  was  210,  of  the  Eagle,  130,  of  the  Ticonde- 
roga,  loo,  and  of  the  Preble,,  30;  but  the  first  three 
had  also  a  few  soldiers  distributed  between  them. 
The  following  list  is  probably  pretty  accurate  as  to 
the  aggregate  ;  but  there  may  have  been  a  score  or 
two  fewer  men  on  the  gun-boats,  or  more  on  the 
larger  vessels. 

MACDONOUGH'S  FORCE. 

Metal,  from  long 
Name. 

Saratoga, 
EagU, 

Ticondmg*, 

Preble, 

Six£un-boats,        420 

Four  gun-boats,     160  104  48    "  long,     48 

In  all,  14  vessels  of  2,244  tons  and  882  men,  with 
86  guns  throwing  at  a  broadside  1,194  Ibs.  of  shot, 
480  from  long,  and  714  from  short  guns. 

The  force  of  the  British  squadron  in  guns  and 
ships  is  known  accurately,  as  most  of  it  was  capt 
ured.  The  Confiance  rated  for  years  in  our  lists 
as  a  frigate  of  the  class  of  the  Constellation,  Congress, 
and  Macedonian  ;  she  was  thus  of  over  1,200  tons. 
(Cooper  says  more,  "  nearly  double  the  tonnage  of 
the  Saratoga")  She  carried  on  her  main-deck  thirty 
long  24*3,  fifteen  in  each  broadside.  She  did  not 


Tons. 

Crew. 

Broadside. 

or  short  gun 

734 

240 

414  Ibs. 

(  short,  318 

500 

150 

264    " 

(  long,     72 

350 

112 

180    " 

j  long,    84 
(  short     96 

80 

30 

36     " 

long,    36 

420 

246 

252    " 

(  long,   144 
(  short,  1  08 

NAVAL  WAR   OF    I&I2, 

have  a  complete  spar-deck ;  on  her  poop,  which  came 
forward  to  the  mizzen-mast,  were  two  32-pound  (or 
possibly  42-pound),  carronades  and  on  her  spacious 
top-gallant  forecastle  were  four  32-  (or  42-)  pound 
carronades,  and  a  long  24  on  a  pivot.1  She  had 
aboard  her  a  furnace  for  heating  shot ;  eight  or  ten 
.of  which  heated  shot  were  found  with  the  furnace.2 
This  was,  of  course,  a  perfectly  legitimate  advantage. 
The  Linnet,  Captain  Daniel  Pring,  was  a  brig  of  the 
same  size  as  the  Ticonderoga,  mounting  16  long  I2's. 
The  Chubb  and  Finch,  Lieutenants  James  McGhie 
and  William  Hicks,  were  formerly  the  American 
sloops  Growler  and  Eagle,  of  112  and  iiotons  re 
spectively.  The  former  mounted  ten  1 8-pound  car 
ronades  and  one  long  6;  the  latter,  six  1 8-pound 
carronades,  four  long  6's,  and  one  short  18.  There 
were  twelve  gun-boats.*  Five  of  these  were  large, 
of  about  70  tons  each ;  three  mounted  a  long  24 
and  a  32-pound  carronade  each ;  one  mounted  a 
long  18  and  a  32-pound  carronade  ;  one  a  long  18 
and  a  short  18.  Seven  were  smaller,  of  about  40 
tons  each  ,  three  of  these  carried  each  a  long  18, 
and  four  carried  each  a  32-pound  carronade.  There 
is  greater  difficulty  in  finding  out  the  number  of 
men  in  the  British  fleet.  American  historians  are 
unanimous  in  stating  it  at  from  1,000  to  1,100;  Brit- 

1  This  is  her  armament  as  given  by  Cooper,  on  the  authority  of 
Lieutenant  E.  A.  F.  Lavallette,  who  was  in  charge  of  her  for  three 
months,  and  went  aboard  her  ten  minutes  after  the  Linnet  struck. 

a  James  stigmatizes  the  statement  of  Commodore  Macdonough 
about  the  furnace  as  "as  gross  a  falsehood  as  ever  was  uttered  "  ;  but 
he  gives  no  authority  for  the  denial,  and  it  appears  to  have  been  mere 
ly  an  ebullition  of  spleen  on  his  part.  Every  American  officer  who 
went  aboard  the  Confiance  saw  the  furnace  and  the  hot  shot. 

3  Letter  of  General  George  Prevost,  Sept.  u,  1814.  All  the  Amer 
ican  accounts  say  13  ;  the  British  official  account  had  best  be  taken. 
James  says  only  ten,  but  gives  no  authority  ;  he  appears  to  have  been 
•entirely  ignorant  of  all  things  connected  with  this  action. 


3  So 


NAVAL   WAR   OF   l8l2. 


ish  historians  never  do  any  thing  but  copy  James 
blindly.  Midshipman  Lea  of  the  Confiance,  in  a 
letter  (already  quoted)  published  in  the  "  London 
Naval  Chronicle,"  vol.  xxxii,  p.  292,  gives  her  crew 
as  300;  but  more  than  this  amount  of  dead  and 
prisoners  were  taken  out  of  her.  The  number  giver 
her  by  Commander  Ward  in  his  "  Naval  Tactics,"  i? 
probably  nearest  right — 325.'  The  Linnet  had  about 
125  men,  and  the  Chubb  and  Finch  about  50  men 
each.  According  to  Admiral  Paulding  (given  by 
Lossing,  in  his  "  Field  Book  of  the  War  of  1812," 
p.  868)  their  gun-boats  averaged  50  men  each.  This 
is  probably  true,  as  they  were  manned  largely  by 
soldiers,  any  number  of  whom  could  be  spared  from 
Sir  George  Prevost's  great  army ;  but  it  may  be  best 
to  consider  the  large  ones  as  having  41,  and  the 
omall  26  men,  which  were  the  complements  of  the 
American  gun-boats  of  the  same  sizes. 
The  following,  then,  is  the  force  of 


DOWNIE  S   SQUADRON. 


Name.                   Tonnage. 

Crew. 

Broadside. 

From  what  guns, 
long  or  short. 

Confiance, 

1200 

325 

480  Ibs. 

j  l°ng» 
\  short, 

384 
96 

Linnet, 

350 

125 

96      " 

long, 

96 

Chubb, 

112 

50 

96     «• 

j  long» 
1  short, 

6 
90 

Finch, 

no 

50 

84      " 

(  long, 
\  short, 

12 

72 

Five  gun-boats, 

350 

205 

254     " 

(  long, 
(  short, 

12 
72 

Seven  gun-boats, 

280 

182 

182     " 

j  lonS> 
(  short, 

54 
128 

In  all,  16  vessels,  of  about  2,402  tons,  with  937 

1  James  gives  her  but  270  men, — without  stating  his  authority. 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  381 

men,1  and  a  total  of  92  guns,  throwing  at  a  broad 
side  1,192  Ibs.,  660  from  long  and  532  from  short 
pieces. 

These  are  widely  different  from  the  figures  that 
appear  in  the  pages  of  most  British  historians,  from 
Sir  Archibald  Alison  down  and  up.  Thus,  in  the 
"  History  of  the  British  Navy,"  by  C.  D.  Yonge  (al 
ready  quoted),  it  is  said  that  on  Lake  Champlain 
"  our  (the  British)  force  was  manifestly  and  vastly 
inferior,  *  *  their  (the  American)  broadside 

outweighing  ours  in  more  than  the  proportion  of 
three  to  two,  while  the  difference  in  their  tonnage 
and  in  the  number  of  their  crews  was  still  more  in 
their  favor."  None  of  these  historians,  or  quasi-histo- 
rians,  have  made  the  faintest  effort  to  find  out  the 
facts  for  themselves,  following  James'  figures  with 
blind  reliance,  and  accordingly  it  is  only  necessary 
to  discuss  the  latter.  This  reputable  gentleman 
ends  his  account("  Naval  Occurrences,"  p.  424)  by  re 
marking  that  Macdonough  wrote  as  he  did  because 
"he  knew  that  nothing  would  stamp  a  falsehood 
with  currency  equal  to  a  pious  expression,  *  *  * 
his  falsehoods  equalling  in  number  the  lines  of  his 
letter."  These  remarks  are  interesting  as  showing 
the  unbiassed  and  truthful  character  of  the  author, 
rather  than  for  any  particular  weight  they  will  have 
in  influencing  any  one's  judgment  on  Commodore 
Macdonough.  James  gives  the  engaged  force  of  the 
British  as  "  8  vessels,  of  1,426  tons,  with  537  men, 
and  throwing  765  Ibs.  of  shot."  To  reduce  the 
force  down  to  this,  he  first  excludes  the  Finch,  be 
cause  she  "  grounded  opposite  an  American  battery 
before  the  engagement  commenced"  which  reads  espe- 

1  About  ;  there  were  probably  more  rather  than  less. 


382  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

daily  well  in  connection  with  Capt.  Pring's  official 
letter :  "  Lieut.  Hicks,  of  the  Finch,  had  the  morti 
fication  to  strike  on  a  reef  of  rocks  to  the  eastward 
of  Crab  Island  about  the  middle  of  the  engagement"  ' 
What  James  means  cannot  be  imagined  ;  no  stretch 
of  language  will  convert  "  about  the  middle  of "  into 
"before.''  The  Finch  struck  on  the  reef  in  conse 
quence  of  having  been  disabled  and  rendered  help^ 
less  by  the  fire  from  the  Ticonderoga.  Adding  her 
force  to  James*  statement  (counting  her  crew  only 
as  he  gives  it),  we  get  9  vessels,  1,536  tons,  577  men, 
849  Ibs.  of  shot.  James  also  excludes  five  gun 
boats,  because  they  ran  away  almost  as  soon  as 
the  action  commenced  (vol.  vi,  p.  501).  This 
assertion  is  by  no  means  equivalent  to  the  state 
ment  in  Captain  Pring's  letter  "  that  the  flotilla 
of  gun-boats  had  abandoned  the  object  assigned  to 
them,"  and,  if  it  was,  it  would  not  warrant  his  ex 
cluding  the  five  gun-boats.  Their  flight  may  have 
been  disgraceful,  but  they  formed  part  of  the  attack 
ing  force  nevertheless  ;  almost  any  general  could  say 
that  he  had  won  against  superior  numbers  if  he  re 
fused  to  count  in  any  of  his  own  men  whom  he  sus 
pected  of  behaving  badly.  James  gives  his  10  gun 
boats  294  men  and  13  guns  (two  long  24*5,  five  long 
i8's,  six  32-pound  carronades),  and  makes  them 
average  45  tons;  adding  on  the  five  he  leaves  out, 
we  get  14  vessels,  of  1,761  tons,  with  714  men,  throw 
ing  at  a  broadside  1,025  Ibs.  of  shot  (591  from  long 
guns,  434  from  carronades).  But  Sir  George  Pre- 
vost,  in  the  letter  already  quoted,  says  there  were 
12  gun-boats,  and  the  American  accounts  say  more. 

1  The  italics  are  mine.     The  letter  is  given  in  full  in  the  "  Naval 
Chronicle." 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    1 8 12.  383 

Supposing  the  two  gun-boats  James  did  not  include 
at  all  to  be  equal  respectively  to  one  of  the  largest 
and  one  of  the  smallest  of  the  gun-boats  as  he  gives 
them  ("  Naval  Occurrences,"  p.  417) ;  that  is,  one  to 
have  had  35  men,  a  long  24,  and  a  32-pound 
carronade,  the  other,  25  men  and  a  32-pound  car- 
ronade,  we  get  for  Downie's  force  16  vessels,  of 
1,851  tons,  with  774  men,  throwing  at  a  broadside 
1,113  Ibs.  of  shot  (615  from  long  guns,  498  from  car- 
ronades).  It  must  be  remembered  that  so  far  I 
have  merely  corrected  James  by  means  of  the  au 
thorities  from  which  he  draws  his  account — the 
official  letters  of  the  British  commanders.  1  have 
not  brought  up  a  single  American  authority  against 
him,  but  have  only  made  such  alterations  as  a  writer 
could  with  nothing  whatever  but  the  accounts  of 
Sir  George  Prevost  and  Captain  Pring  before  him 
to  compare  with  James.  Thus  it  is  seen  that  ac 
cording  to  James  himself  Downie  really  had  774 
men  to  Macdonough's  882,  and  threw  at  a  broad 
side  1,113  Ibs.  of  shot  to  Macdonough's  1,194  Ibs. 
James  says  ("Naval  Occurrences,"  pp.  410,  413): 
"  Let  it  be  recollected,  no  musketry  was  employed 
on  either  side,"  and  "  The  marines  were  of  no  use,, 
as  the  action  was  fought  out  of  the  range  of  mus 
ketry  "  ;  the  106  additional  men  on  the  part  of  the 
Americans  were  thus  not  of  much  consequence,  the 
action  being  fought  at  anchor,  and  there  being  men 
enough  to  manage  the  guns  and  perform  every  other 
duty.  So  we  need  only  attend  to  the  broadside 
force.  Here,  then,  Downie  could  present  at  a 
broadside  615  Ibs.  of  shot  from  long  guns  to  Mac 
donough's  480,  and  498  Ibs.  from  carronades  to  Mac 
donough's  714;  or,  he  threw  135  Ibs.  of  shot  more 


384  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

from  his  long  guns,  and  216  less  from  his  carronades. 
This  is  equivalent  to  Downie's  having  seven  long 
i8's  and  one  long  9,  and  Macdonough's  having  one 
24-pound  and  six  32-pound  carronades.  A  32-pound 
carronade  is  not  equal  to  a  long  18  ;  so  that  even  by 
James  own  showing  Downies  force  was  slightly  the 
superior. 

Thus  far,  I  may  repeat,  I  have  corrected  James 
solely  by  the  evidence  of  his  own  side ;  now  I  shall 
bring  in  some  American  authorities.  These  do  not 
contradict  the  British  official  letters,  for  they  virt 
ually  agree  with  them  ;  but  they  do  go  against  James' 
unsupported  assertions,  and,  being  made  by  naval 
officers  of  irreproachable  reputation,  will  certainly 
outweigh  them.  In  the  first  place,  James  asserts 
that  on  the  main-deck  of  the  Confiance  but  13  guns 
were  presented  in  broadside,  two  32-pound  carron 
ades  being  thrust  through  the  bridle-  and  two  others 
through  the  stern-ports ;  so  he  excludes  two  of  her 
guns  from  the  broadside.  Such  guns  would  have  been 
of  great  use  to  her  at  certain  stages  of  the  combat, 
and  ought  to  be  included  in  the  force.  But  besides 
this  the  American  officers  positively  say  that  she 
had  a  broadside  of  1 5  guns.  Adding  these  two  guns, 
and  making  a  trifling  change  in  the  arrangement  of 
the  guns  in  the  row-galleys,  we  get  a  broadside  of 
1,192  Ibs.,  exactly  as  I  have  given  it  above.  There 
is  no  difficulty  in  accounting  for  the  difference  of 
tonnage  as  given  by  James  and  by  the  Americans, 
for  we  have  considered  the  same  subject  in  reference 
to  the  battle  of  Lake  Erie.  James  calculates  the 
American  tonnage  as  if  for  sea-vessels  of  deep 
holds,  while,  as  regards  the  British  vessels,  he  allows 
for  the  shallow  holds  that  all  the  lake  craft  had  ; 


N\VAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  385 

that  is,  he  gives  in  one  the  nominal,  in  the  other 
the  real,  tonnage  This  fully  accounts  tor  the  dis 
crepancy.  It  only  remains  to  account  for  the  dif 
ference  in  the  nun  her  of  men.  From  James  we  can 
get  772.  In  the  first  place,  we  can  reason  by  analo 
gy.  I  have  alread/  shown  that,  as  regards  the  bat 
tle  of  Lake  Erie,  h^  is  convicted  (by  English,  not 
by  American,  evidence)  of  having  underestimated 
Barclay's  force  by  about  25  per  cent.  If  he  did  the 
same  thing  here,  the  British  force  was  over  1,000 
strong,  and  I  have  no  doubt  that  it  was.  But  we 
have  other  proofs.  On  p.  417  of  the  "  Naval  Oc 
currences"  he  says  the  complement  of  the  four  cap 
tured  British  vessels  amounted  to  420  men,  of  whom 
54  were  killed  in  action,  leaving  366  prisoners,  in 
cluding  the  wounded.  But  the  report  of  pris 
oners,  as  given  by  the  American  authorities, 
gives  369  officers  and  seamen  unhurt  or  but  slightly 
wounded,  57  wounded  men  paroled,  and  other 
wounded  whose  number  was  unspecified.  Suppos 
ing  this  number  to  have  been  82,  and  adding  54 
dead,  we  would  get  in  all  550  men  for  the  four  ships, 
the  number  I  have  adopted  in  my  list.  This  would 
make  the  British  wounded  129  instead  of  116,  as 
James  says:  but  neither  the  Americans  nor  the 
British  seem  to  have  enumerated  all  their  wounded 
in  this  fight.  Taking  into  account  all  these  con 
siderations,  it  will  be  seen  that  the  figures  I  have 
given  are  probably  approximately  correct,  and,  at 
any  rate,  indicate  pretty  closely  the  relative  strength 
of  the  two  squadrons.  The  slight  differences  in  ton 
nage  and  crews  (158  tons  and  55  men,  in  favor  of 
the  British)  are  so  trivial  that  they  need  not  be 
taken  into  account,  and  we  will  merely  consider  the 


386  NAVAL  WAR  OF   i8i::. 

broadside  force.  In  absolute  weight  of  metal  the 
two  combatants  were  evenly  matched — almost  ex 
actly; — but  whereas  from  Downie's  broadside  of  1,192 
Ibs.  660  were  from  long  and  532  from  short  guns,  of 
Macdonough's  broadside  of  1,194  Ibs.,  but  480  were 
from  long  and  714  from  short  pieces.  The  forces 
were  thus  equal,  except  that  Downie  opposed  180 
Ibs.  from  long  guns  to  182  from  carronades ;  as  if  10 
long  i8's  were  opposed  to  ten  1 8-pound  carronades. 
This  would  make  the  odds  on  their  face  about  10  to 
9  against  the  Americans  ;  in  reality  they  were 
greater,  for  the  possession  of  the  Confiance  was  a 
very  great  advantage.  The  action  is,  as  regards 
metal,  the  exact  reverse  of  those  between  Chauncy 
and  Yeo.  Take,  for  example,  the  fight  off  Burling 
ton  on  Sept.  28,  1813.  Yeo's  broadside  was  1,3/4 
Ibs.  to  Chauncy's  1,288;  but  whereas  only  180  of 
Yeo's  was  from  long  guns,  of  Chauncy's  but  536 
was  from  carronades.  Chauncy's  fleet  was  thus 
much  the  superior.  At  least  we  must  say  this  :  if 
Macdonough  beat  merely  an  equal  force,  then  Yeo 
made  a  most  disgraceful  and  cowardly  flight  before 
an  inferior  foe ;  but  if  we  contend  that  Macdon 
ough's  force  was  inferior  to  that  of  his  antagonist, 
then  we  must  admit  that  Yeo's  was  in  like  manner 
inferior  to  Chauncy's.  These  rules  work  both  ways. 
The  Confiance  was  a  heavier  vessel  than  the  Pike, 
presenting  in  broadside  one  long  24-  and  three  32- 
pound  carronades  more  than  the  latter.  James  (vol. 
yi>  P-  355)  says:  "  The  Pike  alone  was  nearly  a 
match  for  Sir  James  Yeo's  squadron,"  and  Brenton 
says  (vol.  ii,  503) :  "  The  General  Pike  was  more  than 
a  match  for  the  whole  British  squadron."  Neither 
of  these  writers  means  quite  as  much  as  he  says,  for 


NAVAL    WAR    OF    1 8 12.  387 

the  logical  result  would  be  that  the   Confiance  alone     / 
was  a  match  for  all  of  Macdonough's  force.     Still  it 
is  safe  to  say  that  the  Pike  gave  Chauncy  a  great  ad 
vantage,  and  that  the  Confiance  made  Downie's  fleet    I 
much  superior  to  Macdonough's. 

Macdonough  saw  that  the  British  would  be  forced 
to  make  the  attack  in  order  to  get  the  control  of 
the  waters.  On  this  long,  narrow  lake  the  winds'^ 
usually  blow  pretty  nearly  north  or  south,  and  th^x 
set  of  the  current  is  of  course  northward  ;  all  the 
vessels,  being  flat  and  shallow,  could  not  beat  to 
windward  well,  so  there  was  little  chance  of  the 
British  making  the  attack  when  there  was  a  souther 
ly  wind  blowing.  So  late  in  the  season  there  was 
danger  of  sudden  and  furious  gales,  which  would 
make  it  risky  for  Downie  to  wait  outside  the  bay 
till  the  wind  suited  him  ;  and  inside  the  bay  the 
wind  was  pretty  sure  to  be  light  and  baffling. 
V^oung  Macdonough  (then  but  28  years  of  age)  cal-~ 
culated  all  these  chances  very  coolly  and  decided  to 
await  the  attack  at  anchor  in  Plattsburg  Bay,  with 
the  head  of  his  line  so  far  to  the  north  that  it  could 
hardly  be  turned  ;  and  then  proceeded  to  make  all 
the  other  preparations  with  the  same  foresight. 
Not  only  were  his  vessels  provided  with  springs, 
but  also  with  anchors  to  be  used  astern  in  any 
emergency.  The  Saratoga  was  further  prepared  for 
a  change  of  wind,  or  for  the  necessity  of  winding 
ship,  by  having  a  kedge  planted  broad  off  on  each 
of  her  bows,  with  a  hawser  and  preventer  hawser 
(hanging  in  bights  under  water)  leading  from  each 
quarter  to  the  kedge  on  that  side.  There  had  not 
been  time  to  train  the  men  thoroughly  at  the 
guns ;  and  to  make  these  produce  their  full  effect 


388  NAVAL   WAR    OF    1 8 12. 

the  constant  supervision  of  the  officers  had  to  be 
exerted.  The  British  were  laboring  under  this 
same  disadvantage,  but  neither  side  felt  the  want 
very  much,  as  the  smooth  water,  stationary  position 
of  the  ships,  and  fair  range,  made  the  fire  of  both 
sides  very  destructive. 

Plattsburg  Bay  is  deep  and  opens  to  the  south 
ward  ;  so  that  a  wind  which  would  enable  the  Brit 
ish  to  sail  up  the  lake  would  force  them  to  beat 
when  entering  the  bay.  The  east  side  of  the  mouth 
of  the  bay  is  formed  by  Cumberland  Head;  the 
entrance  is  about  a  mile  and  a  half  across,  and  the 
other  boundary,  southwest  from  the  Head,  is  an 
extensive  shoal,  and  a  small,  low  island.  This  is 
called  Crab  Island,  and  on  it  was  a  hospital  and  one 
six-pounder  gun,  which  was  to  be  manned  in  case 
of  necessity  by  the  strongest  patients.  Macdon- 
ough  had  anchored  in  a  north-and-south  line  a  little 
to  the  south  of  the  outlet  of  the  Saranac,  and  out 
of  range  of  the  shore  batteries,  being  two  miles  from 
the  western  shore.  The  head  of  his  line  was  so 
near  Cumberland  Head  that  an  attempt  to  turn  it 
would  place  the  opponent  under  a  very  heavy  fire, 
while  to  the  south  the  shoal  prevented  a  flank 
attack.  The  Eagle  lay  to  the  north,  flanked  on 
each  side  by  a  couple  of  gun-boats  ;  then  came  the 
Saratoga,  with  three  gun-boats  between  her  and  the 
Ticonderoga,  the  next  in  line  ;  then  came  three  gun 
boats  and  the  Preble.  The  four  large  vessels  were 
at  anchor;  the  galleys  being  under  their  sweeps  and 
forming  a  second  line  about  40  yards  back,  some 
of  them  keeping  their  places  and  some  not  doing 
so.  By  this  arrangement  his  line  could  not  be 
doubled  upon,  there  was  not  room  to  anchor  on  his 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  389 

broadside  out  of  reach  of  his  carronades,  and  the 
enemy  was  forced  to  attack  him  by  standing  in 
bows  on. 

The  morning  of  September  nth  opened  with  a 
light  breeze  from  the  northeast.  Downie's  fleet 
weighed  anchor  at  daylight,  and  came  down  the 
lake  with  the  wind  nearly  aft,  the  booms  of  the  two 
sloops  swinging  out  to  starboard.  At  half-past 
seven,1  the  people  in  the  ships  could  see  their  ad 
versaries'  upper  sails  across  the  narrow  strip  of  land 
ending  in  Cumberland  Head,  before  the  British 
doubled  the  latter.  Captain  Downie  hove  to  with 
his  four  large  vessels  when  he  had  fairly  opened  the 
Bay,  and  waited  for  his  galleys  to  overtake  him. 
Then  his  four  vessels  filled  on  the  startroato!  tack 
and  headed  for  the  American  line,  going  abreast,  th.e 
Chubb  to  the  north,  heading  well  to  windward  of  the, 
Eagle,  for  whose  bows  the  Linnet  was  headed,  while  ) 
the  Confiance  was  to  be  laid  athwart  the  hawse  of  the 
Saratoga  ;  the  Finch  was  to  leeward  with  the  twelve 
gun-boats,  and  was  to  engage  the  rear  of  the  Ameri 
can  line. 

As  the  English  squadron  stood  bravely  in,  young 
Macdonough,  who  feared  his  foes  not  at  all,  but  his 
God  a  great  deal,  knelt  for  a  moment,  with  his  offi 
cers,  on  the  quarter-deck  ;  and  then  ensued  a  few 
minutes  of  perfect  quiet,  the  men  waiting  with  grim 
expectancy  for  the  opening  of  the  fight.  The  Eagle 
spoke  first  with  her  long  i8's,  but  to  no  effect, 
for  the  shot  fell  short.  Then,  as  the  Linnet  passed 
the  Saratoga,  she  fired  her  broadside  of  long  I2's, 

1  The  letters  of  the  two  commanders  conflict  a  little  as  to  time, 
both  absolutely  and  relatively.  Pring  says  the  action  lasted  two  hours 
and  three  quarters  ,  the  American  accounts,  two  hours  and  twenty 
minutes.  Fring  says  it  began  at  8.00  ;  Macdonough  says  a  few  minutes 
before  nine,  etc.  I  take  the  mean  time. 


390  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

but  her  shot  also  fell  short,  except  one  that  struck  a 
hen-coop  which  happened  to  be  aboard  the  Saratoga. 
There  was  a  game  cock  inside,  and,  instead  of  being 
frightened  at  his  sudden  release,  he  jumped  up  on  a 
gun-slide,  clapped  his  wings,  and  crowed  lustily. 
The  men  laughed  and  cheered ;  and  immediately 
afterward  Macdonough  himself  fired  the  first  shot 
from  one  of  the  long  guns.  The  24-pound  ball 
struck  the  Confiance  near  the  hawse-hole  and 
ranged  the  length  of  her  deck,  killing  and  wound 
ing  several  men.  All  the  American  long  guns  now 
opened  and  were  replied  to  by  the  British  galleys. 
The  Confiance  stood  steadily  on  without  replying. 
But  she  was  baffled  by  shifting  winds,  and  was  soon 
so  cut  up,  having  both  her  port  bow-anchors  shot 
away,  and  suffering  much  loss,  that  she  was  obliged 
to  port  her  helm  and  come  to  while  still  nearly  a 
quarter  of  a  mile  distant  from  the  Saratoga.  Cap 
tain  Downie  came  to  anchor  in  grand  style, — secur 
ing  every  thing  carefully  before  he  fired  a  gun,  and 
then  opening  with  a  terribly  destructive  broadside. 
The  Chubb  and  Linnet  stood  farther  in,  and  anchored 
forward  the  Eagle  s  beam.  Meanwhile  the  Finch 
got  abreast  of  the  Ticonderoga,  under  her  sweeps, 
supported  by  the  gun-boats.  The  main  fighting 
was  thus  to  take  place  between  the  vans,  where  the 
Eagle,  Saratoga,  and  six  or  seven  gun-boats  were 
engaged  with  the  Chubb,  Linnet,  Confiance,  and  two 
or  three  gun-boats ;  while  in  the  rear,  the  Ticonde 
roga,  the  Preble,  and  the  other  American  galleys 
engaged  the  Finch  and  the  remaining^  nine  or  ten 
English  galleys.  The  battle  at  the  fo6t  of  the  line 
was  fought  on  the  part  of  the  American^  to  prevent 
their  flank  being  turned,  and  on  the/part  of  the 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  39! 

British  to  effect  that  object.  At  first  the  fighting 
was  at  long  range,  but  gradually  the  British  galleys 
closed  up,  firing  very  well.  The  American  galleys 
at  this  end  of  the  line  were  chiefly  the  small  ones, 
armed  with  one  12-pounder  apiece,  and  they  by  de> 
grees  drew  back  before  the  heavy  fire  of  their  op. 
ponents.  About  an  hour  after  the  discharge  of  the 
first  gun  had  been  fired  the  Finch  closed  up  toward 
the  Ticonderoga,  and  was  completely  crippled  by  a 
couple  of  broadsides  from  the  latter.  She  drifted 
helplessly  down  the  line  and  grounded  near  Crab 
Island  ;  some  of  the  convalescent  patients  manned 
the  six-pounder  and  fired  a  shot  or  two  at  her, 
when  she  struck,  nearly  half  of  her  crew  being  killed 
or  wounded.  About  the  same  time  the  British 
gun-boats  forced  the  Preble  out  of  line,  whereupon 
she  cut  her  cable  and  drifted  inshore  out  of  the 
fight.  Two  or  three  of  the  British  gun-boats  had 
already  been  sufficiently  damaged  by  some  of  the 
shot  from  the  Ticonderogas  long  guns  to  make 
them  wary ;  and  the  contest  at  this  part  of  the  line 
narrowed  down  to  one  between  the  American 
schooner  and  the  remaining  British  gun-boats,  who 
combined  to  make  a  most  determined  attack  upon 
her.  So  hastily  had  the  squadron  been  fitted  out  that 
many  of  the  matches  for  her  guns  were  at  the  last 
moment  found  to  be  defective.  The  captain  of  one 
of  the  divisions  was  a  midshipman,  but  sixteen  years 
old,  Hiram  Paulding.  When  he  found  the  matches 
to  be  bad  he  fired  the  guns  of  his  section  by  having 
pistols  flashed  at  them,  and  continued  this  through 
the  whole  fight.  The  Ticonderogas  commander, 
Lieut.  Cassin,  fought  his  schooner  most  nobly.  He 
kept  walking  the  taffrail  amidst  showers  of  mus- 


392  NAVAL   WAR    OF    l8l2. 

ketry  and  grape,  coolly  watching  the  movements  of 
the  galleys  and  directing  the  guns  to  be  loaded  with 
canister  and  bags  of  bullets,  when  the  enemy  tried 
to  board.  The  British  galleys  were  handled  with 
determined  gallantry,  under  the  command  of  Lieu 
tenant  Bell.  Had  they  driven  off  the  Ticonderoga 
they  would  have  won  the  day  for  their  side,  and 
they  pushed  up  till  they  were  not  a  boat-hook's 
length  distant,  to  try  to  carry  her  by  boarding ;  but 
every  attempt  was  repulsed  and  they  were  forced  to 
draw  off,  some  of  them  so  crippled  by  the  slaughter 
they  had  suffered  that  they  could  hardly  man  the 
oars. 

Meanwhile  the  fighting  at  the  head  of  the  line  had 
been  even  fiercer.  The  first  broadside  of  the  Con- 
fiance,  fired  from  16  long  24*5,  double  shotted, 
coolly  sighted,  in  smooth  water,  at  point-blank  range, 
produced  the  most  terrible  effect  on  the  Saratoga. 
Her  hull  shivered  all  over  with  the  shock,  and  when 
the  crash  subsided  nearly  half  of  her  people  were 
seen  stretched  on  deck,  for  many  had  been  knocked 
down  who  were  not  seriously  hurt.  Among  the 
slain  was  her  first  lieutenant,  Peter  Gamble;  he 
was  kneeling  down  to  sight  the  bow-gun,  when  a 
shot  entered  the  port,  split  the  quoin,  and  drove  a 
portion  of  it  against  his  side,  killing  him  without 
breaking  the  skin.  The  survivors  carried  on  the 
fight  with  undiminished  energy.  Macdonough  him 
self  worked  like  a  common  sailor,  in  pointing  and 
handling  a  favorite  gun.  While  bending  over  to 
sight  it  a  round  shot  cut  in  two  the  spanker  boom, 
which  fell  on  his  head  and  struck  him  senseless  for 
two  or  three  minutes ;  he  then  leaped  to  his  feet 
and  continued  as  before,  when  a  shot  took  off  the 


NAVAL    WAR    OF    l8l2.  393 

head  of  the  captain  of  the  gun  and  drove  it  in  his 
face  with  such  a  force  as  to  knock  him  to  the  other 
side  of  the  deck.  But  after  the  first  broadside  not 
so  much  injury  was  done  ;  the  guns  of  the  Confi- 
ance  had  been  levelled  to  point-blank  range,  and  as 
the  quoins  were  loosened  by  the  successive  dis 
charges  they  were  not  properly  replaced,  so  that 
her  broadsides  kept  going  higher  and  higher  and  do 
ing  less  and  less  damage.  Very  shortly  after  the 
beginning  of  the  action  her  gallant  captain  was 
slain.  He  was  standing  behind  one  of  the  long 
guns  when  a  shot  from  the  Saratoga  struck  it  and 
threw  it  completely  off  the  carriage  against  his  right 
groin,  killing  him  almost  instantly.  His  skin  was 
not  broken  ;  a  black  mark,  about  the  size  of  a  small 
plate,  was  the  only  visible  injury.  His  watch  was 
found  flattened,  with  its  hands  pointing  to  the  very 
second  at  which  he  received  the  fatal  blow.  As  the 
contest  went  on  the  fire  gradually  decreased  in 
weight,  the  guns  being  disabled.  The  inexperi 
ence  of  both  crews  partly  caused  this.  The  Ameri 
can  sailors  overloaded  their  carronades  so  as  to  very 
much  destroy  the  effect  of  their  fire;  when  the  offi 
cers  became  disabled,  the  men  would  cram  the  guns 
with  shot  till  the  last  projected  from  the  muzzle 
Of  course,  this  lessened  the  execution,  and  also 
gradually  crippled  the  guns.  On  board  the  Confi- 
ance  the  confusion  was  even  worse  :  after  the  bat 
tle  the  charges  of  the  guns  were  drawn,  and  on  the 
side  she  had  fought  one  was  found  with  a  canvas 
bag  containing  two  round  of  shot  rammed  home 
and  wadded  without  any  powder  ;  another  with  two 
cartridges  and  no  shot ;  and  a  third  with  a  wad  be 
low  the  cartridge. 


394  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

At  the  extreme  head  of  the  line  the  advantage 
had  been  with  the -British.  The  Chubb  and  Linnet 
had  begun  a  brisk  engagement  with  the  Eagle  and 
American  gun-boats.  In  a  short  time  the  Chubb  had 
her  cable,  bowsprit,  and  main-boom  shot  away, 
drifted  within  the  American  lines,  and  was  taken 
possession  of  by  one  of  the  Saratoga  s  midshipmen. 
The  Linnet  paid  no  attention  to  the  American  gun 
boats,  directing  her  whole  fire  against  the  Eagle,  and 
the  latter  was,  in  addition,  exposed  to  part  of  the 
fire  of  the  Confiance.  After  keeping  up  a  heavy  fire 
for  a  long  time  her  springs  were  shot  away,  and  she 
came  up  into  the  wind,  hanging  so  that  she  could 
not  return  a  shot  to  the  well-directed  broadsides  of 
the  Linnet.  Henly  accordingly  cut  his  cable,  started 
home  his  top-sails,  ran  down,  and  anchored  by  the 
stern  between  and  inshore  of  the  Confiance  and  7Y- 
conderoga,  from  which  position  he  opened  on  the 
Confiance.  The  Linnet  now  directed  her  attention 
to  the  American  gun-boats,  which  at  this  end  of  the 
line  were  very  well  fought,  but  she  soon  drove  them 
off,  and  then  sprung  her  broadside  so  as  to  rake  the 
Saratoga  on  her  bows. 

Macdonough  by  this  time  had  his  hands  full,  and 
his  fire  was  slackening  ;  he  was  bearing  the  whole 
brunt  of  the  action,  with  the  frigate  on  his  beam  and 
the  brig  raking  him.  Twice  his  ship  had  been  set 
on  fire  by  the  hot  shot  of  the  Confiance ;  one  by 
one  his  long  guns  were  disabled  by  shot,  and  his 
carronades  were  either  treated  the  same  way  or  else 
rendered  useless  by  excessive  overcharging.  Fi 
nally  but  a  single  carronade  was  left  in  the  starboard 
batteries,  and  on  firing  it  the  naval-bolt  broke,  the 
gun  flew  off  the  carriage  and  fell  down  the  main 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  395 

hatch,  leaving  the  Commodore  without  a  single  gun 
to  oppose  to  the  few  the  Confiance  still  presented. 
The  battle  would  have  been  lost  had  not  Macdon- 
ough's  foresight  provided  the  means  of  retrieving 
it.  The  anchor  suspended  astern  of  the  Saratoga 
was  let  go,  and  the  men  hauled  in  on  the  hawser  that 
led  to  the  starboard  quarter,  bringing  the  ship's  stern 
up  over  the  kedge.  The  ship  now  rode  by  the 
kedge  and  by  a  line  that  had  been  bent  to  a  bight  in 
the  stream  cable,  and  she  was  raked  badly  by  the 
accurate  fire  of  the  Linnet.  By  rousing  on  the  line 
the  ship  was  at  length  got  so  far  round  that  the 
aftermost  gun  of  the  port  broadside  bore  on  the 
Confiance.  The  men  had  been  sent  forward  to  keep 
as  much  out  of  harm's  way  as  possible,  and  now 
some  were  at  once  called  back  to  man  the  piece, 
which  then  opened  with  effect.  The  next  gun  was 
treated  in  the  same  manner  ;  but  the  ship  now  hung 
and  would  go  no  farther  round.  The  hawser  lead 
ing  from  the  port  quarter  was  then  got  forward  un 
der  the  bows  and  passed  aft  to  the  starboard  quar 
ter,  and  a  minute  afterward  the  ship's  whole  port 
battery  opened  with  fatal  effect.  The  Confiance 
meanwhile  had  also  attempted  to  round.  Her 
springs,  like  those  of  the  Linnet,  were  on  the  star 
board  side,  and  so  of  course  could  not  be  shot  away 
as  the  Eagle 's  were  ;  but,  as  she  had  nothing  but 
springs  to  rely  on,  her  efforts  did  little  beyond  forc 
ing  her  forward,  and  she  hung  with  her  head  to  the 
wind.  She  had  lost  over  half  of  her  crew,1  most  of 
her  guns  on  the  engaged  side  were  dismounted,  and 
her  stout  masts  had  been  splintered  till  they  looked 

1  Midshipman  Lee,  in  his  letter  already  quoted,  says  "not  five 
men  were  left  unhurt  "  ;  this  would  of  course  include  bruises,  etc., 
as  hurts. 


396  NAVAL   WAR    OF    l8l2. 

like  bundles  of  matches  ;  her  sails  had  been  torn  to 
rags,  and  she  was  forced  to  strike,  about  two  hours 
after  she  had  fired  the  first  broadside.  Without 
pausing  a  minute  the  Saratoga  again  hauled  on  her 
starboard  hawser  till  her  broadside  was  sprung  to 
bear  on  the  Linnet,  and  the  ship  and  brig  began  a 
brisk  fight,  which  the  Eagle  from  her  position  could 
take  no  part  in,  while  the  Ticonderoga  was  just  fin 
ishing  up  the  British  galleys.  The  shattered  and 
disabled  state  of  the  Linnet's  masts,  sails,  and  yards 
precluded  the  most  distant  hope  of  Capt.  Pring's 
effecting  his  escape  by  cutting  his  cable  ;  but  he 
kept  up  a  most  gallant  fight  with  his  greatly  su 
perior  foe,  in  hopes  that  some  of  the  gun-boats  would 
come  and  tow  him  off,  and  despatched  a  lieutenant 
to  the  Confiance  to  ascertain  her  state.  The  lieu 
tenant  returned  with  news  of  Capt.  Downie's  death, 
while  the  British  gun-boats  had  been  driven  half  a 
mile  off ;  and,  after  having  maintained  the  fight  single- 
handed  for  fifteen  minutes,  until,  from  the  number 
of  shot  between  wind  and  water,  the  water  had 
risen  a  foot  above  her  lower  deck,  the  plucky  little 
brig  hauled  down  her  colors,  and  the  fight  ended, 
a  little  over  two  hours  and  a  half  after  the  first  gun 
had  been  fired.  Not  one  of  the  larger  vessels  had  a 
mast  that  would  bear  canvas,  and  the  prizes  were  in 
a  sinking  condition.  The  British  galleys  drifted  to 
leewrard,  none  with  their  colors  up ;  but  as  the 
Saratoga  s  boarding-officer  passed  along  the  deck  of 
the  Confiance  he  accidentally  ran  against  a  lock- 
string  of  one  of  her  starboard  guns,1  and  it  went  off. 
This  was  apparently  understood  as  a  signal  by  the 

1  A  sufficient  commentary,  by  the  way,  on  James'  assertion  that  the 
guns  of  the  Confiance  had  to  be  fired  by  matches,  as  the  gun-locks 
did  not  fit ! 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  397 

galleys,  and  they  moved  slowly  off,  pulling  but  a 
very  few  sweeps,  and  not  one  of  them  hoisting  an 
ensign. 

On  both  sides  the  ships  had  been  cut  up  in  the 
most  extraordinary  manner;  the  Saratoga  had  55 
shot-holes  in  her  hull,  and  the  Confiance  105  in  hers, 
and  the  Eagle  and  Linnet  had  suffered  in  proportion. 
The  number  of  killed  and  wounded  can  not  be  ex 
actly  stated ;  it  was  probably  about  200  on  the 
American  side,  and  over  300  on  the  British.1 

Captain  Macdonough  at  once  returned  the  British 
officers  their  swords.  Captain  Pring  writes:  "I 


1  Macdonough  returned  his  loss 

as  follows 

Killed. 

Wounded. 

Saratoga, 

28 

29 

Eagle, 

13 

20 

Ticonderogat 

6 

6 

Preble, 

2 

Boxer, 

3 

I 

Centipede, 

I 

Wilmer, 

I 

A  total  of  52  killed  and  58  wounded  ;  but  the  latter  head  apparently 
only  included  those  who  had  to  go  to  the  hospital.  Probably  about 
90  additional  were  more  or  less  slightly  wounded.  Captain  Pring,  in 
his  letter  of  Sept.  I2th,  says  the  Confiance  had  41  killed  and  40 
wounded  ;  the  Linnet,  10  killed  and  14  wounded  ;  the  Chubb,  6 
killed  and  16  wounded  ;  the  Finch,  2  wounded  :  in  all,  57  killed 
and  72  wounded.  But  he  adds  "  that  no  opportunity  has  offered  to 
muster  *  *  *  this  is  the  whole  as  yet  ascertained  to  be  killed  or 
wounded."  The  Americans  took  out  180  dead  and  wounded  from 
the  Confiance,  50  from  the  Linnet,  and  40  from  the  Chubb  and  Finch  ; 
in  all,  270.  James  ("  Naval  Occurrences,"  p.  412)  says  the  Confiance 
had  83  wounded.  As  Captain  Pring  wrote  his  letter  in  Plattsburg 
Bay  the  day  after  the  action,  he  of  course  could  not  give  the  loss 
aboard  the  British  gun-boats  ;  so  James  at  once  assumed  that  they  suf 
fered  none.  As  well  as  could  be  found  out  they  had  between  50  and 
100  killed  and  wounded.  The  total  British  loss  was  between  300  and 
400,  as  nearly  as  can  be  ascertained.  For  this  action,  as  already  shown, 
James  is  of  no  use  whatever.  Compare  his  statements,  for  example, 
with  those  of  Midshipman  Lee,  in  the  "  Naval  Chronicle."  The  com 
parative  loss,  as  a  means  of  testing  the  competitive  prowess  of  the 
combatants,  is  not  of  much  consequence  in  this  case,  as  the  weaker 
party  in  point  of  force  conquered. 


398  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8i2. 

have  much  satisfaction  in  making  you  acquainted 
with  the  humane  treatment  the  wounded  have  re 
ceived  from  Commodore  Macdonough  ;  they  were 
immediately  removed  to  his  own  hospital  on  Crab 
Island,  and  furnished  with  every  requisite.  His 
generous  and  polite  attention  to  myself,  the  officers, 
and  men,  will  ever  hereafter  be  gratefully  remem 
bered."  The  effects  of  the  victory  were  immediate 
and  of  the  highest  importance.  Sir  George  Prevost 
and  his  army  at  once  fled  in  great  haste  and  con 
fusion  back  to  Canada,  leaving  our  northern  frontier 
clear  for  the  remainder  of  the  war  ;  while  the  victory 
had  a  very  great  effect  on  the  negotiations  for 
peace. 

In  this  battle  the  crews  on  both  sides  behaved 
with  equal  bravery,  and  left  nothing  to  be  desired  in 
this  respect ;  but  from  their  rawness  they  of  course 
showed  far  less  skill  than  the  crews  of  most  of  the 
American  and  some  of  the  British  ocean  cruisers, 
such  as  the  Constitution,  United  States,  or  Shan 
non,  the  Hornet,  Wasp,  or  Reindeer.  Lieut.  Cassin 
handled  the  Ticonderoga,  and  Captain  Pring  the 
Linnet,  with  the  utmost  gallantry  and  skill,  and, 
after  Macdonough,  they  divide  the  honors  of  the 
day.  But  Macdonough  in  this  battle  won  a  higher 
fame  than  any  other  commander  of  the  war,  British 
or  American.  He  had  a  decidedly  superior  force  to 
contend  against,  the  officers  and  men  of  the  two 
sides  being  about  on  a  par  in  every  respect ;  and  it 
was  solely  owing  to  his  foresight  and  resource  that  we 
won  the  victory.  He  forced  the  British  to  engage 
at  a  disadvantage  by  his  excellent  choice  of  position  ; 
and  he  prepared  beforehand  for  every  possible  con 
tingency.  His  personal  prowess  had  already  been 


NAVAL   WAR  OF    l8l2. 


399 


shown  at  the  cost  of  the  rovers  of  Tripoli,  and  in 
this  action  he  helped  fight  the  guns  as  ably  as  the 
best  sailor.  His  skill,  seamanship,  quick  eye,  readi 
ness  of  resource,  and  indomitable  pluck,  are  beyond 
all  praise.  Down  to  the  time  of  the  Civil  War  he  is 
the  greatest  figure  in  our  naval  history.  A  thor 
oughly  religious  man,  he  was  as  generous  and  hu 
mane  as  he  was  skilful  and  brave  ;  one  of  the 
greatest  of  our  sea-captains,  he  has  left  a  stainless 
name  behind  him. 


BRITISH    LOSS. 


Name. 

Tons. 

Guns. 

Remarks. 

Brig, 

IOO 

10 

Burnt  by  Lieut. 

Magnet, 

187 

12 

"     by  her  ere 

Black  Snake, 

3° 

I 

Captured. 

Gun-  boat, 

5° 

2 

« 

" 

5° 

3 

M 

Confiance, 

1,200 

37 

(1 

Linnet, 

35° 

16 

« 

Chubb, 

112 

ii 

M 

Finch, 

110 

n 

« 

9  vessels, 

2,189 

103 

AMERICAN 

LOSS. 

Name. 

Tons. 

Guns. 

Remarks. 

Growler, 

81 

7 

Captured. 

Boat, 

5° 

2 

« 

Tigress, 

96 

I 

M 

Scorpion, 

86 

2 

M 

Ohio, 

94 

I 

M 

Sonurs, 

98 

2 

M 

6  vessels,      505 


CHAPTER  IX. 

1815. 

CONCLUDING  OPERATIONS. 

President  captured  by  Captain  Hayes'  squadron— Successful  cutting-out 
expeditions  of  the  Americans— Privateer  brig  Chasseur  captures  St.  Lawrence 
schooner — Constitution  captures  Cyane  and  Levant — Escapes  from  a  British 
squadron — The  Hornet  captures  the  Penguin,  and  escapes  from  a  74 — The  Pea 
cock  and  the  Nautilus — Summary — Remarks  on  the  war — Tables  of  compara 
tive  loss,  etc. — Compared  with  results  of  Anglo-French  struggle. 

THE  treaty  of  peace  between  the  United  States 
and  Great  Britain  was  signed  at  Ghent,  Dec. 
24,  1814,  and  ratified  at  Washington,  Feb.  18,  1815. 
But  during  these  first  two  months  of  1815,  and  until 
the  news  reached  the  cruisers  on  the  ocean,  the 
warfare  went  on  with  much  the  same  characteristics 
as  before.  The  blockading  squadrons  continued 
standing  on  and  off  before  the  ports  containing 
war-ships  with  the  same  unwearying  vigilance  ;  but 
the  ice  and  cold  prevented  any  attempts  at  harry 
ing  the  coast  except  from  the  few  frigates  scattered 
along  the  shores  of  the  Carolinas  and  Georgia. 
There  was  no  longer  any  formidable  British  fleet  in 
the  Chesapeake  or  Delaware,  while  at  New  Orleans 
the  only  available  naval  force  of  the  Americans 
consisted  of  a  few  small  row-boats,  with  which  they 
harassed  the  rear  of  the  retreating  British.  The 
Constitution,  Capt.  Stewart,  was  already  at  sea, 
having  put  out  from  Boston  on  the  i/th  of  Decem 
ber,  while  the  blockading  squadron  (composed  of 

400 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    1 8 12.  40 1 

the    same   three  frigates  she  subsequently   encoun 
tered)  was  temporarily  absent. 

The  Hornet,  Capt.  Biddle,  had  left  the  port  of 
New  London,  running  in  heavy  weather  through 
the  blockading  squadron,  and  had  gone  into  New 
York,  where  the  President,  Commodore  Decatur, 
and  Peacock,  Capt.  Warrington,  with  the  Tom  Bow 
line  brig  were  already  assembled,  intending  to  start 
on  a  cruise  for  the  East  Indies.  The  blockading 
squadron  off  the  port  consisted  of  the  $6-gun  razee 
Majestic,  Capt.  Hayes,  24-pounder  frigate  Endymion, 
Capt.  Hope,  i8-pounder  frigate  Pomone,  Capt. 
Lumly,  and  i8-pounder  frigate  Tenedos,  Capt.  Park 
er.1  On  the  I4th  of  January  a  severe  snow-storm 
came  on  and  blew  the  squadron  off  the  coast. 
Next  day  it  moderated,  and  the  ships  stood  off  to 
the  northwest  to  get  into  the  track  which  they  sup 
posed  the  Americans  would  take  if  they  attempted 
to  put  out  in  the  storm.  Singularly  enough,  at  the 
instant  of  arriving  at  the  intended  point,  an  hour 
before  daylight  on  the  I5th,  Sandy  Hook  bearing 
W.  N.  W.  15  leagues,  a  ship  was  made  out,  on  the 
Majestic  s  weather-bow,  standing  S.  E.9  This  ship 
was  the  unlucky  President.  On  the  evening  of  the 
14th  she  had  left  her  consorts  at  anchor,  and  put 
out  to  sea  in  the  gale.  But  by  a  mistake  of  the 
pilots  who  were  to  place  boats  to  beacon  the  pas 
sage  the  frigate  struck  on  the  bar,  where  she  beat 
heavily  for  an  hour  and  a  half,8  springing  her  masts 
and  becoming  very  much  hogged  and  twisted.4 
Owing  to  the  severity  of  her  injuries  the  President 

'Letter  of  Rear-Admiral  Hotham,  Jan.  23,  1815. 
8  Letter  of  Capt.  Hayes,  Jan.  17,  1815. 

3  Letter  of  Commodore  Decatur,  Jan.  18,  1815. 

4  Report  of  Court-martial,  Alex.  Murray  presiding,  April  20,  1815. 


4O2  NAVAL   WAR    OF    l8l2. 

would  have  put  back  to  port,  but  was  prevented  by 
the  westerly  gale.1  Accordingly  Decatur  steered  at 
first  along  Long  Island,  then  shaped  his  course  to 
the  S.  E.,  and  in  the  dark  ran  into  the  British  squad 
ron,  which,  but  for  his  unfortunate  accident,  he 
would  thus  have  escaped.  At  daylight,  the  Presi 
dent,  which  had  hauled  up  and  passed  to  the  north 
ward  of  her  opponents,3  found  herself  with  the 
Majestic  and  Endymion  astern,  the  Pomona  on  the 
port  and  the  Tenedos  on  the  starboard  quarter.3 
The  chase  now  became  very  interesting.4  During 
the  early  part  of  the  day,  while  the  wind  was  still 
strong,  the  Majestic  led  the  Endymion  and  fired  oc 
casionally  at  the  President,  but  without  effect.5 
The  Pomona  gained  faster  than  the  others,  but  by 
Capt.  Hayes'  orders  was  signalled  to  go  in  chase  of 
the  Tenedos,  whose  character  the  captain  could  not 
make  out6;  and  this  delayed  her  several  hours  in 
the  chase.7  In  the  afternoon,  the  wind  coming  out 
light  and  baffling,  the  Endymion  left  the  Majestic 
behind,8  and,  owing  to  the  President ' s  disabled  state 
and  the  amount  of  water  she  made  in  consequence 
of  the  injuries  received  while  on  the  bar,  gained 
rapidly  on  her,9  although  she  lightened  ship  and 
did  every  thing  else  that  was  possible  to  improve 
her  sailing.10  But  a  shift  of  wind  helped  the  Endym 
ion"  and  the  latter  was  able  at  about  2.30,  to  be 
gin  skirmishing  with  her  bow-chasers,  answered  by 
the  stern-chasers  of  the  President™  At  5.30  the 

JDecatur's  letter,  Jan.  i8th.  9Decatur's  letter,  Jan,  i8th. 

8  James,  vi,  529.  4  Letter  of  Capt.  Hayes. 

6  Letter  of  Commodore  Decatur.          6  James,  vi,  529. 

7  Log  of  Pomone,  published  at  Bermuda,  Jan.  2gth,  and  quoted  in 
full  in  the  "  Naval  Chronicle,"  xxxiii,  370. 

8  Letter  of  Captain  Hayes.  6  Letter  of  Decatur, 

w  Letter  of  Decatur.  "Cooper,  ii,  466.          " Log  of  Pomvne. 


NAVAL  WAR   OF    l8l2.  403 

Endymion  began  close  action,1  within  half  point- 
blank  shot  on  the  President's  starboard  quar;er,a 
where  not  a  gun  of  the  latter  could  bear.3  The 
President  continued  in  the  same  course,  steering 
east  by  north,  the  wind  being  northwest,  expecting 
the  Endymion  soon  to  come  up  abeam ;  but  the 
latter  warily  kept  her  position  by  yawing,  so  as  not 
to  close."  So  things  continued  for  half  an  hour 
during  which  the  President  suffered  more  than 
during  all  the  remainder  of  the  combat.5  At  6.00 
the  President  kept  off,  heading  to  the  south,  and 
the  two  adversaries  ran  abreast,  the  Americans 
using  the  starboard  and  the  British  the  port  bat 
teries.6  Decatur  tried  to  close  with  his  antagonist, 
but  whenever  he  hauled  nearer  to  the  latter  she 
hauled  off7  and  being  the  swiftest  ship  could  of 
course  evade  him  ;  so  he  was  reduced  to  the  neces 
sity  of  trying  to  throw  her  out  of  the  combat 8  by 
dismantling  her.  He  was  completely  successful  in 
this,  and  after  two  hours'  fighting  the  Endymion  s 
sails  were  all  cut  from  her  yards  9  and  she  dropped 
astern,  the  last  shot  being  fired  from  the  President.™ 
The  Endymion  was  now  completely  silent,11  and 
Commodore  Decatur  did  not  board  her  merely  be 
cause  her  consorts  were  too  close  astern12 ;  accord 
ingly  the  President  hauled  up  again  to  try  her 
chances  at  running,  having  even  her  royal  studding- 
sails  set,13  and  exposed  her  stern  to  the  broadside  of 

1  Letter  of  Capt.  Hayes.  3  James,  vi,  530. 

*  Letter  of  Decatur.  *  Letter  of  Decatur. 

*  Cooper,  470.  6  Log  of  Pomone. 

7  Report  of  Court-martial.  8  Letter  of  Commodore  Decatur, 

*  Letter  of  Capt.  Hayes.  10  Log  of  Pomone. 

11  Log  of  Pomone.  u  Report  of  Court-martial 

18  James,  vi,  538. 


404  NAVAL   WAR    OF    l8l2. 

the  Endymion?  but  the  latter  did  not  fire  a  single 
gun.2  Three  hours  afterward,  at  ii,3  the  Pomone 
caught  up  with  the  President,  and  luffing  to  port 
gave  her  the  starboard  broadside 4 ;  the  Tenedos 
being  two  cables'  length's  distance  astern,  taking  up 
a  raking  position.5  The  Pomone  poured  in  another 
broadside,  within  musket  shot,"  when  the  President 
surrendered  and  was  taken  possession  of  by  Capt. 
Parker  of  the  Tenedos?  A  considerable  number  of 
the  President's  people  were  killed  by  these  two  last 
broadsides.8  The  Endymion  was  at  this  time  out 
of  sight  astern.9  She  did  not  come  up,  according 
to  one  account,  for  an  hour  and  three  quarters,10  and 
according  to  another,  for  three  hours  "  ;  and  as  she 
was  a  faster  ship  than  the  President,  this  means  that 
she  was  at  least  two  hours  motionless  repairing 
damages.  Commodore  Decatur  delivered  his  sword 
to  Capt.  Hayes  of  the  Majestic,  who  returned  it, 
stating  in  his  letter  that  both  sides  had  fought 
with  great  gallantry.12  The  President  having  been 
taken  by  an  entire  squadron,13  the  prize-money  was 
divided  equally  among  the  ships.14  The  President's 
crew  all  told  consisted  of  450  men,15  none  of  whom 
were  British.16  She  had  thus  a  hundred  more  men 

1  Letter  of  Commodore  Decatur.  2  Log  of  the  Pomone. 

}  Letter  of  Capt.  Hayes.  4  Log  of  the  Pomone. 

5  Decatur's  letter.  6  Log  of  Pomone. 

7  James,  vi,  531. 

8  Letter  of   Commodore   Decatur,   March  6,   1815;    deposition   of 
Chaplain   Henry  Robinson  before  Admiralty  Court  at  St.  Georges, 
Bermuda,  Jan.  1815. 

9  Letter  of  Decatur,  Jan.  i8th.  10Log  of  Pomone. 

11  Letter  of  Decatur,  Mar.  6th.  12  Letter  of  Capt.  Hayes. 

|S  Admiral  Hotham's  letter,  Jan.  23d. 

14 Bermuda  "  Royal  Gazette,"  March  8,  1815. 

J*  Depositions  of  Lieut.  Gallagher  and  the  other  officers. 

1   Deposition  of  Commodore  Decatur. 


NAVAL   WAR    OF    l8l2.  405 

than  her  antagonist  and  threw  about  100  pounds 
more  shot  at  a  broadside ;  but  these  advantages 
were  more  than  counterbalanced  by  the  injuries  re 
ceived  on  the  bar,  and  by  the  fact  that  her  powder 
was  so  bad  that  while  some  of  the  British  shot  went 
through  both  her  sides,  such  a  thing  did  not  once 
happen  to  the  Endymion?  when  fairly  hulled.  The 
President  lost  24  killed  and  55  wounded2;  the 
Endymion,  11  killed  and  14  wounded.3  Two  days 
afterward,  on  their  way  to  the  Bermudas,  a  violent 
easterly  gale  came  on,  during  which  both  ships  were 
dismasted,  and  the  Endymion  in  addition  had  to 
throw  over  all  her  spar-deck  guns.4 

As  can  be  seen,  almost  every  sentence  of  this  ac 
count  is  taken  (very  nearly  word  for  word)  from  the 
various  official  reports,  relying  especially  on  the  log 
of  the  British  frigate  Pomone*  I  have  been  thus 
careful  to  have  every  point  of  the  narrative  estab 
lished  by  unimpeachable  reference  :  first,  because 
there  have  been  quite  a  number  of  British  histori 
ans  who  have  treated  the  conflict  as  if  it  were  a 
victory  and  not  a  defeat  for  the  Endymion  ;  and  in 
the  second  place,  because  I  regret  to  say  that  I  do 
not  think  that  the  facts  bear  out  the  assertions,  on 
the  part  of  most  American  authors,  that  Commo 
dore  Decatur  " covered  himself  with  glory"  and 
showed  the  "  utmost  heroism."  As  regards  the 
first  point,  Captain  Hope  himself,  in  his  singularly 
short  official  letter,  does  little  beyond  detail  his  own 
loss,  and  makes  no  claim  to  having  vanquished  his 
opponent.  Almost  all  the  talk  about  its  being  a 
"victory"  comes  from  James;  and  in  recounting 

1  Bermuda  "  Royal  Gazette,"  Jan.  6,  1818.         2  Decatur's  letter. 
3  Letter  of  Capt.  Hope,  Jan.  15,  1815.  4  James,  vi,  534. 


406  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

this,  as  well  as  all  the  other  battles,  nearly  every 
subsequent  British  historian  simply  gives  James* 
statements  over  again,  occasionally  amplifying,  but 
more  often  altering  or  omitting,  the  vituperation. 
The  point  at  issue  is  simply  this :  could  a  frigate 
which,  according  to  James  himself,  went  out  of  ac 
tion  with  every  sail  set,  take  another  frigate  which 
for  two  hours,  according  to  the  log  of  the  Pomona, 
lay  motionless  and  unmanageable  on  the  waters, 
without  a  sail  ?  To  prove  that  it  could  not,  of 
course  needs  some  not  over-scrupulous  manipulation 
of  the  facts.  The  intention  with  which  James  sets 
about  his  work  can  be  gathered  from  the  trium 
phant  conclusion  he  comes  to,  that  Decatur's  name 
has  been  "'sunk  quite  as  low  as  that  of  Bainbridge 
or  Porter,"  which,  comparing  small  things  to  great, 
is  somewhat  like  saying  that  Napoleon's  defeat  by 
Wellington  and  Blucher  "  sunk  "  him  to  the  level 
of  Hannibal.  For  the  account  of  the  American 
crew  and  loss,  James  relies  on  the  statements  made 
in  the  Bermuda  papers,  of  whose  subsequent 
forced  retraction  he  takes  no  notice,  and  of  course 
largely  over-estimates  both.  On  the  same  authority 
he  states  that  the  President's  fire  was  "  silenced," 
Commodore  Decatur  stating  the  exact  reverse.  The 
point  is  fortunately  settled  by  the  log  of  the  Pomone, 
which  distinctly  says  that  the  last  shot  was  fired  by 
the  President.  His  last  resort  is  to  state  that  the 
loss  of  the  President  was  fourfold  (in  reality  three 
fold)  that  of  the  Endymion.  Now  we  have  seen  that 
the  President  lost  "a  considerable  number  "  of  men 
from  the  fire  of  the  Pomone.  Estimating  these  at 
only  nineteen,  we  have  a  loss  of  sixty  caused  by  the 
Endymion,  and  as  most  of  this  was  caused  during 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  407 

the  first  half  hour,  when  the  President  was  not  firing, 
it  follows  that  while  the  two  vessels  were  both  fight 
ing,  broadside  and  broadside,  the  loss  inflicted  was 
about  equal  ;  or,  the  President,  aiming  at  her  adver 
sary's  rigging,  succeeded  in  completely  disabling  her, 
and  incidentally  killed  25  men,  while  the  Endymion 
did  not  hurt  the  President ' s  rigging  at  all,  and,  aim 
ing  at  her  hull,  where,  of  course,  the  slaughter  ought 
to  have  been  far  greater  than  when  the  fire  was  di 
rected  aloft,  only  killed  about  the  same  number  of 
men.  Had  there  been  no  other  vessels  in  chase, 
Commodore  Decatur,  his  adversary  having  been 
thus  rendered  perfectly  helpless,  could  have  simply 
taken  any  position  he  chose  and  compelled  the  lat 
ter  to  strike,  without  suffering  any  material  addi 
tional  loss  himself.  As  in  such  a  case  he  would 
neither  have  endured  the  unanswered  fire  of  the  En 
dymion  on  his  quarter  for  the  first  half  hour,  nor  the 
subsequent  broadsides  of  the  Pomone,  the  President's 
loss  would  probably  have  been  no  greater  than  that 
of  the  Constitution  in  taking  the  Java.  It  is  diffi 
cult  to  see  how  any  outsider  with  an  ounce  of  com 
mon-sense  and  fairmindedness  can  help  awarding  the 
palm  to  Decatur,  as  regards  the  action  with  the  En- 
dymion.  But  I  regret  to  say  that  I  must  agree  with 
James  that  he  acted  rather  tamely,  certainly  not 
heroically,  in  striking  to  the  Pomone.  There  was,  of 
course,  not  much  chance  of  success  in  doing  battle 
with  two  fresh  frigates  ;  but  then  they  only  mounted 
eighteen-pounders,  and,  judging  from  the  slight  re 
sults  of  the  cannonading  from  the  Endymion  and  the 
two  first  (usually  the  most  fatal)  broadsides  of  the 
Pomone,  it  would  have  been  rather  a  long  time  be 
fore  they  would  have  caused  much  damage.  Mean- 


408  NAVAL   WAR    OF    l8l2. 

while  the  President  was  pretty  nearly  as  well  off  as 
ever  as  far  as  fighting  and  sailing  went.  A  lucky 
shot  might  have  disabled  one  of  her  opponents,  and 
then  the  other  would,  in  all  probability,  have  under 
gone  the  same  fate  as  the  Endymion.  At  least  it 
was  well  worth  trying,  and  though  Decatur  could 
not  be  said  to  be  disgraced,  yet  it  is  excusable 
to  wish  that  Porter  or  Perry  had  been  in  his  place. 
It  is  not  very  pleasant  to  criticise  the  actions  of  an 
American  whose  name  is  better  known  than  that  of 
almost  any  other  single-ship  captain  of  his  time  ; 
but  if  a  man  is  as  much  to  be  praised  for  doing  fair 
ly,  or  even  badly,  as  for  doing  excellently,  then 
there  is  no  use  in  bestowing  praise  at  all. 

This  is  perhaps  as  good  a  place  as  any  other  to  no 
tice  one  or  two  of  James'  most  common  misstate- 
ments  ;  they  really  would  not  need  refutation  were  it 
not  that  they  have  been  reechoed,  as  usual,  by  almost 
every  British  historian  of  the  war  for  the  last  60  years. 
In  the  first  place,  James  puts  the  number  of  the 
President's  men  at  475  ;  she  had  450.  An  exactly 
parallel  reduction  must  often  be  made  when  he 
speaks  of  the  force  of  an  American  ship.  Then  he 
says  there  were  many  British  among  them,  which  is 
denied  under  oath  by  the  American  officers;  this 
holds  good  also  for  the  other  American  frigates.  He 
says  there  were  but  4  boys ;  there  were  nearly  30  ; 
and  on  p.  120  he  says  the  youngest  was  14,  whereas 
we  incidentally  learn  from  the  "  Life  of  Decatur  " 
that  several  were  under  12.  A  favorite  accusation 
is  that  the  American  midshipmen  were  chiefly  mas 
ters  and  mates  of  merchant-men  ;  but  this  was 
hardly  ever  the  case.  Many  of  the  midshipmen 
of  the  war  afterward  became  celebrated  command- 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  409 

ers,  and  most  of  these  (a  notable  instance  being  Far- 
ragut,  the  greatest  admiral  since  Nelson)  were  en 
tirely  too  young  in  1812  to  have  had  vessels  under 
them,  and,  moreover,  came  largely  from  the  so-called 
"  best  families." 

Again,  in  the  first  two  frigate  actions  of  1812,  the 
proportion  of  killed  to  wounded  happened  to  be 
unusually  large  on  board  the  American  frigates ; 
accordingly  James  states  (p.  146)  that  the  returns  of 
the  wounded  had  been  garbled,  under-estimated,  and 
made  "  subservient  to  the  views  of  the  commanders 
and  their  government."  To  support  his  position 
that  Capt.  Hull,  who  reported  7  killed  and  7 
wounded,  had  not  given  the  list  of  the  latter  in  full, 
he  says  that  "  an  equal  number  of  killed  and 
wounded,  as  given  in  the  American  account,  hardly 
ever  occurs,  except  in  cases  of  explosion  "  ;  and  yet, 
on  p.  519,  he  gives  the  loss  of  the  British  Hermes  as 
25  killed  and  24  wounded,  disregarding  the  incon 
gruity  involved.  On  p.  169,  in  noticing  the  loss  of 
the  United  States,  5  killed  and  7  wounded,  he  says 
that  "  the  slightly  wounded,  as  in  all  other  Ameri 
can  cases,  are  omitted."  This  is  untrue,  and  the 
proportion  on  the  United  States,  5  to  7,  is  just  about 
the  same  as  that  given  by  James  himself  on  the 
Endymion,  11  to  14,  and  Nautilus,  6  to  8.  In  sup 
porting  his  theory,  James  brings  up  all  the  instances 
where  the  American  wounded  bore  a  larger  propor 
tion  to  their  dead  than  on  board  the  British  ships, 
but  passes  over  the  actions  with  the  Reindeer,  Eper- 
vier,  Penguin,  Endymion,  and  Boxer,  where  the  re 
verse  was  the  case.  One  of  James'  most  common 
methods  of  attempting  to  throw  discredit  on  the 
much  vilified  "  Yankees  "  is  by  quoting  newspaper 


410  NAVAL  WAR   OF    l8l2. 

accounts  of  their  wounded.  Thus  he  says  (p.  562) 
of  the  Hornet,  that  several  of  her  men  told  some  of 
the  Penguin  s  sailors  that  she  lost  10  men  killed,  16 
wounded,  etc.  Utterly  false  rumors  of  this  kind  were 
as  often  indulged  in  by  the  Americans  as  the  British. 
After  the  capture  of  the  President  articles  occasion 
ally  appeared  in  the  papers  to  the  effect  that  some 
American  sailor  had  counted  "23  dead"  on  board 
the  Endymion,  that  "  more  than  50  "  of  her  men  were 
wounded,  etc.  Such  statements  were  as  commonly 
made  and  with  as  little  foundation  by  one  side  as  by 
the  other,  and  it  is  absurd  for  a  historian  to  take 
any  notice  of  them.  James  does  no  worse  than 
many  of  our  own  writers  of  the  same  date;  but 
while  their  writings  have  passed  into  oblivion,  his 
work  is  still  often  accepted  as  a  standard.  This 
must  be  my  apology  for  devoting  so  much  time  to 
it.  The  severest  criticism  to  which  it  can  possibly 
be  subjected  is  to  compare  it  with  the  truth.  When 
ever  dealing  with  purely  American  affairs,  James* 
history  is  as  utterly  untrustworthy  as  its  contempo 
rary,  "  Niles'  Register,"  is  in  matters  purely  British, 
while  both  are  invaluable  in  dealing  with  things  re 
lating  strictly  to  their  own  nation  ;  they  supplement 
each  other. 

On  Jan.  8th  General  Packenham  was  defeated  and 
killed  by  General  Jackson  at  New  Orleans,  the 
Louisiana  and  the  seamen  of  the  Carolina  having 
their  full  share  in  the  glory  of  the  day,  and  Captain 
Henly  being  among  the  very  few  American  wounded. 
On  the  same  day  Sailing-master  Johnson,  with  28 
men  in  two  boats,  cut  out  the  British-armed  trans 
port  brig  Cyprus,  containing  provisions  and  munitions 


NAVAL  WAR  OF   l8l2.  41 1 

of  war,  and  manned  by  ten  men.1  On  the  i8th  the 
British  abandoned  the  enterprise  and  retreated  to 
their  ships ;  and  Mr.  Thomas  Shields,  a  purser,  for 
merly  a  sea-officer,  set  off  to  harass  them  while  em 
barking.  At  sunset  on  the  2Oth  he  left  with  five 
boats  and  a  gig,  manned  in  all  with  53  men,  and 
having  under  him  Sailing-master  Daily  and  Master's 
Mate  Boyd.a  At  ten  o'clock  P.M.  a  large  barge,  con 
taining  14  seamen  and  40  officers  and  men  of  the 
I4th  Light  Dragoons,  was  surprised  and  carried  by 
boarding  after  a  slight  struggle.  The  prisoners  out 
numbering  their  captors,  the  latter  returned  to  shore, 
left  them  in  a  place  of  safety,  and  again  started  at 
2  A.M.  on  the  morning  of  the  22d.  Numerous  trans 
ports  and  barges  of  the  enemy  could  be  seen,  ob 
serving  very  little  order  and  apparently  taking  no 
precautions  against  attack,  which  they  probably  did 
not  apprehend.  One  of  the  American  boats  capt 
ured  a  transport  and  five  men ;  another,  containing 
Mr.  Shields  himself  and  eight  men,  carried  by  board 
ing,  after  a  short  resistance,  a  schooner  carrying  ten 
men.  The  flotilla  then  re-united  and  captured  in 
succession,  with  no  resistance,  five  barges  containing 
70  men.  By  this  time  the  alarm  had  spread  and 
they  were  attacked  by  six  boats,  but  these  were  re 
pelled  with  some  loss.  Seven  of  the  prisoners  (who 
were  now  half  as  many  again  as  their  captors)  suc 
ceed  in  escaping  in  the  smallest  prize.  Mr.  Shields 
returned  with  the  others,  78  in  number.  During  the 
entire  expedition  he  had  lost  but  three  men,  wounded  ; 
he  had  taken  132  prisoners,  and  destroyed  eight  craft 
whose  aggregate  tonnage  about  equalled  that  of  the 
five  gun-vessels  taken  on  Lake  Borgne. 

1  Letter  of  Sailing-master  Johnson  Jan,  9.  1815. 

4  Letter  ol  Thomas  Shields  to  Com.  Patterson    Jan.  25    1815. 


412  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

On  Jan.  30,  1815,  information  was  received  by 
Captain  Dent,  commanding  at  North  Edisto,  Ga., 
that  a  party  of  British  officers  and  men,  in  four  boats 
belonging  to  H.  M.  S.  Hebrus,  Capt.  Palmer,  were 
watering  at  one  of  the  adjacent  islands.1  Lieut. 
Lawrence  Kearney,  with  three  barges  containing 
about  75  men,  at  once  proceeded  outside  to  cut 
them  off,  when  the  militia  drove  them  away.  The 
frigate  was  at  anchor  out  of  gunshot,  but  as  soon  as 
she  perceived  the  barges  began  firing  guns  as  sig 
nals.  The  British  on  shore  left  in  such  a  hurry  that 
they  deserted  their  launch,  which,  containing  a  12- 
pound  boat  carronade  and  six  swivels,  was  taken  by 
the  Americans.  The  other  boats — two  cutters,  and 
a  large  tender  mounting  one  long  nine  and  carrying 
30  men — made  for  the  frigate ;  but  Lieut.  Kearney 
laid  the  tender  aboard  and  captured  her  after  a 
sharp  brush.  The  cutters  were  only  saved  by  the 
fire  of  the  Hebrus,  which  was  very  well  directed — 
one  of  her  shot  taking  off  the  head  of  a  man  close 
by  Lieut.  Kearney.  The  frigate  got  under  way  and 
intercepted  Kearney's  return,  but  the  Lieutenant 
then  made  for  South  Edisto,  whither  he  carried  his 
prize  in  triumph.  This  was  one  of  the  most  daring 
exploits  of  the  war,  and  was  achieved  at  very  small 
cost.  On  Feb.  I4th  a  similar  feat  was  performed. 
Lieutenant  Kearney  had  manned  the  captured 
launch  with  25  men  and  the  12-pound  carronade. 
News  was  received  of  another  harrying  expedition 
undertaken  by  the  British,  and  Captain  Dent,  with 
seven  boats,  put  out  to  attack  them,  but  was  unable 
to  cross  the  reef.  Meanwhile  Kearney's  barge  had 

1  Letter  of  Lawrence  Kearney  of  Jan.  30,  1815  (see  in  the  Archives 
at  Washington,  "Captains'  Letters/'  vol.  42,  No.  loo). 


NAVAL   WAR    OF    l8l2.  413 

gotten  outside,  and  attacked  the  schooner  Brant,  a 
tender  to  H.  M.  S.  Severn,  mounting  an  i8-pounder, 
and  with  a  crew  of  two  midshipmen,  and  twenty- 
one  marines  and  seamen.  A  running  fight  began, 
the  Brant  evidently  fearing  that  the  other  boats 
might  get  across  the  reef  and  join  in  the  attack; 
suddenly  she  ran  aground  on  a  sand-bank,  which 
accident  totally  demoralized  her  crew.  Eight  of 
them  escaped  in  her  boat,  to  the  frigate ;  the  re 
maining  fifteen,  after  firing  a  few  shot,  surrendered 
and  were  taken  possession  of.1 

I  have  had  occasion  from  time  to  time  to  speak 
of  cutting-out  expeditions,  successful  and  otherwise, 
undertaken  by  British  boats  against  American  pri 
vateers  ;  and  twice  a  small  British  national  cutter 
was  captured  by  an  overwhelmingly  superior  Ameri 
can  opponent  of  this  class.  We  now,  for  the  only 
time,  come  across  an  engagement  between  a  priva 
teer  and  a  regular  cruiser  of  approximately  equal 
force.  These  privateers  came  from  many  different 
ports  and  varied  greatly  in  size.  Baltimore  pro 
duced  the  largest  number;  but  New  York,  Phila 
delphia,  Boston,  and  Salem,  were  not  far  behind  ; 
and  Charleston,  Bristol,  and  Plymouth,  supplied 
some  that  were  very  famous.  Many  were  merely  small 
pilot-boats  with  a  crew  of  20  to  40  men,  intended 
only  to  harry  the  West  Indian  trade.  Others  were 
large,  powerful  craft,  unequalled  for  speed  by  any 
vessels  of  their  size,  which  penetrated  to  the  re- 

1  Letter  of  Captain  Dent,  Feb.  i6th  (in  "  Captains'  Letters,"  vol. 
42,  No.  130).  Most  American  authors,  headed  by  Cooper,  give  this 
exploit  a  more  vivid  coloring  by  increasing  the  crew  of  the  Brant  to 
forty  men,  omitting  to  mention  that  she  was  hard  and  fast  aground, 
and  making  no  allusion  to  the  presence  of  the  five  other  American 
boats  which  undoubtedly  caused  the  Brant's  flight  in  the  first  place. 


4H  NAVAL  WAR   OF    l8l2. 

motest  corners  of  the  ocean,  from  Man  to  the 
Spice  Islands.  When  a  privateer  started  she  was 
overloaded  with  men,  to  enable  her  to  man  her 
prizes;  a  successful  cruise  would  reduce  her  crew  to 
a  fifth  of  its  original  size.  The  favorite  rig  was 
that  of  a  schooner,  but  there  were  many  brigs  and 
brigantines.  Each  was  generally  armed  with  a  long 
24  or  32  on  a  pivot,  and  a  number  of  light  guns  in 
broadside,  either  long  Q'S  or  short  i8's  or  I2's. 
Some  had  no  pivot  gun,  others  had  nothing 
else.  The  largest  of  them  carried  17  guns  (a 
pivotal  32  and  16  long  I2's  in  broadside)  with  a 
crew  of  150.  Such  a  vessel  ought  to  have  been  a 
match,  at  her  own  distance,  for  a  British  brig-sloop, 
but  we  never  hear  of  any  such  engagements,  and 
there  were  several  instances  where  privateers  gave 
up,  without  firing  a  shot,  to  a  force  superior,  it  is 
true,  but  not  enough  so  to  justify  the  absolute 
tameness  of  the  surrender.1  One  explanation  of 
this  was  that  they  were  cruising  as  private  ventures, 
and  their  object  was  purely  to  capture  merchant 
men  with  as  little  risk  as  possible  to  themselves. 
Another  reason  was  that  they  formed  a  kind  of  sea- 
militia,  and,  like  their  compeers  on  land,  some  could 
fight  as  well  as  any  regulars,  while  most  would  not 
fight  at  all,  especially  if  there  was  need  of  concerted 
action  between  two  or  three.  The  American  papers 
of  the  day  are  full  of  "  glorious  victories"  gained  by 
privateers  over  packets  and  Indiamen  ;  the  British 
papers  are  almost  as  full  of  instances  where  the 
packets  and  Indiamen  "  heroically  repulsed "  the 
privateers.  As  neither  side  ever  chronicles  a  defeat, 

1  As  when  the  Epervier,  some  little  time  before  her  own  capture, 
took  without  resistance  the  Alfred,  of  Salem,  mounting  16  long  nines 
and  having  108  men  aboard. 


NAVAL  WAR    OF    l8l2.  415 

and  as  the  narration  is  apt  to  be  decidedly  figurative 
in  character,  there  is  very  little  hope  of  getting  at 
the  truth  of  such  meetings ;  so  I  have  confined  my 
self  to  the  mention  of  those  cases  where  privateers, 
of  either  side,  came  into  armed  collision  with  regu 
lar  cruisers.  We  are  then  sure  to  find  some  au 
thentic  account. 

The  privateer  brig  Chasseur,  of  Baltimore,  Cap 
tain  Thomas  Boyle,  carried  16  long  12*5,  and  had, 
when  she  left  port,  115  men  aboard.  She  made  18 
prizes  on  her  last  voyage,  and  her  crew  was  thus 
reduced  to  less  than  80  men  ;  she  was  then  chased 
by  the  Barossa  frigate,  and  threw  overboard  10  of 
her  long  I2's.  Afterward  eight  Q-pound  carronades 
were  taken  from  a  prize,  to  partially  supply  the 
places  of  the  lost  guns ;  but  as  she  had  no  shot  of 
the  calibre  of  these  carronades  each  of  the  latter  was 
loaded  with  one  4-pound  and  one  6-pound  ball,  giving 
her  a  broadside  of  76  Ibs.  On  the  26th  of  February, 
two  leagues  from  Havana,  the  Chasseur  fell  in  with 
the  British  schooner  St.  Lawrence,  Lieut.  H.  C.  Gor 
don,  mounting  twelve  12-pound  carronades,  and  one 
long  9;  her  broadside  was  thus  81  Ibs.,  and  she  had 
between  60  and  80  men  aboard.1  The  Chasseur  mis 
took  the  St.  Lawrence  for  a  merchant-man  and  closed 
with  her.  The  mistake  was  discovered  too  late  to  es 
cape,  even  had  such  been  Captain  Boyle's  intention, 

1  Letter  of  Captain  Thomas  Boyle,  of  March  2,  1815  (see  Niles  and 
Coggeshall) ;  he  says  the  schooner  had  two  more  carronades  ;  I  have 
taken  the  number  given  by  James  (p.  539).  Captain  Boyle  says  the 
St.  Lawrence  had  on  board  89  men  and  several  more,  including  a 
number  of  soldiers  and  marines  and  gentlemen  of  the  navy,  as  pas 
sengers  ;  James  says  her  crew  amounted  to  5  r  "exclusive  of  some 
passengers,"  which  I  suppose  must  mean  at  least  nine  men.  So  the 
forces  were  pretty  equal ;  the  Chasseur  may  have  had  20  men  more 
or  10  men  less  than  her  antagonist,  and  she  threw  from  5  to  21  Ibs. 
less  weight  of  shot. 


416  NAVAL  WAR   OF    l8l2. 

and  a  brief  but  bloody  action  ensued.  At  1.26  P.  M., 
the  S/.  Lawrence  fired  the  first  broadside,  within 
pistol  shot,  to  which  the  Chasseur  replied  with  her 
great  guns  and  musketry.  The  brig  then  tried  to 
close,  so  as  to  board  ;  but  having  too  much  way  on, 
shot  ahead  under  the  lee  of  the  schooner,  which  put 
her  helm  up  to  wear  under  the  Chasseur  s  stern. 
Boyle,  however,  followed  his  antagonist's  manoeuvre, 
and  the  two  vessels  ran  along  side  by  side,  the  St. 
Lazvrence  drawing  ahead,  while  the  firing  was  very 
heavy.  Then  Captain  Boyle  put  his  helm  a  star 
board  and  ran  his  foe  aboard,  when  in  the  act  of 
boarding,  her  colors  were  struck  at  1.41  P.  M.,  15 
minutes  after  the  first  shot.  Of  the  Chasseur  s 
crew  5  were  killed  and  8  wounded,  including  Cap 
tain  Boyle  slightly.  Of  the  St.  Lawrence's  crew  6 
were  killed  and  ^(according  to  James  18)  wounded. 
This  was  a  very  creditable  action.  The  St.  Law 
rence  had  herself  been  an  American  privateer,  called 
the  Atlas,  and  was  of  241  tons,  or  just  36  less  than 
the  Chasseur.  The  latter  could  thus  fairly  claim 
that  her  victory  was  gained  over  a  regular  cruiser  of 
about  her  own  force.  Captain  Southcombe  of  the 
Lottery,  Captain  Reid  of  the  General  Armstrong, 
Captain  Ordronaux  of  the  Neufchatel,  and  Captain 
Boyle  of  the  Chasseur,  deserve  as  much  credit  as 
any  regularly  commissioned  sea-officers.  But  it  is  a 
mistake  to  consider  these  cases  as  representing  the 
average ;  an  ordinary  privateer  was,  naturally 
enough,  no  match  for  a  British  regular  cruiser  of 
equal  force.  The  privateers  were  of  incalculable 
benefit  to  us,  and  inflicted  enormous  damage  on  the 
foe;  but  in  fighting  they  suffered  under  the  same 
disadvantages  as  other  irregular  forces;  they  were 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  417 

utterly  unreliable.     A  really  brilliant  victory  would 
be  followed  by  a  most  extraordinary  defeat. 

After  the  Constitution  had  escaped  from  Boston, 
as  I  have  described,  she  ran  to  the  Bermudas,  cruised 
in  their  vicinity  a  short  while,  thence  to  Madeira,  to 
the  Bay  of  Biscay,  and  finally  off  Portugal,  cruising 
for  some  time  in  sight  of  the  Rock  of  Lisbon.  Cap 
tain  Stewart  then  ran  off  southwest,  and  on  Feb. 
2oth,  Madeira  bearing  W.  S.  W.  60  leagues,1  the 
day  being  cloudy,  with  a  light  easterly  breeze,8  at 
I  P.M.  a  sail  was  made  two  points  on  the  port  bow ; 
and  at  2  P.M.,  Captain  Stewart,  hauling  up  in  chase, 
discovered  another  sail.  The  first  of  these  was  the 
frigate-built  ship  corvette  Cyane,  Captain  Gordon 
Thomas  Falcon,  and  the  second  was  the  ship  sloop 
Levant,  Captain  the  Honorable  George  Douglass.3 
Both  were  standing  close  hauled  on  the  starboard 
tack,  the  sloop  about  10  miles  to  leeward  of  the  cor 
vette.  At  4  P.M.  the  latter  began  making  signals 
to  her  consort  that  the  strange  sail  was  an  enemy, 
and  then  made  all  sail  before  the  wind  to  join  the 
sloop.  The  Constitution  bore  up  in  chase,  setting 
her  top-mast,  top-gallant,  and  royal  studding-sails. 
In  half  an  hour  she  carried  away  her  main  royal 
mast,  but  immediately  got  another  prepared,  and  at 
5  o'clock  began  firing  at  the  corvette  with  the  two 
port-bow  guns ;  as  the  shot  fell  short  the  firing  soon 
ceased.  At  5.30  the  Cyane  got  within  hail  of  the 
Levant,  and  the  latter's  gallant  commander  expressed 
to  Captain  Gordon  his  intention  of  engaging  the 

1  Letter  of  Captain  Stewart  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  May  20, 
1815. 

1  Log  of  Constitution,  Feb.  20,  1815. 
*  "  Naval  Chronicle,"  xxxiii,  466. 


41 8  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

American  frigate.  The  two  ships  accordingly  hauled 
up  their  courses  and  stood  on  the  starboard  tack ; 
but  immediately  afterward  their  respective  captains 
concluded  to  try  to  delay  the  action  till  dark,  so  as 
to  get  the  advantage  of  manoeuvring.1  Accordingly 
they  again  set  all  sail  and  hauled  close  to  the  wind 
to  endeavor  to  weather  their  opponent ;  but  finding 
the  latter  coming  down  too  fast  for  them  to  succeed 
they  again  stripped  to  righting  canvas  and  formed 
on  the  starboard  tack  in  head  and  stern  line,  the 
Levant  about  a  cable's  length  in  front  of  her  con 
sort.  The  American  now  had  them  completely 
under  her  guns  and  showed  her  ensign,  to  which  chal 
lenge  the  British  ships  replied  by  setting  their  colors. 
At  6.10  the  Constitution  ranged  up  to  windward  of 
the  Cyaneand  Levant,  the  former  on  her  port  quarter 
the  latter  on  her  port  bow,  both  being  distant  about 
250  yards  from  her2 — so  close  that  the  American 
marines  were  constantly  engaged  almost  from  the  be 
ginning  of  the  action.  The  fight  began  at  once,  and 
continued  with  great  spirit  for  a  quarter  of  an  hour, 
the  vessels  all  firing  broadsides.  It  was  now  moon 
light,  and  an  immense  column  of  smoke  formed 
under  the  lee  of  the  Constitution,  shrouding  from 
sight  her  foes ;  and,  as  the  fire  of  the  latter  had  al 
most  ceased,  Captain  Stewart  also  ordered  his  men 
to  stop,  so  as  to  find  out  the  positions  of  the  ships. 
In  about  three  minutes  the  smoke  cleared,  disclosing 

1  "  Naval  Chronicle,"  xxxiii,  466. 

2  Testimony  sworn   to  by   Lieutenant   W.  B.  Shubrick   and  Lieu 
tenant  of  Marines  Archibald  Henderson  before  Thomas  Welsh,  Jr., 
Justice  of  the  Peace,  Suffolk  St.,  Boston,  July  20,  1815.     The  depo 
sitions  were   taken  in  consequence  of  a  report  started  by  some  of  the 
British  journals   that  the  action  began  at  a  distance  of  f  of  a  mile. 
All  the  American  depositions  were  that  all  three  ships  began  firing  at 
once,  when  equidistant  from  each  other  about  250  yards,  the  marines 
being  engaged  almost  the  whole  time. 


NAVAL  WAR   OF    l8l2.  419 

to  the  Americans  the  Levant  dead  to  leeward  on  the 
port  beam,  and  the  Cyane  luffing  up  for  their  port 
quarter.  Giving  a  broadside  to  the  sloop,  Stewart 
braced  aback  his  main  and  mizzen  top-sails,  with 
top-gallant  sails  set,  shook  all  forward,  and  backed 
rapidly  astern,  under  cover  of  the  smoke,  abreast 
the  corvette,  forcing  the  latter  to  fill  again  to  avoid 
being  raked.  The  firing  was  spirited  for  a  few  min 
utes,  when  the  Cyane  s  almost  died  away.  The 
Levant  bore  up  to  wear  round  and  assist  her  consort, 
but  the  Constitution  filled  her  top-sails,  and,  shooting 
ahead,  gave  her  two  stern  rakes,  when  she  at  once 
made  all  sail  to  get  out  of  the  combat.  The  Cyane 
was  now  discovered  wearing,  when  the  Constitution 
herself  at  once  wore  and  gave  her  in  turn  a  stern 
rake,  the  former  luffing  to  and  firing  her  port  broad 
side  into  the  starboard  bow  of  the  frigate.  Then, 
as  the  latter  ranged  up  on  her  port  quarter,  she 
struck,  at  6.50,  just  forty  minutes  after  the  be 
ginning  of  the  action.  She  was  at  once  taken  pos 
session  of,  and  Lieut.  Hoffman,  second  of  the  Con 
stitution,  was  put  in  command.  Having  manned 
the  prize,  Captain  Stewart,  at  8  o'clock,  filled  away 
after  her  consort.  The  latter,  however,  had  only 
gone  out  of  the  combat  to  refit.  Captain  Douglass 
had  no  idea  of  retreat,  and  no  sooner  had  he  rove 
new  braces  than  he  hauled  up  to  the  wind,  and  came 
very  gallantly  back  to  find  out  his  friend's  condition. 
At  8.50  he  met  the  Constitution,  and,  failing  to 
weather  her,  the  frigate  and  sloop  passed  each  other 
on  opposite  tacks,  exchanging  broadsides.  Finding 
her  antagonist  too  heavy,  the  Levant  then  crowded 
all  sail  to  escape,  but  was  soon  overtaken  by  the 
Constitution,  and  at  about  9.30  the  latter  opened 


420  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

with  her  starboard  bow-chasers,  and  soon  afterward 
the  British  captain  hauled  down  his  colors.  Mr. 
Ballard,  first  of  the  Constitution,  was  afterward  put 
in  command  of  the  prize.  By  one  o'clock  the  ships 
were  all  in  order  again. 

The  Constitution  had  been  hulled  eleven  times, 
more  often  than  in  either  of  her  previous  actions, 
but  her  loss  was  mainly  due  to  the  grape  and  mus- 
ketry  of  the  foe  in  the  beginning  of  the  fight.1  The 
British  certainly  fired  better  than  usual,  especially 
considering  the  fact  that  there  was  much  manoeu 
vring,  and  that  it  was  a  night  action.  The  Americans 
lost  3  men  killed,  3  mortally,  and  9  severely  and 
slightly,  wounded.  The  corvette,  out  of  her  crew 
of  180,  had  12  men  killed  and  26  wounded,  several 
mortally  ;  the  sloop,  out  of  140,  had  7  killed  and  16 
wounded.  The  Constitution  had  started  on  her 
cruise  very  full-handed,  with  over  470  men,  but 
several  being  absent  on  a  prize,  she  went  into  bat 
tle  with  about  45O.2  The  prizes  had  suffered  a  good 
deal  in  their  hulls  and  rigging,  and  had  received 
some  severe  wounds  in  their  masts  and  principal 
spars.  The  Cyane  carried  on  her  main-deck  twenty- 
two  32-pound  carronades,  and  on  her  spar-deck  two 
long  I2's,  and  ten  i8-pounder  carronades.  The  Le 
vant  carried,  all  on  one  deck,  eighteen  32-pound 
carronades  and  two  long  Q'S,  together  with  a  shifting 
12-pounder.  Thus,  their  broadside  weight  of  metal 
was  763  pounds,  with  a  total  of  320  men,  of  whom 
61  fell,  against  the  Constitution  s  704  pounds  and 
450  men,  of  whom  15  were  lost;  or,  nominally,  the 
relative  force  was  100  to  91,  and  the  relative  loss 

1  Deposition  of  her  officers  as  before  cited. 

2  410  officers  and  seamen,    and  41   marines,   by  her  muster-roll  of 
Feb.  iQth.     (The  muster-rolls  are  preserved  in  trie  Treasury  Depart- 
mein  at  Washington.) 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  421 

IOO  to  24.  But  the  British  guns  were  almost  ex 
clusively  carronades  which,  as  already  pointed  out 
in  the  case  of  the  Essex  and  in  the  battle  off  Platts- 
burg,  are  no  match  for  long  guns.  Moreover,  the 
scantling  of  the  smaller  ships  was,  of  course,  by  no 
means  as  stout  as  that  of  the  frigate,  so  that  the  dis 
parity  of  force  was  much  greater  than  the  figures 
would  indicate,  although  not  enough  to  account  for 
the  difference  in  loss.  Both  the  British  ships  were 
ably  handled,  their  fire  was  well  directed,  and  the 
Levant  in  especial  was  very  gallantly  fought. 

As  regards  the  Constitution,  "her  manoeuvring  was 
as  brilliant  as  any  recorded  in  naval  annals,"  and  it 
would  have  been  simply  impossible  to  surpass  the 
consummate  skill  with  which  she  was  handled  in  the 
smoke,  always  keeping  her  antagonists  to  leeward, 
and,  while  raking  both  of  them,  not  being  once 
raked  herself.  The  firing  was  excellent,  considering 
the  short  time  the  ships  were  actually  engaged,  and 
the  fact  that  it  was  at  night.  Altogether  the  fight 
reflected  the  greatest  credit  on  her,  and  also  on  her 
adversaries.1 

1  There  is  no  British  official  account  of  the  action.  James  states 
that  the  entire  British  force  was  only  302  men  of  whom  12  were 
killed  and  29  wounded.  This  is  probably  not  based  on  any  author 
ity.  Captain  Stewart  received  on  board  301  prisoners,  of  whom  42 
were  wounded,  several  mortally.  Curiously  enough  James  also  un 
derestimates  the  American  loss,  making  it  only  12.  He  also  says 
that  many  attempts  were  made  by  the  Americans  to  induce  the  capt 
ured  British  to  desert,  while  the  Constitution 's  officers  deny  this  un 
der  oath,  before  Justice  Welsh,  as  already  quoted,  and  state  that,  on 
the  contrary,  many  of  the  prisoners  offered  to  enlist  on  the  frigate, 
but  were  all  refused  permission — as  "  the  loss  of  the  Chesapeake  had 
taught  us  the  danger  of  having  renegades  aboard."  This  denial,  by 
the  way,  holds  good  for  all  the  similar  statements  made  by  James  as 
regards  the  Guerriere,  Macedonian,  etc.  He  also  states  that  a  British 
court-martial  found  various  counts  against  the  Americans  for  harsh 
treatment,  but  all  of  these  were  specifically  denied  by  the  American 
officers,  under  oath,  as  already  quoted. 

I  have  relied  chiefly  on  Captain  Stewart's  narrative  ;  but  partly  (as 
to  time,  etc.)  on  the  British  account  in  the  "  Naval  Chronicle." 


422 


NAVAL  WAR  OF    l8l2. 


The  merits  of  this  action  can  perhaps  be  bet 
ter  appreciated  by  comparing  it  with  a  similar  one 
that  took  place  a  few  years  before  between  a  British 
sloop  and  corvette  on  the  one  side,  and  a  French 
frigate  on  the  other,  and  which  is  given  in  full  by 
both  James  and  Troude.  Although  these  authors 
differ  somewhat  in  the  account  of  it,  both  agree 
that  the  Frenchman,  the  Nereide,  of  44  guns,  on 
Feb.  14,  1810,  fought  a  long  and  indecisive  battle 
with  the  Rainbow  of  26  and  Avon  of  18  guns,  the 
British  sloops  being  fought  separately,  in  succession. 
The  relative  force  was  almost  exactly  as  in  the  Con 
stitution  s  fight.  Each  side  claimed  that  the  other 
fled.  But  this  much  is  sure  :  the  Constitution  en 
gaging  the  Cyanc  and  Levant  together,  captured 
both  ;  while  the  Nereidc,  engaging  the  Rainbow  and 
'Avon  separately,  captured  neither. 


NAVAL    WAR    OF    l8l2.  423 

The  three  ships  now  proceeded  to  the  Cape  de 
Verds,  and  on  March  loth  anchored  in  the  harbor 
of  Porto  Praya,  Island  of  San  Jago.  Here  a  mer 
chant-brig  was  taken  as  a  cartel,  and  a  hundred  of 
the  prisoners  were  landed  to  help  fit  her  for  sea. 
The  next  day  the  weather  was  thick  and  foggy, 
with  fresh  breezes.1  The  first  and  second  lieuten 
ants,  with  a  good  part  of  the  people,  were  aboard 
the  two  prizes.  At  five  minutes  past  twelve,  while 
Mr.  Shubrick,  the  senior  remaining  lieutenant,  was 
on  the  quarter-deck,  the  canvas  of  a  large  vessel 
suddenly  loomed  up  through  the  haze,  her  hull  be 
ing  completely  hidden  by  the  fog-bank.  Her  char 
acter  could  not  be  made  out  ;  but  she  was  sailing 
close-hauled,  and  evidently  making  for  the  roads. 
Mr.  Shubrick  at  once  went  down  and  reported  the 
stranger  to  Captain  Stewart,  when  that  officer 
coolly  remarked  that  it  was  probably  a  British 
frigate  or  an  Indiaman,  and  directed  the  lieutenant 
to  return  on  deck,  call  all  hands,  and  get  ready  to 
go  out  and  attack  her.2  At  that  moment  the  can 
vas  of  two  other  ships  was  discovered  rising  out  of 
the  fog  astern  of  the  vessel  first  seen.  It  was  now 
evident  that  all  three  were  heavy  frigates.3  In  fact, 
they  were  the  Newcastle,  50,  Captain  Lord  George 
Stewart ;  Leander,  50,  Captain  Sir  Ralph  Collier, 
K.  C.  B.,  and  Acasta,  40,  Captain  Robert  Kerr, 
standing  into  Porto  Praya,  close-hauled  on  the 
starboard  tack,  the  wind  being  light  northeast  by 
north.4  Captain  Stewart  at  once  saw  that  his  op 
ponents  were  far  too  heavy  for  a  fair  fight,  and, 

3  Log  of  Constitution,  March  II,  1815.  2  Cooper,  ii,  459. 

3  Letter  of  Lieutenant  Hoffman,  April  10,  1815. 

4  Marshall's  "  Naval  Biography,"  ii,  535. 


424  NAVAL    WAR    OF    l8l2. 

knowing  that  the  neutrality  of  the  port  would  not 
be  the  slightest  protection  to  him,  he  at  once  sig 
nalled  to  the  prizes  to  follow,  cut  his  cable,  and,  in 
less  than  ten  minutes  from  the  time  the  first  frigate 
was  seen,  was  standing  out  of  the  roads,  followed 
by  Hoffmann  and  Ballard.  Certainly  a  more  satis 
factory  proof  of  the  excellent  training  of  both  offi 
cers  and  men  could  hardly  be  given  than  the  rapidity, 
skill,  and  perfect  order  with  which  every  thing  was 
done.  Any  indecision  on  the  part  of  the  officers  or 
bungling  on  the  part  of  the  men  would  have  lost 
every  thing.  The  prisoners  on  shore  had  manned  a 
battery  and  delivered  a  furious  but  ill-directed  fire 
at  their  retreating  conquerors.  The  frigate,  sloop, 
and  corvette,  stood  out  of  the  harbor  in  the  order 
indicated,  on  the  port  tack,  passing  close  under  the 
east  point,  and  a  gunshot  to  windward  of  the  Brit 
ish  squadron,  according  to  the  American,  or  about  a 
league,  according  to  the  British,  accounts.  The 
Americans  made  out  the  force  of  the  strangers  cor 
rectly,  and  their  own  force  was  equally  clearly  dis 
cerned  by  the  Acasta  ;  but  both  the  Newcastle  and 
Leander  mistook  the  Cyane  and  Levant  for  frigates, 
a  mistake  similar  to  that  once  made  by  Com 
modore  Rodgers.  The  Constitution  now  crossed  her 
top-gallant  yards  and  set  the  foresail,  main-sail, 
spanker,  flying  jib,  and  top-gallant  sails  ;  and  the 
British  ships,  tacking,  made  all  sail  in  pursuit.  The 
Newcastle  was  on  the  Constitution  s  lee  quarter 
and  directly  ahead  of  the  Leander,  while  the  Acasta 
was  on  the  weather-quarter  of  the  Newcastle.  All 
six  ships  were  on  the  port  tack.  The  Constitution 
cut  adrift  the  boats  towing  astern,  and  her  log 
notes  that  at  12.50  she  found  she  was  sailing  about 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  425 

as  fast  as  the  ships  on  her  lee  quarter,  but  that  the 
Acasta  was  luffing  into  her  wake  and  dropping 
astern.  The  log  of  the  Acasta  says,  "We  had 
gained  on  the  sloops,  but  the  frigate  had  gained  on 
us."  At  i.io  the  Cyane  had  fallen  so  far  astern  and 
to  leeward  that  Captain  Stewart  signalled  to  Lieu 
tenant  Hoffman  to  tack,  lest  he  should  be  cut  off 
if  he  did  not.  Accordingly  the  lieutenant  put  about 
and  ran  off  toward  the  northwest,  no  notice  being 
taken  of  him  by  the  enemy  beyond  an  ineffectual 
broadside  from  the  sternmost  frigate.  At  2.35  he  was 
out  of  sight  of  all  the  ships  and  shaped  his  course 
for  America,  which  he  reached  on  April  loth.1  At 
1.45  the  Newcastle  opened  on  the  Constitution  firing 
by  divisions,  but  the  shot  all  fell  short,  according  to 
the  American  statements,  about  200  yards,  while 
the  British  accounts  (as  given  in  Marshall's  "  Naval 
Biography  ")  make  the  distance  much  greater;  at  any 
rate  the  vessels  were  so  near  that  from  the  Constitu 
tion  the  officers  of  the  Newcastle  could  be  seen  stand 
ing  on  the  hammock  nettings.  But,  very  strangely, 
both  the  5<D-gun  ships  apparently  still  mistook  the 
Levant,  though  a  low,  flush-decked  sloop  like  the 
Hornet,  for  the  "  President,  Congress,  or  Macedo 
nian,"  Captain  Collier  believing  that  the  Constitution 
had  sailed  with  two  other  frigates  in  company.2  By 
three  o'clock  the  Levant  had  lagged  so  as  to  be  in 
the  same  position  from  which  the  Cyane  had  just 
been  rescued  ;  accordingly  Captain  Stewart  signalled 
to  her  to  tack,  which  she  did,  and  immediately  after 
ward  all  three  British  ships  tacked  in  pursuit.  Be 
fore  they  did  so,  it  must  be  remembered  the  Acasta 

'Letter  of  Lieutenant  Hoffman,  April  10,  1815. 
*  Marshall,  ii,  533. 


426  NAVAL  WAR   OF    l8l2. 

had  weathered  on  the  Constitution,  though  left  con 
siderably  astern,  while  the  Newcastle  and  Leander 
had  about  kept  their  positions  on  her  lee  or  star- 
board  quarter ;  so  that  if  any  ship  had  been  de 
tached  after  the  Levant  it  should  have  been  the 
Leander,  which  had  least  chance  of  overtaking  the 
American  frigate.  The  latter  was  by  no  means  as 
heavily  armed  as  either  of  the  two  50*3,  and  but 
little  heavier  than  the  Acasta  ;  moreover,  she  was 
shorthanded,  having  manned  her  two  prizes.  The 
Acasta,  at  any  rate,  had  made  out  the  force  of  the 
Levant,  and,  even  had  she  been  a  frigate,  it  was  cer 
tainly  carrying  prudence  to  an  extreme  to  make 
more  than  one  ship  tack  after  her.  Had  the  New 
castle  and  Acasta  kept  on  after  the  Constitution  there 
was  a  fair  chance  of  overtaking  her,  for  the  Acasta 
had  weathered  on  her,  and  the  chase  could  not  bear 
up  for  fear  of  being  cut  off  by  the  Newcastle.  At 
any  rate  the  pursuit  should  not  have  been  given  up 
so  early.  Marshall  says  there  was  a  mistake  in  the 
signalling.  The  British  captains  certainly  bungled 
the  affair ;  even  James  says  (p.  558) :  "  It  is  the  most 
blundering  piece  of  business  recorded  in  these  six 
volumes."  As  for  Stewart  and  his  men,  they  de- 
serve  the  highest  credit  for  the  cool  judgment  and 
prompt,  skilful  seamanship  they  had  displayed.  The 
Constitution,  having  shaken  off  her  pursuers,  sailed 
to  Maranham,  where  she  landed  her  prisoners.  At 
Porto  Rico  she  learned  of  the  peace,  and  forthwith 
made  sail  for  New  York,  reaching  it  about  the  mid 
dle  of  May. 

As  soon  as  he  saw  Captain  Stewart's  signal,  Lieu 
tenant  Ballard  had  tacked,  and  at  once  made  for  the 
anchorage  at  Porto  Prayo,  which  he  reached,  though 


NAVAL  WAR  OF   l8l2.  427 

pursued  by  all  his  foes,  and  anchored  within  150 
yards  of  a  heavy  battery.1  The  wisdom  of  Captain 
Stewart's  course  in  not  trusting  to  the  neutrality  of 
the  port,  now  became  evident.  The  Acasta  opened 
upon  the  sloop  as  soon  as  the  latter  had  anchored, 
at  4.30'  The  Newcastle,  as  soon  as  she  arrived,  also 
opened,  and  so  did  the  Leander,  while  the  British 
prisoners  on  shore  fired  the  guns  of  the  battery. 
Having  borne  this  combined  cannonade  for  15  min 
utes,3  the  colors  of  the  Levant  were  hauled  down. 
The  unskilful  firing  of  the  British  ships  certainly 
did  not  redeem  the  blunders  previously  made  by 
Sir  George  Collier,  for  the  three  heavy  frigates  dur 
ing  15  minutes'  broadside  practice  in  smooth  water 
against  a  stationary  and  unresisting  foe,  did  her  but 
little  damage,  and  did  not  kill  a  man.  The  chief 
effect  of  the  fire  was  to  damage  the  houses  of  the 
Portuguese  town.* 

After  the  capture  of  the  President,  the  Peacock, 
Captain  Warrington,  the  Hornet,  Captain  Biddle, 
and  Tom  Bowline,  brig,  still  remained  in  New  York 
harbor.  On  the  22d  of  January  a  strong  northwest 
erly  gale  began  to  blow,  and  the  American  vessels, 
according  to  their  custom,  at  once  prepared  to  take 
advantage  of  the  heavy  weather  and  run  by  the 
blockaders.  They  passed  the  bar  by  daylight,  under 
storm  canvas,  the  British  frigates  lying  to  in  the 
southeast  being  plainly  visible.  They  were  igno 
rant  of  the  fate  of  the  President,  and  proceeded  tow 
ard  Tristan  d'  Acunha,  which  was  the  appointed 

'Letter  of  Lieutenant  Ballard,  May  2,  1815. 

*  Newcastle's  log,  as  given  by  Marshall  and  James. 

s  Ballard's  letter.  *  James,  vi,  551. 


428  NAVAL   WAR   OF    1 8 12. 

rendezvous.  A  few  days  out  the  Hornet  parted 
company  from  the  two  others ;  these  last  reached 
Tristan  d*  Acunha  about  March  i8th,  but  were  driven 
off  again  by  a  gale.  The  Hornet  reached  the  island 
on  the  23d,  and  at  half-past  ten  in  the  morning,  the 
wind  being  fresh  S.S.W.,  when  about  to  anchor  off 
the  north  point,  a  sail  was  made  in  the  southeast, 
steering  west.1  This  was  the  British  brig-sloop  Pen 
guin,  Captain  James  Dickenson.  She  was  a  new 
vessel,  having  left  port  for  the  first  time  in  Septem 
ber,  1814.  While  at  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope  she 
had  received  from  Vice- Admiral  Tyler  12  marines 
from  the  Medway,  74,  increasing  her  complement  to 
132;  and  was  then  despatched  on  special  service 
against  a  heavy  American  privateer,  the  Young 
Wasp,  which  had  been  causing  great  havoc  among 
the  homeward-bound  Indiamen. 

When  the  strange  sail  was  first  seen  Captain  Bid- 
die  was  just  letting  go  his  top-sail  sheets  ;  he  at  once 
sheeted  them  home,  and,  the  stranger  being  almost 
instantly  shut  out  by  the  land,  made  all  sail  to  the 
west,  and  again  caught  sight  of  her.  Captain  Dick 
enson  now,  for  the  first  time,  saw  the  American 
sloop,  and  at  once  bore  up  for  her.  The  position  of 
the  two  vessels  was  exactly  the  reverse  of  the  Wasp 
and  Frolic,  the  Englishman  being  to  windward.  The 
Hornet  hove  to,  to  let  her  antagonist  close  ;  then 
she  filled  her  maintop-sail  and  continued  to  yaw, 
wearing  occasionally  to  prevent  herself  from  being 
raked.  At  forty  minutes  past  one  the  Penguin,  be 
ing  within  musket-shot,  hauled  to  the  wind  on  the 
starboard  tack,  hoisted  a  St.  George's  ensign  and 

1  Letter  from  Captain  Biddle  to  Commodore  Decatur,  Mar.  25, 
1815. 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  429 

fired  a  gun.  The  Hornet  luffed  up  on  the  same 
tack,  hoisting  American  colors,  and  the  action  began 
with  heavy  broadsides.  The  vessels  ran  along  thus 
for  15  minutes,  gradually  coming  closer  together, 
and  Captain  Dickenson  put  his  helm  aweather,  to 
run  his  adversary  aboard.  At  this  moment  the 
brave  young  officer  received  a  mortal  wound,  and 
the  command  devolved  on  the  first  lieutenant,  Mr. 
McDonald,  who  endeavored  very  gallantly  to  carry 
out  his  commander's  intention,  and  at  1.56  the  Pen 
guin  s  bowsprit  came  in  between  the  Hornet's  main- 
and  mizzen-rigging  on  the  starboard  side.  The 
American  seamen  had  been  called  away,  and  were 
at  their  posts  to  repel  boarders,  but  as  the  British 
made  no  attempt  to  come  on,  the  cutlass  men  began 
to  clamber  into  the  rigging  to  go  aboard  the  brig. 
Captain  Biddle  very  coolly  stopped  them,  "  it  being 
evident  from  the  beginning  that  our  fire  was  greatly 
superior  both  in  quickness  and  effect."  There  was 
a  heavy  sea  running,  and  as  the  Hornet  forged  ahead, 
the  Penguin  s  bowsprit  carried  away  her  mizzen 
shrouds,  stern  davits,  and  spanker  boom  ;  and  the 
brig  then  hung  on  her  starboard  quarter,  where  only 
small  arms  could  be  used  on  either  side.  An  English 
officer  now  called  out  something  which  Biddle 
understood,  whether  correctly  or  not  is  disputed,  to 
be  the  word  of  surrender  ;  accordingly  he  directed 
his  marines  to  cease  firing,  and  jumped  on  the  taff- 
rail.  At  that  minute  two  of  the  marines  on  the 
Penguin  s  forecastle,  not  30  feet  distant,  fired  at  him, 
one  of  the  balls  inflicting  a  rather  severe  wound  in 
his  neck.  A  discharge  of  musketry  from  the  Hornet 
at  once  killed  both  the  marines,  and  at  that  moment 
the  ship  drew  ahead.  As  the  vessels  separated  the 


430  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

Penguin  s  foremast  went  overboard,  the  bowsprit 
breaking  short  off.  The  Hornet  at  once  wore,  to 
present  a  fresh  broadside,  while  the  Penguin  s  dis 
abled  condition  prevented  her  following  suit,  and 
having  lost  a  third  of  her  men  killed  and  wounded 
(14  of  the  former  and  28  of  the  latter),  her  hull  be 
ing  riddled  through  and  through,  her  foremast  gone, 
main-mast  tottering,  and  most  of  the  guns  on  the 
engaged  side  dismounted,  she  struck  her  colors  at 
two  minutes  past  two,  twenty-two  minutes  after  the 
first  gun  was  fired.  Of  the  Hornet's  150  men,  8 
were  absent  in  a  prize.  By  actual  measurement  she 
was  two  feet  longer  and  slightly  narrower  than  her 
antagonist.  Her  loss  was  chiefly  caused  by  mus 
ketry,  amounting  to  I  marine  killed,  I  seaman  mor 
tally,  Lieutenant  Conner  very  severely,  and  Captain 


PENGUIN 


HORNET 


Biddle  and  seven  seamen  slightly,  wounded.  Not 
a  round  shot  struck  the  hull,  nor  was  a  mast  or  spar 
materially  injured,  but  the  rigging  and  sails  were  a 
good  deal  cut,  especially  about  the  fore  and  main 
top-gallant  masts.  The  Hornet's  crew  had  been  suf 
fering  much  from  sickness,  and  9  of  the  men  were 
unable  to  be  at  quarters,  thus  reducing  the  vessels 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  431 

to  an  exact  equality.  Counting  in  these  men,  and 
excluding  the  8  absent  in  a  prize,  we  get  as 

COMPARATIVE     FORCE. 

Weight 
Tonnage.      No.  Guns.         Metal.  Crew.  Loss. 

Hornet  480  10  279  142*  n 

Penguin  477  10  274  132  42 

Or,  the  force  being  practically  equal,  the  Hornet  in 
flicted  fourfold  the  loss  and  tenfold  the  damage  she 
suffered.  Hardly  any  action  of  the  war  reflected 
greater  credit  on  the  United  States  marine  than 
this  ;  for  the  cool,  skilful  seamanship  and  excellent 
gunnery  that  enabled  the  Americans  to  destroy  an 
antagonist  of  equal  force  in  such  an  exceedingly 
short  time.  The  British  displayed  equal  bravery, 
but  were  certainly  very  much  behind  their  antago 
nists  in  the  other  qualities  which  go  to  make  up  a 
first-rate  man-of-warsman.  Even  James  says  he 
"  cannot  offer  the  trifling  disparity  of  force  in  this 

1  This  number  of  men  is  probably  too  great  ;  I  have  not  personally 
examined  the  Hornefs  muster-roll  for  that  period.  Lieutenant  Em- 
mons  in  his  "  History,"  gives  her  132  men  ;  but  perhaps  he  did  not 
include  the  nine  sick,  which  would  make  his  statement  about  the 
same  as  mine.  In  response  to  my  inquiries,  I  received  a  very  kind 
letter  from  the  Treasury  Department  (Fourth  Auditor's  office),  which 
stated  that  the  muster-roll  of  the  Hornet  on  this  voyage  showed  "  101 
officers  and  crew  (marines  excepted)."  Adding  the  20  marines  would 
make  but  121  in  all.  I  think  there  must  be  some  mistake  in  this, 
and  so  have  considered  the  Hornet's  crew  as  consisting  originally  of 
150  men,  the  same  as  on  her  cruises  in  1812. 

The  Penguin  was  in  reality  slightly  larger  than  the  Hornet,  judg 
ing  from  the  comparisons  made  in  Biddle's  letter  (for  the  original  of 
which  see  in  the  Naval  Archives,  "  Captains'  Letters,"  vol  42,  No. 
112).  He  says  that  the  Penguin,  though  two  feet  shorter  on  deck 
than  the  Hornet,  had  a  greater  length  of  keel,  a  slightly  greater 
breadth  of  beam,  stouter  sides,  and  higher  bulwarks,  with  swivels  on 
the  capstan  and  tops,  and  that  she  fought  both  her  "  long  I2's"  on 
the  same  side.  I  have  followed  James,  however,  as  regards  this  ;  he 
says  her  long  guns  were  6-pounders,  and  that  but  one  was  fought  on 
a  side. 


432  NAVAL   WAR    OF    l8l2. 

action  as  an  excuse  for  the  Penguin  s  capture.     The 
chief  cause  is  the  immense  disparity  be 

tween  the  two  vessels  in     *    *    *    the  effectiveness 
of  their  crews." 

The  Penguin  was  so  cut  up  by  shot  that  she  had 
to  be  destroyed.  After  the  stores,  etc.,  had  been 
taken  out  of  her,  she  was  thoroughly  examined 
(Captain  Biddle,  from  curiosity,  taking  her  measure 
ments  in  comparison  with  those  of  the  Hornet). 
Her  destruction  was  hastened  on  account  of  a 
strange  sail  heaving  in  sight  ;  but  the  latter  proved 
to  be  the  Peacock,  with  the  Tom  Bowline  in  com 
pany.  The  latter  was  now  turned  to  account  by 
being  sent  in  to  Rio  de  Janeiro  as  a  cartel  with  the 
prisoners.  The  Peacock  and  Hornet  remained  about 
the  island  till  April  I3th,  and  then,  giving  up  all 
hopes  of  seeing  the  President,  and  rightly  supposing 
she  had  been  captured,  started  out  for  the  East 

1  After  the  action  but  one  official  account,  that  of  Captain  Biddle, 
was  published  ;  none  of  the  letters  of  the  defeated  British  com 
manders  were  published  after  1813.  As  regards  this  action,  every 
British  writer  has  followed  James,  who  begins  his  account  thus: 
"  Had  the  vessel  in  sight  to  windward  been  rigged  with  three  masts 
instead  of  two,  and  had  she  proved  to  be  a  British  cruiser,  Captain 
Biddle  would  have  marked  her  down  in  his  log  as  a  'frigate,'  and 
have  made  off*  with  all  the  canvas  he  could  possibly  spread.  Had 
the  ship  overtaken  the  Hornet  and  been  in  reality  a  trifle  superior  in 
force,  Captain  Biddle,  we  have  no  doubt,  would  have  exhausted  his 
eloquence  in  lauding  the  blessings  of  peace  before  he  tried  a  struggle 
for  the  honors  of  war."  After  this  preface  (which  should  be  read 
in  connection  with  the  Hornefs  unaccepted  challenge  to  the  Bonne 
Citoyenne,  a  ship  "a  trifle  superior  in  force")  it  can  be  considered 
certain  that  James  will  both  extenuate  and  also  set  down  a  good  deal 
in  malice.  One  instance  of  this  has  already  been  given  in  speaking 
of  the  President's  capture.  Again,  he  says,  "the  Hornet  received 
several  round  shot  in  her  hull,"  which  she  did — a  month  after  this 
action,  from  the  Cornwallis,  74  ;  James  knew  perfectly  well  that  not 
one  of  the  Penguin  s  shot  hit  the  Hornet's  hull.  The  quotations  I 
have  given  are  quite  enough  to  prove  that  nothing  he  says  about  the 
action  is  worth  attending  to.  The  funniest  part  of  his  account  is 
where  he  makes  Captain  Biddle  get  drunk,  lose  his  "  native  cunning," 
and  corroborate  his  (James')  statements.  He  does  not  even  hint  at 
ihe  authority  for  this. 


NAVAL   WAR    OF    1 8 12.  433 

Indies.  On  the  2/th  of  the  month,  in  lat.  38°3o'  S. 
and  long.  33°  E.,1  the  Peacock  signalled  a  stranger  in 
the  S.E.,  and  both  sloops  crowded  sail  in  chase. 
The  next  morning  they  came  down  with  the  wind 
aft  from  the  northwest,  the  studding-sails  set  on 
both  sides.  The  new  22-gun  sloops  were  not  only 
better  war-vessels,  but  faster  ones  too,  than  any! 
other  ships  of  their  rate  ;  and  the  Peacock  by  after 
noon  was  two  leagues  ahead  of  the  Hornet.  At  2 
P.M.  the  former  was  observed  to  manifest  some  hes 
itation  about  approaching  the  stranger,  which  in 
stead  of  avoiding  had  rather  hauled  up  toward 
them.  All  on  board  the  Hornet  thought  her  an 
Indiaman,  and  "  the  men  began  to  wonder  what 
they  would  do  with  the  silks,"  when,  a  few  minutes 
before  four,  the  Peacock  signalled  that  it  was  a  line- 
of-battle  ship,  which  reversed  the  parts  with  a  ven 
geance.  Warrington's  swift  ship  was  soon  out  of 
danger,  while  Biddle  hauled  close  to  the  wind  on 
the  port  tack,  with  the  Cornwallis,  74,  bearing  the 
flag  of  Admiral  Sir  George  Burleton,  K.C.B.,2  in  hot 
pursuit,  two  leagues  on  his  lee  quarter.  The  74 
gained  rapidly  on  the  Hornet,  although  she  stopped 
to  pick  up  a  marine  who  had  fallen  overboard. 
Finding  he  had  to  deal  with  a  most  weatherly  craft, 
as  well  as  a  swift  sailer,  Captain  Biddle,  at  9  P.M.,  be 
gan  to  lighten  the  Hornet  of  the  mass  of  stores 
taken  from  the  Penguin.  The  Cornwallis  gained 
still,  however,  and  at  2  A.M.  on  the  2Qth  was  ahead 
of  the  Hornet's  lee  or  starboard  beam,  when  the 
sloop  put  about  and  ran  off  toward  the  west.  Day 
light  showed  the  74  still  astern  and  to  leeward,  but 

1  Letter  of  Captain  Biddle,  June  loth,  and  extracts  from  her  log. 

2  James,  vi,  564. 


434  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

having  gained  so  much  as  to  be  within  gunshot, 
and  shortly  afterward  she  opened  fire,  her  shot 
passing  over  the  Hornet.  The  latter  had  recourse 
anew  to  the  lightening  process.  She  had  already 
hove  overboard  the  sheet-anchor,  several  heavy 
spare  spars,  and  a  large  quantity  of  shot  and  bal 
last  ;  the  remaining  anchors  and  cables,  more  shot, 
six  guns,  and  the  launch  now  followed  suit,  and, 
thus  relieved,  the  Hornet  passed  temporarily  out  of 
danger  ;  but  the  breeze  shifted  gradually  round  to 
the  east,  and  the  liner  came  looming  up  till  at  noon 
she  was  within  a  mile,  a  shorter  range  than  that  at 
which  the  United  States  crippled  and  cut  up  the 
Macedonian  ;  and  had  the  Cornwallis  fire  been  half 
as  well  aimed  as  that  of  the  States,  it  would  have 
been  the  last  of  the  Hornet.  But  the  74*3  guns  were 
very  unskilfully  served,  and  the  shot  passed  for  the 
most  part  away  over  the  chase,  but  three  getting 
home.  Captain  Biddle  and  his  crew  had  no  hope 
of  ultimate  escape,  but  no  one  thought  of  giving 
up.  All  the  remaining  spare  spars  and  boats,  all 
the  guns  but  one,  the  shot,  and  in  fact  every  thing 
that  could  be  got  at,  below  or  on  deck,  was  thrown 
overboard.  This  increased  the  way  of  the  Hornet, 
while  the  Cornwallis  lost  ground  by  hauling  off  to 
give  broadsides,  which  were  as  ineffectual  as  the  fire 
from  the  chase-guns  had  been.  The  Hornet  now 
had  gained  a  little,  and  managed  to  hold  her  own, 
and  shortly  afterward  the  pluck  and  skill  of  her 
crew1  were  rewarded.  The  shift  in  the  wind  had 
been  very  much  against  them,  but  now  it  veered 

1  It  is  perhaps  worth  noting  that  the  accounts  incidentally  mention 
the  fact  that  almost  the  entire  crew  consisted  of  native  Americans,  of 
whom  quite  a  number  had  served  as  impressed  seamen  on  board  British 
war-ships.  James  multiplies  these  threefold  and  sets  them  down  as 
British. 


NAVAL   WAR    OF    1 8 12.  435 

back  again  so  as  to  bring  them  to  windward  ;  and 
every  minute,  as  it  blew  fresher  and  fresher,  their 
chances  increased.  By  dark  the  Cornwallis  was  well 
astern,  and  during  the  night  the  wind  kept  freshen 
ing,  blowing  in  squalls,  which  just  suited  the  Hor 
net,  and  when  day  broke  the  liner  was  hull  down 
astern.  Then,  on  the  morning  of  the  3Oth,  after 
nearly  48  hours'  chase,  she  abandoned  the  pursuit. 
The  Hornet  was  now  of  course  no  use  as  a  cruiser, 
and  made  sail  for  New  York,  which  she  reached  on 
June  Qth.  This  chase  requires  almost  the  same 
comments  as  the  last  chase  of  the  Constitution.  In 
both  cases  the  American  captains  and  their  crews 
deserve  the  very  highest  praise  for  plucky,  skilful 
seamanship  ;  but  exactly  as  Stewart's  coolness  and 
promptitude  might  not  have  saved  the  Constitution 
had  it  not  been  for  the  blunders  made  by  his  an 
tagonists,  so  the  Hornet  would  have  assuredly  been 
taken,  in  spite  of  Biddle's  stubbornness  and  resource, 
if  the  Cornwallis  had  not  shown  such  unskilful  gun 
nery,  which  was  all  the  more  discreditable  since  she 
carried  an  admiral's  flag. 

The  Peacock  was  thus  the  only  one  left  of  the 
squadron  originally  prepared  for  the  East  Indies  ; 
however,  she  kept  on,  went  round  the  Cape  of  Good 
Hope,  and  cruised  across  the  Indian  Ocean,  captur 
ing  4  great  Indiamen,  very  valuable  prizes,  manned 
by  291  men.  Then  she  entered  the  Straits  of  Sunda, 
and  on  the  3<Dth  of  June,  off  the  fort  of  Anjier  fell 
in  with  the  East  India  Company's  cruiser  Nautilus, 
Lieut.  Boyce,  a  brig  of  180  (American  measure 
ment  over  200)  tons,  with  a  crew  of  80  men,  and 
14  guns,  4  long  9*3  and  ten  i8-pound  carronades.1 

1  "History  of  the  Indian  Navy,"  by  Charles  Ratlibone  Low  (late 
lieutenant  of  the  Indian  Navy),  London,  1877,  p.  285. 


436  NAVAL   WAR   OF    1 8 12. 

Captain  Warrington  did  not  know  of  the  peace ; 
one  of  the  boats  of  the  Nautilus,  however,  with  her 
purser,  Mr.  Bartlett,  boarded  him.  Captain  Warring- 
ton  declares  the  latter  made  no  mention  of  the 
peace,  while  Mr.  Bartlett  swears  that  he  did  before 
he  was  sent  below.  As  the  Peacock  approached, 
Lieut.  Boyce  hailed  to  ask  if  she  knew  peace  had 
been  declared.  Captain  Warrington,  according  to 
his  letter,  regarded  this  as  a  ruse  to  enable  the  brig 
to  escape  under  the  guns  of  the  fort,  and  commanded 
the  lieutenant  to  haul  down  his  colors,  which  the 
latter  refused  to  do,  and  very  gallantly  prepared  for 
a  struggle  with  a  foe  of  more  than  twice  his  strength. 
According  to  Captain  Warrington,  one,  or,  by  the 
deposition  of  Mr.  Bartlett,1  two  broadsides  were 
then  interchanged,  and  the  brig  surrendered,  having 
lost  7  men,  including  her  first  lieutenant,  killed  and 
mortally  wounded,  and  8  severely  or  slightly  wound 
ed.  Two  of  her  guns  and  the  sheet-anchor  were 
disabled,  the  bends  on  the  starboard  side  complete 
ly  shivered  from  aft  to  the  forechains,  the  bulwarks 
from  the  chess-tree  aft  much  torn,  and  the  rigging 
cut  to  pieces.2  The  Peacock  did  not  suffer  the  slight 
est  loss  or  damage.  Regarding  the  affair  purely  as 
a  conflict  between  vessels  of  nations  at  war  with 
each  other,  the  criticism  made  by  Lord  Howard 
Douglass  on  the  action  between  the  President  and 
Little  Belt  applies  here  perfectly.  "  If  a  vessel  meet 
an  enemy  of  even  greatly  superior  force,  it  is  due  to 
the  honor  of  her  flag  to  try  the  effect  of  a  few 
rounds  ;  but  unless  in  this  gallant  attempt  she  leave 
marks  of  her  skill  upon  the  larger  body,  while  she, 

1  As  quoted  by  Low. 

*  Letter  of  Lieut.  Boyce  to  Company's  Marine  Board,  as  quoted  by 
Low. 


NAVAL    WAR    OF    l8l2.  437 

the  smaller  body,  is  hit  at  every  discharge,  she  does 
but  salute  her  enemy's  triumph  and  discredit  her  own 
gunnery."  '  There  could  not  have  been  a  more  sat 
isfactory  exhibition  of  skill  than  that  given  by  Cap 
tain  Warrington  ;  but  I  regret  to  say  that  it  is  diffi 
cult  to  believe  he  acted  with  proper  humanity.  It 
seems  impossible  that  Mr.  Bartlett  did  not  mention 
that  peace  had  been  signed  ;  and  when  the  opposing 
force  was  so  much  less  than  his  own  it  would  have 
been  safe  at  least  to  defer  the  order  "  haul  down 
your  flag  "for  a  short  time,  while  he  could  have  kept 
the  brig  within  half  pistol-shot,  until  he  could  have 
inquired  into  the  truth  of  the  report.  Throughout 
this  work  I  have  wherever  possible  avoided  all  ref 
erences  to  the  various  accusations  and  recrimina 
tions  of  some  of  the  captains  about  "  unfairness," 
"  cruelty,"  etc.,  as  in  most  cases  it  is  impossible  to 
get  at  the  truth,  the  accounts  flatly  contradicting 
one  another.  In  this  case,  however,  there  certainly 
seems  some  ground  for  the  rather  fervent  denunci 
ations  of  Captain  Warrington  indulged  in  by  Lieut. 
Low.  But  it  is  well  to  remember  that  a  very  similar 
affair,  with  the  parties  reversed,  had  taken  place  but 
a  few  months  before  on  the  coast  of  America.  This 
was  on  Feb.  22d,  after  the  boats  of  the  Erebus,  20, 
and  Primrose,  18,  under  Captains  Bartholomew  and 
Phillot,  had  been  beaten  off  with  a  loss  of  30  men 
(including  both  captains  wounded),  in  an  expedition 
up  St.  Mary's  River,  Ga.  The  two  captains  and 
their  vessels  then  joined  Admiral  Cockburn  at  Cum 
berland  Island,  and  on  the  25th  of  February  were 
informed  officially  of  the  existence  of  peace.  Three 
weeks  afterward  the  American  gunboat,  No.  168, 

1 "  Naval  Gunnery,"  p.  3. 


438  NAVAL    WAR    OF    l8l2. 

Mr.  Hurlburt,  sailed  from  Tybee  Bar,  Ga.,  bearing 
despatches  for  the  British  admiral.1  On  the  same 
day  in  the  afternoon  she  fell  in  with  the  Erebus,  Cap* 
tain  Bartholomew.  Peace  having  been  declared,  and 
having  been  known  to  exist  for  over  three  weeks, 
no  effort  was  made  to  avoid  the  British  vessel;  but 
when  the  gunboat  neared  the  latter  she  was  suddenly 
hailed  and  told  to  heave  to.  Mr.  Hurlburt  answered 
that  he  had  dispatches  for  Admiral  Cockburn,  to 
which  Captain  Bartholomew  responded,  with  many 
oaths,  that  he  did  not  care,  he  would  sink  her  if  she 
did  not  send  a  boat  aboard.  When  Mr.  Hurlburt 
attempted  to  answer  some  muskets  were  discharged 
at  him,  and  he  was  told  to  strike.  He  refused,  and 
the  Erebus  immediately  opened  fire  from  her  great 
guns  ;  the  gunboat  had  gotten  so  far  round  that  her 
pivot-gun  would  not  bear  properly,  but  it  was  dis 
charged  across  the  bows  of  the  Erebus,  and  then  Mr. 
Hurlburt  struck  his  colors.  Although  he  had  lain 
right  under  the  foe's  broadside,  he  had  suffered  no 
loss  or  damage  except  a  few  ropes  cut,  and  some 
shot-holes  in  the  sails.  Afterward  Captain  Barthol 
omew  apologized,  and  let  the  gunboat  proceed. 

This  attack  was  quite  as  wanton  and  unprovoked 
as  Warrington's,  and  Bartholomew's  foe  was  rela 
tively  to  himself  even  less  powerful  ;  moreover, 
while  the  Peacock's  crew  showed  great  skill  in  hand 
ling  their  guns,  the  crew  of  the  Erebus  most  emphati 
cally  did  not.  The  intent  in  both  cases  was  equally 
bad,  only  the  British  captain  lacked  the  ability  to 
carry  his  out. 

J  Letter  from  Com.  Campbell  to  Sec.  of  Navy,  Mar.  29,  1815,  in- 
eluding  one  from  Sailing-master  John  H.  Hurlburt  of  Mar.  18,  1815, 
preserved  in  the  Naval  Archives,  in  vol.  43,  No.  125,  of  "  Captains' 
I  etters."  See  also  "  Niles'  Register,"  viii,  104,  118,  etc. 


NAVAL   WAR    OF    l8l2.  439 

SUMMARY. 

The  concluding  operations  of  the  war  call  for 
much  the  same  comments  as  those  of  the  preceding 
years.  The  balance  of  praise  certainly  inclines 
toward  the  Americans.  Captain  John  Hayes' 
squadron  showed  great  hardihood,  perseverance  and 
judgment,  which  were  rewarded  by  the  capture 
of  the  President ;  and  Decatur's  surrender  seems  de 
cidedly  tame.  But  as  regards  the  action  between  the 
President  and  Endymion  (taking  into  account  the 
fact  that  the  former  fought  almost  under  the  guns 
of  an  overwhelming  force,  and  was  therefore  obliged 
to  expose  herself  far  more  than  she  otherwise  would 
have),  it  showed  nearly  as  great  superiority  on  the 
side  of  the  Americans  as  the  frigate  actions  of  1812 
did — in  fact,  probably  quite  as  much  as  in  the  case 
of  the  Java.  Similarly,  while  the  Cyane  and  Levant 
did  well,  the  Constitution  did  better ;  and  Sir  George 
Collier's  ships  certainly  did  not  distinguish  them 
selves  when  in  chase  of  Old  Ironsides.  So  with  the 
Hornet  in  her  two  encounters ;  no  one  can  question 
the  pluck  with  which  the  Penguin  was  fought,  but 
her  gunnery  was  as  bad  as  that  of  the  Cornwallis 
subsequently  proved.  And  though  the  skirmish 
between  the  Peacock  and  Nautilus  is  not  one  to 
which  an  American  cares  to  look  back,  yet,  regard 
ing  it  purely  from  a  fighting  stand-point,  there  is  no 
question  which  crew  was  the  best  trained  and  most 
skilful. 

LIST  OF  SHIPS   BUILT   IN    1815. 
Name.  Rate.  Where  Built.  Cost. 

Washington  74  Portsmouth        $235,861.00 

Independence  74  Boston  421,810.41 


440  NAVAL  WAR   OF    l8l2. 

Name.  Rate.  Where  Built.  Cost. 

Franklin  74  Philadelphia  438,149.40 

Guerrtire  44  306,158.56 

Java  44  Baltimore  232,767.38 

Fulton  30  New  York  320,000.00 
Torpedo                                              " 

These  ships  first  put  to  sea  in  this  year.  For  the 
first  time  in  her  history  the  United  States  possessed 
line-of-battle  ships  ;  and  for  the  first  time  in  all  his 
tory,  the  steam  frigate  appeared  on  the  navy  list  of 
a  nation  The  Fulton,  with  her  clumsy  central 
wheel,  concealed  from  shot  by  the  double  hull,  with 
such  thick  scantling  that  none  but  heavy  guns  could 
harm  her,  and  relying  for  offensive  weapons  not  on 
a  broadside  of  thirty  guns  of  small  calibre,  but  on 
two  pivotal  lOO-pounder  columbiads,  or,  perhaps,  if 
necessary,  on  blows  from  her  hog  snout, — the  Fulton 
was  the  true  prototype  of  the  modern  steam  iron 
clad,  with  its  few  heavy  guns  and  ram.  Almost  as 
significant  is  the  presence  of  the  Torpedo.  I  have 
not  chronicled  the  several  efforts  made  by  the 
Americans  to  destroy  British  vessels  with  torpedoes  ; 
some  very  nearly  succeeded,  and  although  they 
failed  it  must  not  be  supposed  that  they  did  no 
good.  On  the  contrary,  they  made  the  British  in 
many  cases  very  cautious  about  venturing  into  good 
anchorage  (especially  in  Long  Island  Sound  and  the 
Chesapeake),  and  by  the  mere  terror  of  their  name 
prevented  more  than  one  harrying  expedition.  The 
Fulton  was  not  got  into  condition  to  be  fought  until 
just  as  the  war  ended ;  had  it  continued  a  few 
months,  it  is  more  than  probable  that  the  deeds  of 
the  Merrimac  and  the  havoc  wrought  by  the  Con 
federate  torpedoes  would  have  been  forestalled  by 


NAVAL  WAR  OF    l8l2.  441 

nearly  half  a  century.  As  it  was,  neither  of  these 
engines  of  war  attracted  much  attention.  For  ten 
or  fifteen  years  the  Fulton  was  the  only  war-vessel 
of  her  kind  in  existence,  and  then  her  name  disap 
pears  from  our  lists.  The  torpedoes  had  been  tried 
in  the  Revolutionary  War,  but  their  failure  pre 
vented  much  notice  from  being  taken  of  them,  and, 
besides,  at  that  time  there  was  a  strong  feeling  that 
it  was  dishonorable  to  blow  a  ship  up  with  a  pow 
der-can  concealed  under  the  water,  though  highly 
laudable  to  burn  her  by  means  of  a  fire-raft  floating 
on  the  water — a  nice  distinction  in  naval  ethics  that 
has  since  disappeared.1 

AMERICAN  VESSELS   DESTROYED,  ETC. 

By  Ocean  Cruisers. 
Name.  Guns.        Tonnage.  Remarks. 

President  52         1,576          captured  by  squadron. 


52  guns.  1,576  tons. 

BRITISH    VESSELS   DESTROYED,    ETC. 

a. — By  Privateers. 
Name.  Guns.  Tonnage.  Remarks. 

Chasseur  12  240    by  privateer  St.  Lawrence. 

b. — By  Ocean  Cruisers. 

Cyane  34  659  by  Constitution. 

Levant  20  500  retaken. 

Penguin  19  477  by  Hornet. 

85  guns,     1,876  tons. 

20  500  (subtracting  Levant). 


65  guns,     1,376  tons. 


'  James  fairly  foams  at  the  mouth  at  the  mere  mention  of  torpedoes. 


442  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

In  summing  up  the  results  of  the  struggle  on  the 
ocean  it  is  to  be  noticed  that  very  little  was  attempt 
ed,  and  nothing  done,  by  the  American  Navy  that 
could  materially  affect  the  result  of  the  war.  Com 
modore  Rodgers'  expedition  after  the  Jamaica  Plate 
fleet  failed  ;  both  the  efforts  to  get  a  small  squadron 
into  the  East  Indian  waters  also  miscarried  ;  and 
otherwise  the  whole  history  of  the  struggle  on  the 
ocean  is,  as  regards  the  Americans,  only  the  record 
of  individual  cruises  and  fights.  The  material  re 
sults  were  not  very  great,  at  least  in  their  effect  on 
Great  Britain,  whose  enormous  navy  did  not  feel  in 
the  slightest  degree  the  loss  of  a  few  frigates  and 
sloops.  But  morally  the  result  was  of  inestimable 
benefit  to  the  United  States.  The  victories  kept 
up  the  spirits  of  the  people,  cast  down  by  the  de 
feats  on  land  ;  practically  decided  in  favor  of  the 
Americans  the  chief  question  in  dispute  —  Great  Brit 
ain's  right  of  search  and  impressment  —  and  gave 
the  navy,  and  thereby  the  country,  a  world-wide 
reputation.  I  doubt  if  ever  before  a  nation  gained 
so  much  honor  by  a  few  single-ship  duels.  For 
there  can  be  no  question  which  side  came  out  of  the 
war  with  the  greatest  credit.  The  damage  inflicted 
by  each  on  the  other  was  not  very  unequal  in 
amount,  but  the  balance  was  certainly  in  favor  of 
the  United  States,  as  can  be  seen  by  the  following 
tables,  for  the  details  of  which  reference  can  be 
made  to  the  various  years  : 

AMERICAN  LOSS".  BRITISH  LOSS. 

Caused:  —  Tonnage.        Guns.  Tonnage.1       Guns. 

By  Ocean  Cruisers          5,984          278  8,451  351 


tonnage  can  only  be  given  approximately,  as  that  of  the  ves 
sels  on  Lake  Champlain  is  not  exactly  known,  although  we  know 
about  what  the  two  fleeth  tonned  relatively  to  one  another. 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  443 

AMERICAN  LOSS.  BRITISH  LOSS. 

Caused:—  Tonnage.  Guns.                     Tonnage.         Guns. 

On  the  Lakes  727  37 

By  the  Army  3,007  116 

By  Privateers  


Total,  9,718          431.  13,512 

In  addition  we  lost  4  revenue-cutters,  mounting 

24  guns,  and,  in  the  aggregate,  of  387  tons,  and  also 

25  gun-boats,  with  71  guns,  and,  in  the  aggregate  of 
nearly  2,000  tons.     This   would   swell   our   loss   to 
12,105  tons,  and  526  guns1 ;  but  the  loss  of  the  rev- 

1  This  differs  greatly  from  the  figures  given  by  James  in  his  "  Naval 
Occurrences"  (App.  ccxv).  He  makes  the  American  loss  14,844  tons, 
and  660  guns.  His  list  includes,  for  example,  the  "  Growler  and 
Hamilton,  upset  in  carrying  sail  to  avoid  Sir  James'  fleet "  ;  it  would 
be  quite  as  reasonable  to  put  down  the  loss  of  the  Royal  George  to  the 
credit  of  the  French.  Then  he  mentions  the  Julia  and  Growler, 
which  were  recaptured  ;  the  Asp,  which  was  also  recaptured  ;  the 
"  New  York,  46,  destroyed  at  Washington,"  which  was  not  destroyed 
or  harmed  in  any  way,  and  which,  moreover,  was  a  condemned  hulk  ; 
the  "Boston,  42  (in  reality  32),  destroyed  at  Washington,"  which 
had  been  a  condemned  hulk  for  ten  years,  and  had  no  guns  or  any 
thing  else  in  her,  and  was  as  much  a  loss  to  our  navy  as  the  fishing 
up  and  burning  of  an  old  wreck  would  have  been  ;  and  8  gun-boats 
whose  destruction  was  either  mythical,  or  else  which  were  not  na 
tional  vessels.  By  deducting  all  these  we  reduce  James'  total  by  120 
guns,  and  2,600  tons  ;  and  a  few  more  alterations  (such  as  excluding 
the  swivels  in  the  President's  tops,  which  he  counts,  etc.),  brings  his 
number  down  to  that  given  above — and  also  affords  a  good  idea  of  the 
value  to  be  attached  to  his  figures  and  tables.  The  British  loss  he 
gives  at  but  530  guns  and  10,273  tons.  He  omits  the  24-gun  ship 
burnt  by  Chauncy  at  York,  although  including  the  frigate  and  cor 
vette  burnt  by  Ross  at  Washington  ;  if  the  former  is  excluded  the 
two  latter  should  be,  which  would  make  the  balance  still  more  in 
favor  of  the  Americans.  He  omits  the  guns  of  the  Gloucester,  be 
cause  they  had  been  taken  out  of  her  and  placed  in  battery  on  the 
shore,  but  he  includes  those  of  the  Adams,  which  had  been  served  in 
precisely  the  same  way.  He  omits  all  reference  to  the  British  14-gun 
schooner  burnt  on  Ontario,  and  to  all  3  and  4~gun  sloops  and  schooners 
captured  there,  although  including  the  corresponding  American 
vessels.  The  reason  that  he  so  much  underestimates  the  tonnage, 
especially  on  the  lakes,  I  have  elsewhere  discussed.  His  tables  of 
the  relative  loss  in  men  are  even  more  erroneous,  exaggerating  that 
of  the  Americans,  and  greatly  underestimating  that  of  the  British  ; 
but  I  have  not  tabulated  this  on  account  of  the  impossibility  of  get 
ting  fair  estimates  of  the  killed  and  wounded  in  the  cutting-out  ex- 


444  NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2. 

enue-cutters  and  gun-boats  can  fairly  be  considered 
to  be  counterbalanced  by  the  capture  or  destruction 
of  the  various  British  Royal  Packets  (all  armed  with 
from  2  to  10  guns),  tenders,  barges,  etc.,  which  would 
be  in  the  aggregate  of  at  least  as  great  tonnage  and 
gun  force,  and  with  more  numerous  crews. 

But  the  comparative  material  loss  gives  no  idea 
of  the  comparative  honor  gained.  The  British  navy, 
numbering  at  the  outset  a  thousand  cruisers,  had 
accomplished  less  than  the  American,  which  num 
bered  but  a  dozen.  Moreover,  most  of  the  loss  suf 
fered  by  the  former  was  in  single  fight,  while  this 
had  been  but  twice  the  case  with  the  Americans, 
who  had  generally  been  overwhelmed  by  numbers. 
The  President  and  Essex  were  both  captured  by 
more  than  double  their  force  simply  because  they 
were  disabled  before  the  fight  began,  otherwise  they 
would  certainly  have  escaped.  With  the  exceptions 
of  the  Chesapeake  and  Argus  (both  of  which  were 
taken  fairly,  because  their  antagonists,  though  of 
only  equal  force,  were  better  fighters),  the  remain 
ing  loss  of  the  Americans  was  due  to  the  small 
cruisers  stumbling  from  time  to  time  across  the  path 
of  some  one  of  the  innumerable  British  heavy  ves 
sels.  Had  Congressional  forethought  been  sufri- 

peditions,  and  the  difficulty  of  enumerating  the  prisoners  taken  in 
descents,  etc.  Roughly,  about  2,700  Americans  and  3,800  British 
were  captured  ;  the  comparative  loss  in  killed  and  wounded  stood 
much  more  in  our  favor. 

I  have  excluded  from  the  British  loss  the  brigs  Detroit  and  Cale 
donia,  and  schooner  Na ncy  (aggregating  10  guns  and  about  500  tons), 
destroyed  on  the  upper  lakes,  because  I  hardly  know  whether  they 
could  be  considered  national  vessels  ;  the  schooner  Highflyer,  of  8 
guns,  40  men,  and  209  tons,  taken  by  Rodgers,  because  she  seems  to 
have  been  merely  a  tender  ;  and  the  Dominica,  15,  of  77  men,  and  270 
tons,  because  her  captor,  the  privateer  Decatur,  though  nominally  an 
American,  was  really  a  French  vessel.  Of  course  both  tables  are 
only  approximately  exact  ;  but  at  any  rate  the  balance  of  damage  and 
loss  was  over  4  to  3  in  our  favor. 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    l8l2.  44$ 

ciently  great  to  have  allowed  a  few  line-of-battle 
ships  to  have  been  in  readiness  some  time  previous 
to  the  war,  results  of  weight  might  have  been  ac 
complished.  But  the  only  activity  ever  exhibited 
by  Congress  in  materially  increasing  the  navy  pre 
vious  to  the  war,  had  been  in  partially  carrying  out 
President  Jefferson's  ideas  of  having  an  enormous 
force  of  very  worthless  gun-boats — a  scheme  whose 
wisdom  was  about  on  a  par  with  some  of  that  states 
man's  political  and  military  theories. 

Of  the  twelve  '  single-ship  actions,  two  (those  of 
the  Argus  and  Chesapeake)  undoubtedly  redounded 
most  to  the  credit  of  the  British,  in  two  (that  of  the 
Wasp  with  the  Reindeer,  and  that  of  the  Enterprise 
with  the  Boxer),  the  honors  were  nearly  even,  and 
in  the  other  eight  the  superiority  of  the  Americans 
was  very  manifest.  In  three  actions  (those  with  the 
Penguin,  Frolic,  and  Shannon]  the  combatants  were 
about  equal  in  strength,  the  Americans  having 
slightly  the  advantage  ;  in  all  the  others  but  two, 
the  victors  combined  superiority  of  force  with  superi 
ority  of  skill.  In  but  two  cases,  those  of  the  Argus 
and  Epervier,  could  any  lack  of  courage  be  imputed 
to  the  vanquished.  The  second  year  alone  showed 
to  the  advantage  of  the  British  ;  the  various  en 
counters  otherwise  were  as  creditable  to  the  Amer 
icans  at  the  end  as  at  the  beginning  of  the  war. 
This  is  worth  attending  to,  because  many  authors 
speak  as  if  the  successes  of  the  Americans  were  con- 

1  Not  counting  the  last  action  of  the  Constitution,  the  President's 
action,  or  the  capture  of  the  Essex,  on  account  of  the  difficulty  of 
fairly  estimating  the  amount  of  credit  due  to  each  side.  In  both  the 
first  actions,  however,  the  American  ships  seem  to  have  been  rather 
more  ably  fought  than  their  antagonists,  and,  taking  into  account 
the  overwhelming  disadvantages  under  which  the  Essex  labored,  her 
defence  displayed  more  desperate  bravery  than  did  that  of  any  other 
ship  during  the  war. 


NAVAL   WAR   OF    1 8 12. 

fined  to  the  first  year.  It  is  true  that  no  frigate 
was  taken  after  the  first  year,  but  this  was  partly 
because  the  strictness  of  the  blockade  kept  the 
American  frigates  more  in  port,  while  the  sloops 
put  out  to  sea  at  pleasure,  and  partly  because  after 
that  year  the  British  i8-pounder  frigates  either 
cruised  in  couples,  or,  when  single,  invariably  re 
fused,  by  order  of  the  Board  of  Admiralty,  an  en 
counter  with  a  24-pounder  ;  and  though  much  of  the 
American  success  was  unquestionably  to  be  attrib 
uted  to  more  men  and  heavier  guns,  yet  much  of  it 
was  not.  The  war  itself  gives  us  two  instances  in 
which  defeat  was  owing  solely,  it  may  be  said,  to 
inferiority  of  force,  courage  and  skill  being  equal. 
The  Wasp  was  far  heavier  than  the  Reindeer,  and, 
there  being  nothing  to  choose  between  them  in  any 
thing  else,  the  damage  done  was  about  proportionate 
to  this  difference.  It  follows,  as  a  matter  of  course, 
that  the  very  much  greater  disproportion  in  loss  in 
the  cases  of  the  Avon,  Epervier,  etc.,  where  the  dis 
proportion  in  force  was  much  less  (they  mounting 
32's  instead  of  24' s,  and  the  victors  being  all  of  the 
same  class),  is  only  to  be  explained  by  the  inferiority 
in  skill  on  the  part  of  the  vanquished.  These  re 
marks  apply  just  as  much  to  the  Argus.  The  Rein 
deer,  with  her  24*3,  would  have  been  almost  exactly 
on  a  par  with  her,  and  yet  would  have  taken  her 
with  even  greater  ease  than  the  Peacock  did  with 
her  32's.  In  other  words,  the  only  effect  of  our 
superiority  in  metal,  men,  and  tonnage  was  to  in 
crease  somewhat  the  disparity  in  loss.  Plad  the 
Congress  and  Constellation,  instead  of  the  United 
States  and  Constitution,  encountered  the  Macedonian 
and  Java,  the  difference  in  execution  would  have 


NAVAL  WAR    OF    l8l2.  447 

been  less  than  it  was,  but  the  result  would  have 
been  unchanged,  and  would  have  been  precisely  such 
as  ensued  when  the  Wasp  met  the  Frolic,  or  the 
Hornet  the  Penguin.  On  the  other  hand,  had  the 
Shannon  met  the  Constitution  there  would  have  been 
a  repetition  of  the  fight  between  the  Wasp  and  Rein 
deer  ;  for  it  is  but  fair  to  remember  that  great  as  is 
the  honor  that  Broke  deserves,  it  is  no  more  than 
that  due  to  Manners. 

The  Republic  of  the  United  States  owed  a  great 
deal  to  the  excellent  make  and  armament  of  its 
ships,  but  it  ow,ed  still  more  to  the  men  who  were 
in  them.  The  massive  timbers  and  heavy  guns  of 
Old  Ironsides  would  have  availed  but  little  had  it 
not  been  for  her  able  commanders  and  crews.  Of 
all  the  excellent  single-ship  captains,  British  or 
American,  produced  by  the  war,  the  palm  should  be 
awarded  to  Hull.1  The  deed  of  no  other  man  (ex 
cepting  Macdonough)  equalled  his  escape  from 
Broke's  five  ships,  or  surpassed  his  half-hour's  con 
flict  with  the  Guerriere.  After  him,  almost  all  the 
American  captains  deserve  high  praise — Decatur, 
Jones,  Blakely,  Biddle,  Bainbridge,  Lawrence,  Bur 
rows,  Allen,  Warrington,  Stewart,  Porter.  It  is  no 
small  glory  to  a  country  to  have  had  such  men  up 
holding  the  honor  of  its  flag.  On  a  par  with  the 
best  of  them  are  Broke,  Manners,  and  also  Byron 
and  Blythe.  It  must  be  but  a  poor-spirited  Ameri 
can  whose  veins  do  not  tingle  with  pride  when  he 
reads  of  th-e  cruises  and  fights  of  the  sea-captains, 
and  their  grim  prowess,  which  kept  the  old  Yankee 
flag  floating  over  the  waters  of  the  Atlantic  for 

1  See  "  Naval  Tactics, "by  Commander  J.  II.  Ward,  and  "  Life  of 
Commodore  Tatnall,"  by  Charles  C.  Jones,  Jr. 


448  NAVAL   WAR    OF    l8l2. 

three  years,  in  the  teeth  of  the  mightiest  naval 
power  the  world  has  ever  seen  ;  but  it  is  equally 
impossible  not  to  admire  Broke's  chivalric  challenge 
and  successful  fight,  or  the  heroic  death  of  the  cap 
tain  of  the  Reindeer. 

Nor  can  the  war  ever  be  fairly  understood  by  any 
one  who  does  not  bear  in  mind  that  the  combatants 
were  men  of  the  same  stock,  who  far  more  nearly 
resembled  each  other  than  either  resembled  any 
other  nation.  I  honestly  believe  that  the  American 
sailor  offered  rather  better  material  for  a  man-of- 
warsman  than  the  British,  because  the  freer  institu 
tions  of  his  country  (as  compared  with  the  Britain 
of  the  drunken  Prince  Regent  and  his  dotard  father 
— a  very  different  land  from  the  present  free  Eng 
land)  and  the  peculiar  exigencies  of  his  life  tended 
to  make  him  more  intelligent  and  self-reliant ;  but 
the  difference,  when  there  was  any,  was  very  small, 
and  disappeared  entirely  when  his  opponents  had 
been  drilled  for  any  length  of  time  by  men  like 
Broke  or  Manners.  The  advantage  consisted  in  the 
fact  that  our  average  commander  was  equal  to  the 
best,  and  higher  than  the  average,  of  the  opposing 
captains ;  and  this  held  good  throughout  the  various 
grades  of  the  officers.  The  American  officers  knew 
they  had  redoubtable  foes  to  contend  with,  and 
made  every  preparation  accordingly.  Owing  their 
rank  to  their  own  exertions,  trained  by  practical  ex 
perience  and  with  large  liberty  of  action,  they  made 
every  effort  to  have  their  crews  in  the  most  perfect 
state  of  skill  and  discipline.  In  Commodore  Tat- 
nall's  biography  (p.  15)  it  is  mentioned  that  the 
blockaded  Constellation  had  her  men  well  trained  at 
the  guns  and  at  target  practice,  though  still  lying  in 


NAVAL   WAR    OF    l8l2.  449 

ihe  river,  so  as  to  be  at  once  able  to  meet  a  foe 
when  she  put  out  to  sea.  The  British  captain,  often 
owing  his  command  to  his  social  standing  or  to 
favoritism,  hampered  by  red  tape,1  and  accustomed 
by  20  years'  almost  uninterrupted  success  to  regard 
the  British  arms  as  invincible,  was  apt  to  laugh  at 
all  manoeuvring,2  and  scorned  to  prepare  too  care 
fully  for  a  fight,  trusting  to  the  old  British  "  pluck 
and  luck"  to  carry  him  through.  So,  gradually  he 
forgot  how  to  manoeuvre  or  to  prepare.  The  Java 
had  been  at  sea  six  weeks  before  she  was  captured, 
yet  during  that  time  the  entire  exercise  of  her  crew 
at  the  guns  had  been  confined  to  the  discharge  of 
six  broadsides  of  blank  cartridges  (James,  vi,  184)  ; 
the  Constitution,  like  the  Java,  had  shipped  an  en 
tirely  new  and  raw  crew  previous  to  her  first  cruise, 
and  was  at  sea  but  five  weeks  before  she  met  the 
Guerriere,  and  yet  her  men  had  been  trained  to  per 
fection.  This  is  a  sufficient  comment  on  the  com 
parative  merits  of  Captain  Hull  and  Captain  Lam 
bert.  The  American  prepared  himself  in  every 
possible  way ;  the  Briton  tried  to  cope  with  courage 
alone  against  courage  united  to  skill.  His  bad 
gunnery  had  not  been  felt  in  contending  with  Euro 
pean  foes3  as  unskilful  as  himself.  Says  Lord  How 
ard  Douglass  (p.  3) :  "  We  entered  with  too  much 
confidence  into  a  war  with  a  marine  much  more  ex 
pert  than  any  of  our  European  enemies 

1  For  instance,  James  mentions  that  they  were  forbidden  to  use 
more  than  so  many  shot  in  practice,  and  that  Capt.  Broke  utterly  dis 
regarded  this  command. 

2  Lord  Howard  Douglass,  "  Naval  Gunnery,"  states  this  in  various 
places. — "  Accustomed  to  contemn  all  manoeuvring." 

3  Lord  Howard  Douglass  ;    he    seems  to  think  that  in  1812  the 
British  had  fallen  off  absolutely,   though  not  relatively  to  their  Euro 
pean  foes. 


450  NAVAL   WAR    OF    1 8 12. 

there  was  inferiority  of  gunnery  as  well  as  of  force," 
etc.  Admiral  Codrington,  commenting  on  the 
Eperviers  loss,  says,  as  before  quoted,  that,  owing 
to  his  being  chosen  purely  for  merit,  the  American 
captain  was  an  overmatch  for  the  British,  unless 
"he  encountered  our  best  officers  on  equal  terms." 
The  best  criticism  on  the  war  is  that  given  by 
Capitaine  Jurien  de  la  Gravie>e.'  After  speaking  of 
of  the  heavier  metal  and  greater  number  of  men  of 
the  American  ships,  he  continues:  "  And  yet  only 
an  enormous  superiority  in  the  precision  and  rapidi 
ty  of  their  fire  can  explain  the  difference  in  the 
losses  sustained  by  the  combatants.  *  *  *  Nor 
was  the  skill  of  their  gunners  the  only  cause  to 
which  the  Americans  owed  their  success.  Their 
ships  were  faster ;  the  crews,  composed  of  chosen 
men,  manoeuvred  with  uniformity  and  precision  ; 
their  captains  had  that  practical  knowledge  which 
is  only  to  be  acquired  by  long  experience  of  the  sea  ; 
and  it  is  not  to  be  wondered  at  that  the  Constitution, 
when  chased  during  three  days  by  a  squadron  of 
five  English  frigates,  succeeded  in  escaping,  by  sur 
passing  them  in  manoeuvring,  and  by  availing  her 
self  of  every  ingenious  resource  and  skilful  expedi 
ent  that  maritime  science  could  suggest.  *  *  * 
To  a  marine  exalted  by  success,  but  rendered  neg 
ligent  by  the  very  habit  of  victory,  the  Congress 
only  opposed  the  best  of  vessels  and  most  for 
midable  of  armaments.  *  *  * " 2 

1  "  Guerres  Mari times,"  li,  p.  269,  272,  274  (Paris,  1847). 

2  The  praise  should  be  given  to  the  individual  captains  and  not  to 
Congress,  however  ;    and   none  of   the  American   ships  had  picked 
crews.      During  the  war  the  Shannon  had  the  only  crew  whicli  could 
with  any  fairness  be  termed   "picked,"   for  her  men  had  been  to 
gether  seven  years,  and  all  of  her    "boys"  must  have  been  well- 
grown  young  men,  much  older  than  the  boys  on  her  antagonii!:. 


i8i2.  451 

It  is  interesting  to  compare  the  results  of  this  in 
ter-Anglian  warfare,  waged  between  the  Insular  and 
the  Continental  English,  with  the  results  of  the  con 
test  that  the  former  v/ere  at  the  same  time  carrying 
on  with  their  Gallo-Roman  neighbors  across  the 
channel.  For  this  purpose  I  shall  rely  on  Troude's 
"Batailles  Navales,"  which  would  certainly  not  give 
the  English  more  than  their  due.  His  account  of 
the  comparative  force  in  each  case  can  be  supple 
mented  by  the  corresponding  one  given  in  James. 
Under  drawn  battles  I  include  all  such  as  were  inde 
cisive,  in  so  far  that  neither  combatant  was  captured  ; 
in  almost  every  case  each  captain  claimed  that  the 
other  ran  away. 

During  the  years  1812  to  1815  inclusive,  there 
were  eight  actions  between  French  and  English 
ships  of  approximately  equal  force.  In  three  of 
these  the  English  were  victorious. 

In  1812  the  Victorious,  74,  captured  the  Rivoli,  74. 

COMPARATIVE   FORCE. 
Broadsides,  Metal,  Ibs. 

Troude.  James. 

Victorious  1,014  1,060 

Rivoli  1,010  1,085 

In  1814  the  Tagus  captured  the  Ceres  and  the 
Hebrus  captured  the  Etoile. 

Broadsides,  Metal,  Ib*. 

Troude.  James. 

Tagus  444  4^7 

Ceres  428  463 

Hebrus  467  467 

jktoile  428  463 


452  NAVAL    WAR    OF    l8l2. 

The  Ceres,  when  she  surrendered,  had  but  one 
man  wounded,  although  she  had  suffered  a  good 
deal  aloft.  The  fight  between  the  74/3  was  murder 
ous  to  an  almost  unexampled  degree,  125  English 
and  400  French  falling.  The  Hebrus  lost  40  and 
the  Etoile  120  men. 

Five  actions  were  "  drawn." 

In  1812  the  Swallow  fought  the  Renard  and  Gar 
land.  The  former  threw  262,  the  latter  290  Ibs.  of 
shot  at  a  broadside. 

In  1815  the  Pilot,  throwing  262  Ibs.,  fought  a  draw 
with  the  Egerie  throwing  260. 

In  1814  two  frigates  of  the  force  of  the  Tagus 
fought  a  draw  with  two  frigates  of  the  force  of 
the  Ceres ;  and  the  Eurotas,  with  24-pounders  failed 
to  capture  the  Chlorinde,  which  had  only  i8-pound- 
ers. 

In  1815  the  Amelia  fought  a  draw  with  the 
Arethuse,  the  ships  throwing  respectively  549  and 
463  Ibs.,  according  to  the  English,  or  572  and  410 
Ibs.,  according  to  the  French  accounts.  In  spite  of 
being  superior  in  force  the  English  ship  lost  141 
men,  and  the  French  but  105.  This  was  a  bloodier 
fight  than  even  that  of  the  Chesapeake  with  the 
Shannon ;  but  the  gunnery  was,  nevertheless,  much 
worse  than  that  shown  by  the  two  combatants  in 
the  famous  duel  off  Boston  harbor,  one  battle  last 
ing  four  hours  and  the  other  15  minutes. 

There  were  a  number  of  other  engagements  where 
the  British  were  successful  but  where  it  is  difficult 
to  compare  the  forces.  Twice  a  74  captured  or  de 
stroyed  two  frigates,  and  a  razee  performed  a  similar 
feat.  An  i8-gun  brig,  the  Weasel,  fought  two  1 6- 
gun  brigs  till  one  of  them  blew  up. 


NAVAL    \VAR    OF    l8l2.  453 

The  loss  of  the  two  navies  at  each  other's  hands 
during  the  four  years  was: — 

English  Ships.  French  Ships. 

i  i6-gun  brig  3  line-of-battle  ships 

i  i2-gun  brig  n  frigates 

i  lo-gun  cutter  2  26-gun  flutes 

2  i6-gun  brigs 
i  lo-gun  brig 
many  gun-boats,  etc. 

Or  one  navy  lost  three  vessels,  mounting  38  guns, 
and  the  other  19  vessels,  mounting  830  guns. 

During  the  same  time  the  English  lost  to  the 
Danes  one  14-gun  brig,  and  destroyed  in  return 
a  frigate  of  46  guns,  a  6-gun  schooner,  a  4-gun  cutter, 
two  galliots  and  several  gun-brigs. 

In  the  above  lists  it  is  to  be  noticed  how  many 
of  the  engagements  were  indecisive,  owing  chiefly  to 
the  poor  gunnery  of  the  combatants.  The  fact  that 
both  the  Eurotas  and  the  Amelia,  though  more 
powerfully  armed  and  manned  than  the  Hebrus,  yet 
failed  to  capture  the  sister  ships  of  the  frigate  taken 
by  the  latter,  shows  that  heavy  metal  and  a  numer 
ous  crew  are  not  the  only  elements  necessary  for 
success;  indeed  the  Eurotas  and  Amelia  were  as 
superior  in  force  to  their  antagonists  as  the  Constitu 
tion  was  to  the  Java. 

But  the  chief  point  to  be  noticed  is  the  over 
whelming  difference  in  the  damage  the  two  navies 
caused  each  other.  This  difference  was,  roughly, 
as  five  to  one  against  the  Danes,  and  as  fifty  to  one 
against  the  French ;  while  it  was  as  four  to  three  in 
favor  of  the  American.  These  figures  give  some 
idea  of  the  effectiveness  of  the  various  navies.  At 


454  NAVAL   WAR  OF    l8l2. 

any  rate  they  show  that  we  had  found  out  what  the 
European  nations  had  for  many  years  in  vain  striven 
to  discover — a  way  to  do  more  damage  than  we  re 
ceived  in  a  naval  contest  with  England. 


CHAPTER  X. 

1815. 

THE  BATTLE  OF  NEW  ORLEANS. 

The  war  on  land  generally  disastrous— British  send  great  expedition  against 
New  Orleans— Jackson  prepares  for  the  defence  of  the  city— Night  attack  on 
the  British  advance  guard — Artillery  duels — Great  battle  of  January  8,  1815 — 
Slaughtering  repulse  of  the  main  attack — Rout  of  the  Americans  on  the  right 
bank  of  the  river— Final  retreat  of  the  British— Observations  on  the  character 
of  the  troops  and  commanders  engaged. 

WHILE  our  navy  had  been  successful,  the  war 
on  land  had  been  for  us  full  of  humiliation. 
The  United  States  then  formed  but  a  loosely  knit 
confederacy,  the  sparse  population  scattered  over  a 
great  expanse  of  land.  Ever  since  the  Federalist 
party  had  gone  out  of  power  in  1800,  the  nation's 
ability  to  maintain  order  at  home  and  enforce  respect 
abroad  had  steadily  dwindled  ;  and  the  twelve  years' 
nerveless  reign  of  the  Doctrinaire  Democracy  had 
left  us  impotent  for  attack  and  almost  as  feeble  for 
defence.  Jefferson,  though  a  man  whose  views  and 
theories  had  a  profound  influence  upon  our  national 
life,  was  perhaps  the  most  incapable  Executive  that 
ever  filled  the  presidential  chair ;  being  almost  purely 
a  visionary,he  was  utterly  unable  to  grapple  with  the 
slightest  actual  danger,  and,  not  even  excepting  his 
successor,  Madison, it  would  be  difficult  to  imagine  a 
man  less  fit  to  guide  the  state  with  honor  and  safety 
through  the  stormy  times  that  marked  the  opening  of 
the  present  century.  Without  the  prudence  to  avoid 

455 


THE  BATTLE  OF  NEW  ORLEANS. 

war  or  the  forethought  to  prepare  for  it,  the  Admin 
istration  drifted  helplessly  into  a  conflict  in  which 
only  the  navy  prepared  by  the  Federalists  twelve 
years  before,  and  weakened  rather  than  strength 
ened  during  the  intervening  time,  saved  us  from 
complete  and  shameful  defeat.  True  to  its  theories, 
the  House  of  Virginia  made  no  preparations,  and 
thought  the  war  could  be  fought  by  "  the  nation  in 
arms "  ;  the  exponents  of  this  particular  idea,  the 
militiamen,  a  partially  armed  mob,  ran  like  sheep 
whenever  brought  into  the  field.  The  regulars  were 
not  much  better.  After  two  years  of  warfare,  Scott 
records  in  his  autobiography  that  there  were  but  two 
books  of  tactics  (one  written  in  French)  in  the  entire 
army  on  the  Niagara  frontier ;  and  officers  and  men 
were  on  such  a  dead  level  of  ignorance  that  he  had 
to  spend  a  month  drilling  all  of  the  former,  divided 
into  squads,  in  the  school  of  the  soldier  and  school 
of  the  company.1  It  is  small  wonder  that  such 
troops  were  utterly  unable  to  meet  the  English. 
Until  near  the  end,  the  generals  were  as  bad  as  the 
armies  they  commanded,  and  the  administration  of 
the  War  Department  continued  to  be  a  triumph  of 
imbecility  to  the  very  last.2  With  the  exception  of 
the  brilliant  and  successful  charge  of  the  Kentucky 
mounted  infantry  at  the  battle  of  the  Thames,  the 
only  bright  spot  in  the  war  in  the  North  was  the 

1  "  Memoirs  of  Lieutenant-General  Scott,"  written  by  himself  (2 
vols. ,  New  York,  1864),  i,  p.  115. 

3  Monroe's  biographer  (see  "  James  Monroe,"  by  Daniel  C.  Gil- 
man,  Boston,  1883,  p.  123)  thinks  he  made  a  good  Secretary  of  War  ; 
I  think  he  was  as  much  a  failure  as  his  predecessors,  and  a  harsher 
criticism  could  not  be  passed  on  him.  Like  the  other  statesmen  of 
his  school,  he  was  mighty  in  word  and  weak  in  action;  bold  to  plan 
but  weak  to  perform.  As  an  instance,  contrast  his  fiery  letters  to 
Jackson  with  the  fact  that  he  never  gave  him  a  particle  of  practical 
help. 


THE   BATTLE   OF   NEW   ORLEANS.  457 

campaign  on  the  Niagara  frontier  during  the  sum 
mer  of  1814  ;  and  even  here,  the  chief  battle,  that  of 
Lundy's  Lane,  though  reflecting  as  much  honor  on 
the  Americans  as  on  the  British,  was  for  the  former 
a  defeat,  and  not  a  victory,  as  most  of  our  writers 
seem  to  suppose. 

But  the  war  had  a  dual  aspect.  It  was  partly  a  con 
test  between  the  two  branches  of  the  English  race, 
and  partly  a  last  attempt  on  the  part  of  the  Indian 
tribes  to  ^  check  the  advance  of  the  most  rapidly 
growing  one  of  these  same  two  branches  ;  and  this 
last  portion  of  the  struggle,  though  attracting  com 
paratively  little  attention,  was  really  much  the  most 
far-reaching  in  its  effect  upon  history.  The  triumph 
of  the  British  would  have  distinctly  meant  the  giv 
ing  a  new  lease  of  life  to  the  Indian  nationalities, 
the  hemming  in,  for  a  time,  of  the  United  States,  and 
the  stoppage,  perhaps  for  many  years,  of  the  march 
of  English  civilization  across  the  continent.  The 
English  of  Britain  were  doing  all  they  could  to  put 
off  the  day  when  their  race  would  reach  to  a  world 
wide  supremacy. 

There  was  much  fighting  along  our  Western  fron 
tier  with  various  Indian  tribes  ;  and  it  was  especially 
fierce  in  the  campaign  that  a  backwoods  general  of 
Tennessee,  named  Andrew  Jackson,  carried  on 
against  the  powerful  confederacy  of  the  Creeks,  a 
nation  that  was  thrust  in  like  a  wedge  between  the 
United  States  proper  and  their  dependency,  the 
newly  acquired  French  province  of  Louisiana.  After 
several  slaughtering  fights,  the  most  noted  being- 
the  battle  of  the  Horse-shoe  Bend,  the  power  of  the 
Creeks  was  broken  for  ever  ;  and  afterward,  as  there 
was  much  question  over  the  proper  boundaries  of 


458      THE  BATTLE  OF  NEW  ORLEANS. 

what  was  then  the  Latin  land  of  Florida,  Jackson 
marched  south,  attacked  the  Spaniards  and  drove 
them  from  Pensacola.  Meanwhile  the  British,  hav 
ing  made  a  successful  and  ravaging  summer  cam 
paign  through  Virginia  and  Maryland,  situated  in 
the  heart  of  the  country,  organized  the  most  for 
midable  expedition  of  the  war  for  a  winter  campaign 
against  the  outlying  land  of  Louisiana,  whose  de 
fender  Jackson  of  necessity  became.  Thus,  in  the 
course  of  events,  it  came  about  that  Louisiana  was 
the  theatre  on  which  the  final  and  most  dramatic 
act  of  the  war  was  played. 

Amid  the  gloomy,  semi-tropical  swamps  that 
cover  the  quaking  delta  thrust  out  into  the  blue 
waters  of  the  Mexican  Gulf  by  the  strong  torrent  of 
the  mighty  Mississippi,  stood  the  fair,  French  city 
of  New  Orleans.  Its  lot  had  been  strange  and 
varied.  Won  and  lost,  once  and  again,  in  conflict 
with  the  subjects  of  the  Catholic  king,  there  was  a 
strong  Spanish  tinge  in  the  French  blood  that 
coursed  so  freely  through  the  veins  of  its  citizens  ; 
joined  by  purchase  to  the  great  Federal  Republic, 
it  yet  shared  no  feeling  with  the  latter,  save  that  of 
hatred  to  the  common  foe.  And  now  an  hour  of 
sore  need  had  come  upon  the  city;  for  against  it 
came  the  red  English,  lords  of  fight  by  sea  and  land. 
A  great  fleet  of  war  vessels — ships  of  the  line,  frig 
ates  and  sloops — under  Admiral  Cochrane,  was  on 
the  way  to  New  Orleans,  convoying  a  still  larg 
er  fleet  of  troop  ships,  with  aboard  them  some 
ten  thousand  fighting  men,  chiefly  the  fierce  and 
hardy  veterans  of  the  Peninsular  War,1  who  had 

1 "  The  British  infantry  embarked  at  Bordeaux,  some  for  America, 
some  for  England."  ('"'  History  of  the  War  in  the  Peninsula,"  by 


THE   BATTLE   OF  NEW   ORLEANS.  459 

been  trained  for  seven  years  in  the  stern  school  of 
the  Iron  Duke,  and  who  were  now  led  by  one  of 
the  bravest  and  ablest  of  all  Wellington's  brave  and 
able  lieutenants,  Sir  Edward  Packenham. 

On  the  8th  of  December  1814,  the  foremost 
vessels,  with  among  their  number  the  great  two- 
decker  Tonnant,  carrying  the  admiral's  flag,  an 
chored  off  the  Chandeleur  Islands1 ;  and  as  the 
current  of  the  Mississippi  was  too  strong  to  be  easily 
breasted,  the  English  leaders  determined  to  bring 
their  men  by  boats  through  the  bayous,  and  disem 
bark  them  on  the  bank  of  the  river  ten  miles  below 
the  wealthy  city  at  whose  capture  they  were  aiming. 
There  was  but  one  thing  to  prevent  the  success  of 
this  plan,  and  that  was  the  presence  in  the  bayous  of 
five  American  gun-boats,  manned  by  a  hundred  and 
eighty  men,  and  commanded  by  Lieutenant  Comdg. 
Catesby  Jones,  a  very  shrewd  fighter.  So  against 
him  was  sent  Captain  Nicholas  Lockyer  with  forty- 
five  barges,  and  nearly  a  thousand  sailors  and 
marines,  men  who  had  grown  gray  during  a  quarter 
of  a  century  of  unbroken  ocean  warfare.  The  gun 
boats  were  moored  in  a  head-and-stern  line,  near  the 
Rigolets,  with  their  boarding-nettings  triced  up,  and 
every  thing  ready  to  do  desperate  battle ;  but  the 
British  rowed  up  with  strong,  swift  strokes,  through 
a  murderous  fire  of  great  guns  and  musketry  ;  the 
vessels  were  grappled  amid  fierce  resistance  ;  the 
boarding-nettings  were  slashed  through  and  cut 
away  ;  with  furious  fighting  the  decks  were  gained  ; 
and  one  by  one,  at  push  of  pike  and  cutlass  stroke, 

Major-General  Sir  W.  F.  P.  Napier,  K.C.B.  New  edition.  New 
York,  1882,  vol.  v,  p.  200.)  For  discussion  of  numbers,  see  farther 
on. 

'See,  ante,  p.  343. 


460      THE  BATTLE  OF  NEW  ORLEANS. 

the  gun-boats  were  carried  in  spite  of  their  stubborn 
defenders;  but  not  till  more  than  one  barge  had 
been  sunk,  while  the  assailants  had  lost  a  hundred 
men,  and  the  assailed  about  half  as  many. 

There  was  now  nothing  to  hinder  the  landing  of 
the  troops  ;  and  as  the  scattered  transports  arrived, 
the  soldiers  were  disembarked,  and  ferried  through 
the  sluggish  water  of  the  bayous  on  small  flat-bot 
tomed  craft ;  and  finally,  Dec.  23d,  the  advance 
guard,  two  thousand  strong,  under  General  Keane, 
emerged  at  the  mouth  of  the  canal  Villere,  and 
camped  on  the  bank  of  the  river,1  but  nine  miles 
below  New  Orleans,  which  now  seemed  a  certain 
prize,  almost  within  their  grasp. 

Yet,  although  a  mighty  and  cruel  foe  was  at  their 
very  gates,  nothing  save  fierce  defiance  reigned  in 
the  fiery  Creole  hearts  of  the  Crescent  City.  For  a 
master-spirit  was  in  their  midst.  Andrew  Jackson, 
having  utterly  broken  and  destroyed  the  most  pow 
erful  Indian  confederacy  that  had  ever  menaced  the 
Southwest,  and  having  driven  the  haughty  Spaniards 
from  Pensacola,  was  now  bending  all  the  energies  of 
his  rugged  intellect  and  indomitable  will  to  the  one 
object  of  defending  New  Orleans.  No  man  could 
have  been  better  fitted  for  the  task.  He  had  heredi 
tary  wrongs  to  avenge  on  the  British,  and  he  hated 
them  with  an  implacable  fury  that  was  absolutely 
devoid  of  fear.  Born  and  brought  up  among  the 
lawless  characters  of  the  frontier,  and  knowing  well 
how  to  deal  with  them,  he  was  able  to  establish  and 
preserve  the  strictest  martial  law  in  the  city  without 
in  the  least  quelling  the  spirit  of  the  citizens.  To 
a  restless  and  untiring  energy  he  united  sleepless 

'Letter  of  Major-General  John  Keane,  Dec.  26,  1814. 


THE    BATTLE   OF   NEW    ORLEANb.  461 

vigilance  and  genuine  military  genius.  Prompt  to 
attack  whenever  the  chance  offered  itself,  seizing 
with  ready  grasp  the  slightest  vantage-ground,  and 
never  giving  up  a  foot  of  earth  that  he  could  keep, 
he  yet  had  the  patience  to  play  a  defensive  game 
when  it  so  suited  him,  and  with  consummate  skill 
he  always  followed  out  the  scheme  of  warfare  that 
was  best  adapted  to  his  wild  soldiery.  In  after- 
years  he  did  to  his  country  some  good  and  more  evil  ; 
but  no  true  American  can  think  of  his  deeds  at  New 
Orleans  without  profound  and  unmixed  thankful 
ness. 

He  had  not  reached  the  city  till  December  2d, 
and  had  therefore  but  three  weeks  in  which  to  pre 
pare  the  defence.  The  Federal  Government, 
throughout  the  campaign,  did  absolutely  nothing 
for  the  defence  of  Louisiana;  neither  provisions  nor 
munitions  of  war  of  any  sort  were  sent  to  it,  nor 
were  any  measures  taken  for  its  aid.1  The  inhabi 
tants  had  been  in  a  state  of  extreme  despondency  up 
to  the  time  that  Jackson  arrived,  for  they  had  no 
one  to  direct  them,  and  they  were  weakened  by  fac 
tional  divisions  2;  but  after  his  coming  there  was 
nothing  but  the  utmost  enthusiasm  displayed,  so 
great  was  the  confidence  he  inspired,  and  so  firm  his 
hand  in  keeping  down  all  opposition.  Under  his 
direction  earthworks  were  thrown  up  to  defend  all 
the  important  positions,  the  whole  population  work 
ing  night  and  day  at  them  ;  all  the  available  artillery 
was  mounted,  and  every  ounce  of  war  material  that 
the  city  contained  was  seized  ;  martial  law  was  pro- 

*"  Historical  Memoir  of  the  War  in  West  Florida  and  Louisiana" 
(by  Major  A.  Lacarriex  Latour,  translated  from  the  French  by  H.  P. 
Nugent,  Philadelphia,  1816),  p.  66. 

2  Latour,  53. 


462      THE  BATTLE  OF  NEW  ORLEANS. 

claimed  ;  and  all  general  business  was  suspended, 
every  thing  being  rendered  subordinate  to  the  one 
grand  object  of  defence. 

Jackson's  forces  were  small.  There  were  two  war 
vessels  in  the  river.  One  was  the  little  schooner 
Carolina,  manned  by  regular  seamen,  largely  New 
Englanders.  The  other  was  the  newly  built  ship 
Louisiana,  a  powerful  corvette  ;  she  had  of  course 
no  regular  crew,  and  her  officers  were  straining  every 
nerve  to  get  one  from  the  varied  ranks  of  the  mari 
time  population  of  New  Orleans  ;  long-limbed  and 
hard-visaged  Yankees,  Portuguese  and  Norwegian 
seamen  from  foreign  merchantmen,  dark-skinned 
Spaniards  from  the  West  Indies,  swarthy  French 
men  who  had  served  under  the  bold  privateersman 
Lafitte, — all  alike  were  taken,  and  all  alike  by  unflag 
ging  exertions  were  got  into  shape  for  battle.1 
There  were  two  regiments  of  regulars,  numbering 
together  about  eight  hundred  men,  raw  and  not  very 
well  disciplined,  but  who  were  now  drilled  with  great 
care  and  regularity.  In  addition  to  this  Jackson 
raised  somewhat  over  a  thousand  militiamen 
among  the  citizens.  There  were  some  Ameri 
cans  among  them,  but  they  were  mostly  French 
Creoles,2  and  one  band  had  in  its  formation  some 
thing  that  was  curiously  pathetic.  It  was  composed 
of  free  men  of  color,3  who  had  gathered  to  de 
fend  the  land  which  kept  the  men  of  their  race  in 
slavery ;  who  were  to  shed  their  blood  for  the  Flag 
that  symbolized  to  their  kind  not  freedom  but 
bondage ;  who  were  to  die  bravely  as  freemen, 
only  that  their  brethren  might  live  on  ignobly  as 

1  Letter  of  Commodore  Daniel  G.  Patterson,  Dec.  20,  1814. 
aLatour,  no.  3  Latour,  in. 


THE   BATTLE   OF   NEW   ORLEANS.  463 

slaves.     Surely  there  was  never  a  stranger  instance 
than  this  of  the  irony  of  fate. 

But  if  Jackson  had  been  forced  to  rely  only  on 
these  troops  New  Orleans  could  not  have  been  saved. 
His  chief  hope  lay  in  the  volunteers  of  Tennessee, 
who,  under  their  Generals,  Coffee  and  Carroll,  were 
pushing  their  toilsome  and  weary  way  toward  the 
city.  Every  effort  was  made  to  hurry  their  march 
through  the  almost  impassable  roads,  and  at  last,  in 
the  very  nick  of  time,  on  the  23d  of  December, 
the  day  on  which  the  British  troops  reached  the 
river  bank,  the  vanguard  of  the  Tennesseeans  marched 
into  New  Orleans.  Gaunt  of  form  and  grim  of  face  ; 
with  their  powder-horns  slung  over  their  buckskin 
shirts  ;  carrying  their  long  rifles  on  their  shoulders 
and  their  heavy  hunting-knives  stuck  in  their  belts; 
with  their  coon-skin  caps  and  fringed  leggings;  thus 
came  the  grizzly  warriors  of  the  backwoods,  the 
heroes  of  the  Horse-Shoe  Bend,  the  victors  over 
Spaniard  and  Indian,  eager  to  pit  themselves 
against  the  trained  regulars  of  Britain,  and  to  throw 
down  the  guage  of  battle  to  the  world-renowned 
infantry  of  the  island  English.  Accustomed  to  the 
most  lawless  freedom,  and  to  giving  free  rein  to  the 
full  violence  of  their  passions,  defiant  of  discipline 
and  impatient  of  the  slightest  restraint,  caring  little 
for  God  and  nothing  for  man,  they  were  soldiers 
who,  under  an  ordinary  commander,  would  have 
been  fully  as  dangerous  to  themselves  and  their 
leaders  as  to  their  foes.  But  Andrew  Jackson  was 
of  all  men  the  one  best  fitted  to  manage  such 
troops.  Even  their  fierce  natures  quailed  before 
the  ungovernable  fury  of  a  spirit  greater  than  their 
own  ;  and  their  sullen,  stubborn  wills  were  bent  at 


464      THE  BATTLE  OF  NEW  ORLEANS. 

last  before  his  unyielding  temper  and  iron  hand. 
Moreover,  he  was  one  of  themselves  ;  he  typified 
their  passions  and  prejudices,  their  faults  and  their 
virtues  ;  he  shared  their  hardships  as  if  he  had  been 
a  common  private,  and,  in  turn,  he  always  made 
them  partakers  of  his  triumphs.  They  admired 
his  personal  prowess  with  pistol  and  rifle,  his  un 
swerving  loyalty  to  his  friends,  and  the  relentless 
and  unceasing  war  that  he  waged  alike  on  the  foes 
of  himself  and  his  country.  As  a  result  they  loved 
and  feared  him  as  few  generals  have  ever  been  loved 
or  feared  ;  they  obeyed  him  unhesitatingly  ;  they 
followed  his  lead  without  flinching  or  murmuring, 
and  they  ever  made  good  on  the  field  of  battle  the 
promise  their  courage  held  out  to  his  judgment. 

It  was  noon  of  December  23d  when  General 
Keane,  with  nineteen  hundred  men,  halted  and 
pitched  his  camp  on  the  east  bank  of  the  Missis 
sippi  ;  and  in  the  evening  enough  additional  troops 
arrived  to  swell  his  force  to  over  twenty-three  hun 
dred  soldiers.1  Keane's  encampment  was  in  a  long 
plain,  rather  thinly  covered  with  fields  and  farm 
houses,  about  a  mile  in  breadth,  and  bounded  on 
one  side  by  the  river,  on  the  other  by  gloomy  and 
impenetrable  cypress  swamps ;  and  there  was  no 

1  James  ("Military  Occurrences  of  the  Late  War,"  by  Wm. 
James,  London,  1818),  vol.  ii,  p.  362,  says  2,050  rank  and  file  ;  the 
English  returns,  as  already  explained,  unlike  the  French  and  Amer 
ican,  never  included  officers,  sergeants,  drummers,  artillerymen,  or 
engineers,  but  only  "  sabres  and  bayonets  "  (Napier,  iv,  252).  At 
the  end  of  Napier's  fourth  volume  is  given  the  "morning  state  "  of 
Wellington's  forces  on  April  10,  1814.  This  shows  56,030  rank  and 
file  and  7,431  officers,  sergeants,  and  trumpeters  or  drummers  ;  or, 
in  other  words,  to  get  at  the  real  British  force  in  an  action,  even 
supposing  there  are  no  artillerymen  or  engineers  present,  13 
per  cent,  must  be  added  to  the  given  number,  which  includes 
only  rank  and  file.  Making  this  addition,  Keane  had  2, 310  men. 
The  Americans  greatly  overestimated  his  force,  Latour  making  it 
4,980. 


THE    BATTLE    OF   NEW    ORLEANS.  465 

obstacle  interposed  between  the  British  camp  and 
the  city  it  menaced. 

At  two  in  the  afternoon  word  was  brought  to 
Jackson  that  the  foe  had  reached  the  river  bank,  and 
without  a  moment's  delay  the  old  backwoods  fighter 
prepared  to  strike  a  rough  first  blow.  At  once, 
and  as  if  by  magic,  the  city  started  from  her 
state  of  rest  into  one  of  fierce  excitement  and 
eager  preparation.  The  alarm-guns  were  fired  ;  in 
every  quarter  the  war-drums  were  beaten  ;  while, 
amid  the  din  and  clamor,  all  the  regulars  and 
marines,  the  best  of  the  Creole  militia,  and  the 
vanguard  of  the  Tennesseeans,  under  Coffee,— 
forming  a  total  of  a  little  more  than  two  thousand 
men,1 — were  assembled  in  great  haste ;  and  the  gray 
of  the  winter  twilight  saw  them,  with  Old  Hickory  at 
their  head,  marching  steadily  along  the  river  bank 
toward  the  camp  of  their  foes.  Patterson,  mean 
while,  in  the  schooner  Carolina,  dropped  down  with 
the  current  to  try  the  effect  of  a  flank  attack. 

Meanwhile  the  British  had  spent  the  afternoon  in 
leisurely  arranging  their  camp,  in  posting  the  pickets, 
and  in  foraging  among  the  farm-houses.  There  was 
no  fear  of  attack,  and  as  the  day  ended  huge  camp- 
fires  were  lit,  at  which  the  hungry  soldiers  cooked 
their  suppers  undisturbed.  One  division  of  the 
troops  had  bivouacked  on  the  high  levee  that  kept 
the  waters  from  flooding  the  land  near  by  ;  and 
about  half  past  seven  in  the  evening  their  attention 
was  drawn  to  a  large  schooner  which  had  dropped 
noiselessly  down,  in  the  gathering  dusk,  and  had 

General  Jackson,  in  his  official  letter,  says  only  1,500;  but  Latour, 
in  a  detailed  statement,  makes  it  2,024  \  exclusive  cf  107  Mississippi 
dragoons  who  inarched  with  the  column,  but  being  on  horseback 
had  to  stay  behind,  and  took  no  part  in  the  action.  Keane  thought 
he  had  been  attacked  by  5,000  men. 


466      THE  BATTLE  OF  NEW  ORLEANS. 

come  to  anchor  a  short  distance  off  shore,  the  force 
of  the  stream  swinging  her  broadside  to  the  camp.1 
The  soldiers  crowded  down  to  the  water's  edge, 
and,  as  the  schooner  returned  no  answer  to  their 
hails,  a  couple  of  musket-shots  were  fired  at  her. 
As  if  in  answer  to  this  challenge,  the  men  on  shore 
heard  plainly  the  harsh  voice  of  her  commander, 
as  he  sung  out,  "  Now  then,  give  it  to  them  for 
the  honor  of  America  "  ;  and  at  once  a  storm  of 
grape  hurtled  into  their  ranks.  Wild  confusion 
followed.  The  only  field-pieces  with  Keane  were 
two  light  3-pounders,  not  able  to  cope  with  the 
Carolina  s  artillery  ;  the  rocket  guns  we^e  brought 
up,  but  were  speedily  silenced  ;  musketry  proved 
quite  as  ineffectual ;  and  in  a  very  few  minutes 
the  troops  were  driven  helter-skelter  off  the  levee, 
and  were  forced  to  shelter  themselves  behind  it, 
not  without  having  suffered  severe  loss.2  The 
night  was  now  as  black  as  pitch  ;  the  embers  of  the 
deserted  camp-fires,  beaten  about  and  scattered  by 
the  schooner's  shot,  burned  with  a  dull  red  glow  ; 
and  at  short  intervals  the  darkness  was  momentarily 
lit  up  by  the  flashes  of  the  Carolina  s  guns. 
Crouched  behind  the  levee,  the  British  soldiers  lay 
motionless,  listening  in  painful  silence  to  the  patter 
ing  of  the  grape  among  the  huts,  and  to  the  moans 
and  shrieks  of  the  wounded  who  lay  beside  them. 
Things  continued  thus  till  toward  nine  o'clock, 
when  a  straggling  fire  from  the  pickets  gave  warn- 

1 1  have  taken  my  account  of  the  night  action  chiefly  from  the 
work  of  an  English  soldier  who  took  part  in  it  ;  Ensign  (afterward 
Chaplain-General)  H.  R.  Gleig's  "Narrative  of  the  Campaigns  of 
the  British  Army  at  Washington,  Baltimore,  and  New  Orleans." 
(New  edition,  Philadelphia,  1821,  pp.  286-300.) 

2  General  Keane,  in  his  letter,  writes  that  the  British  suffered  but 
a  single  casualty;  Gleig,  who  was  present,  says  (p.  288)  :  "The 
deadly  shower  of  grape  swept  down  numbers  in  the  camp." 


THE  BATTLE  OF  NEW  ORLEANS.      467 

ing  of  the  approach  of  a  more  formidable  foe.  The 
American  land-forces  had  reached  the  outer  lines  of 
the  British  camp,  and  the  increasing  din  of  the 
musketry,  with  ringing  through  it  the  whip-like  crack 
of  the  Tennesseean  rifles,  called  out  the  whole  Brit 
ish  army  to  the  shock  of  a  desperate  and  uncertain 
strife.  The  young  moon  had  by  this  time  struggled 
through  the  clouds,  and  cast  on  the  battle-field  a 
dim,  unearthly  light  that  but  partly  relieved  the  in 
tense  darkness.  All  order  was  speedily  lost.  Each 
officer,  American  or  British,  as  fast  as  he  could 
gather  a  few  soldiers  round  him,  attacked  the  nearest 
group  of  foes  ;  the  smoke  and  gloom  would  soon 
end  the  struggle,  when,  if  unhurt,  he  would  rally 
what  men  he  could  and  plunge  once  more  into  the 
fight.  The  battle  soon  assumed  the  character  of  a 
multitude  of  individual  combats,  dying  out  almost 
as  soon  as  they  began,  because  of  the  difficulty  of 
telling  friend  from  foe,  and  beginning  with  ever- 
increasing  fury  as  soon  as  they  had  ended.  The 
clatter  of  the  firearms,  the  clashing  of  steel,  the  ral 
lying  cries  and  loud  commands  of  the  officers,  the 
defiant  shouts  of  the  men,  joined  to  the  yells  and 
groans  of  those  who  fell,  all  combined  to  produce  so 
terrible  a  noise  and  tumult  that  it  maddened  the 
coolest  brains.  From  one  side  or  the  other  bands  of 
men  would  penetrate  into  the  heart  of  the  enemy's 
lines,  and  would  there  be  captured,  or  would  cut 
their  way  out  with  the  prisoners  they  had  taken. 
There  was  never  a  fairer  field  for  the  fiercest  personal 
prowess,  for  in  the  darkness  the  firearms  were  of 
little  service,  and  the  fighting  was  hand  to  hand. 
Many  a  sword,  till  then  but  a  glittering  toy,  was  that 
night  crusted  with  blood.  The  British  soldiers  and 


468  THE   BATTLE   OF   NEW   ORLEANS. 

the  American  regulars  made  fierce  play  with  their 
bayonets,  and  the  Tennesseeans,  with  their  long 
hunting-knives.  Man  to  man,  in  grimmest  hate,  they 
fought  and  died,  some  by  bullet  and  some  by  bayo 
net-thrust  or  stroke  of  sword.  More  than  one  in  his 
death  agony  slew  the  foe  at  whose  hand  he  himself 
had  received  the  mortal  wound  ;  and  their  bodies 
stiffened  as  they  lay,  locked  in  the  death  grip. 
Again  the  clouds  came  over  the  moon  ;  a  thick  fog 
crept  up  from  the  river,  wrapping  from  sight  the 
ghastly  havoc  of  the  battle-field  ;  and  long  before 
midnight  the  fighting  stopped  perforce,  for  the  fog 
and  the  smoke  and  the  gloom  were  such  that  no  one 
could  see  a  yard  away.  By  degrees  each  side  drew 
off.1  In  sullen  silence  Jackson  marched  his  men  up 
the  river,  while  the  wearied  British  returned  to  their 
camp.  The  former  had  lost  over  two  hundred,2 
the  latter  nearly  three  hundred 3  men  ;  for  the 
darkness  and  confusion  that  added  to  the  horror, 
lessened  the  slaughter  of  the  battle. 

Jackson  drew  back  about  three  miles,  where  he 
halted  and  threw  up  a  long  line  of  breastworks, 
reaching  from  the  river  to  the  morass  ;  he  left  a 
body  of  mounted  riflemen  to  watch  the  British.  All 
the  English  troops  reached  the  field  on  the  day  after 
the  fight ;  but  the  rough  handling  that  the  foremost 

*Keane  writes:  "The  enemy  thought  it  prudent  to  retire,  and 
did  not  again  dare  to  advance.  It  was  now  12  o'clock,  and  the  firing 
ceased  on  both  sides  "  ;  and  Jackson  :  "  We  should  have  succeeded 
.  .  .  in  capturing  the  enemy,  had  not  a  thick  fog,  which  arose 
about  (?)  o'clock,  occasioned  some  confusion.  ...  I  contented  my 
self  with  lying  on  the  field  that  night."  Jackson  certainly  failed  to 
capture  the  British  ;  but  equally  certainly  damaged  them  so  as  to 
arrest  their  march  till  he  was  in  condition  to  meet  and  check  them. 

8  24  killed,  115  wounded,  74  missing. 

'46  killed,  167  wounded,  64  missing.  I  take  the  official  return 
for  each  side,  as  authority  for  the  respective  force  and  loss. 


THE   BATTLE   OF  NEW   ORLEANS.  469 

had  received  made  them  cautious  about  advancing. 
Moreover,  the  left  division  was  kept  behind  the  levee 
all  day  by  the  Carolina,  which  opened  upon  them 
whenever  they  tried  to  get  away ;  nor  was  it  till  dark 
that  they  made  their  escape  out  of  range  of  her  can 
non.  Christmas-day  opened  drearily  enough  for  the 
invaders.  Although  they  were  well  inland,  the 
schooner,  by  greatly  elevating  her  guns,  could  some 
times  reach  them,  and  she  annoyed  them  all  through 
the  day ';  and  as  the  Americans  had  cut  the  levee  in 
their  front,  it  at  one  time  seemed  likely  that  they 
would  be  drowned  out.  However,  matters  now  took 
a  turn  for  the  better.  The  river  was  so  low  that  the 
cutting  of  the  levee  instead  of  flooding  the  plain2 
merely  filled  the  shrunken  bayous,  and  rendered  it 
easy  for  the  British  to  bring  up  their  heavy  guns  ; 
and  on  the  same  day  their  trusted  leader,  Sir  Edward 
Packenham,  arrived  to  take  command  in  person, 
and  his  presence  gave  new  life  to  the  whole  army. 
A  battery  was  thrown  up  during  the  two  succeeding 
nights  on  the  brink  of  the  river  opposite  to  where 
the  Carolina  lay;  and  at  dawn  a  heavy  cannonade 
of  red-hot  shot  and  shell  was  opened  upon  her  from 
eleven  guns  and  a  mortar.8  She  responded  briskly, 
but  very  soon  caught  fire  and  blew  up,  to  the  venge 
ful  joy  of  the  troops  whose  bane  she  had  been 
for  the  past  few  days.  Her  destruction  removed 
the  last  obstacle  to  the  immediate  advance  of  the 

1 "  While  sitting  at  table,  a  loud  shriek  was  heard.  ...  A  shot 
had  taken  effect  on  the  body  of  an  unfortunate  soldier  .  .  .  who 
was  fairly  cut  in  two  at  the  lower  portion  of  the  belly  ! "  (Gleig, 
p.  306.) 

3Latour,  113. 

3  Gleig,  307.  The  Americans  thought  the  battery  consisted  of  5 
18-  and  12-pounders  ;  Gleig  says  9  field-pieces  (9-  and  6-pounders), 
2  howitzers,  and  a  mortar. 


4/0      THE  BATTLE  OF  NEW  ORLEANS. 

army  ;  but  that  night  her  place  was  partly  taken  by 
the  mounted  riflemen,  who  rode  down  to  the  British 
lines,  shot  the  sentries,  engaged  the  out-posts,  and 
kept  the  whole  camp  in  a  constant  state  of  alarm.1 
In  the  morning  Sir  Edward  Packenham  put  his 
army  in  motion,  and  marched  on  New  Orleans. 
When  he  had  gone  nearly  three  miles  he  sud 
denly,  and  to  his  great  surprise,  stumbled  on  the 
American  army.  Jackson's  men  had  worked  like 
beavers,  and  his  breastworks  were  already  defended 
by  over  three  thousand  fighting  men,2  and  by 
half  a  dozen  guns,  and  moreover  were  flanked 
by  the  corvette  Louisiana,  anchored  in  the  stream. 
No  sooner  had  the  heads  of  the  British  columns 
appeared  than  they  were  driven  back  by  the  fire 
of  the  American  batteries ;  the  field-pieces,  mor 
tars,  and  rocket  guns  were  then  brought  up,  and 
a  sharp  artillery  duel  took  place.  The  motley  crew 
of  the  Louisiana  handled  their  long  ship  guns  with 
particular  effect  ;  the  British  rockets  proved  of  but 
little  service 3;  and  after  a  stiff  fight,  in  which  they 
had  two  field-pieces  and  a  light  mortar  dismounted,4 
the  British  artillerymen  fell  back  on  the  infantry. 
Then  Packenham  drew  off  his  whole  army  out  of 
cannon  shot,  and  pitched  his  camp  facing  the  in 
trenched  lines  of  the  Americans.  For  the  next  three 

aGleig,  310. 

'3,282  men  in  all,  according  to  the  Adjutant-General's  return  for 
Dec.  28,  1814. 

'Latour,  121. 

4  Gleig,  314.  The  official  returns  show  a  loss  of  18  Americans 
and  58  British,  the  latter  suffering  much  less  than  Jackson  supposed. 
Lossing,  in  his  "  Field  Book  of  the  War  of  1812,"  not  only  greatly 
overestimates  the  British  loss,  but  speaks  as  if  this  was  a  serious  at 
tack,  which  it  was  not.  Packenham's  army,  while  marching,  unex 
pectedly  came  upon  the  American  intrenchment,  and  recoiled  at 
once,  after  seeing  that  his  field-pieces  were  unable  to  contend  with 
'hr  American  artillery. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  NEW  ORLEAAS.      471 

days  the  British  battalions  lay  quietly  in  front  of 
their  foe,  like  wolves  who  have  brought  to  bay  a 
gray  boar,  and  crouch  just  out  of  reach  of  his  tusks, 
waiting  a  chance  to  close  in. 

Packenham,  having  once  tried  the  strength  of 
Jackson's  position,  made  up  his  mind  to  breach  his 
works  and  silence  his  guns  with  a  regular  battering 
train.  Heavy  cannon  were  brought  up  from  the 
ships,  and  a  battery  was  established  on  the  bank  to 
keep  in  check  the  Louisiana.  Then,  on  the  night  of 
the  last  day  of  the  year,  strong  parties  of  workmen 
were  sent  forward,  who,  shielded  by  the  darkness, 
speedily  threw  up  stout  earthworks,  and  mounted 
therein  fourteen  heavy  guns,1  to  face  the  thirteen  a 
mounted  in  Jackson's  lines,  which  were  but  three 
hundred  yards  distant. 

New  Year's  day  dawned  very  misty.  As  soon  as 
the  haze  cleared  off  the  British  artillerymen  opened 
with  a  perfect  hail  of  balls,  accompanied  by  a  cloud 
of  rockets  and  mortar  shells.  The  Americans  were 
taken  by  surprise,  but  promptly  returned  the  fire, 
with  equal  fury  and  greater  skill.  Their  guns  were 
admirably  handled  ;  some  by  the  cool  New  England 
seamen  lately  forming  the  crew  of  the  Carolina, 
others  by  the  fierce  Creole  privateersmen  of  Lafitte, 
and  still  others  by  the  trained  artillerymen  of  the 

1  10  long  i8s  and  4  24-pound  carronades  (James,  ii,  368). 
Gleig  says  (p.  318),  "6  batteries  mounting  30  pieces  of  heavy 
cannon."  This  must  include  the  "  brigade  of  field-pieces  "  of  which 
James  speaks.  9  of  these,  9-  and  6-pounders,  and  2  howitzers, 
had  been  used  in  the  attack  on  the  Carolina  ;  and  there  were  also  2 
field-mortars  and  2  3-pounders  present  ;  and  there  must  have  been 
i  other  field-piece  with  the  army,  to  make  up  the  30  of  which  Gleig 
speaks. 

aviz. :  I  long  32,  3  long  245,  I  long  18,  3  long  I2s,  3  long  6s,  a 
6-inch  howitzer,  and  a  small  carronade  (Latour,  147)  ;  and  on  the 
same  day  Patterson  had  in  his  water-battery  i  long  24  and  2  long 
I2s  (see  his  letter  of  Jan.  2d),  making  a  total  of  16  American  guns. 


472      THE  BATTLE  OF  NEW  ORLEANS. 

regular  army.  They  were  all  old  hands,  who  in 
their  time  had  done  their  fair  share  of  fighting,  and 
were  not  to  be  flurried  by  any  attack,  however  un 
expected.  The  British  cannoneers  plied  their  guns 
like  fiends,  and  fast  and  thick  fell  their  shot ;  more 
slowly  but  with  surer  aim,  their  opponents  answered 
them.1  The  cotton  bales  used  in  the  American 
embrasures  caught  fire,  and  blew  up  two  powder 
caissons  ;  while  the  sugar  hogsheads  of  which  the 
British  batteries  were  partly  composed  were  speedily 
shattered  and  splintered  in  all  directions.  Though 
the  British  champions  fought  with  unflagging  cour 
age  and  untiring  energy,  and  though  they  had  long 
been  versed  in  war,  yet  they  seemed  to  lack  the 
judgment  to  see  and  correct  their  faults,  and  most 
of  their  shot  went  too  high.2  On  the  other  hand, 
the  old  sea-dogs  and  trained  regulars  who  held  the 
field  against  them,  not  only  fought  their  guns  well 
and  skilfully  from  the  beginning,  but  all  through 

1  The  British  historian,  Alison,  says  ("  History  of  Europe,"  by  Sir 
Archibald  Alison,  gth  edition,  Edinburgh  and  London,  1852,  vol. 
xii ,  p.  141) :  "  It  was  soon  found  that  the  enemy's  guns  were  so  superior 
in  weight  and  number,  that  nothing  was  to  be  expected  from  that  species 
of  attack."  As  shown  above, at  this  time  Jackson  had  on  both  sides  of  the 
river  1 6  guns  ;  the  British,  according  to  both  James  and  Gleig,  between 
20  and  30.  Jackson's  long  guns  were  I  32,  4  245,  i  18,  5  123,  and  3 
6s,  throwing  in  all  224  pounds  ;  Packenham  had  10  long  i8s,  2  long 
35,  and  from  6  to  10  long  cjs  and  6s,  thus  throwing  between  228  and 
258  pounds  of  shot  ;  while  Jackson  had  but  I  howitzer  and  I  car- 
ronade  to  oppose  4  carronades,  2  howitzers,  2  mortars,  and  a  dozen 
rocket  guns  ;  so  in  both  number  and  weight  of  guns  the  British  were 
greatly  superior. 

a  In  strong  contrast  to  Alison,  Admiral  Codrington,  an  eye 
witness,  states  the  true  reason  of  the  British  failure  :  ("  Memoir  of 
Admiral  Sir  Edward  Codrington,"  by  Lady  Bourchier,  London, 
1873,  vol.  i,  p.  334.)  "On  the  1st  we  had  our  batteries  ready,  by 
severe  labor,  in  situation,  from  which  the  artillery  people  were,  as  a 
matter  of  course,  to  destroy  and  silence  the  opposing  batteries,  and 
give  opportunity  for  a  well-arranged  storm.  But,  instead,  not  a  gun 
of  the  enemy  appeared  to  suffer,  and  our  own  firing  too  high  was  not 
discovered  till "  too  late.  "  Such  a  failure  in  this  boasted  arm  was 
not  to  be  expected,  and  I  think  it  a  blot  on  the  artillery  escutcheon." 


THE    BATTLE    OF   NEW   ORLEANS.  473 

the  action  kept  coolly  correcting  their  faults  and 
making  more  sure  their  aim.  Still,  the  fight  was  stiff 
and  well  contested.  Two  of  the  American  guns 
were  disabled  and  34  of  their  men  were  killed  or 
wounded.  But  one  by  one  the  British  cannon  were 
silenced  or  dismounted,  and  by  noon  their  gunners 
had  all  been  driven  away,  with  the  loss  of  78  of  their 
number. 

The  Louisiana  herself  took  no  part  in  this  action. 
Patterson  had  previously  landed  some  of  her  guns 
on  the  opposite  bank  of  the  river,  placing  them  in  a 
small  redoubt.  To  match  these  the  British  also 
threw  up  some  works  and  placed  in  them  heavy 
guns,  and  all  through  New  Year's  day  a  brisk  can 
nonade  was  kept  up  across  the  river  between  the 
two  water-batteries,  but  with  very  little  damage  to 
either  side. 

For  a  week  after  this  failure  the  army  of  the 
invaders  lay  motionless  facing  the  Americans.  In 
the  morning  and  evening  the  defiant,  rolling  chal 
lenge  of  the  English  drums  came  throbbing  up 
through  the  gloomy  cypress  swamps  to  where  the 
grim  riflemen  of  Tennessee  were  lying  behind  their 
log  breastworks,  and  both  day  and  night  the  still 
ness  was  at  short  intervals  broken  by  the  sullen 
boom  of  the  great  guns  which,  under  Jackson's 
orders,  kept  up  a  never-ending  fire  on  the  leaguering 
camp  of  his  foes.1  Nor  could  the  wearied  British 
even  sleep  undisturbed  ;  all  through  the  hours  of 
darkness  the  outposts  were  engaged  in  a  most 
harassing  bush  warfare  by  the  backwoodsmen,  who 
shot  the  sentries,  drove  in  the  pickets,  and  allowed 
none  of  those  who  were  on  guard  a  moment's 
safety  or  freedom  from  alarm.2 

JGleig,  322.  9Gleig,  323. 


474  THE   BATTLE   OF  NEW   ORLEANS. 

But  Packenham  was  all  the  while  steadily  pre 
paring  for  his  last  and  greatest  stroke.  He  had 
determined  to  make  an  assault  in  force  as  soon 
as  the  expected  reinforcements  came  up  ;  nor,  in 
the  light  of  his  past  experience  in  conflict  with 
foes  of  far  greater  military  repute  than  those 
now  before  him,  was  this  a  rash  resolve.  He  had 
seen  the  greatest  of  Napoleon's  marshals,  each  in 
turn,  defeated  once  and  again,  and  driven  in  head 
long  flight  over  the  Pyrenees  by  the  Duke  of 
Wellington  ;  now  he  had  under  him  the  flower  of 
the  troops  who  had  won  those  victories  ;  was  it 
to  be  supposed  for  a  moment  that  such  soldiers l 
who,  in  a  dozen  battles,  had  conquered  the  armies 
and  captured  the  forts  of  the  mighty  French  em 
peror,  would  shrink  at  last  from  a  mud  wall  guarded 
by  rough  backwoodsmen  ?  That  there  would  be 
loss  of  life  in  such  an  assault  was  certain  ;  but  was 
loss  of  life  to  daunt  men  who  had  seen  the  horrible 
slaughter  through  which  the  stormers  moved  on  to 
victory  at  Ciudad  Rodrigo,  Badajos,  and  San  Sebas- 
ian  ?  At  the  battle  of  Toulouse  an  English  army, 
of  which  Packenham's  troops  then  formed  part,  had 
driven  Soult  from  a  stronger  position  than  was  now 
to  be  assailed,  though  he  held  it  with  a  veteran 
infantry.  Of  a  surety,  the  dashing  general  who  had 
delivered  the  decisive  blow  on  the  stricken  field  of 

1  Speaking  of  Soult's  overthrow  a  few  months  previous  to  this 
battle,  Napier  says  (v,  209) :  "  He  was  opposed  to  one  of  the 
greatest  generals  of  the  world,  at  the  head  of  unconquerable  troops. 
For  what  Alexander's  Macedonians  were  at  Arbela,  Hannibal's 
Africans  at  Cannae,  Caesar's  Romans  at  Pharsalia,  Napoleon's  Guards 
at  Austerlitz — such  were  Wellington's  British  soldiers  at  this  period. 
.  .  .  Six  years  of  uninterrupted  success  had  engrafted  on 
their  natural  strength  and  fierceness  a  confidence  that  made  them 
invincible." 


THE  BATTLE   OF   NEW   ORLEANS.  4/5 

Salamanca,1  who  had  taken  part  in  the  rout  of  the 
ablest  generals  and  steadiest  soldiers  of  Continental 
Europe,  was  not  the  man  to  flinch  from  a  motley 
array  of  volunteers,  militia,  and  raw  regulars,  led  by 
a  grizzled  old  bush-fighter,  whose  name  had  never 
been  heard  of  outside  of  his  own  swamps,  and  there 
only  as  the  savage  destroyer  of  some  scarcely  more 
savage  Indian  tribes. 

Moreover,  Packenham  was  planning  a  flank  at 
tack.  Under  his  orders  a  canal  was  being  dug 
from  the  head  of  the  bayou  up  which  the 
British  had  come,  across  the  plain  to  the  Mis 
sissippi.  This  was  to  permit  the  passage  of  a 
number  of  ships'  boats,  on  which  one  division  was 
to  be  ferried  to  the  opposite  bank  of  the  river, 
where  it  was  to  move  up,  and,  by  capturing  the 
breastworks  and  water-battery  on  the  west  side, 
flank  Jackson's  main  position  on  the  east  side.2 
When  this  canal  was  nearly  finished  the  expected 

1  It  was  about  5  o'clock  when  Packenham  fell  upon  Thomieres. 
.  .  .  From  the  chief  to  the  lowest  soldier,  all  [of  the  French] 
felt  that  they  were  lost,  and  in  an  instant  Packenham,  the  most  frank 
and  gallant  of  men,  commenced  the  battle.  The  British  columns 
formed  lines  as  they  marched,  and  the  French  gunners,  standing  up 
manfully  for  the  honor  of  their  country,  sent  showers  of  grape  into 
the  advancing  masses,  while  a  crowd  of  light  troops  poured  in  a  fire 
of  musketry,  under  cover  of  which  the  main  body  endeavored  to  dis 
play  a  front.  But,  bearing  onwards  through  the  skirmishers  with 
the  might  of  a  giant,  Packenham  broke  the  half-formed  lines  into 
fragments,  and  sent  the  whole  in  confusion  upon  the  advancing  sup 
ports.  .  .  .  Packenham,  bearing  onwards  with  conquering  vio 
lence,  .  .  .  formed  one  formidable  line  two  miles  in  advance  of 
where  Packenham  had  first  attacked  ;  and  that  impetuous  officer, 
with  unmitigated  strength,  still  pressed  forward,  spreading  terror 
and  disorder  on  the  enemy's  left."  (Napier,  iv,  57,  58,  59.) 

2"  A  particular  feature  in  the  assault  was  our  cutting  a  canal  into 
the  Mississippi.  ...  to  convey  a  force  to  the  right  bank,  which 
.  .  .  might  surprise  the  enemy's  batteries  on  that  side.  I  do  not 
know  how  far  this  measure  was  relied  on  by  the  general,  but,  as  he 
ordered  and  made  his  assault  at  daylight,  I  imagine  he  did  not  place 
much  dependence  upon  it."  (Codrington,  i,  335.) 


476  THE    BATTLE   OF   NE\V    ORLEANS. 

reinforcements,  two  thousand  strong,  under  General 
Lambert,  arrived,  and  by  the  evening  of  the  /th  all 
was  ready  for  the  attack,  which  was  to  be  made  at 
daybreak  on  the  following  morning.  Packenham 
had  under  him  nearly  10,000 1  fighting  men  ;  1,500 
of  these,  under  Colonel  Thornton  were  to  cross 
the  river  and  make  the  attack  on  the  west  bank. 
Packenham  himself  was  to  superintend  the  main  as 
sault,  on  the  east  bank,  which  was  to  be  made  by  the 
British  right  under  General  Gibbs,  while  the  left 
moved  forward  under  General  Keane,  and  General 
Lambert  commanded  the  reserve.2  Jackson's3  po- 

1  James  (ii,    373)  says    the     British   "rank    and    file"   amounted 
to     8,153     men,    including     1,200     seamen    and    marines.       The 
only   other  place  where  he  speaks  of  the  latter  is  in  recounting  the 
attack  on  the  right  bank,   when  he  says   "about  200"  were   with 
Thornton,  while  both  the  admirals,  Cochrane  and  Codrington,  make 
the  number   300 ;    so    he    probably    underestimates    their    number 
throughout,  and  at  least  300  can  be  added,  making  1,500  sailors  and 
marines,   and  a    total   of    8,453.     This  number  is  corroborated  by 
Major  McDougal,  the  officer  wno  received  Sir  Edward's  body  in  his 
arms  when  he  was  killed  ;  he  says  (as  quoted  in  the  "Memoirs  of  British 
Generals  Distinguished  During  the  Peninsular  War,  "by  John  William 
Cole,  London,  1856,  vol.  ii,  p.  364)  that  after  the  battle  and  the  loss 
of  2,036  men,  "we  had  still  an  effective  force  of  6,400,"  making  a 
total  before  the  attack  of  8,436  rank  and  file.     Calling  it  8,450,  and 
adding  (see  ante,   note   10)  13.3  per  cent,  for  the  officers,  sergeants, 
and  trumpeters,  we  get  about  9, 600  men. 

2  Letter    of  Major-General  John   Lambert  to  Earl  Bathurst,  Jan. 
10,  1815. 

s  4,698  on  the  east  bank,  according  to  the  official  report  of  Adju 
tant-General  Robert   Butler,  for  the  morning  of  January  8th.     The 
details  are  as  follow  : 

At  batteries    ....  .  .          154 

Command   of     Col.    Ross    (671     regulars   and  742 

Louisiana  militia)  .....       1413 

Command   of  General   Carroll   (Tennesseeans,  and 

somewhat  under  500  Kentuckians)  .  .       1562 

General  Coffee's  command  (Tennesseeans,  and  about 

250  Louisiana  militia)         .  .  813 

Major  Hind's  dragoons          ....         230 

Col.  Slaughter's  command     .  .  .  .526 

Total,         4,698 
These  figures  tally  almost  exactly  with  those  given  by  Major  La- 


THE    BATTLE   OF   NEW    ORLEANS.  4/7 

sition  was  held  by  a  total  of  5>5°°  men.1  Having 
kept  a  constant  watch  on  the  British,  Jackson  had 
rightly  concluded  that  they  would  make  the  main  at 
tack  on  the  east  bank,  and  had,  accordingly,  kept  the 
bulk  of  his  force  on  that  side.  His  works  consisted 
simply  of  a  mud  breastwork,  with  a  ditch  in  front 
of  it,  which  stretched  in  a  straight  line  from  the 
river  on  his  right  across  the  plain,  and  some  dis 
tance  into  the  morass  that  sheltered  his  left.  There 
was  a  small,  unfinished  redoubt  in  front  of  the 
breastworks  on  the  river  bank.  Thirteen  pieces  of 
artillery  were  mounted  on  the  works.2  On  the  right 

tour,  except  that  he  omits  all  reference  to  Col.  Slaughter's  command, 
thus  reducing  the  number  to  about  4,100.  Nor  can  I  anywhere  find 
any  allusion  to  Slaughter's  command  as  taking  part  in  the  battle  ;  and 
it  is  possible  that  these  troops  were  the  500  Kentuckians  ordered 
across  the  river  by  Jackson  ;  in  which  case  his  whole  force  but 
slightly  exceeded  5,000  men. 

On  the  west  bank  there  were  546  Louisiana  militia — 260  of  the 
First  regiment,  176  of  the  Second,  and  no  of  the  Sixth.  Jackson 
had  ordered  500  Kentucky  troops  to  be  sent  to  reinforce  them  ;  only 
400  started,  of  whom  but  1 80  had  arms.  Seventy  more  received 
arms  from  the  Naval  Arsenal  ;  and  thus  a  total  of  250  armed  men 
were  added  to  the  546  already  on  the  west  bank. 

1  Two  thousand  Kentucky  militia  had  arrived,  but  in  wretched 
plight  ;  only  500  had  arms,  though  pieces  were  found  for  about  250 
more  ;  and  thus  Jackson's  army  received  an  addition  of  750  very 
badly  disciplined  soldiers. 

"  Hardly  one  third  of  the  Kentucky  troops,  so  long  expected,  are 
armed,  and  the  arms  they  have  are  not  fit  for  use."  (Letter  of  Gen. 
Jackson  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  Jan.  3d.) 

a  Almost  all  British  writers  underestimate  their  own  force  and 
enormously  magnify  that  of  the  Americans.  Alison,  for  example, 
quadruples  Jackson's  relative  strength,  writing:  "About  6,000  com 
batants  were  on  the  British  side  ;  a  slender  force  to  attack  double 
their  number,  intrenched  to  the  teeth  in  works  bristling  with  bayo 
nets  and  loaded  with  heavy  artillery."  Instead  of  double,  he  should 
have  said  half  ;  the  bayonets  only  "  bristled"  metaphorically,  as  less 
than  a  quarter  of  the  Americans  were  armed  with  them  ;  and  the 
British  breaching  batteries  had  a  heavier  "load"  of  artillery 
than  did  the  American  lines.  Gleig  says  that  "  to  come  nearer  the 
truth"  he  "will  choose  a  middle  course,  and  suppose  their  whole 
force  to  be  about  25,000  men,"  (p.  325).  Gleig,  by  the  way,  in 
speaking  of  the  battle  itself,  mentions  one  most  startling  evolution 
of  the  Americans,  namely,  that  "  without  so  much  as  lifting  their 


4/8      THE  BATTLE  OF  NEW  ORLEANS. 

was  posted  the  Seventh  regular  infantry, 430  strong; 
then  came  740  Louisiana  militia  (both  French  Creoles 
and  men  of  color,  and  comprising  30  New  Orleans 
riflemen,  who  were  Americans),  and  240  regulars  of 
the  Forty-fourth  regiment  ;  while  the  rest  of  the 
line  was  formed  by  nearly  500  Kentuckians  and  over 
i, 600  Tennesseeans,  under  Carroll  and  Coffee,  with 
250  Creole  militia  in  the  morass  on  the  extreme  left, 
to  guard  the  head  of  a  bayou.  In  the  rear  were  230 
dragoons,  chiefly  from  Mississippi,  and  some  other 
troops  in  reserve  ;  making  in  all  4,700  men  on  the 
east  bank.  The  works  on  the  west  bank  were  farther 
down  stream,  and  were  very  much  weaker.  Commo 
dore  Patterson  had  thrown  up  a  water-battery  of 
nine  guns,  three  long  24*3  and  six  long  I2's,  pointing 
across  the  river,  and  intended  to  take  in  flank  any 
foe  attacking  Jackson.  This  battery  was  protected 
by  some  strong  earthworks,  mounting  three  field- 
pieces,  which  were  thrown  up  just  below  it,  and 
stretched  from  the  river  about  200  yards  into  the 
plain.  The  line  of  defence  was  extended  by  a  ditch 
for  about  a  quarter  of  a  mile  farther,  when  it  ended, 
and  from  there  to  the  morass,  half  a  mile  distant, 
there  were  no  defensive  works  at  all.  General  Mor 
gan,  a  very  poor  militia  officer,1  was  in  command, 

faces  above  the  ramparts,  they  swung  their  firelocks  by  one  arm  over 
the  wall  and  discharged  them  "  at  the  British.  If  any  one  will  try  to 
perform  this  feat,  with  a  long,  heavy  rifle  held  in  one  hand,  and  with 
his  head  hici  behind  a  wall,  so  as  not  to  see  the  object  aimed  at,  he 
will  get  a  good  idea  of  the  likelihood  of  any  man  in  his  senses  at 
tempting  it. 

1  He  committed  every  possible  fault,  except  showing  lack  of  cour 
age.  He  placed  his  works  at  a  very  broad  instead  of  at  a  narrow 
part  of  the  plain,  against  the  advice  of  Latour,  who  had  Jackson's  ap 
proval  (Latour,  167).  He  continued  his  earthworks  but  a  very 
short  distance  inland,  making  them  exceedingly  strong  in  front,  and 
absolutely  defenceless  on  account  of  their  flanks  being  unprotected. 
He  did  not  mount  the  lighter  guns  of  the  water-battery  on  his  lines, 


THE   BATTLE   OF   NEW    ORLEANS.  479 

with  a  force  of  550  Louisiana  militia,  some  of  them 
poorly  armed  ;  and  on  the  night  before  the  engage 
ment  he  was  reinforced  by  250  Kentuckians,  poorly 
armed,  undisciplined,  and  worn  out  with  fatigue.1 

All  through  the  night  of  the  /th  a  strange, 
murmurous  clangor  arose  from  the  British  camp, 
and  was  borne  on  the  moist  air  to  the  lines  of  their 
slumbering  foes.  The  blows  of  pickaxe  and  spade 
as  the  ground  was  thrown  up  into  batteries  by 
gangs  of  workmen,  the  rumble  of  the  artillery  as  it 
was  placed  in  position,  the  measured  tread  of  the 
battalions  as  they  shifted  their  places  or  marched  off 
under  Thornton, — all  these  and  the  thousand  other 
sounds  of  warlike  preparation  were  softened  and 
blended  by  the  distance  into  one  continuous  hum 
ming  murmur,  which  struck  on  the  ears  of  the 
American  sentries  with  ominous  foreboding  for  the 
morrow.  By  midnight  Jackson  had  risen  and  was 
getting  every  thing  in  readiness  to  hurl  back  the  blow 
that  he  rightly  judged  was  soon  to  fall  on  his  front. 
Before  the  dawn  broke  his  soldiery  was  all  on  the 
alert.  The  bronzed  and  brawny  seamen  were 
grouped  in  clusters  around  the  great  guns.  The 
Creole  soldiers  came  of  a  race  whose  habit  it  has 
ever  been  to  take  all  phases  of  life  joyously;  but 
that  morning  their  gayety  was  tempered  by  a  dark 
undercurrent  of  fierce  anxiety.  They  had  more  at 
stake  than  any  other  men  on  the  field.  They  were 
fighting  for  their  homes  ;  they  were  fighting  for 

as  he  ought  to  have  done.  Having  a  force  of  800  men,  too  weak 
anyhow,  he  promptly  divided  it  ;  and,  finally,  in  the  fight  itself,  he 
stationed  a  small  number  of  absolutely  raw  troops  in  a  thin  line  on 
the  open,  with  their  flank  in  air  ;  while  a  much  larger  number  of  older 
troops  were  kept  to  defend  a  much  shorter  line,  behind  a  strong 
breastwork,  with  their  flanks  covered. 
1  Latour,  170. 


480      THE  BATTLE  OF  NEW  ORLEANS. 

their  wives  and  their  daughters.  They  well  knew 
that  the  men  they  were  to  face  were  very  brave  in 
battle  and  very  cruel  in  victory ';  they  well  knew 
the  fell  destruction  and  nameless  woe  that  awaited 
their  city  should  the  English  take  it  at  the  sword's 
point.  They  feared  not  for  themselves  ;  but  in  the 
hearts  of.  the  bravest  and  most  careless  there  lurked 
a  dull  terror  of  what  that  day  might  bring  upon 
those  they  loved.2  The  Tennesseeans  were  troubled 

1  To  prove  this,  it  is  only  needful  to  quote  from  the  words  of  the 
Duke  of   Wellington   himself  ;  referring,  it  must  be  remembered,   to 
their   conduct   in  a  friendly,   not  a  hostile,  country.     "  It  is  impossi 
ble  to  describe  to  you  the  irregularities   and   outrages  committed  by 
the  troops.     They  are  never  out  of  sight  of  their  officers,  I  might  al 
most  say,    out  of  sight   of   the  commanding  officers  of   the  regiments 
that  outrages  are  not  committed.      .     .     .       There  is  not  an  outrage 
of  any  description  which   has   not  been  committed  on  a  people  who 
have    uniformly  received    them  as   friends."     "  I  really  believe  that 
more  plunder  and   outrages  have  been  committed  by  this  army  than 
by  any  other  that   ever  was  in  the  field."     "A  detachment  seldom 
marches    .    .    .    that  a  murder,  or  a  highway  robbery,  or  some  act  of 
outrage  is  not  committed  by  the  British  soldiers  composing  it.   They 
have    killed   eight   people   since    the  army    returned    to    Portugal." 
"  They  really  forget  every  thing    when  plunder  or  wine  is   within 
reach." 

2  That  these  fears  were  just  can  be  seen  by  the  following  quota- 
tations,  from  the  works  of  a  British  officer,  General  Napier,  who  was 
an  eye-witness  of  what  he   describes.     It  must  be   remembered  that 
Ciudad  Rodrigo,  Badajos,  and  San  Sebastian  were  friendly  towns, 
only  the  garrisons  being  hostile.      "  Now  commenced  that  wild  and 
desperate  wickedness  which  tarnished  the  lustre  of  the  soldiers'  hero 
ism.     All,  indeed,  were  not  alike,  for  hundreds  risked  and  many  lost 
their  lives  in  striving  to  stop  the  violence  ;  but  the  madness  generally 
prevailed,  and  as  the  worst  men  were  leaders  here,  all  the  dreadful  pas 
sions  of  human  nature  were  displayed.     Shameless  rapacity,  brutal 
intemperance,   savage  lust,  cruelty  and  murder,  shrieks  and  piteous 
lamentations,  groans,  shouts,  imprecations,  the  hissing  of  fires  burst 
ing  from  the  houses,  the  crashing  of  doors  and  windows,  the  reports  of 
muskets  used  in  violence,  resounded  for  two  days  and  nights  in  the 
streets  of  Badajos.      On  the  third,  when  the  city  was  sacked,  when 
the  soldiers  were  exhausted  by  their  own   excesses,  the  tumult  rather 
subsided  than  was  quelled."      (Vol.   iii,  377.)     And  again:   "This 
storm  seemed  to  be  a  signal  from  hell  for  the  perpetration  of   villainy 
which    would    have    shamed    the    most     ferocious     barbarians     of 
antiquity.        At  Rodrigo  intoxication    and   plunder   had     b?en  the 
principal    object  ;     at   Badajos  lust   and    murder    were    jol.-ed     to 
rapine  and  drunkenness  ;  but  at  San   Sebastian   the  airest,  the   most 


THE    BATTLE   OF   NEW   ORLEANS.  481 

by  no  such  misgivings.  In  saturnine,  confident 
silence  they  lolled  behind  their  mud  walls,  or,  lean 
ing  on  their  long  rifles,  peered  out  into  the  gray  fog 
with  savage,  reckless  eyes.  So,  hour  after  hour,  the 
two  armies  stood  facing  each  other  in  the  darkness, 
waiting  for  the  light  of  day. 

At  last  the  sun  rose,  and  as  its  beams  struggled 
through  the  morning  mist  they  glinted  on  the  sharp 
steel  bayonets  of  the  English,  where  their  scarlet 
ranks  were  drawn  up  in  battle  array,  but  four  hun 
dred  yards  from  the  American  breastworks.  There 
stood  the  matchless  infantry  of  the  island  king,  in 
the  pride  of  their  strength  and  the  splendor  of  their 
martial  glory ;  and  as  the  haze  cleared  away  they 
moved  forward,  in  stern  silence,  broken  only  by  the 
angry,  snarling  notes  of  the  brazen  bugles.  At  once 
the  American  artillery  leaped  into  furious  life;  and, 

revolting  cruelty  was  added  to  the  catalogue  of  crimes — one  atrocity, 
of  which  a  girl  of  seventeen  was  the  victim,  staggers  the  mind  by  its 
enormous,  incredible,  indescribable  barbarity  ...  a  Portu 
guese  adjutant,  who  endeavored  to  prevent  some  wickedness,  was  put 
to  death  in  the  market-place,  not  with  sudden  violence  from  a  single 
ruffian,  but  deliberately,  by  a  number  of  English  soldiers  .... 
and  the  disorder  continued  until  the  flames,  following  the  steps  of  the 
plunderer,  put  an  end  to  his  ferocity  by  destroying  the  whole  town." 
Packenham  himself  would  have  certainly  done  all  in  his  power  to  pre 
vent  excesses,  and  has  been  foully  slandered  by  many  early 
American  writers.  Alluding  to  these,  Napier  remarks,  somewhat 
caustically:  "Pre-eminently  distinguished  for  detestation  of  inhu 
manity  and  outrage,  he  has  been,  with  astounding  falsehood,  repre 
sented  as  instigating  his  troops  to  the  most  infamous  excesses  ;  but 
from  a  people  holding  millions  of  their  fellow-beings  in  the  most  hor 
rible  slavery,  while  they  prate  and  vaunt  of  liberty  until  all  men 
turn  in  loathing  from  the  sickening  folly,  what  can  be  expected  ? 
(Vol.  v,  p.  31.)  Napier  possessed  to  a  very  eminent  degree  the  virt 
ue  of  being  plain-spoken.  Elsewhere  (iii,  450),  after  giving  a  most 
admirably  fair  and  just  account  of  the  origin  of  the  Anglo-American 
war,  he  alludes,  with  a  good  deal  of  justice,  to  the  Americans  of  1812, 
as  "a  people  who  (notwithstanding  the  curse  of  black  slavery  which 
clings  to  them,  adding  the  most  horrible  ferocity  to  the  peculiar  base 
ness  of  their  mercantile  spirit,  and  rendering  their  republican  vanity 
ridiculous)  do,  in  their  general  government,  uphold  civil  institutions 
which  have  startled  the  crazy  despotisms  of  Europe.' 


482      THE  BATTLE  OF  NEW  ORLEANS. 

ready  and  quick,  the  more  numerous  cannon  of  the 
invaders  responded  from  their  hot,  feverish  lips. 
Unshaken  amid  the  tumult  of  that  iron  storm  the 
heavy  red  column  moved  steadily  on  toward  the  left 
of  the  American  line,  where  the  Tennesseeans  were 
standing  in  motionless,  grim  expectancy.  Three 
fourths  of  the  open  space  was  crossed,  and  the  eager 
soldiers  broke  into  a  run.  Then  a  fire  of  hell  smote 
the  British  column.  From  the  breastwork  in  front 
of  them  the  white  smoke  curled  thick  into  the  air, 
as  rank  after  rank  the  wild  marksmen  of  the  back 
woods  rose  and  fired,  aiming  low  and  sure.  As 
stubble  is  withered  by  flame,  so  withered  the  British 
column  under  that  deadly  fire;  and,  aghast  at  the 
slaughter,  the  reeling  files  staggered  and  gave  back. 
Packenham,  fit  captain  for  his  valorous  host,  rode  to 
the  front,  and  the  troops,  rallying  round  him, 
sprang  forward  with  ringing  cheers.  But  once  again 
the  pealing  rifle-blast  beat  in  their  faces ;  and  the 
life  of  their  dauntless  leader  went  out  before  its 
scorching  and  fiery  breath.  With  him  fell  the 
other  general  who  was  with  the  column,  and  all  of 
the  men  who  were  leading  it  on  ;  and,  as  a  last  re 
source,  Keane  brought  up  his  stalwart  Highlanders; 
but  in  vain  the  stubborn  mountaineers  rushed  on, 
only  to  die  as  their  comrades  had  died  before  them, 
with  unconquerable  courage,  facing  the  foe,  to  the 
last.  Keane  himself  was  struck  down ;  and  the 
shattered  wrecks  of  the  British  column,  quailing 
before  certain  destruction,  turned  and  sought  refuge 
beyond  reach  of  the  leaden  death  that  had  over 
whelmed  their  comrades.  Nor  did  it  fare  better 
with  the  weaker  force  that  was  to  assail  the  right  of 
the  American  line.  This  was  led  by  the  dashing 


THE    BATTLE   OF   NEW    ORLEANS.  483 

Colonel  Rennie,  who,  when  the  confusion  caused  by 
the  main  attack  was  at  its  height,  rushed  forward 
with  impetuous  bravery  along  the  river  bank.  With 
such  headlong  fury  did  he  make  the  assault,  that  the 
rush  of  his  troops  took  the  outlying  redoubt,  whose 
defenders,  regulars  and  artillerymen,  fought  to  the 
last  with  their  bayonets  and  clubbed  muskets,  and 
were  butchered  to  a  man.  Without  delay  Rennie 
flung  his  men  at  the  breastworks  behind,  and,  gal 
lantly  leading  them,  sword  in  hand,  he,  and  all  around 
him,  fell,  riddled  through  and  through  by  the  balls 
of  the  riflemen.  Brave  though  they  were,  the  Brit 
ish  soldiers  could  not  stand  against  the  singing, 
leaden  hail,  for  if  they  stood  it  was  but  to  die.  So 
in  rout  and  wild  dismay  they  fled  back  along  the 
river  bank,  to  the  main  army.  For  some  time 
afterward  the  British  artillery  kept  up  its  fire,  but 
ivas  gradually  silenced  ;  the  repulse  was  entire  and 
complete  along  the  whole  line ;  nor  did  the  cheer 
ing  news  of  success  brought  from  the  west  bank 
give  any  hope  to  the  British  commanders,  stunned 
by  their  crushing  overthrow.1 

Meanwhile  Colonel  Thornton's  attack  on  the  op 
posite  side  had  been  successful,  but  had  been  de- 

1  According  to  their  official  returns  the  British  loss  was  2,036  ;  the 
American  accounts,  of  course,  make  it  much  greater.  Latour  is  the 
only  trustworthy  American  contemporary  historian  of  this  war,  and 
even  he  at  times  absurdly  exaggerates  the  British  force  and  loss. 
Most  of  the  other  American  "  histories  "  of  that  period  were  the  most 
preposterously  bombastic  works  that  ever  saw  print.  But  as  regards 
this  battle,  none  of  them  are  as  bad  as  even  such  British  historians  as 
Alison  ;  the  exact  reverse  being  the  case  in  many  other  battles,  notably 
Lake  Erie.  The  devices  each  author  adopts  to  lessen  the  seeming 
force  of  his  side  are  generally  of  much  the  same  character.  For  in 
stance,  Latour  says  that  800  of  Jackson's  men  were  employed  on 
works  at  the  rear,  on  guard  duty,  etc.,  and  deducts  them  ;  James,  for 
precisely  similar  reasons,  deducts  853  men  :  by  such  means  one  re 
duces  Jackson's  total  force  to  4,000,  and  the  other  gives  Packenham 
but  7,300.  Only  2,000  Americans  were  actually  engaged  on  the  east 
banks. 


484  THE   BATTLE   OF   NEW   ORLEANS. 

layed  beyond  the  originally  intended  hour.  The  sides 
of  the  canal  by  which  the  boats  were  to  be  brought 
through  to  the  Mississippi  caved  in,  and  choked  the 
passage,1  so  that  only  enough  got  through  to  take 
over  a  half  of  Thornton's  force.  With  these,  seven 
hundred  in  number, a  he  crossed,  but  as  he  did  not 
allow  for  the  current,  it  carried  him  down  about  two 
miles  below  the  proper  landing-place.  Meanwhile 
General  Morgan,  having  under  him  eight  hundred 
militia  3  whom  it  was  of  the  utmost  importance  to 
have  kept  together,  promptly  divided  them  and  sent 
three  hundred  of  the  rawest  and  most  poorly  armed 
down  to  meet  the  enemy  in  the  open.  The  inevi 
table  result  was  their  immediate  rout  and  disper 
sion  ;  about  one  hundred  got  back  to  Morgan's  lines. 
He  then  had  six  hundred  men,  all  militia,  to  oppose 
to  seven  hundred  regulars.  So  he  stationed  the  four 
hundred  best  disciplined  men  to  defend  the  two 
hundred  yards  of  strong  breastworks,  mounting  three 
guns,  which  covered  his  left ;  while  the  two  hun 
dred  worst  disciplined  were  placed  to  guard  six 
hundred  yards  of  open  ground  on  his  right, 
with  their  flank  resting  in  air,  and  entirely  un 
protected.4  This  truly  phenomenal  arrangement 
ensured  beforehand  the  certain  defeat  of  his  troops, 
no  matter  how  well  they  fought ;  but,  as  it  turned 
out,  they  hardly  fought  at  all.  Thornton,  pushing 
up  the  river,  first  attacked  the  breastwork  in  front, 

^odrington,  i,   386. 

5  James  says  298  soldiers  and  about  200  sailors  ;  but  Admiral 
Cochrane  in  his  letter  (Jan.  iSth)  says  600  men,  half  sailors  ;  and  Ad 
miral  Codrington  also  (p.  335)  gives  this  number,  300  being  sailors  : 
adding  13^  per  cent,  for  the  officers,  sergeants,  and  trumpeters,  we 
get  680  men. 

3  796.     (Latour,  164-172.) 

4  Report  of  Court  of  Inquiry,  Maj.-Gen.  Wm.  Carroll  presiding. 


THE    BATTLE    OF   NEW    ORLEANS.  485 

but  was  checked  by  a  hot  fire  ;  deploying  his  men 
he  then  sent  a  strong  force  to  march  round  and 
take  Morgan  on  his  exposed  right  flank.1  There, 
the  already  demoralized  Kentucky  militia,  ex 
tended  in  thin  order  across  an  open  space,  outnum 
bered,  and  taken  in  flank  by  regular  troops,  were 
stampeded  at  once,  and  after  firing  a  single  vol 
ley  they  took  to  their  heels.2  This  exposed  the 
flank  of  the  better  disciplined  Creoles,  who  were  also 
put  to  flight  ;  but  they  kept  some  order  and  were 
soon  rallied.3  In  bitter  rage  Patterson  spiked  the 
guns  of  his  water-battery  and  marched  off  with  his 
sailors,  unmolested.  The  American  loss  had  been 
slight,  and  that  of  their  opponents  not  heavy,  though 
among  their  dangerously  wounded  was  Colonel 
Thornton. 

This  success,  though  a  brilliant  one,  and  a  disgrace 
to  the  American  arms,  had  no  effect  on  the  battle. 
Jackson  at  once  sent  over  reinforcements  under  the 
famous  French  general,  Humbert,  and  preparations 
were  forthwith  made  to  retake  the  lost  position. 
But  it  was  already  abandoned,  and  the  force  that 
had  captured  it  had  been  recalled  by  Lambert,  when 
he  found  that  the  place  could  not  be  held  without 
additional  troops.4  The  total  British  loss  on  both 

1  Letter  of  Col.  W.  Thornton,  Jan.  8,  1815. 

2  Letter  of  Commodore  Patterson,  Jan.  13,  1815. 

3  Alison  outdoes   himself   in  recounting  this  feat.        Having   re 
duced  the  British  force  to  340  men,  he  says  they  captured  the  redoubt, 
"though   defended   by   22  guns  and    1,700  men."      Of   course,    it 
was  physically  impossible  for  the  water-battery  to  take  part  in  the 
defence  ;  so  there  were  but  3  guns,  and  by  halving  the  force  on  one 
side  and  trebling  it  on  the  other,  he  makes  the  relative  strength  of 
the  Americans   just  sixfold  what  it  was, — and  is  faithfully  followed 
by  other  British  writers. 

4  The  British  Col.   Dickson,  who  had  been  sent  over  to  inspect, 
reported  that   2,000  men  would  be   needed  to  hold  the  battery  ;  so 
Lambert  ordered  the  British  to  retire.     (Lambert's  letter,  Jan.  loth.) 


486      THE  BATTLE  OF  NEW  ORLEANS. 

sides  of  the  river  amounted  to  over  two  thousand 
men,  the  vast  majority  of  whom  had  fallen  in  the 
attack  on  the  Tennesseeans,  and  most  of  the  re 
mainder  in  the  attack  made  by  Colonel  Rennie. 
The  Americans  had  lost  but  seventy  men,  of  whom 
but  thirteen  fell  in  the  main  attack.  On  the  east 
bank,  neither  the  Creole  militia  nor  the  Forty-fourth 
regiment  had  taken  any  part  in  the  combat. 

The  English  had  thrown  for  high  stakes  and  had 
lost  every  thing,  and  they  knew  it.  There  was 
nothing  to  hope  for  left.  Nearly  a  fourth  of  their 
fighting  men  had  fallen  ;  and  among  the  officers  the 
proportion  was  far  larger.  Of  their  four  generals, 
Packenham  was  dead,  Gibbs  dying,  Keane  dis 
abled,  and  only  Lambert  left.  Their  leader,  the 
ablest  officers,  and  all  the  flower  of  their  bravest 
men  were  lying,  stark  and  dead,  on  .the 
bloody  plain  before  them ;  and  their  bodies 
were  doomed  to  crumble  into  mouldering  dust 
on  the  green  fields  where  they  had  fought 
and  had  fallen.  It  was  useless  to  make  another 
trial.  They  had  learned  to  their  bitter  cost,  that  no 
troops,  however  steady,  could  advance  over  open 
ground  against  such  a  fire  as  came  from  Jackson's 
lines.  Their  artillerymen  had  three  times  tried  con 
clusions  with  the  American  gunners,  and  each  time 
they  had  been  forced  to  acknowledge  themselves 
worsted.  They  would  never  have  another  chance 
to  repeat  their  flank  attack,  for  Jackson  had  greatly 
strengthened  and  enlarged  the  works  on  the  west 
bank,  and  had  seen  that  they  were  fully  manned 
and  ably  commanded.  Moreover,  no  sooner  had 
the  assault  failed,  than  the  Americans  again  began 
their  old  harassing  warfare.  The  heaviest  cannon, 


THE  BATTLE  OF  NEW  ORLEANS.      487 

both  from  the  breastwork  and  the  water-battery, 
played  on  the  British  camp,  both  night  and  day,  giv 
ing  the  army  no  rest,  and  the  mounted  riflemen 
kept  up  a  trifling,  but  incessant  and  annoying,  skir 
mishing  with  their  pickets  and  outposts. 

The  British  could  not  advance,  and  it  was  worse 
than  useless  for  them  to  stay  where  they  were,  for 
though  they,  from  time  to  time,  were  reinforced,  yet 
Jackson's  forces  augmented  faster  than  theirs,  and 
every  day  lessened  the  numerical  inequality  between 
the  two  armies.  There  was  but  one  thing  left  to  do, 
and  that  was  to  retreat.  They  had  no  fear  of  being 
attacked  in  turn.  The  British  soldiers  were  made 
of  too  good  stuff  to  be  in  the  least  cowed  or  cast 
down  even  by  such  a  slaughtering  defeat  as  that 
they  had  just  suffered,  and  nothing  would  have 
given  them  keener  pleasure  than  to  have  had  a  fair 
chance  at  their  adversaries  in  the  open  ;  but  this 
chance  was  just  what  Jackson  had  no  idea  of  giving 
them.  His  own  army,  though  in  part  as  good  as 
an  army  could  be,  consisted  also  in  part  of  untrained 
militia,  while  not  a  quarter  of  his  men  had  bayo- 
ness  ;  and  the  wary  old  chief,  for  all  his  hardihood, 
had  far  too  much  wit  to  hazard  such  a  force  in  fight 
with  a  superior  number  of  seasoned  veterans,  thor 
oughly  equipped,  unless  on  his  own  ground  and  in 
his  own  manner.  So  he  contented  himself  with  keep 
ing  a  sharp  watch  on  Lambert ;  and  on  the  night  of 
January  i8th  the  latter  deserted  his  position,  and 
made  a  very  skilful  and  rapid  retreat,  leaving  eighty 
wounded  men  and  fourteen  pieces  of  cannon  behind 
him.1  A  few  stragglers  were  captured  on  land, 

1  Letter  of  General  Jackson,  Jan.  igth,  and  of  General  Lambert, 
Jan.  28th. 


488  THE   BATTLE   OF   NEW   ORLEANS. 

and,  while  the  troops  were  embarking,  a  number  of 
barges,  with  over  a  hundred  prisoners,  were  cut  out 
by  some  American  seamen  in  row-boats  ;  but  the 
bulk  of  the  army  reached  the  transports  unmolested. 
At  the  same  time,  a  squadron  of  vessels,  which  had 
been  unsuccessfully  bombarding  Fort  Saint  Philip 
for  a  week  or  two,  and  had  been  finally  driven  off 
when  the  fort  got  a  mortar  large  enough  to  reach  them 
with,  also  returned  ;  and  the  whole  fleet  set  sail  for 
Mobile.  The  object  was  to  capture  Fort  Boyer, 
which  contained  less  than  four  hundred  men,  and, 
though  formidable  on  its  sea-front,1  was  incapable  of 
defence  when  regularly  attacked  on  its  land  side. 
The  British  landed,  February  8th,  some  1,500 
men,  broke  ground,  and  made  approaches;  for  four 
days  the  work  went  on  amid  a  continual  fire,  which 
killed  or  wounded  n  Americans  and  31  Brit 
ish  ;  by  that  time  the  battering  guns  were  in  posi 
tion  and  the  fort  capitulated,  February  I2th,  the 
garrison  marching  out  with  the  honors  of  war.  Im 
mediately  afterward  the  news  of  peace  arrived  and 
all  hostilities  terminated. 

In  spite  of  the  last  trifling  success,  the  campaign 
had  been  to  the  British  both  bloody  and  disastrous. 
It  did  not  affect  the  results  of  the  war ;  and  the  de- 

1  "  Towards  the  sea  its  fortifications  are  respectable  enough;  but 
on  the  land  side  it  is  little  better  than  a  block-house.  The  ramparts 
being  composed  of  sand  not  more  than  three  feet  in  thickness,  and 
faced  with  plank,  are  barely  cannon-proof;  while  a  sand  hill,  rising 
within  pistol-shot  of  the  ditch,  completely  commands  it.  Within, 
again,  it  is  as  much  wanting  in  accommodation  as  it  is  in  strength. 
There  are  no  bomb-proof  barracks,  nor  any  hole  or  arch  under  which 
men  might  find  protection  from  shells  ;  indeed,  so  deficient  is  it  in 
common  lodging-rooms,  that  great  part  of  the  garrison  sleep  in 
tents.  .  .  .  With  the  reduction  of  this  trifling  work  all  hostilities 
ended.  "  (Gleig,  357.) 

General  Jackson  impliedly  censures  the  garrison  for  surrendering 
so  quickly  ;  but  in  such  a  fort  it  was  absolutely  impossible  to  act 
otherwise,  and  not  the  slightest  stain  rests  upon  the  fort's  defenders. 


THE    BATTLE   OF   NEW   ORLEANS.  489 

cisive  battle  itself  was  a  perfectly  useless  shedding 
of  blood,  for  peace  had  been  declared  before  it  was 
fought.  Nevertheless,  it  was  not  only  glorious  but 
profitable  to  the  United  States.  Louisiana  was 
saved  from  being  severely  ravaged,  and  New  Orleans 
from  possible  destruction  ;  and  after  our  humiliating 
defeats  in  trying  to  repel  the  invasions  of  Virginia 
and  Maryland,  the  signal  victory  of  New  Orleans 
was  really  almost  a  necessity  for  the  preservation  of 
the  national  honor.  This  campaign  was  the  great 
event  of  the  war,  and  in  it  was  fought  the  most  im 
portant  battle  as  regards  numbers  that  took  place 
during  the  entire  struggle  ;  and  the  fact  that  we  were 
victorious,  not  only  saved  our  self-respect  at  home, 
but  also  gave  us  a  prestige  abroad  which  we  should 
otherwise  have  totally  lacked.  It  could  not  be  said 
to  entirely  balance  the  numerous  defeats  that  we  had 
elsewhere  suffered  on  land — defeats  which  had  so 
far  only  been  offset  by  Harrison's  victory  in  1813 
and  the  campaign  in  Lower  Canada  in  1814 — but  it 
at  any  rate  went  a  long  way  toward  making  the 
score  even. 

Jackson  is  certainly  by  all  odds  the  most  promi 
nent  figure  that  appeared  during  this  war,  and 
stands  head  and  shoulders  above  any  other  com 
mander,  American  or  British,  that  it  produced.  It 
will  be  difficult,  in  all  history,  to  show  a  par 
allel  to  the  feat  that  he  performed.  In  three 
weeks'  fighting,  with  a  force  largely  composed 
of  militia,  he  utterly  defeated  and  drove  away 
an  army  twice  the  size  of  his  own,  composed 
of  veteran  troops,  and  led  by  one  of  the  ablest  of 
European  generals.  During  the  whole  campaign  he 
only  erred  once,  and  that  was  in  putting  General 


4QO      THE  BATTLE  OF  NEW  ORLEANS. 

Morgan,  a  very  incompetent  officer,  in  command  of 
the  forces  on  the  west  bank.  He  suited  his  move 
ments  admirably  to  the  various  exigencies  that  arose. 
The  promptness  and  skill  with  which  he  attacked,  as 
soon  as  he  knew  of  the  near  approach  of  the  British, 
undoubtedly  saved  the  city ;  for  their  vanguard  was 
so  roughly  handled  that,  instead  of  being  able  to 
advance  at  once,  they  were  forced  to  delay  three 
days,  during  which  time  Jackson  entrenched  himself 
in  a  position  from  which  he  was  never  driven.  But 
after  this  first  attack  the  offensive  would  have  been 
not  only  hazardous,  but  useless,  and  accordingly 
Jackson,  adopting  that  mode  of  warfare  which  best 
suited  the  ground  he  was  on  and  the  troops  he  had 
under  him,  forced  the  enemy  always  to  fight  him 
where  he  was  strongest,  and  confined  himself  strict 
ly  to  the  pure  defensive — a  system  condemned  by 
most  European  authorities,1  but  which  has  at 
times  succeeded  to  admiration  in  America,  as  wit 
ness  Fredericksburg,  Gettysburg,  Kenesaw  Moun 
tain,  and  Franklin.  Moreover,  it  must  be  remembered 
that  Jackson's  success  was  in  no  wise  owing  either 
to  chance  or  to  the  errors  of  his  adversary.2  As 

1Thus  Napier  says  (vol.  v,  p.  25) :  "  Soult  fared  as  most  generals 
will  who  seek  by  extensive  lines  to  supply  the  want  of  numbers  or  of 
hardiness  in  the  troops.  Against  rude  commanders  and  undisciplined 
soldiers,  lines  may  avail  ;  seldom  against  accomplished  commanders, 
never  when  the  assailants  are  the  better  soldiers."  And  again  (p. 
150),  "Offensive  operations  must  be  the  basis  of  a  good  defensive 
system." 

2  The  reverse  has  been  stated  again  and  again  with  very  great  injus 
tice,  not  only  by  British,  but  even  by  American  writers  (as e.g.,  Prof.W. 
G.  Sumner,  in  his  "  Andrew  Jackson  as  a  Public  Man,"  Boston,  1882). 
The  climax  of  absurdity  is  reached  by  Major  McDougal,  who  says 
(as  quoted  by  Cole  in  his  "Memoirs  of  British  Generals,"  ii,  p. 
364):  "  Sir  Edward  Packenham  fell,  not  after  an  utter  and  disas 
trous  defeat,  but  at  the  very  moment  when  the  arms  of  victory  were 
extended  towards  him  ";  and  by  James,  who  says  (ii,  388)  :  "  The 
premature  fall  of  a  British  general  saved  an  American  city."  These 


THE   BATTLE   OF  NEW   ORLEANS.  49! 

far  as  fortune  favored  either  side,  it  was  that  of  the 
British  * ;  and  Packcnham  left  nothing  undone  to 
accomplish  his  aim,  and  made  no  movements  that 
his  experience  in  European  war  did  not  justify  his 
making.  There  is  not  the  slightest  reason  for  sup 
posing  that  any  other  British  general  would  have 
accomplished  more  or  have  fared  better  than  he 
did.8  Of  course  Jackson  owed  much  to  the  nature 
of  the  ground  on  which  he  fought ;  but  the  oppor 
tunities  it  afforded  would  have  been  useless  in  the 
hands  of  any  general  less  ready,  hardy,  and  skilful 
than  Old  Hickory. 

A  word  as  to  the  troops  themselves.  The  British 
infantry  was  at  that  time  the  best  in  Europe,  the 
French  coming  next.  Packenham's  soldiers  had 
formed  part  of  Wellington's  magnificent  peninsular 
army,  and  they  lost  nothing  of  their  honor  at  New 
Orleans.  Their  conduct  throughout  was  admirable. 
Their  steadiness  in  the  night  battle,  their  patience 

assertions  are  just  on  a  par  with  those  made  by  American  writers, 
that  only  the  fall  of  Lawrence  prevented  the  Chesapeake  from  captur 
ing  the  Shannon. 

British  writers  ha*e  always  attributed  the  defeat  largely  to  the  fact 
that  the  44th  regiment,  which  was  to  have  led  the  attack  with 
fascines  and  ladders,  did  not  act  well.  I  doubt  if  this  had  any  effect 
on  the  result.  Some  few  of  the  men  with  ladders  did  reach  the 
ditch,  but  were  shot  down  at  once,  and  their  fate  would  have  been 
shared  by  any  others  who  had  been  with  them  ;  the  bulk  of  the 
column  was  never  able  to  advance  through  the  fire  up  to  the  breast 
work,  and  all  the  ladders  and  fascines  in  Christendom  would  not 
have  helped  it.  There  will  always  be  innumerable  excuses  offered 
for  any  defeat ;  but  on  this  occasion  the  truth  is  simply  that  the  Brit 
ish  regulars  found  they  could  not  advance  in  the  open  against 
a  fire  more  deadly  than  they  had  ever  before  encountered. 

1E.g.:  The  unexpected  frost  made  the  swamps  firm  for  them  to  ad 
vance  through  ;  the  river  being  so  low  when  the  levee  was  cut,  the  ba 
yous  were  filled,  instead  of  the  British  being  drowned  out  ;  the  Carolina 
was  only  blown  up  because  the  wind  happened  to  fail  her ;  bad 
weather  delayed  the  advance  of  arms  and  reinforcements,  etc.,  etc. 

*"  He  was  the  next  man  to  look  to  after  Lord  Wellington  "  (Cod- 
rington,  i,  339). 


492      THE  BATTLE  OF  NEW  ORLEANS. 

through  the  various  hardships  they  had  to  undergo, 
their  stubborn  courage  in  action,  and  the  undaunted 
front  they  showed  in  time  of  disaster  (for  at  the 
very  end  they  were  to  the  full  as  ready  and  eager 
to  fight  as  at  the  beginning),  all  showed  that  their 
soldierly  qualities  were  of  the  highest  order.  As 
much  cannot  be  said  of  the  British  artillery,  which, 
though  very  bravely  fought  was  clearly  by  no  means 
as  skilfully  handled  as  was  the  case  with  the  Ameri 
can  guns.  The  courage  of  the  British  officers  of  all 
arms  is  mournfully  attested  by  the  sadly  large  pro 
portion  they  bore  to  the  total  on  the  lists  of  the 
killed  and  wounded. 

An  even  greater  meed  of  praise  is  due  to  the 
American  soldiers,  for  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that 
they  were  raw  troops  opposed  to  veterans ;  and  in 
deed,  nothing  but  Jackson's  tireless  care  in  drilling 
them  could  have  brought  them  into  shape  at  all. 
The  regulars  were  just  as  good  as  the  British, 
and  no  better.  The  Kentucky  militia,  who  had 
only  been  48  hours  with  the  army  and  were  badly 
armed  and  totally  undisciplined,  proved  as  useless 
as  their  brethren  of  New  York  and  Virginia,  at 
Queenstown  Heights  and  Bladensburg,  had  pre 
viously  shown  themselves  to  be.  They  would  not 
stand  in  the  open  at  all,  and  even  behind  a  breastwork 
had  to  be  mixed  with  better  men.  The  Louisiana 
militia,  fighting  in  defence  of  their  homes,  and  well 
trained,  behaved  excellently,  and  behind  breast 
works  were  as  formidable  as  the  regulars.  The  Ten- 
nesseeans,  good  men  to  start  with,  and  already  well 
trained  in  actual  warfare  under  Jackson,  were  in  their 
own  way  unsurpassable  as  soldiers.  In  the  open 
field  the  British  regulars,  owing  to  their  greater 


THE    BATTLE   OF   NEW   ORLEANS.  493 

skill  in  manoeuvring,  and  to  their  having  bayonets, 
with  which  the  Tennesseeans  were  unprovided,  could 
in  all  likelihood  have  beaten  them  ;  but  in  rough  or 
broken  ground  the  skill  of  the  Tennesseeans,  both 
as  marksmen  and  woodsmen,  would  probably  have 
given  them  the  advantage ;  while  the  extreme 
deadliness  of  their  fire  made  it  far  more  dangerous 
to  attempt  to  storm  a  breastwork  guarded  by  these 
forest  riflemen  than  it  would  have  been  to  attack  the 
same  work  guarded  by  an  equal  number  of  the  best 
regular  troops  of  Europe.  The  American  soldiers 
deserve  great  credit  for  doing  so  well ;  but  greater 
credit  still  belongs  to  Andrew  Jackson,  who,  with 
his  cool  head  and  quick  eye,  his  stout  heart  and 
strong  hand,  stands  out  in  history  as  the  ablest  gen 
eral  the  United  States  produced,  from  the  outbreak 
of  the  Revolution  down  to  the  beginning  of  the 
Great  Rebellion. 


APPENDIX  A. 

TONNAGE    OF    THE    BRITISH    AND  AMERICAN    MEN-OF-WAR 
IN    1812-15. 

According  to  Act  of  Congress  (quoted  in  "  Nilesr 
Register,"  iv,  64),  the  way  of  measuring  double-decked 
or  war- vessels  was  as  follows  : 

"  Measure  from  fore-part  of  main  stem  to  after-part  of 
stern  port,  above  the  upper  deck  ;  take  the  breadth 
thereof  at  broadest  part  above  the  main  wales,  one  half  of 
which  breadth  shall  be  accounted  the  depth.  Deduct 
from  the  length  three  fifths  of  such  breadth,  multiply  the 
remaindfci  by  the  breadth  and  the  product  by  the  depth  ; 
divide  by  95  ;  the  quotient  is  tonnage." 

(*".  <?.,  If  length  =  x,  and  breadth  =  y  ; 
Tonnage  =  (x  -  |  y)  X  y  X  j  y.) 

95 

Niles  states  that  the  British  mode,  as  taken  from  Steele's 
"Shipmaster's  Assistant,"  was  this:  Drop  plumb-line 
over  stem  of  ship  and  measure  distance  between  such 
line  and  the  after  part  of  the  stern  port  at  the  load  water 
mark  ;  then  measure  from  top  of  said  plumb-line  in 
parallel  direction  with  the  water  to  perpendicular  point 
immediately  over  the  load  water-mark  of  the  fore  part  of 
main  stem  ;  subtract  from  such  admeasurement  the 
above  distance  ;  the  remainder  is  ship's  extreme  length, 
from  which  deduct  3  inches  for  every  foot  of  the  load- 
draught  of  water  for  the  rake  abaft,  and  also  three  fifths 
of  the  ship's  breadth  for  the  rake  forward  ;  remainder  is 
length  of  keel  for  tonnage.  Breadth  shall  be  taken  from 
outside  to  outside  of  the  plank  in  broadest  part  of  the 

4Q5 


49^  APPENDIX. 

ship  either  above  or  below  the  main  wales,  exclusive 
of  all  manner  of  sheathing  or  doubling.  Depth  is  to 
be  considered  as  one  half  the  length.  Tonnage  will 
then  be  the  length  into  the  depth  into  breadth,  divided  by 

94- 

Tonnage  was  thus  estimated  in  a  purely  arbitrary  man 
ner,  with  no  regard  to  actual  capacity  or  displacement  ; 
and,  moreover,  what  is  of  more  importance,  the  British 
method  differed  from  the  American  so  much  that  a  ship 
measured  in  the  latter  way  would  be  nominally  about  15 
per  cent,  larger  than  if  measured  by  British  rules.  This 
is  the  exact  reverse  of  the  statement  made  by  the  British 
naval  historian,  James.  His  mistake  is  pardonable, 
for  great  confusion  existed  on  the  subject  at  that  time, 
even  the  officers  not  knowing  the  tonnage  of  their  own 
ships.  When  the  President  was  captured,  her  officers 
stated  that  she  measured  about  1,400  tons  ;  in  reality  she 
tonned  1,576,  American  measure.  Still  more  singular 
was  the  testimony  of  the  officers  of  the  Argus,  who 
thought  her  to  be  of  about  350  tons,  while  she  was 
of  298,  by  American,  or  244,  by  British  measure 
ment.  These  errors  were  the  more  excusable  as 
they  occurred  also  in  higher  quarters.  The  earliest 
notice  we  have  about  the  three  44-gun  frigates  of  the 
Constitution 's  class,  is  in  the  letter  of  Secretary  of  the 
Navy,  Benjamin  Stoddart,  on  Dec.  24,  1798,*  where  they 
are  expressly  said  to  be  of  1,576  tons;  and  this  tonnage 
is  given  them  in  every  navy  list  that  mentions  it  for  40 
years  afterward  ;  yet  Secretary  Paul  Hamilton  in  one  of 
his  letters  incidentally  alludes  to  them  as  of  1,444  tons. 
Later,  I  think  about  the  year  1838,  the  method  of  measur 
ing  was  changed,  and  their  tonnage  was  put  down  as 
1,607.  James  takes  the  American  tonnage  from  Secre 
tary  Hamilton's  letter  as  1,444,  and  states  (vol.  vi,  p.  5), 
that  this  is  equivalent  to  1,533  tons,  English.  But  in 
"  American  Slate  Papers,"  xiv,  57. 


APPENDIX.  497 

reality,  by  American  measurement,  the  tonnage  was 
1,576  ;  so  that  even  according  to  James'  own  figures  the 
British  way  of  measurement  made  the  frigate  43  tons 
smaller  than  the  American  way  did  ;  actually  the  difference 
was  nearer  290  tons.  James'  statements  as  to  the  size  of  our 
various  ships  would  seem  to  have  been  largely  mere  guess 
work,  as  he  sometimes  makes  them  smaller  and  sometimes 
larger  than  they  were  according  to  the  official  navy  lists. 
Thus,  the  Constitution,  President,  and  United  States,  each 
of  1,576,  he  puts  down  as  of  1,533  ;  the  Wasp,  of  450,  as 
of  434  ;  the  Hornet,  of  480,  as  of  460  ;  and  the  Chesapeake, 
of  1,244,  as  of  1,135  tons.  On  the  other  hand  the  Enter 
prise,  of  165  tons,  he  states  to  be  of  245  ;  the  Argus  of 
298,  he  considers  to  be  of  316,  and  the  Peacock,  Frolic, 
etc.,  of  509  each,  as  of  539.  He  thus  certainly  adopts 
different  standards  of  measurement,  not  only  for  the 
American  as  distinguished  from  the  British  vessels,  but 
even  among  the  various  American  vessels  themselves. 
And  there  are  other  difficulties  to  be  encountered  ;  not 
only  were  there  different  ways  of  casting  tonnage  from 
given  measurements,  but  also  there  were  different  ways 
of  getting  what  purported  to  be  the  same  measurement. 
A  ship,  that,  according  to  the  British  method  of  measure 
ment  was  of  a  certain  length,  would,  according  to  the 
American  method,  be  about  5  per  cent,  longer  ;  and  so  if 
two  vessels  were  the  same  size,  the  American  would  have 
the  greatest  nominal  tonnage.  For  example,  James  in 
his  "  Naval  Occurrences  "  (p.  467)  gives  the  length  of  the 
Cyane's  main  deck  as  118  feet  2  inches.  This  same 
Cyanc  was  carefully  surveyed  and  measured,  under  orders 
from  the  United  States  navy  department,  by  Lieut.  B.  F. 
Hoffman,  and  in  his  published  report '  he  gives,  among 
the  other  dimensions  :  "Length  of  spar-deck,  124  feet  9 
inches,"  and  "length  of  gun-deck  123  feet  3  inches." 
With  such  a  difference  in  the  way  of  taking  measure- 
1  "American  State  Papers,"  xiv,  p.  417. 


498  APPENDIX. 

ments,  as  well  as  of  computing  tonnage  from  the  measure 
ments  when  taken,  it  is  not  surprising  that  according  to 
the  American  method  the  Cyane  should  have  ranked  as 
of  about  659  tons,  instead  of  539.  As  James  takes  no 
account  of  any  of  these  differences  I  hardly  know  how  to 
treat  his  statements  of  comparative  tonnage.  Thus  he 
makes  the  Hornet  460  tons,  and  the  Peacock  and  Penguin, 
which  she  at  different  times  captured,  about  388  each. 
As  it  happens  both  Captain  Lawrence  and  Captain 
Biddle,  who  commanded  the  Hornet  in  her  two  success 
ful  actions,  had  their  prizes  measured.  The  Peacock 
sank  so  rapidly  that  Lawrence  could  not  get  very  accu 
rate  measurements  of  her ;  he  states  her  to  be  four  feet 
shorter  and  half  a  foot  broader  than  the  Hornet.  The 
British  naval  historian,  Brenton  (vol.  v,  p.  in),  also  states 
that  they  were  of  about  the  same  tonnage.  But  we  have 
more  satisfactory  evidence  from  Captain  Biddle.  He 
stayed  by  his  prize  nearly  two  days,  and  had  her  thor 
oughly  examined  in  every  way  ;  and  his  testimony  is,  of 
course,  final.  He  reports  that  the  Penguin  was  by 
actual  measurement  two  feet  shorter,  and  somewhat 
broader  than  the  Hornet^  and  with  thicker  scantling. 
She  tonned  477,  compared  to  the  Hornet's  480 — a  differ 
ence  of  about  one  half  of  one  per  cent.  This  testimony  is 
corroborated  by  that  of  the  naval  inspectors  who  examined 
the  Epervier  after  she  was  captured  by  the  Peacock. 
Those  two  vessels  were  respectively  of  477  and  509  tons, 
and  as  such  they  ranked  on  the  navy  lists.  The  Ameri 
can  Peacock  and  her  sister  ships  were  very  much  longer 
than  the  brig  sloops  of  the  Epervier 's  class,  but  were  no 
broader,  the  latter  being  very  tubby.  All  the  English 
sloops  were  broader  in  proportion  than  the  American 
ones  were  ;  thus  the  Levant,  which  was  to  have  mounted 
the  same  number  of  guns  as  the  Peacock,  had  much  more 
beam,  and  was  of  greater  tonnage,  although  of  rather  less 
length.  The  Macedonian,  when  captured,  ranked  on  our 


APPENDIX.  499 

lists  as  of  1,325  tons,1  the  United  States  as  of  1,576  ;  and 
they  thus  continued  until,  as  I  have  said  before,  the 
method  of  measurement  was  changed,  when  the  former 
ranked  as  of  1,341,  and  the  latter  as  of  1,607  tons- 
James,  however,  makes  them  respectively  1,081,  and 
T>533-  Now  to  get  the  comparative  force  he  ought  to 
have  adopted  the  first  set  of  measurements  given,  or  else 
have  made  them  1,081  and  1,286.  Out  of  the  twelve 
single-ship  actions  of  the  war,  four  were  fought  with  38- 
gun  frigates  like  the  Macedonian,  and  seven  with  i8-gun 
brig  sloops  of  the  Eperviers  class  ;  and  as  the  Macedonian 
and  Epervier  were  both  regularly  rated  in  our  navy,  we 
get  a  very  exact  idea  of  our  antagonists  in  those  eleven 
cases.  The  twelfth  was  the  fight  between  the  Enterprise 
and  the  Boxer,  in  which  the  latter  was  captured  ;  the 
Enterprise  was  apparently  a  little  smaller  than  her  foe, 
but  had  two  more  guns,  which  she  carried  in  her  bridle 
ports. 

As  my  purpose  in  giving  the  tonnage  is  to  get  it  com 
paratively,  and  not  absolutely,  I  have  given  it  throughout 
for  both  sides  as  estimated  by  the  American  method  of 
that  day.  The  tonnage  of  the  vessels  on  the  lakes  has 
been  already  noticed. 


APPENDIX     B. 

PREVIOUS    HISTORY    OF    UNITED    STATES    NAVY. 

Very  few  students  of  naval  history  will  deny  that  in 
1812  the  average  American  ship  was  superior  to  the 
average  British  ship  of  the  same  strength  ;  and  that  the 
latter  was  in  turn  superior  to  the  average  French  ship. 
The  explanation  given  by  the  victor  is  in  each  case  the 

1  See  the  work  of  Lieutenant  Emmons,  who  had  access  to  all  the 
official  records. 


500  APPENDIX. 

same  ;  the  American  writer  ascribes  the  success  of  his 
nation  to  "  the  aptitude  of  the  American  character  for 
the  sea,"  and  the  Briton  similarly  writes  that  "  the 
English  are  inherently  better  suited  for  the  sea  than  the 
French."  Race  characteristics  may  have  had  some  little 
effect  between  the  last  pair  of  combatants  (although 
only  a  little),  and  it  is  possible  that  they  somewhat 
affected  the  outcome  of  the  Anglo-American  struggle, 
but  they  did  not  form  the  main  cause.  This  can  best  be 
proved  by  examining  the  combats  of  two  preceding 
periods,  in  which  the  English,  French,  and  Americans 
were  at  war  with  one  another. 

During  the  years  1798-1800,  the  United  States  carried 
on  a  desultory  conflict  with  France,  then  at  war  with 
England.  Our  navy  was  just  built,  and  was  rated  in  the 
most  extraordinary  manner ;  the  Chesapeake,  carrying 
i8-pounders,  was  called  a  44 ;  and  the  Constellation, 
which  carried  24*5,  a  36,  while  the  Washington,  rating 
24,  was  really  much  heavier  than  the  Boston,  rating  28. 
On  Feb.  9,  1799,  after  an  hour's  conflict,  the  Constellation 
captured  the  French  frigate  Insurgente  j  the  Americans 
lost  3,  the  French  70  men,  killed  and  wounded.  The 
Constitution  carried  but  38  guns  ;  28  long  24*5,  on  the 
main-deck,  and  10  long  12*5  on  the  qurter-deck,  with  a 
crew  of  309  men.  According  to  Troude  (iii,  169), 
r  Insurgente  carried  26  long  i2's,  10  long  6's,  and  4 
36-pound  carronades  ;  the  Americans  report  her  number 
of  men  as  nearly  four  hundred.  Thus  in  actual *  (not 

1  French  shot  was  really  very  much  heavier  than  the  nominally 
corresponding  English  shot,  as  the  following  table,  taken  from  Cap 
tain  T.  L.  Simmon's  work  on  "  Heavy  Ordnance"  (London,  1837,  p. 
62)  will  show  : 

Nominal  French  Weight  Actual  Weight  of  Same  Shot  in 

of  Shot.  English  Pounds. 

36  Ibs.  43  Ibs.  4    oz. 

24    "  28    "     8f    " 

18    "  21    "     4   " 

12    "  14    "       7       " 


APPENDIX.  501 

nominal)  weight  of  shot  the  Constellation  was  superior  by 
about  80  pounds,  and  was  inferior  in  crew  by  from  50  to 
100  men.  This  would  make  the  vessels  apparently 
nearly  equal  in  force  ;  but  of  course  the  long  24/5  of  the 
Constellation  made  it  impossible  that  rinsurgente,  armed 
only  with  long  12*3,  should  contend  with  her.  As 
already  said,  a  superiority  in  number  of  men  makes  very 
little  difference,  provided  each  vessel  has  ample  to 
handle  the  guns,  repair  damages,  work  the  sails,  etc. 
Troude  goes  more  into  details  than  any  other  French 
historian  ;  but  I  think  his  details  are  generally  wrong. 
In  this  case  he  gives  the  Constellation  12*5,  instead  of  the 
24*5  she  really  carried  ;  and  also  supplies  her  with  10 
32-pound  carronades — of  which  species  of  ordnance 
there  was  then  not  one  piece  in  our  navy.  The  first 
carronades  we  ever  had  were  those  carried  by  the  same 
frigate  on  her  next  voyage.  She  had  completely  changed 
her  armament,  having  28  long  i8's  on  the  main-deck,  ten 
24-pound  carronades  on  the  quarter-deck  ;  and,  I  believe, 
6  long  i2's  on  the  forecastle,  with  a  crew  of  310  men. 
Thus  armed,  she  encountered  and  fought  a  drawn  battle 
with  la  Vengeance.  Troude  (vol.  iii,  pp.  201,  and  216) 
describes  the  armament  of  the  latter  as  26  long  i8's, 
10  long  8's,  and  4  36-pound  carronades.  On  board  of 
her  was  an  American  prisoner,  James  Howe,  who  swore 
she  had  52  guns,  and  400  men  (see  Cooper,  i,  306). 
The  French  and  American  accounts  thus  radically  disa 
gree.  The  point  is  settled  definitely  by  the  report  of  the 
British  captain  Milne,  who,  in  the  Seine  frigate,  captured 
la  Vengeance  in  the  same  year,  and  then  reported  her 
armament  as  being  28  long  i8's,  16  long  12*5,  and  8 
36-pound  carronades,  with  326  men.  As  the  American 
and  British  accounts,  written  entirely  independently  of 
one  another,  tally  almost  exactly,  it  is  evident  that 
Troude  was  very  greatly  mistaken.  He  blunders  very 
much  over  the  Constellations  armament. 


502  APPENDIX. 

Thus  in  this  action  the  American  frigate  fought  a  draw 
with  an  antagonist,  nearly  as  much  superior  to  herself  as 
an  American  44  was  to  a  British  38.  In  November,  1800, 
the  "  28-gun  frigate,"  Boston,  of  530  tons,  200  men, 
carrying  24  long  g's  on  the  main-deck,  and  on  the 
spar-deck  8  long  6's  (or  possibly  1 2-pound  carronades), 
captured,  after  two  hours  action,  the  French  corvette 
Berceau,  of  24  guns,  long  8's  ;  the  Boston  was  about  the 
same  size  as  her  foe,  with  the  same  number  of  men,  and 
superior  in  metal  about  as  ten  to  nine.  She  lost  15,  and 
the  Berceau  40  men.  Troude  (iii,  p.  219)  gives  the 
Berceau  30  guns,  22  long  8's,  and  8  1 2-pound  carronades. 
If  this  is  true  she  was  in  reality  of  equal  force  with  the 
Boston.  But  I  question  if  Troude  really  knew  anything 
about  the  combatants  ;  he  gives  the  Boston  (of  the  same 
size  and  build  as  the  Cyane]  48  guns — a  number  impos 
sible  for  her  to  carry.  He  continually  makes  the 
grossest  errors  ;  in  this  same  (the  third)  volume,  for 
example,  he  arms  a  British  5<D-gun-ship  with  72  cannon, 
giving  her  a  broadside  fifty  per  cent,  heavier  than  it 
should  be  (p.  141)  ;  and,  still  worse,  states  the  ordinary 
complement  of  a  British  32-gun  frigate  to  be  384  men, 
instead  of  about  220  (p.  417).  He  is  by  no  means  as 
trustworthy  as  James,  though  less  rancorous. 

The  United  States  schooner  Experiment,  of  12  guns, 
long  6's,  and  70  men,  captured  the  French  man-of-war 
three-masted-schooner  La  Diane,  of  14  guns  (either  4-  or 
6-pounders),  with  a  crew  of  60  men,  and  30  passengers  ; 
and  the  Enterprise,  the  sister  vessel  of  the  Experiment, 
captured  numerous  strong  privateers.  One  of  them,  a 
much  heavier  vessel  than  her  captor,  made  a  most  ob 
stinate  fight.  She  was  the  Flambeau  brig  of  fourteen 
8-pounders  and  100  men,  of  whom  half  were  killed  or 
wounded.  The  Enterprise  had  3  killed  and  7  wounded. 

Comparing  these  different  actions,  it  is  evident  that  the 
Americans  were  superior  to  the  French  in  fighting  capac- 


APPENDIX.  503 

ity  during  the  years  1799  and  1800.  During  the  same 
two  years  there  had  been  numerous  single  contests  be 
tween  vessels  of  Britain  and  France,  ending  almost 
invariably  in  favor  of  the  former,  which  I  mention  first 
in  each  couple.  The  i2-pounder  frigate  Dcedalus  cap 
tured  the  i2-pounder  frigate  Prudente,  of  equal  force. 
The  British  i8-pounder  frigate  Sybille  captured  the  frigate 
Forte,  armed  with  52  guns,  30  of  them  long  24' 's  on  the 
main-deck  ;  she  was  formidably  armed  and  as  heavy  as 
the  Constitution.  The  Sybille  lost  22  and  the  Forte  145 
men  killed  and  wounded.  The  i8-pounder  frigate  Clyde, 
with  the  loss  of  5  men,  captured  the  i2-pounder  frigate 
Vestale,  which  lost  32.  The  cutter  Courser,  of  twelve 
4-pounders  and  40  men,  captured  the  privateer  Guerriere, 
of  fourteen  4-pounders  and  44  men.  The  cutter  Viper, 
of  fourteen  4-pounders  and  48  men,  captured  the  priva 
teer  Suret,  of  fourteen  4-pounders  and  57  men.  The 
i6-gun  ship-sloop  Peterel,  with  89  men,  engaged  the  Cerf, 
14,  Lejoille,  6,  and  Ligurienne,  16,  with  in  all  240  men,  and 
captured  the  Ligurienne.  The  30-gun  corvette  Dart  cap 
tured  by  surprise  the  38-gun  frigate  Desirde.  The  Gypsey, 
of  ten  4-pounders  and  82  men,  captured  the  Quidproquo, 
of  8  guns,  4-  and  8-pounders,  and  98  men.  The  schooner 
Milbrook  of  sixteen  i8-pounder  carronades  and  47  men, 
fought  a  draw  with  the  privateer  Bellone,  of  24  long  8's 
and  six  36-pound  carronades.  Finally,  six  months  after 
the  Vengeance  had  escaped  from  the  Constellation  (or 
beaten  her  off,  as  the  French  say)  she  was  captured  by 
the  British  frigate  Seine,  which  threw  a  broadside  about 
30  pounds  more  than  the  American  did  in  her  action,  and 
had  some  29  men  less  aboard.  So  that  her  commander, 
Captain  Milne,  with  the  same  force  as  Commodore  Trux- 
ton,  of  the  Constellation,  accomplished  what  the  latter 
failed  to  do. 

Reviewing  all  these  actions,  it  seems  pretty  clear  that, 
while  the  Americans  were  then  undoubtedly  much  supe- 


504  APPENDIX. 

rior    to    the    French,    they   were    still,    at    least    slightly, 
inferior  to  the  British. 

From  1777  to  1782  the  state  of  things  was  very  differ 
ent.  The  single  combats  were  too  numerous  for  me  to 
mention  them  here  ;  and  besides  it  would  be  impossible 
to  get  at  the  truth  without  going  to  a  great  deal  of 
trouble — the  accounts  given  by  Cooper,  Sohomberg,  and 
Troude  differing  so  widely  that  they  can  often  hardly  be 
recognized  as  treating  of  the  same  events.  But  it  is  cer 
tain  that  the  British  were  very  much  superior  to  the 
Americans.  Some  of  the  American  ships  behaved  most 
disgracefully,  deserting  their  consorts  and  fleeing  from 
much  smaller  foes.  Generally  the  American  ship  was 
captured  when  opposed  by  an  equal  force — although 
there  were  some  brilliant  exceptions  to  this.  With  the 
French  things  were  more  equal  ;  their  frigates  were  sunk 
or  captured  time  and  again,  but  nearly  as  often  they 
sunk  or  captured  their  antagonists.  Some  of  the  most 
gallant  rights  on  record  are  recounted  of  French  frigates 
of  this  period  ;  in  1781  the  Minerve,  32,  resisted  the 
Courageous,  74,  till  she  had  lost  73  men  and  had  actually 
inflicted  a  loss  of  17  men  on  her  gigantic  antagonist,  and 
the  previous  year  the  Bellepoule,  32,  had  performed  a 
similar  feat  with  the  Nonsuch,  64,  while  the  Capricieuse 
32,  had  fought  for  five  hours  before  surrendering  to  the 
Prudente  and  Licorne,  each  of  force  equal  to  herself.  She 
lost  100  men,  inflicting  a  loss  of  55  upon  her  two  antago 
nists.  Such  instances  make  us  feel  rather  ashamed  when 
we  compare  them  with  the  fight  in  which  the  British  ship 
Glasgow,  20,  beat  off  an  American  squadron  of  5  ships, 
including  two  of  equal  force  to  herself,  or  with  the  time 
when  the  Ariadne,  20,  and  Ceres,  14,  attacked  and  cap 
tured  without  resistance  the  Alfred,  20,  the  latter  ship 
being  deserted  in  the  most  outrageously  cowardly  man 
ner  by  her  consort  the  Raleigh,  32.  At  that  period  the 
average  American  ship  was  certainly  by  no  means  equal 


APPENDIX.  505 

to  the  average  French  ship  of  the  same  force,  and  the  lat 
ter  in  turn  was  a  little,  but  only  a  little,  inferior  to  the 
average  British  ship  of  equal  strength. 

Thus  in  1782  the  British  stood  first  in  nautical  prow 
ess,  separated  but  by  a  very  narrow  interval  from  the 
French,  while  the  Americans  made  a  bad  third.  In  1789 
the  British  still  stood  first,  while  the  Americans  had 
made  a  great  stride  forward,  coming  close  on  their  heels, 
and  the  French  had  fallen  far  behind  into  the  third  place. 
In  1812  the  relative  positions  of  the  British  and  French 
were  unchanged,  but  the  Americans  had  taken  another 
very  decided  step  in  advance,  and  stood  nearly  as  far 
ahead  of  the  British  as  the  latter  were  ahead  of  the 
French. 

The  explanation  of  these  changes  is  not  difficult.  In 
1782  the  American  war  vessels  were  in  reality  privateers; 
the  crews  were  unpracticed,  the  officers  untrained,  and 
they  had  none  of  the  traditions  and  discipline  of  a  regu 
lar  service.  At  the  same  time  the  French  marine  was  at 
;ts  highest  point  ;  it  was  commanded  by  officers  of  ability 
and  experience,  promoted  largely  for  merit,  and  with 
crews  thoroughly  trained,  especially  in  gunnery,  by  a  long 
course  of  service  on  the  sea.  In  courage,  and  in  skill 
in  the  management  of  guns,  musketry,  etc.,  they  were  the 
full  equals  of  their  English  antagonists ;  their  slight 
average  inferiority  in  seamanship  may,  it  is  possible,  be 
fairly  put  down  to  the  difference  in  race.  (It  seems  cer 
tain  that,  when  serving  in  a  neutral  vessel,  for  example, 
the  Englishmen  aboard  are  apt  to  make  better  sailors 
than  the  Frenchmen.)  In  1799  the  revolution  had  de 
prived  the  French  of  all  their  best  officers,  had  let  the 
character  of  the  marine  run  down,  and  the  discipline  of 
the  service  become  utterly  disorganized  ;  this  exposed 
them  to  frightful  reverses,  and  these  in  turn  prevented 
the  character  of  the  service  from  recovering  its  former 
tone.  Meanwhile  the  Americans  had  established  for  the 


APPENDIX. 

first  time  a  regular  navy,  and,  as  there  was  excellent  ma 
terial  to  work  with,  it  at  once  came  up  close  to  the  En 
glish  ;  constant  and  arduous  service,  fine  discipline, 
promotion  for  merit,  and  the  most  unflagging  attention  to 
practical  seamanship  and  gunnery  had  in  1812  raised  it 
far  above  even  the  high  English  standard.  During  all 
these  three  periods  the  English  marine,  it  must  be  re 
membered,  did  not  fall  off,  but  at  least  kept  its  position  ; 
the  French,  on  the  contrary,  did  fall  of,  while  the  Ameri 
can  navy  advanced  by  great  strides  to  the  first  place. 


APPENDIX  C. 

After  my  work  was  in  press  I  for  the  first  time  came 
across  Prof.  J.  Russell  Soley's  "  Naval  Campaign  of 
1812,"  in  the  "  Proceedings  of  the  United  States  Naval 
Institute,"  for  October  20,  1881.  It  is  apparently  the 
precursor  of  a  more  extended  history.  Had  I  known 
that  such  a  writer  as  Professor  Soley  was  engaged  on  a 
work  of  this  kind  I  certainly  should  not  have  attempted 
it  myself. 

In  several  points  our  accounts  differ.  In  the  action 
with  the  Guerriere  his  diagram  differs  from  mine  chiefly 
in  his  making  the  Constitution  steer  in  a  more  direct  line, 
while  I  have  represented  her  as  shifting  her  course  several 
times  in  order  to  avoid  being  raked,  bringing  the  wind 
first  on  her  port  and  then  on  her  starboard-quarter.  My 
account  of  the  number  of  the  crew  of  the  Guerriere  is 
taken  from  the  Constitution  s  muster-book  (in  the  Treas 
ury  Department  at  Washington),  which  contains  the 
names  of  all  the  British  prisoners  received  aboard  the 
Constitution  after  the  fight.  The  various  writers  used 
"  larboard  "  and  *'  starboard  "  with  such  perfect  indiffer 
ence,  in  speaking  of  the  closing  and  the  loss  of  the 
Guerriere' s  mizzen-mast,  that  I  hardly  knew  which  account 


APPENDIX.  SO/ 

to  adopt  ;  it  finally  seemed  to  me  that  the  only  way  to 
reconcile  the  conflicting  statements  was  by  making  the 
mast  act  as  a  rudder,  first  to  keep  the  ship  off  the  wind 
until  it  was  dead  aft  and  then  to  bring  her  up  into  it.  If 
this  was  the  case,  it  deadened  her  speed,  and  prevented 
Dacres  from  keeping  his  ship  yardarm  and  yardarm  with 
the  foe,  though  he  tried  to  steady  his  course  with  the 
helm  ;  but,  in  this  view,  it  rather  delayed  Hull's  raking 
than  helped  him.  If  Professor  Soley's  account  is  right,  1 
hardly  know  what  to  make  of  the  statement  in  one  of  the 
American  accounts  that  the  Constitution  "  luffed  across 
the  enemy's  bow,"  and  of  Cooper's  statement  (in  Put 
nam  s  Magazine]  that  the  Guerrttres  bowsprit  pressed 
against  the  Constitutions  " lee  or  port  quarter." 

In  the  action  of  the  Wasp  with  the  Frolic,  I  have 
adopted  James'  statement  of  the  latter's  force  ;  Professor 
Soley  follows  Captain  Jones'  letter,  which  gives  the  brig 
three  additional  guns  and  18  pounds  more  metal  in 
broadside.  My  reason  for  following  James  was  that  his 
account  of  the  Frolic  s  force  agrees  with  the  regular 
armament  of  her  class.  Captain  Jones  gives  her  two  car- 
ronades  on  the  topgallant  forecastle,  which  must  certainly 
be  a  mistake  ;  he  makes  her  chase-guns  long  12*3,  but  all 
the  other  British  brigs  carried  6's  ;  he  also  gives  her  an 
other  gun  in  broadside,  which  he  calls  a  i2-pounder,  and 
Lieutenant  Biddle  (in  a  letter  to  his  father)  a  32-pound, 
carronade.  His  last  gun  should  perhaps  be  counted  in  ; 
I  excluded  it  because  the  two  American  officials  differed 
in  their  account  of  it,  because  I  did  not  know  through 
what  port  it  could  be  fought,  and  because  James  asserted 
that  it  was  dismounted  and  lashed  to  the  forecastle.  The 
Wasp  left  port  with  138  men  ;  subtracting  the  pilot  and 
two  men  who  were  drowned,  makes  135  the  number  on 
board  during  the  action.  As  the  battle  was  fought,  I 
doubt  if  the  loss  of  the  brig's  main-yard  had  much  effect 
on  the  result ;  had  it  been  her  object  to  keep  on  the  wind, 


508  APPENDIX. 

or  had  the  loss  of  her  after-sails  enabled  her  antagonist  to 
cross  her  stern  (as  in  the  case  of  the  Argus  and  Pelican), 
the  accident  could  fairly  be  said  to  have  had  a  decided 
effect  upon  the  contest.  But  as  a  short  time  after  the 
fight  began  the  vessels  were  running  nearly  free,  and  as 
the  Wasp  herself  was  greatly  injured  aloft  at  the  time,  and 
made  no  effort  to  cross  her  foes  stern,  it  is  difficult  to  see 
that  it  made  much  difference.  The  brig's  head-sails  were 
all  right,  and,  as  she  was  not  close-hauled,  the  cause  of 
her  not  being  kept  more  under  command  was  probably 
purely  due  to  the  slaughter  on  her  decks. 

Professor  Soley  represents  the  combat  of  the  States  and 
Macedonian  as  a  plain  yardarm  and  yardarm  action  after 
the  first  forty  minutes.  I  have  followed  the  English 
authorities  and  make  it  a  running  fight  throughout.  If 
Professor  Soley  is  right,  the  enormous  disparity  in  loss 
was  due  mainly  to  the  infinitely  greater  accuracy  of  the 
American  fire  ;  according  to  my  diagram  the  chief  cause 
was  the  incompetency  of  the  Macedonian's  commander. 
In  one  event  the  difference  was  mainly  in  the  gunnery  of 
the  crews,  in  the  other,  it  was  mainly  in  the  tactical  skill 
of  the  captains.  The  question  is  merely  as  to  how  soon 
Garden,  in  his  headlong,  foolishly  rash  approach,  was 
enabled  to  close  with  Decatur.  I  have  represented  the 
closing  as  taking  place  later  than  Professor  Soley  has  done  ; 
very  possibly  I  am  wrong.  Could  my  work  now  be  re 
written  I  think  I  should  adopt  his  diagram  of  the  action 
of  the  Macedonian. 

But  in  the  action  with  the  Java  it  seems  to  me  that 
he  is  mistaken.  He  has  here  followed  the  British  ac 
counts  ;  but  they  are  contradicted  by  the  American 
authorities,  and  besides  have  a  very  improbable  look. 
When  the  Constitution  came  round  for  the  second  time, 
on  the  port  tack,  James  declares  the  Java  passed  directly 
across  her  stern,  almost  touching,  but  that  the  British 
crew,  overcome  by  astonishment  or  awe,  did  not  fire  a 


APPENDIX.  509 

shot  ;  and  that  shortly  afterward  the  manoeuvre  was  re 
peated.  When  this  incident  is  said  to  have  occurred 
the  Java's  crew  had  been  hard  at  work  fighting  the  guns 
for  half  an  hour,  and  they  continued  for  an  hour  and  a 
half  afterward  ;  it  is  impossible  to  believe  that  they  would 
have  foreborne  to  fire  more  than  one  gun  when  in  such  a 
superb  position  for  inflicting  damage.  Even  had  the 
men  been  struck  with  temporary  lunacy  the  officers  alone 
would  have  fired  some  of  the  guns.  Moreover,  if  the 
courses  of  the  vessels  were  such  as  indicated  on  Professor 
Soley's  diagram  the  Java  would  herself  have  been  pre 
viously  exposed  to  a  terrible  raking  fire,  which  was  not  the 
case.  So  the  alleged  manoeuvres  have,/*r  set  a  decided 
ly  apocryphal  look  ;  and  besides  they  are  flatly  contra 
dicted  by  the  American  accounts  which  state  distinctly 
that  the  Java  remained  to  windward  in  every  portion  of 
the  fight.  On  this  same  tack  Professor  Soley  represents 
the  Java  as  forereaching  on  the  Constitution  ;  I  have  re 
versed  this.  At  this  time  the  Java  had  been  much  cut 
up  in  her  rigging  and  aloft  generally,  while  the  Constitu 
tion  had  set  much  additional  sail,  and  in  consequence  the 
latter  forged  ahead  and  wore  in  the  smoke  unperceived. 
When  the  ships  came  foul  Professor  Soley  has  drawn  the 
Constitution  in  a  position  in  which  she  would  receive  a 
most  destructive  stern  rake  from  her  antagonist's  whole 
broadside.  The  positions  could  not  have  been  as  there 
represented.  The  Java's  bowsprit  came  foul  in  the  Con 
stitutions  mizzen  rigging  and  as  the  latter  forged  ahead 
she  pulled  the  former  gradually  round  till  when  they  sep 
arated  the  ships  were  in  a  head  and  stern  line.  Commo 
dore  Bainbridge,  as  he  particularly  says,  at  once  "  kept 
away  to  avoid  being  raked,"  while  the  loss  of  the  head- 
sails  aboard  the  Java  would  cause  the  latter  to  come  up 
in  the  wind,  and  the  two  ships  would  again  be  running 
parallel,  with  the  American  to  leeward.  I  have  already 
discussed  fully  the  reasons  for  rejecting  in  this  instance 


510  APPENDIX. 

the  British  report  of  their  own  force  and  loss.  This  was 
the  last  defeat  that  the  British  officially  reported  ;  the 
admiralty  were  smarting  with  the  sting  of  successive  dis 
asters  and  anxious  at  all  costs  to  put  the  best  possible 
face  on  affairs  (as  witness  Mr.  Croker's  response  to  Lord 
Dundonald's  speech  in  the  House).  There  is  every 
reason  for  believing  that  in  this  case  the  reports  were 
garbled  ;  exactly  as  at  a  later  date  the  official  correspond 
ence  preceding  the  terrible  disasters  at  Cabul  was  tam 
pered  with  before  being  put  before  the  public  (see 
McCarthy's  "  History  of  our  Own  Times  "). 

It  is  difficult  to  draw  a  diagram  of  the  action  between 
the  Hornet  and  Peacock,  although  it  was  so  short,  the  ac 
counts  contradicting  one  another  as  to  which  ship  was  to 
windward  and  which  on  the  "  larboard  tack  ;  "  and  I  do 
not  know  if  I  have  correctly  represented  the  position  of 
the  combatants  at  the  close  of  the  engagement.  Lieu 
tenant  Conner  reported  the  number  of  men  aboard  the 
Hornet  fit  for  duty  as  135  ;  Lawrence  says  she  had  8 
absent  in  a  prize  and  7  too  sick  to  be  at  quarters.  This 
would  make  an  original  complement  of  150,  and  tallies 
exactly  with  the  number  of  men  left  on  the  Hornet  after 
the  action  was  over,  as  mentioned  by  Lawrence  in  his 
account  of  the  total  number  of  souls  aboard.  The  log 
book  of  the  Hornet  just  before  starting  on  her  cruise, 
states  her  entire  complement  as  158  ;  but  4  of  these  were 
sick  and  left  behind.  There  is  still  a  discrepancy  of  4 
men,  but  during  the  course  of  the  cruise  nothing  would 
be  more  likely  than  that  four  men  should  be  gotten  rid  of> 
either  by  sickness,  desertion,  or  dismissal.  At  any  rate 
the  discrepancy  is  very  trivial.  In  her  last  cruise,  as  I 
have  elsewhere  said,  I  have  probably  overestimated  the 
number  of  the  Hornet's  crew  ;  this  seems  especially 
likely  when  it  is  remembered  that  toward  the  close  of  the 
war  our  vessels  left  port  with  fewer  supernumeraries 
aboard  than  earlier  in  the  contest.  If  such  is  the  case, 


APPENDIX.  5  i  i 

the  Hornet  and  Penguin  were   of  almost   exactly  equal 
force. 

My  own  comments  upon  the  causes  of  our  success, 
upon  the  various  historians  of  the  war,  etc.,  are  so  simi 
lar  to  those  of  Professor  Soley,  that  I  almost  feel  as  if  I 
had  been  guilty  of  plagiarism  ;  yet  I  never  saw  his  writ 
ings  till  half  an  hour  ago.  But  in  commenting  on  the 
actions  of  1812,  I  think  the  Professor  has  laid  too  much 
stress  on  the  difference  in  "  dash  "  between  the  combat 
ants.  The  Wasp  bore  down  with  perfect  confidence  to 
engage  an  equal  foe  ;  and  the  Hornet  could  not  tell  till 
the  Peacock  opened  fire  that  the  latter  was  inferior  in 
force,  and  moreover  fought  in  sight  of  another  hostile 
vessel.  In  the  action  with  the  Guerrie're  it  was  Hull  and 
not  Dacres  who  acted  boldly,  the  Englishman  delaying 
the  combat  and  trying  to  keep  it  at  long  range  for  some 
time.  In  this  fight  it  must  be  remembered  that  neither 
foe  knew  the  exact  force  of  the  other  until  the  close 
work  began  ;  then,  it  is  true,  Dacres  fought  most  bravely. 
So  with  the  Macedonian;  James  particularly  says  that 
she  did  not  know  the  force  of  her  foe,  and  was  confident 
of  victory.  The  Java,  however,  must  have  known  that 
she  was  to  engage  a  superior  force.  In  neither  of  the 
first  two  frigate  actions  did  the  Americans  have  a  chance 
to  display  any  courage  in  the  actual  fighting,  the  victory 
was  won  with  such  ease.  But  in  each  case  they  entered 
as  bravely,  although  by  no  means  as  rashly  or  foolishly, 
into  the  fight  as  their  antagonists  did.  It  must  always  be 
remembered  that  until  this  time  it  was  by  no  means 
proved  that  24-pounders  were  better  guns  than  i8's  to< 
put  on  frigates  ;  exactly  as  at  a  little  later  date  it  was 
vigorously  contended  that  42-pounders  were  no  more 
effective  guns  for  two-deckers  than  32-pounders  were. 
Till  1812  there  had  been  no  experience  to  justify  the 
theory  that  the  24-pounder  was  the  better  gun.  So  that 
in  the  first  five  actions  it  cannot  be  said  that  the  British 


512  APPENDIX. 

showed  any  especial  courage  in  beginning  the  fight ;  it 
was  more  properly  to  be  called  ignorance.  After  the 
fight  was  once  begun  they  certainly  acted  very  bravely, 
and,  in  particular,  the  desperate  nature  of  the  Frolic's 
defence  has  never  been  surpassed. 

But  admitting  this  is  a  very  different  thing  from  ad 
mitting  that  the  British  fought  more  bravely  than 
their  foes  ;  the  combatants  were  about  on  a  par  in  this 
respect.  The  Americans,  it  seems  to  me,  were  always  to 
the  full  as  ready  to  engage  as  their  antagonists  were  ;  on 
each  side  there  were  few  over-cautious  men,  such  as 
Commodore  Rodgers  and  Sir  George  Collier,  the  oppos 
ing  captains  on  Lake  Ontario,  the  commander  of  the 
Bonne  Citoyenne,  and  perhaps  Commodore  Decatur,  but 
as  a  rule  either  side  jumped  at  the  chance  of  a  fight. 
The  difference  in  tactics  was  one  of  skill  and  common 
sense,  not  one  of  timidity.  The  United  States  did  not 
"  avoid  close  action  "  from  over-caution,  but  simply  to 
take  advantage  of  her  opponent's  rashness.  Hull's  ap 
proach  was  as  bold  as  it  was  skilful ;  had  the  opponent  to 
leeward  been  the  Endymion,  instead  of  the  Guerrie're,  her 
24-pounders  would  not  have  saved  her  from  the  fate  that 
overtook  the  latter.  Throughout  the  war  I  think  that  the 
Americans  were  as  bold  in  beginning  action,  and  as  stub 
born  in  continuing  it,  as  were  their  foes — although  no 
more  so.  Neither  side  can  claim  any  superiority  on  the 
average,  though  each  can  in  individual  cases,  as  regards 
courage.  Foolhardiness  does  not  imply  bravery.  A 
prize-fighter  who  refused  to  use  his  guard  would  be 
looked  upon  as  exceptionally  brainless,  not  as  exception 
ally  brave  ;  yet  such  a  case  is  almost  exactly  parallel  to 
that  of  the  captain  of  the  Macedonian. 


APPENDIX     D. 
In   the    "  Historical   Register   of   the  United  States 


APPENDIX.  513 

(Edited  by  T.  H.  Palmer,  Philadelphia,  1814),  vol.  i  p.  105 
(State  Papers),  is  a  letter  from  Lieut.  L.  H.  Babbitt  to 
Master- commandant  Wm.  U.  Crane,  both  of  the  Nautilus, 
dated  Sept.  13,  1812,  in  which  he  says  that  of  the  six  men 
imprisoned  by  the  British  on  suspicion  of  being  of  English 
birth,  four  were  native-born  Americans,  and  two  natur 
alized  citizens.  He  also  gives  a  list  of  six  men  who 
deserted,  and  entered  on  the  Shannon,  of  whom  two 
were  American  born — the  birthplaces  of  the  four  others 
not  being  given.  Adding  these  last,  we  still  have  but  six 
men  as  the  number  of  British  aboard  the  Nautilus.  It  is 
thus  seen  that  the  crack  frigate  Shannon  had  American 
deserters  aboard  her — although  these  probably  formed 
a  merely  trifling  faction  of  her  crew,  as  did  the  British 
deserters  aboard  the  crack  frigate  Constitution. 

On  p.  108,  is  a  letter  of  Dec.  17,  1812,  from  Geo.  S. 
Wise,  purser  of  the  Wasp,  stating  that  twelve  of  that 
ship's  crew  had  been  detained  "  under  the  pretence  of 
their  being  British  subjects  "  ;  so  that  nine  per  cent,  of 
her  crew  may  have  been  British — or  the  proportion  may 
have  been  very  much  smaller. 

On  p.  117,  is  a  letter  of  Jan.  14,  1813,  from  Com 
modore  J.  Rodgers,  in  which  he  states  that  he  encloses 
the  muster-rolls  of  H.  B.  M.  ships,  Moselle  and  Sappho, 
taken  out  of  the  captured  packet  Swallow  ;  and  that  these 
muster-rolls  show  that  in  August,  1812,  one  eighth  of  the 
crews  of  the  Moselle  and  Sappho,  was  composed  of 
Americans. 

These  various  letters  thus  support  strongly  the  conclu 
sions  reached  on  a  former  page  as  to  the  proportion  of 
British  deserters  on  American  vessels. 

In  "  A  Biographical  Memoir  of  the  late  Commodore 
Joshua  Barney,  from  Autographical  Notes  and  Journals  " 
(Edited  by  Mary  Barney,  Boston,  1832),  on  pages  263, 
and  315,  are  descriptions  of  the  flotilla  destroyed  in  the 
Patuxent.  It  consisted  of  one  gun-boat,  carrying  a  long 


5 14  APPENDIX. 

24  ;  one  cutter,  carrying  a  long  18,  a  columbiad  18,  and 
four  Q-pound  carronades,  and  thirteen  row  barges,  each 
carrying  a  long  18  or  12  in  the  bow,  with  a  32-pound  or 
i8-pound  carronade  in  the  stern.  On  p.  256,  Barney's 
force  in  St.  Leonard's  creek,  is  described  as  consisting  of 
one  sloop,  two  gun-boats,  and  thirteen  barges,  with  in  all 
somewhat  over  500  men  ;  and  it  is  claimed  that  the 
flotilla  drove  away  the  blockading  frigates,  entirely  un 
aided  ;  the  infantry  force  on  shore  rendering  no  assist 
ance.  The  work  is  of  some  value,  as  showing  that  James 
had  more  than  doubled  the  size,  and  almost  doubled  the 
strength,  of  Barney's  various  gun-boats. 

It  may  be  mentioned  that  on  p.  108,  Commodore 
Barney  describes  the  Dutch-American  frigate  South 
Carolina,  which  carried  a  crew  of  550  men,  and  was 
armed  with  28  long  42*5  on  the  maindeck,  and  12  long 
I2*s  on  the  spardeck.  She  was  far  heavier  than  any  of 
our  44-gun  frigates  of  1812,  and  an  overmatch  for 
anything  under  the  rank  of  a  74.  This  gives  further 
emphasis  to  what  I  have  already  stated — that  the  dis 
tinguishing  feature  of  the  war  of  1812,  is  not  the  intro 
duction  of  the  heavy  frigate,  for  heavy  frigates  had  been 
in  use  among  various  nations  for  thirty  years  previously, 
but  the  fact  that  for  the  first  time  the  heavy  frigate  was 
used  to  the  best  possible  advantage. 


APPENDIX  E. 

In  the  last  edition  of  James'  "  Naval  History  of  Great 
Britain,"  published  in  London,  in  1886,  by  Richard 
Bentley  &  Son,  there  is  an  'appendix  by  Mr.  H.  T. 
Powell,  devoted  to  the  war  of  1812,  mainly  to  my 
account  thereof. 

Mr.  Powell  begins  by  stating  with  naif  solemnity  that 
"most  British  readers  will  be  surprised  to  learn  that, 
notwithstanding  the  infinite  pains  taken  by  William 


APPENDIX.  5  T  5 

James  to  render  his  history  a  monument  of  accuracy, 
and  notwithstanding  the  exposure  he  brought  upon  con 
temporary  misstatements,  yet  to  this  day  the  Americans 
still  dispute  his  facts."  It  is  difficult  to  discuss  seriously 
any  question  with  a  man  capable  of  writing  down  in 
good  faith  such  a  sentence  as  the  above.  James  (unlike 
Brenton  and  Cooper)  knew  perfectly  well  how  to  be 
accurate  ;  but  if  Mr.  Powell  will  read  the  comments  on 
his  accounts  which  I  have  appended  to  the  description 
of  almost  every  battle,  he  will  see  that  James  stands 
convicted  beyond  possibility  of  doubt,  not  merely  of 
occasional  inaccuracies  or  errors,  but  of  the  systematic, 
malicious,  and  continuous  practice  of  every  known  form 
of  wilful  misstatement,  from  the  suppression  of  the  truth 
and  the  suggestion  of  the  false  to  the  lie  direct.  To  a 
man  of  his  character  the  temptation  was  irresistible  ;  for 
when  he  came  to  our  naval  war,  he  had  to  appear  as  the 
champion  of  the  beaten  side,  and  to  explain  away  de 
feat  instead  of  chronicling  victory.  The  contemporary 
American  writers  were  quite  as  boastful  and  untruthful. 
No  honorable  American  should  at  this  day  endorse  their 
statements  ;  and  similarly,  no  reputable  Englishman 
should  permit  his  name  to  be  associated  in  any  way  with 
James'  book  without  explicitly  disclaiming  all  share  in, 
or  sympathy  with,  its  scurrilous  mendacity. 

Mr.  Powell's  efforts  to  controvert  my  statements  can 
be  disposed  of  in  short  order.  He  first  endeavors  to 
prove  that  James  was  right  about  the  tonnage  of  the 
ships  ;  but  all  that  he  does  is  to  show  that  his  author 
gave  for  the  English  frigates  and  sloops  the  correct  ton 
nage  by  English  and  French  rules.  This  I  never  for  a 
moment  disputed.  What  I  said  was  that  the  comparative 
tonnage  of  the  various  pairs  of  combatants  as  given  by 
James  was  all  wrong  ;  and  this  Mr.  Powell  does  not  even 
discuss.  James  applied  one  system  correctly  to  the 
English  vessels  ;  but  he  applied  quite  another  to  the 


516  APPENDIX. 

American  (especially  on  the  lakes).  Mr.  Powell  actually 
quotes  Admiral  Chads  as  a  witness,  because  he  says  that 
his  father  considered  James'  account  of  the  Java's  fight 
accurate  ;  if  he  wishes  such  testimony,  I  can  produce 
many  relatives  of  the  Perrys,  Porters,  and  Rodgers  of 
1812,  who  insist  that  I  have  done  much  less  than  justice 
to  the  American  side.  He  says  I  passed  over  silently 
James'  schedule  of  dimensions  of  the  frigates  and  sloops. 
This  is  a  mistake  ;  I  showed  by  the  testimony  of  Captains 
Biddle  and  Warrington  and  Lieutenant  Hoffman  that  his 
comparative  measurements  (the  absolute  measurements 
being  of  no  consequence)  for  the  American  and  British 
sloops  are  all  wrong  ;  and  the  same  holds  true  of  the 
frigates. 

Mr.  Powell  deals  with  the  weight  of  shot  exactly  as  he 
does  with  the  tonnage — that  is,  he  seeks  to  show  what 
the  absolute  weight  of  the  British  shot  was  ;  but  he  does 
not  touch  upon  the  point  at  issue,  the  comparative  weight 
of  the  British  and  American  shot. 

When  he  comes  to  the  lake  actions,  Mr.  Powell  is 
driven  to  conclude  that  what  I  aver  must  be  accurate, 
because  he  thinks  the  Confiance  was  the  size  of  the  Gen 
eral  Pike  (instead  of  half  as  large  again  ;  she  mounted 
30  guns  in  battery  on  her  main  deck,  as  against  the 
Pike's  26,  and  stood  to  the  latter  as  the  Constellation  did 
to  the  Essex)  y  and  because  an  American  writer  (very 
properly)  expresses  dissatisfaction  with  Commodore 
Chauncy  !  What  Mr.  Powell  thinks  this  last  statement 
tends  to  prove  would  be  difficult  to  say.  In  the  body  of 
my  work  I  go  into  the  minute  details  of  the  strength  of 
the  combatants  in  the  lake  action  ;  I  clearly  show  that 
James  was  guilty  of  gross  and  wilful  falsification  of  the 
truth  ;  and  no  material  statement  I  make  can  be  success 
fully  controverted. 

So  much  for  Mr.  Powell.  But  a  much  higher  author 
ity,  Mr.  Frank  Chiswell,  has  recently  published  some 


APPENDIX. 

articles  which  tend  to  show  that  my  conclusions  as  to 
the  tonnage  of  the  sea  vessels  (not  as  to  the  lake  vessels, 
which  are  taken  from  different  sources)  are  open  to 
question.  In  the  appendix  to  my  first  edition  I  myself 
showed  that  it  was  quite  impossible  to  reconcile  all  the 
different  statements  ;  that  the  most  that  could  be  done 
was  to  take  one  method  and  apply  it  all  through,  admit 
ting  that  even  in  this  way  it  would  be  impossible  to  make 
all  the  cases  square  with  one  another. 

Mr.  Chiswell  states  that  "  the  American  tonnage 
measurements,  properly  taken,  never  could  give  results 
for  frigates  varying  largely  from  the  English  tonnage." 
But  a  statement  like  this  is  idle  ;  for  the  answer  to  the 
"  never  could  "  is  that  they  did.  If  Mr.  Chiswell  will  turn 
to  James'  "  Naval  Occurrences,"  he  will  find  the  Chesa 
peake  set  down  as  1,135  tons,  and  the  Macedonian  as  of 
1,081  ;  but  in  the  American  Navy  lists,  which  are  those 
I  followed,  the  Chesapeake  is  put  down  as  of  1,244  tons. 
A  simple  application  of  the  rule  of  three  shows  that  even 
if  I  accepted  James'  figures,  I  would  be  obliged  to  con 
sider  the  Macedonian  as  of  about  1,185  tons> to  make  her 
correspond  with  the  system  I  had  adopted  for  the  Amer 
ican  ships. 

But  this  is  not  all.  James  gives  the  length  of  the 
Macedonian  as  154  ft.  6  in.  In  the  Navy  Department  at 
Washington  are  two  plans  of  the  Macedonian.  One  is 
dated  1817,  and  gives  her  length  as  157  ft.  3  in.  This 
difference  in  measurement  would  make  a  difference  of 
20  odd  tons  ;  so  that  by  the  American  mode  she  must 
certainly  have  been  over  1,200  tons,  instead  of  under 
1,100,  as  by  the  British  rules.  The  second  plan  in  the 
Navy  Department,  much  more  elaborate  than  the  first,  is 
dated  1829,  and  gives  the  length  as  164  ft. ;  it  is  probably 
this  that  Emmons  and  the  United  States  Navy  lists  have 
followed — as  I  did  myself  in  calling  the  tonnage  of  the 
Macedonian  1,325.  Since  finding  the  plan  of  1817,  how- 


518  APPENDIX. 

ever,  I  think  it  possible  that  the  other  refers  to  the  second 
vessel  of  the  name,  which  was  built  in  1832.  If  this  is 
true,  then  the  Macedonian  (as  well  as  the  Guerrttre  and 
Java]  should  be  put  down  as  about  120  tons  less  than 
the  measurements  given  by  Emmons  and  adopted  by  me  ; 
but  even  if  this  is  so,  she  must  be  considered  as  tonning 
over  1,200,  using  the  method  I  have  applied  to  the  Chesa 
peake.  Therefore,  adopting  the  same  system  that  I  apply 
to  the  American  38-gun  frigates,  the  British  38-gun 
frigates  were  of  over  1,200,  not  under  1,100,  tons. 

As  for  the  Cyane,  James  makes  her  but  118  ft.  and  2  in. 
long,  while  the  American  Peacock  he  puts  at  119  ft.  5  in. 
But  Lieut.  Hoffman's  official  report  makes  the  former 
123  ft.  3  in.,  and  the  plans  in  the  State  Department  at 
Washington  make  the  latter  117  ft.  n  in.  in  length.  I 
care  nothing  for  the  different  methods  of  measuring 
different  vessels  ;  what  I  wish  to  get  at  is  the  compara 
tive  measurement,  and  this  stands  as  above.  The  com 
parative  tonnage  is  thus  the  very  reverse  of  that  indicated 
by  James'  figures. 

Finally,  as  to  the  brigs,  James  makes  them  some  ten 
feet  shorter  than  the  American  ship-sloops.  In  the 
Washington  archives  I  can  find  no  plan  on  record  of  the 
measurements  of  the  captured  Epervier  j  but  in  the  Navy 
Department,  volume  10,  of  the  "Letters  of  Master  Com 
mandants,  1814,"  under  date  of  May  i2th,  is  the  statement 
of  the  Surveyor  of  the  Port  of  Charleston  that  she  meas 
ured  467  tons  (in  another  place  it  is  given  as  477).  James 
makes  her  388  ;  but  as  he  makes  the  American  Wasp 
434,  whereas  she  stands  on  our  list  as  of  450,  the  appli 
cation  of  the  same  rule  as  with  the  frigates  gives  us,  even 
taking  his  own  figures,  400  as  her  tonnage,  when  meas 
ured  as  our  ships  were.  But  the  measurements  of  the 
Surveyor  of  the  Port  who  examined  the  Epervier  are 
corroborated  by  the  statements  of  Captain  Biddle,  who 
captured  her  sister  brig,  the  Penguin.  Biddle  reported 


APPENDIX.  519 

that  the  latter  was  two  feet  shorter  and  a  little  broader 
than  his  own  ship,  the  Hornet,  which  was  of  480  tons. 
This  would  correspond  almost  exactly  with  the  Survey 
or's  estimate. 

It  still  seems  impossible  to  reconcile  all  these  conflict 
ing  statements  ;  but  I  am  inclined  to  think  that,  on  the 
whole,  in  the  sea  (not  the  lake)  vessels  I  have  put  the 
British  tonnage  too  high.  On  the  scale  I  have  adopted 
for  the  American  44-gun  and  38-gun  frigates  and  i8-gun 
sloops  like  the  Hornet  and  Wasp,  the  British  38-gun 
frigates  ought  to  be  put  down  as  of  a  little  over  1,200, 
and  the  British  i8-gun  sloops  as  of  between  400  and  450, 
tons.  In  other  words,  of  the  twelve  single-ship  actions 
of  the  war  five,  those  of  the  Chesapeake  and  Shannon. 
Enterprise  and  Boxer,  Wasp  and  Frolic,  Hornet  and 
Peacock,  Hornet  and  Penguin,  were  between  vessels  of 
nearly  equal  size  ;  in  six  the  American  was  the  superior 
about  in  the  proportion  of  five  to  four  (rather  more  in  the 
case  of  the  frigates,  rather  less  in  the  case  of  the  brigs) ; 
and  in  one,  that  of  the  Argus  and  Pelican,  the  British 
sloop  was  the  bigger,  in  a  somewhat  similar  ratio. 

This  correction  would  be  in  favor  of  the  British.  But 
in  a  more  important  particular  I  think  I  have  done  in 
justice  to  the  Americans.  I  should  have  allowed  for  the 
short  weight  of  American  metal  on  the  lakes,  taking  off 
seven  per  cent,  from  the  nominal  broadsides  of  Perry  and 
Macdonough  ;  for  the  American  ordnance  was  of  exactly 
the  same  quality  as  that  on  the  ocean  vessels,  while  the 
British  was  brought  over  from  England,  and  must  have 
shown  the  same  superiority  that  obtained  on  the  sea 
going  ships. 

Moreover,  I  am  now  inclined  to  believe  that  both  the 
Guerriere  and  the  Java,  which  were  originally  French 
ships,  still  carried  French  i8's  on  their  main-deck,  and 
that,  therefore,  about  20  pounds  should  be  added  to 
the  broadside  weight  of  metal  of  each.  The  American 


520  APPENDIX. 

accounts  stated  this  to  be  the  case  in  both  instances  ;  but 
I  paid  no  heed  to  them  until  my  attention  was  called  to 
the  fact  that  the  English  had  captured  enormous  quan 
tities  of  French  cannon  and  shot  and  certainly  used  the 
captured  ordnance  on  some  of  their  ships. 

In  writing  my  history  I  have  had  to  deal  with  a  mass 
of  confused  and  contradictory  testimony,  which  it  has 
sometimes  been  quite  impossible  to  reconcile,  the  diffi 
culty  being  greatly  enhanced  by  the  calculated  mendacity 
of  James  and  some  others  of  the  earlier  writers,  both 
American  and  British.  Often  I  have  had  simply  to 
balance  probabilities,  and  choose  between  two  sets  of 
figures,  aware  that,  whichever  I  chose,  much  could  be 
said  against  the  choice.  It  has,  therefore,  been  quite 
impossible  to  avoid  errors  ;  but  I  am  confident  they  have 
been  as  much  in  favor  of  the  British  as  the  Americans  ; 
and  in  all  important  points  my  statements  are  substan 
tially  accurate. 

I  do  not  believe  that  my  final  conclusions  on  the 
different  fights  can  be  disputed.  James  asserts  that  the 
American  ships  were  officered  by  cunning  cowards,  and 
manned  to  the  extent  of  half  their  force  in  point  of 
effectiveness  by  renegade  British.  I  show  that  the  per 
centage  of  non-American  seamen  aboard  the  American 
ships  was  probably  but  little  greater  than  the  percentage 
of  non-British  seamen  aboard  the  British  ships  ;  and  as 
for  the  charges  of  cowardice,  there  were  but  two  instances 
in  which  it  could  be  fairly  urged  against  a  beaten  crew — 
that  of  the  British  Epervier  and  that  of  the  American 
Argus  (for  the  cases  of  Sir  George  Collier,  Commodore 
Rodgers,  Chauncy,  Yeo,  the  commander  of  the  Bonne 
Citoyenne,  etc.,  etc.,  cannot  be  considered  as  coming 
under  this  head).  James  states  that  there  was  usually  a 
great  superiority  of  force  on  the  side  of  the  Americans  ; 
this  is  true  ;  but  I  show  that  it  was  not  nearly  as  great 
as  he  makes  it,  and  that  in  dealing  with  the  lake  flotillas 


APPENDIX.  521 

his  figures  are  absolutely  false,  to  the  extent  of  even  re 
versing  the  relative  strength  of  the  combatants  on  Lake 
Champlain,  where  the  Americans  won,  although  with  an 
inferior  force.  In  the  one  noteworthy  British  victory, 
that  of  the  Shannon,  all  British  authors  fail  to  make  any 
allowance  for  the  vital  fact  that  the  Shannon's  crew  had 
been  drilled  for  seven  years,  whereas  the  Chesapeake  had 
an  absolutely  new  crew,  and  had  been  out  of  port  just 
eight  hours  ;  yet  such  a  difference  in  length  of  drill  is 
more  important  than  disparity  in  weight  of  metal. 

As  a  whole,  it  must  be  said  that  both  sides  showed 
equal  courage  and  resolution  ;  that  the  Americans  usu 
ally  possessed  the  advantage  in  material  force  ;  and  that 
they  also  showed  a  decided  superiority  in  fighting  skill, 
notably  in  marksmanship. 


INDEX. 


Abeille  .        .        .        ,        .212 
Aboukir         .         .         .        24,  54 ' 
Acasta  .       43.  55A  77,  81,  423-?  j 

d'Ache 369 

Achille  .         .         .         .         .     41  I 
Accurate  firing  of  the  Ameri 
cans  .....   169 
Adams,  53,  62,  71-2,  302,  311, 
334,  443  ;  illustration  of  sec 
tion,  x  ;  cruise,  334  ;  chased 
by    Tigris,    335-6;    curious 
sailing     qualities     resulting 
from  being  built  by  contract, 
336  ;    grounds    on    isle   of 
Haute,    336 ;    attacked    by 
British  in   Penobscot,   337  ; 
burned  by  Capt.  Morris       .  338 
Adams,  Chaplain   .         .         .  310 
Adams,  Lieut.        .         .         .  229 
Adirondack  region          .         .139 
Adonis  .....   332 
^Eolus  .         .         .73,  83,  86-7 
sEtna    ....    318,  320 
Africa  .         .       43,  73,  82-3,  86-7 
Alacrity          ....   212 

Albion 317 

Alert,  80- 1,  137  ;  captured  by 

Essex          .         .         .         .81 
Alexandria.   175-6,   318  ;  sur 
renders  to  British        .         .319 

Alfred 414 

Alison,  Sir  A.          ...   381 

Allen 377 

Allen,  Lieut.  U.  H.       .    205,  206 
Allen,  Lieut. W.  H..,  on  United 
States,  114  ;  commander  of 
Argus,  205,  207,  209,  447  ; 
mortally  wounded        .         .  205 
Alligator,  220,   290,  346  ;  fu 
tile  attempt  to  cut  her  out, 
290  ;  sunk  in  a  squall.         .   291 
Almy,  Sailing-master,  T.  C.  .  262 
Alwyn,  Master       .         .         .     91 


Ambuscade     .         .         .    194,  195 
Amelia  Island         .         .         -315 
Americans  accused  of  treach 
ery      187 

"American  Artillerist's  Com 
panion,"  .  .  .  xi 
American  gun-boats  employed 
in  protecting  coasting  trade, 
198-9;  futile  attack  on  Brit 
ish  vessels,  200 ;  lesson 
taught  by  their  failure.  .  219 
American  loss  in  all  .  .  442 
American  navy,  confidence  in 
itself,  29  ;  espiit  de  corps  of 
its  officers,  29 ;  life-long 
training  of  sailors,  29  ;  great 
effectiveness  and  reasons  for 
it,  30  ;  no  impressment,  35  ; 
vessels  not ' '  largely  manned 
by  British  sailors,"  37-44  ; 
proportion  of  officers  fur 
nished  by  different  States  and 
sections,  44  ;  tonnage,  45  ; 
navy  yards,  46  ;  statistics  of 
officers  and  seamen,  46-7  ; 
list  of  vessels,  tonnage  and 
description,  48-51  ;  com 
pared  with  British  navy,  51  ; 
charges  of  underrating,  52- 
56  ;  unquestionable  superi 
ority  in  force,  59  ;  effective 
ness  due  to  small  size,  61  ; 
crew  of  a  44,  67  ;  of  an  18- 
gun  ship,  68  ;  tabulated  com 
parison  of  three  British  and 
three  American  vessels,  69  ; 
superior  discipline  of  Ameri 
cans,  133;  officers  better  paid 
and  of  a  bett'er  class,  134  ; 
American  navy  gave  more 
damage  than  it  received,  434: 
at  outset  of  war  numbered 
but  a  dozen  vessels  .  .  446 


523 


INDEX. 


American  officers,  reasons  for 

their  superiority  .  .  448-9 
American  privateers  cut  out 

by  British  squadron  .   172-4 

American  revolution,  fleet  ac 
tions  of  British  with  Euro 
peans  mostly  indecisive        .   368 
American     sailors     compared 
with  British,   35  ;  of  better 
material    for    man-of-war's 
crew     than     British,     448  ; 
American  sailors  on   Guer- 
ri^re  .         ,         .         .         •     97 
American  sharp-shooters.         .   133 
"American  State  Papers,"  20, 

47,  257,  314,349.  377 
American    vessels    built    and 
captured    or    destroyed    in 
1812,     137  ;     prizes    made, 
138  ;    in    1813,    21020;   in 
1814,  348-9;  in   1815,  439- 
41  ;  total  summary,  442-3  ; 
make-shifts  in  use  of  mer 
chant  schooners  .         .         .   143 
American  whalers  .         .         -34 
American    writings   miscalled 

histories  ....  248 
Amherst  Bay ....  244 
Amherstburg.  .  .  255-6 
Anglo-French  naval  war,  451  ; 

comparative  force  and  loss   45 1-3 
Angus,   Lieut.    S.,  203,    370, 
leads  disastrous   expedition 
against    Red    House     bar 
racks .         .         .         .         158-9 
Anjier   .         :         .         .         .435 
Appling,  Major      .         .         361-2 
Arab      ....          173-4 
Arbuthnot,  Capt.  J.        .         .  328 
Arbuthnot,    Admiral,    victory 

over  Barras  off  Chesapeake  .  368 
Argo       .         .         .         .         .107 
Argus,  12,  39,  64,  69,  73,   96, 
106,  136,  166,  204-12,  218- 

20,  315,  319,  349,  444-5J 
makes  six  prizes,  106  ;  en 
gagement  with  Pelican,  205  ; 
is  captured  by  her,  206 ; 
not  an  action  creditable  to 
Americans,  208  ;  compara 
tive  force  and  loss,  207-8  ; 
diagram  of  action,  208 ; 
charges  against  her  crew, 


209  ;  powder  alleged  to  be 
bad,  209  ;  comparison  with 
previous  combats,  210  ;  in 
feriority  of  beaten  crew  un 
accountable  .  .  .211 
Ariel,  254,  256,  260,  262-5, 

268-70,  372 

Armada  ....  328 
Armide .....  343 
Armstrong,  Lieut.  .  .  372-3 
Arundel,  Sailing-master,  154; 

wounded  and  drowned         .    155 
Asp,  153,  202,  220,   224,  229, 
231,   238,   244-7,    249,   256, 
443  ;  cut  out  by  boats  from 
Mohawk  and  Contest .         .   203 
Aspinwall,   Lieut.  .         .         .  233 
Aslrcea  .          .          .         .          .   117 
Atalanta         ....  332 

Atlas 416. 

Austrians        .         .         .         .     6o» 
Authorities  consulted  and  re 
ferred  to,  ii  (see  list  in  de 
tail). 

"  Autobiography    of    a    Sea 
man  "  .  .         .         -3 
Avon,  66,  208,  210,  211,  328- 
3i,    334,    350,    421,    446  ; 
chased  by  Wasp,  328  ;  cap 
tured  after  short  and  furious 
engagement,  329  ;  sinks      .  331 
Aylmer,  Lieut.  J.  C.       .         .123 
Aylwin .....  377 
Ayscough,  Sir  G.    .         .         -53 
Azores  .         .         .         .         .175 
Bainbridge,    Commodore,   36, 
50,    119,    120,    122-4,    126, 
128,    129,    132,   134-5,   181, 

183,  196,  370,  406,  447 
Bainbridge,  Master  J.  .  .  311 
Baker,  Capt.  .  .319,  320 
Ballahou  .  .  .  316,  350 
Ballard,  Lieut.  .  420,  424,  426-7 

Ballard 377 

Baltic,  battle  of      ...   277 
Baltimore,  172,  317,  342,  413, 
414  ;  unsuccessfully  attack 
ed  by  British       .          .        9,  318 
Barbadoes      .         .217,286-7,316 
Barclay,  Capt.  R.  H.,  63,  68, 
225,    252,    261,     273,    274, 
277,  280,  376  ;  commander 
of   British   forces  on  Lake 


INDEX. 


525 


Erie,  254-6  ;  description  of 
his     squadron    and    crews, 
256-9 ;     engagement     with 
Perry,    262,    264;    severely 
wounded     ....  265 
Barnegat         .          .          .          .82 
Barney,   Commodore    J.,    40, 
317,  319  ;  erroneously  called 
an    Irishman,    317;   attacks 
Albion    and    Dragon    with 
flotilla,  318  ;  memoir  .         .  473 
Barnwell,  Sailing-master         .  299 
Barossa  .         .         .    200,  415 

Barras,  Admiral     .          .          .  368 
Barrie,    Sir    R.,    relieved    by 
Rear-Admiral  Cochrane       .   286 

Barry,  Capt 337 

Bartholomew,    Capt.,    437-8; 
wanton  attack  on  American 
gun-boat     ....  438 
Bartlett,  Purser  .         .  436-7 

Bassett,   Sailing-master,    290 : 

promoted  to  lieutenancy  .  291 
Bastard,  Capt.  J.  .  .  .82 
"  Batailles  Navales  de  la 

France,"  see  Graviere  .  98 
Bayonnaise  .  .  ,  194-5 

Baynes,  Adj. -Gen.  E.  234,  258-9 
Beale,  G.,  Jr.  .  .  .  377 

Bell,  Lieut 392 

Belvidera,  65,  73-7,  82,  83, 
85-7,  172.  Engagement  with 
President  .  .  .  74-6 

Bentham,  Capt.  G.  .  .  338 
Beresford  .  224-5,  235,  252,  255 
Beresford,  Capt.  J.  P.  .  105 

Bermudas         .          .    107,  163,  417 
Bermuda  ' '  Royal  Gazette  "   404-5 
Biddle,  Capt.,  102,    106,  177, 
370,  401,   427-8,   430,  432, 

434,  447 

Bignell,  Lieut.  G.  .   262,  268 

Big  Salmon  River  .  .  .  360 
Big  Sandy  Creek  .  .  360-1 
Bingham,  Capt.  .  .  7 

Black  Rock  .  .  .  .157 
Black  Snake  .  .  .  362,  399 
Bladensburg  .  9,  174,  319 

Blaeny,  Lieut.  .  .  .  358 
Blake's  victory  over  Dutch, 

277,  280 
Blakely,  Capt.  J.  40,  66,  310, 

321,  323-4,  326-31,  352,  447 


Bland,  Quartermaster  F.  .  300 
Blockade  of  American  coast, 

strictness    ....   284 
Blucher  ....  406 

Blyth,    Capt.    S.,    213,    447  ; 
killed,  214  ;  great  personal 
courage  and  humanity          .   216 
Boarding   nettings    boiled    in 

pitch  .          .          .          .162 

Boasting  on  both  sides  .  .  286 
Bombay  .  .  .  .172 
Bonne  Citoyenne  .  1 1 8,  129, 

165,  181,  432 

Borgne,  Lake  .  .  343,  411 
Boston  .  .  .  .49,  446 
Boston  .  88,  134,  129,  163, 

290,  400,  413,  417 
Boston  "  Gazette  "          .         .   127 
Boston  Harbor       .         .         .417 
Boston  Lighthouse          .         .182 
Bowyer,  Fort          .         .         .   338 
Boxer,  vii,    213-7,    219,    349, 
377,  397,  407  J  engagement 
with   Enterprise,   213-5  ;   is 
captured     .          .          .          .215 
Braileford,  Midship.       .          .   159 
Bramer,  Capt.         .         .         .331 
Brant    .....  413 
Breckenbridge,  Lieut.    .         .   201 
Brenton's    "Naval    History," 
13,  14,  37-8,  40,  41,  62,  74, 
92,     115,     118,    128,    247, 
386-7  ;  its  inaccuracy  .     14 

Brest  .  .  .  .  .217 
Brine,  Capt.  .  .  .  327 

Bristol  .....  413 
British  accused  of  brutality    .    187 
British  Admiralty  report          .     42 
British   loss,    summary,    443  ; 
balance  of  loss  against  the 
British         ....   444 
British  navy,  its  great  prestige 
at  opening  of  war,  99  ;  num 
bered  a  thousand  vessels      .  446 
British    officers   hampered  by 

red  tape      ....   449 
British  vessels  captured  or  de 
stroyed    in    1812,    137  ;    in 
1813,  219  ;  in  1814,  345  ;  in 
1815,   441  ;  total  loss,  442  ; 
vessels  on   great  lakes,    in 
experience  of  crews    .          .140 
British  whalers  in  Pacific         .    164 


526 


INDEX. 


Broke,  Capt.  P.  V.,  afterward 

Admiral,  35,  61,  82,  88,  94, 
179-87,     192-4,    285,     351, 
*  447-8  ;  memoir  of,  61  ;  his 
chivalric  challenge  to  Law 
rence,     181  ;     gallant    con 
duct  in  engagement  against 
Chesapeake        .          .          .    182-8 
^Brooks,       Lieut.,       mortally 
|    wounded          .          .         265-268 
Broom,  Lieut.  J.,  killed          .   185 
Brown,  Capt.  T.     .          .          .   286 
Brown,  Gen.  J.  233,  357,  363, 

365-6 

Brown,  Lieut.          .   154,  229,  361 
Brutality  of  British  troops      .   161 
Buchan,  Lieut.  E.,  262  ;  dan 
gerously  wounded        .   264,  268 
Budd,  Lieut.  G.  .   181,  185-6 

Budd,  Lieut.  C.  .         .  .     377 

Bulger,  Lieut.      .         .  372-3 

Bulloch,  Capt.  J.  D.    .         .        vii 
Bunker  Hill  .         .         .         .33 
Bureau  of  Navigation     .         .41 
Burleton,  Admiral,  Sir  G.       .  433 
Burlington  Heights         .         .   363 
4 '  Burlington  Races  "      .         .   253 
Burrows         ....   377 
Burrows,  Lieut.  W.,   Com.  of 
the    Enterprise,   vi,    213-4, 
443  ;      mortally     wounded, 
215  ;    his    gallant    conduct 
and  great  popularity    .         215-6 
Bush,  Lieut.  .         .         -91 

Byng,  Capt.  H.  D.  .  .  202 
Byron,  Capt.  R.  74-7,  82,  88, 

173,  447 

Calder,  Sir  R.  242 

Caledonia,     142,     156-8,    233, 
254,     256-7,     260-70,     372, 
374,  444  ;  and  four  schoon 
ers  brought  into  Lake  Erie.   233 
Caledonia,    British    privateer, 

captured  by  Norwich  .   174 

Call,  William  .  .  .297 
Callao  .....  164 
Campaign  on  the  lakes,  a  fair 

account  difficult  .          .    143 

Campbell,     Commod.     H.    C. 

197,  338,  340,  438 
Campbell,    Master's  Mate    J.   262 
Camperdown,  victory  of  Lord 
Duncan          .          .         .22,  278 


"  Canada  must  be  conquered  "  7 
Canadians,  alleged  cowardice  148 
Canadian  colonies  feebly  de 
fended  ....  8 
Canary  Islands  .  .  163,  334 
"  Captains'  Letters,"  vi,  82, 

179,  183,  197,  412-3,  431,  438 
Garden,   Capt.  J.  S.f    108-10, 
113-6,    301-2  ;  a  poor  com 
mander       .         .         .         .113 
Carnation       .         .       2 1 1-2,  338-9 
Caroband  Bank      .         .         .166 
Carolina     .  43,  137,  343,  347,  410 
Carolinas         .          .          .    161,  400 
Carron  ....  338 

Carronade,  figure  of,        .          .     ix 
Cassin,  Lieut. -Com.,  201,  376, 

392,  398 

Castilian         .          .          .          .331 
Castlereagh,  Lord  .         .     42 

Castine  ....   337 

Cathcart,  Capt.       .         .         .176 
Catnall,  Commod.,  life  by  C. 

C.  Jones  .  .  .  .162 
Centipede  .  .  2O2,  377,  397 
Chads,  Lieut.  H.  C.,  120-2, 

124,  126-7,   129 

Chameleon      .          .         .         .127 
Champlain,    Lake,    139,    142, 
144,    147,    152  ;    battle    of, 
147,275-6,  279,  281,  375,  381,442 
Champlin,  Sailing-master, 262, 

267,  372-3 

Chandeleur  Islands         .         .   343 
Charlestown    .          .    183,  217,  413 
Charwell     .          .         .   355-8,  374 
Chasseur,      415,      416,     441  ; 
American  privateer,  chased 
by  Barossa,  415  ;  mistakes 
St.  Lawrence  for  merchant 
man  and  engages  her  416 
Chauncy,  Commod.  I. ,  66,144, 
152,    156,  193,   230-2,   235, 
237-8,    240-1,    353-6,   443  ; 
commander    of    forces     on 
Ontario,  152  ;     at  Sackett's 
Harbor,  154  ;  attacks  Royal 
George,    154  ;    takes    York, 
230,  and  Fort  George,  231; 
in  action  with  Yeo  does  not 
compare   favorably,    240-1  ; 
advantage  from  long  guns, 
244  ;  his  account  of  action 


INDEX. 


527 


near  Genesee    River,  244  ; 
engagement   in    York   Bay, 
245-50  ;   partial   victory  off 
Burlington,  248  ;  criticized 
as     a    commander,    253-4  > 
blockades    Kingston,    363  ; 
refuses    to    co-operate  with 
Gen.  Brown,  364,  367  ;  does 
not    make   best   use  of   his 
materials,  368  ;  not  deserv 
ing  of  praise  given  him       .  370 
Chauncy's  squadron  on  Onta 
rio  compared  with  Yeo's  .  225-7 
Chauncy,  Lieut.      .         .   229,  236 
Chevrette        .         .         .         .128 
Chlorinde       .         .         .         -99 
Claxton,  Lieut.       .         .         .103 
Claxton,  Midshipman     .          .   268 
Cherub       .  291-6,  298,  300,  305-8 
Chesapeake  Bay      .    161,171,316 
Chesapeake    River,    82,    286, 

368,  400,  440 

Chesapeake,  39,  41-2,  67,  69, 
72,  105,  113,  138,  149,  163, 
178,  180-5,  187-90,  191-6, 
209,  218-20,  421,  444-5  ;  re 
fitted  out  at  Boston,  in 
experienced  crew  and  new 
officers,  178  ;  armament, 
181  ;  engagement  with 
Shannon,  182-8  ;  captured 
by  her,  187  ;  diagram  of  ac 
tion  .  .  .  .  .  188 
Childers  .  .  .  .338 
Chippeway,  142,  147,  259,  260, 
262-3,  265»  267,  269>  270, 

283,  349 

Chili 306 

Chubb,  148,  282,  379-80,  389- 

90,  394,  397,  399 

Civil  War  ....  399 
Clement,  Sailing-master  G.  .  327 
Cleopatra  .  .  .  .  117 

Cylde 59 

Cockburn,    Adm.,    161,  437  ; 

attack  on  Washington         .   318 
Cochrane,  Adm.,  3,   286,  319,  343 
Codrington,      Adm.,      "  Me 
moirs,"    60,   142,    169,  311, 
315,  450  ;  comments  on  use- 
lessness  of  mere  martinets  .   169 
Coggeshall,  G.,    "  History  of 
American  Privateers,"   202, 


341,    415  ;    gross   misstate- 

ments  and  sneers  .   202 

Collier,  Capt.  Sir  G.   R.,  119, 

176,  321,423,425,427,  439; 

nis  blunders.  .         .  427 

Columbia  .  .  .319,  349 
Comparative  force  and  loss 

during  the  war         .          .   451-3 
Comus  .         .         .          .117 

Confiance,  64,  147-8,  250,  276, 

375-6,   378,  380,  384,    387, 

389-90,  392-7,  399 
Congress,    measure    proposed 

against  France  and  England       5 
Congress,   57,  73-4,  76,   106-7, 

138,  174,  1/6,  220,  378,  425,  446 
Congressional        forethought, 

lack  of  .  445. 

Conklin,  Lieut.  .   374-5 

Conkling,  Lieut.  A.  .  .  262 
Connor,  Lieut.  D.  167-8,  172,  430 
Conqiiest,  152,  154,  223,  229, 

231,  238,  244 
Constellation,  36,   32,   157,  72, 

117,  162,    173,    201-2,  378, 

446,  448  ;  crew  of,   unsuc 
cessful   attempt   to  capture 
her 162 

Constitution,  12,  33,  38,  40-3, 
54-8,  64-7,  70-2,  82-92,  95- 
6,  98,  105,  114-5,  H7-9. 
120-33,  J38,  178,  276,  287- 
9°.  334.  352,  398,  400, 
407,  4*7-26,  435,  439, 

447,  449-50,  skirmish  with 
and     escape    from    British 
squadron,    82-8  ;     captures 
and   burns    two   brigs,   88  ; 
recaptures    American    brig, 

89  ;  engagement  with  and  t 
capture  of  Guertiere,  89-92; 
comparative  force  and  loss, 
92  ;  diagram  of  action,  92  ; 
her  gunnery  excellent,  fault 
lessly  handled,  95  ;  crew 
new  men,  96  ;  engagement 
with  Java,  119-123;  cap 
tures  Java,  123  ;  slight 
damage  received,  list  of 
killed  and  wounded,  123  ; 
comparative  force  and  loss, 
126 ;  diagram  of  action, 
125  ;  cruising,  287  ;  cap- 


528 


INDEX. 


tures  Pictou,  287  ;  mis- 
statements  in  regard  to 
.  crew,  288-9  ;  chased  by  two 
British  frigates,  289  ;  en 
gagement  with  Cyane  and 
Levant,  418-22 ;  captures 
both,  419-20  ;  comparative 
force  and  loss,  420-1  ;  brill 
iant  manoeuvring  of  C. ,  di 
agram  of  action  and  com 
ments  on  it,  422  ;  chased 
by  British  squadron,  424  ; 
successful  escape  .  .  425-7 
Contest  ....  202 

Cooper,  J.  F.,  "Naval  His 
tory  of  the  United  States," 
41,  66,  74,  82,  85,  91,  96, 
101,  109,  145-9,  I02>  l64, 
166,  189,  190,  209,  221, 
240,  255,  262,  273,  275, 
323,  326,  332,  349,  354, 
370,  377-8,  402-3,  413,  423; 
less  of  an  authority  than 
James,  iv  ;  disposition  to 
praise  every  thing  Ameri 
can,  1 8  ;  his  injudicious 
praise  ....  272 
Cooper's  "  Miles  Walling- 
ford,"  "  Home  as  Found," 
"  Pilot,"  "  Two  Admirals,"  21 
Cooper,  Midshipman  .  .  168 
Copenhagen  .  .  .24 

Cornick,  Lieut.  H.  D.  .  .128 
Cornwall  ....  204 
Cornwallis  .  56,  127,  432-5,  439 
Corvette,  section  of  x 

Courier  National  .  .  .  117 
^owell,  Lieut.  J.  G.,  heroism 

when  wounded  .  .  .  297 
Coshnahan,  Midshipman  .  185 
Courage  alone  does  not  make 

a  great  commander  .  .271 
Cox.  Lieut.  W.  S.,  361  ;  his 

cowardice  .  .  .  .184 
Crab  Island  .  .  382,  391,  398 
Craney  Island  .  .  162,  201 
Crane,  Lieut.  .  .  .82 
Crawford,  U,  S.  Minister  to 

France  ....  204 
Creerie,  Lieut.  J.  .  .  196-7 
Creighton,  Capt.  .  „  -37 
Croghan,  Capt.  .  .  .  372 
Crow's  shoal  .  .  .  203 


Crowninshield,  Sec.  B.  W.  .  47 
Cumberland  Head  .  38,  388-9 
Cumberland  Island  .  .  437 
Cummings,  Midshipman  J. 

C 157,  268 

Curlew  .         .         .         -174 

Curry,  Lieut.  R.  C.        .         .   203 
Cutting-out  expedition  against 
privateers,  413  ;  daring  and 
successful  one  by  British     .   373 
Cyane,  53,  61,  64-5,  176,  276, 
285,  310,  417-20,  422,  424- 
5,    439,    441  ;    engagement 
with   Constitution,    418-22  ; 
surrenders  .          .          .  449 

Cyprus  .          .          .          .410 

Dabney,  Consul  J.  B.     .         .   338 
Dacres,  Capt.  J.  R.,  82,  88-9, 
94-5,  97,  113-5  I  wounded  in 
engagement  with  Constitu 
tion-    .....     91 
Danes   defeated  in    battle  of 

Baltic  ....  277 
Danish  gun-boat  .  .  198-9 
Dart  captured  by  Newport 

flotilla  ....  217 
Davies,  Lieut.  D.  .  .  124 

Dealy,  Sailing-master     .         .411 
Dearborn,  Gen.  .        .   229-30,  232 
Decatur          ....  444 
Decatur,  Commodore,  25,  32- 
3,  39.   42,   57,    73,    107-10, 
112,    114,    132,     177,     181, 

209,     211,     311,     317,      408, 

428,  447;  his  letter  describ 
ing  capture  of  Macedonian, 
vi  ;  chased  in  the  President 
by  British  fleet,  401-3  ;  sur 
renders,      404  ;      did     not 
"cover  himself  with  glory," 
405-6  ;     but    acted     rather 
tamely      .         .         .  407-8,  439 
Delaware        .         .         .118,  400 
Delaware  Bay         .         .161,  203 
Demerara  River     .          .          .    166 
Dent,  Capt.  J.   H.       .   291,  412-3 
Detroit,    155-7,    258-65,    267, 

269-71,  273,  283,  374,  444 
Detroit,  capture  of  .  .155 
De  Ruyter  .  53,  150,  277,  280 
De  Suffrein's  five  combats 

with  Sir  Edward  Hughes  .  369 
Devastation  .  .  .  318,  320 


INDEX. 


529 


De  Winter     .         .         .         .22 
Diadem          .         .         .         .201 
Dictator         .         .         .         .64 
Dickenson,  Capt.  J.    .         .  428-9 
Didon          ....     98-9 
Discipline  displayed  on  Amer 
ican  privateer  Lottery,  173  ; 
neglect    of     essentials     for 
mere   incidents,    in    British 
navy  .....    169 
Dixon,  Corporal     .         .         .   185 
Dobbs,  Capt.          .         .         .   374 
Dolphin       ....   173-4 
Dominica       ....  444 
Douglass,  Lord    H.,   "Naval 
Gunnery,"  iv,  75-6,  95,  113- 
5,    192,     195,    301,    436-7, 
449  ;   comments    on    action 
between  Essex  and  Phcebe  ,   301 
Douglass,  Capt.   G.          .  417,  419 
Dover          ....   258-9 
Dovvnie,  Capt.  G.,  65,   148-9, 
225,  381,  383-4,  386-7,  389; 
his     force    on    Champlain, 
378-81  ;    action  with  Mac- 
donough,  389-90  ;  killed     .   396 
Downes,  Lieut.       .          .   165,  297 
Dragon  .          .          .   317,  337 

Drake    singeing  the  beard  of 

the  Catholic  king  .  .  302 
Drummond  .  .  .  250,  283 
Drmnmond,  Gen.  G.  .  .  358-9 
Drunkenness  on  the  Argus,  210-1 
Dudley,  Midshipman  .  .158 
Duncan,  Lord,  22  ;  victory  at 

Camperdown       .          .          .   278 
Dundonald,   Lord,    "Autobi 
ography  of  a  Seaman"  .   61,  128 
Durham,  Adm.,  memoir  of    .   289 

Dutch 35 

Eagle,^-i,  281-3,  349,  375-6, 
378,  388-90,  394-7  ;  sent  by 
gun-boats  and  captured       .   282 
Earl  of  Moira,  140,  151,  224, 

233,   252 

Earle,  Commod.,  140;    feeble 
attack  on  Sackett's  Harbor, 
151  ;    shows  gross  incompe 
tence  ....   151 
East  Indies        .         369,  401,  435 
Eckford,    Henry,     147,    222, 

256,  353-4,  386-7 
Egyptian       .          .          .  .50 


Elliott,  Capt.  J.  D.,154,  156-8, 
229,  245,262,265,272,  374; 
captures  Detroit  and  Cale 
donia  ....  157 

Ellis,  Capt 176 

Emmons,  Lieut.  G.  E.,  statis 
tical  "  History  of  U.  S. 
Navy,"  iv,  47,  52,  163,  223, 
256-7,  348,  431;  best  Ameri 
can  work  on  the  subject  .  2O 

Endymion,  12,  51,  56-7,  63-4, 
69,  96,  213-7,  341-2,  401-10, 
439  ;  attack  on  Prince  de 
Neufchatel  repulsed  after 
desperate  struggle  .  .  342 

English  Channel     .          .          .   322 

English  vessels  twice  the  size 
of  Dutch  ....  277 

English  victories  over  Dutch 
due  to  superiority  in  force  .  277 

Epervier,    43,    52-3,    66,    69, 

2IO-I,     312-6,     349-50,    409, 

414,  445-6,  450  ;  captured 
by  Peacock,  comparative 
force  and  loss,  314  ;  gunnery 
of  British,  poor,  315;  Eper- 
vier  purchased  for  U.  S. 
Navy  ....  316 

Enterprise,  vi,  32,  engagement 
with  Boxer,  213-5  ;  captures 
her,  215;   severity  of  action, 
216;  superior  force  of  Ameri 
cans,   216  ;    unfit    to   cruise 
and  made  a  guard-ship         .   217 
Epworth,  Capt.       .          .          .    107 
Erebus        .          .      318,  320,  437-8 

Erie 349 

Erie,  Fort          .          .          156,  374 
Erie,  Lake,    139,    141-4,   147, 
158-9,     245-254,     372  ;     no 
American     force     there    in 

1812 155 

Erie,  Lake,  battle  of  (1813), 
271  ;  teaches  advantage  of 
having  the  odds,  275  ;  vic 
tory  honorably  won,  278  ; 
fought  mainly  by  Canadians  279 
Espiegle  .  .  166,  169,  181 
Essex,  35,  39,  43,  52-3,  58, 
63-4,  72,  78-81,  113,  117-8, 
134,  138,  164,  165,  226, 
276,  291-7,  299.  300,  303-4, 
306-10,  332,  350,  351,  421, 


530 


INDEX. 


444-5  ;  cuts  out  transport 
from  Minerva,  78  ;  cruising 
79-81  ;  engagement  with 
Alert,  8 1  ;  captures  Nocton, 
134  ;  captures  English  mer 
chant  vessel,  135  ;  struck  by 
squall  and  disabled,  294  ;  at 
tacked  \>yPhcebe  and  Cherub, 
295  ;  terrible  loss  and  dam 
age,  300  ;  surrenders,  300  ; 
comments  and  criticism  on 
the  action,  301-10  ;  repaired 
at  Valparaiso  and  sent  to 


England 
Essex  Junior 
Eurotas 
Euryalus 
Ettrydice 
Evans,  Capt. 


.  310 

291-3,  297,  310 

.  99 

318,  320 

.  41 

50,  163 


Evans,  Surgeon,  A.  A.  123,  127 
Everard,  Capt.  T.  .  .  282 

Fair  American,  152,  224,  229, 

238,  244 

Fairy 319 

Falkiner,  Lieut.      .         .         .185 
False  Duck  Islands,  154,  244,  250 
Farragut,    D.    G.    (Admiral), 
80,  164,  292,  297,  290-300  ; 
in  his  memoirs  comments  on 
Phoebe -Essex  fight,   304-5, 
308-9;  greatest  admiral  since 
Nelson         ....  409 

Fayal 338 

Fernando  de  Noronha,  island  135 
Ferris,  Sailing-master  .  .  344 
Finch,  Lieut.  B.,  135,  245,  249 
Finch,  148,  149,  282,  379-82, 

389-91,  397,   399 

Firefly  .        .        .        .349 

Fischer,  Lieut.  Col.  V.  .  358-9 
Flambeau  ....  349 
Florida  .  .  .  .301 

Florida  ....   335 

Floyd,  Capt.  R.  .  .  .  338 
Forrest,  Midshipman  .  .  268 
Forte  .  .  .  57,  98 

Fortune  of  War  .  .  .338 
Forty  Mile  Creek  .  .  235 

Franklin  ....  440 
Frederic kscoarn  .  .  .  117 
"  Free  Trade  and  Sailors' 

Rights"      ....       6 
French-English  naval  war      .  451 


French   histories    of    English 
compared  with  English  his 
tories  of  Americans     .         .   195 
Frenchman's  Creek         .         .   374 
Frigate,  definition  and  descrip 
tion  of  .          .         -54 
Frigate-built  ships,  section  of     xi. 
Frio  Cape       ....    135 
Frolic,   ii,    35,     39,     51,    68, 
101-6,   130,   137,    181,  275, 
304,  311,  326,  349,  350,  352, 
428,  445,  447  ;  engagement 
with  Wasp,  captured  by  her 
after  great  slaughter,  103  ; 
comparative  force  and  loss, 
103  ;  diagram  of  action       .   104 
Fulton             .          .          .         440-1 
Fundy,  Bay             .         .         .88 
Funk,  Lieut.  J.  M.         .         .no 
Galatea            ....   107 
Gallagher,  Lieut.         .         39.  404 
Gallapagos     .         .         .         .164 
Gamble,  Lieut.  P.  .         .  392 

Gamo 117 

Garden,  Capt.  S.  J.  .  .  268 
Garland,  Lieutenant,  mortally 

wounded    ....   265 
Geisinger,    Midshipman          .  332 
General  Armstrong,  338-40,  at 
tacked  by  British  boats,  339; 
attacked  by  Carnation*  scut 
tled  and  burned  by  her  own 
crew  .         .         340,  416 

General  Pike,  64,65,  222-3, 
226,  228,  234-8,  240,  244-7, 
249,  252,  355,  357,  364, 

376386 

Genesee  River,  235,  251,  252, 
366,  368  ;  engagement  near 
mouth          ....   243 
George,  Fort,  251-4,  363,  365; 
attacked   and    captured    by 
Chauncy's  squadron,    230-1,  234 
Georgia  .          .          .161,  401 

Georgiana  .  .  .  .165 
Gibraltar  ....  328 
Gladiator  .  .  .  .121 
Gloria  .  .  .  .117 

Gloucester,    140,   151,    229-30, 

234,  283,  443 

Good  Hope,  Cape     .         428,  435 
Gordon,    Capt.,  417  ;    skilful 
attack  on  Fort  Washington  319 


INDEX. 


531 


Governor  Tompkins,  152,  154, 

223,    229,    231,    232,     244, 

246-7, 

Graham,  Midshipman     . 

Graig,  Lieut. 

Graviere,  Adm.  J.  de  la, 
"  Guerres  Maritimes,"  iv, 
104-5,  JQ1.  45°  !  comments 
on  first  three  engagements, 
129-132  ;  the  best  criticism 
on  the  naval  war 

Graves,  Sir  T. 

Grasse,  Conte  de,  victory  over 
Sir  T.  Graves 

Great  Britain,   views  held 
regard  to  neutral  rights,  I,  5, 
6  ;  find  now  no 
6  ;  offers  apology  for  attack 
on     Chesapeake,    issues   Or 
ders  in  Council,  7;  engaged 
in  European  conflict  during 
early  part  of   this 
assembles    army   of 
men,  9  ;  greatness  of  naval 
power,    21-23 ;    upward 
a  thousand  vessels  at  open 
ing  of  war  .. 

Great  Sodas  .. 

Greene,  Capt.   P.  B. 

Greenwich      .. 

Gregory,  Lieut.  F.  H. 

"  Gridiron  Flag  " 

Griffith,  Adm. 

Growler,  146,    152,    154 
231,    236,     238,     240 
281-3,  358-9,  379,  399,  443  \ 
captured  by  gun-boats 

Guerriere,    n,  12,   39,  41 
58,  63,   67,    68,    73,   82,  83, 
85,    89-92,    95-97,  99, 
113,    116,  129-31,  137,  189, 
193,     288,    319,    421, 
449  ;  engagement  with  and 
capture  by  Constitution,  89- 
92  ;    blown    up  by 
cans,  94  ;  falsely  al 
have  been  rotten,  94  ;  hand 
ling  of  her  compared   with 
that    of    Constitution, 
outmanoeuvred  by  Constitu 
tion    ... 

Guerin,    "  Histoire 
de  France" 


249 

159 
200 


Gunnery,  skill  of  British  fal 
len  off,  149  ;  accuracy  of 
Americans  .  .  .  .169 


Halifax 
Hambleton,  Purser 


82,   187 
.  268 


Hamilton,  Secretary  P.       36,     46 
Hamilton,  151,  154,  223,  229, 

231,  237,  250,  256,  443 
Hampden  ....  336 
Hampton  sacked  by  British 


•  450 

with  revolting  brutality       .   161 

•  369 

Hampton  Roads     .         .   162,  200 

over 

Hanchett,  Capt.     .         .         .  201 

•  369 

Hardy,  Capt.          .         .         .57 

d    in 

Hardy,  Sir  T.                                 285 

,  r,5, 

Harris,  Sergeant    .         .         .   185 

ates, 

Harrison,  General           .          .  262 

ttack 

Hatfield,  Midshipman    .         .  230 

Or- 

Haute,  Isle  of         ...  330 

;aged 

Havana           .         .         .         .415 

uring 

Havannah      ....  320 

r,  8; 

Hawkins,  Capt.  R.         .         .78 

4,000 

Hawkins,  Lieut.   A.       .          .   341 

naval 

Hayes,  Capt.  J.     .         401-4,  439 

d    of 

Hebrus           .         .         .    320,  412 

jpen- 

Head,  Capt.  J.                 .         .174 

.  446 

Hector   .....   165 

•  235 

Hell-gate        .         .         .         .117 

.  118 

Henderson,  Capt.            .         .  338 

.   165 

Henderson,  Lieut.          .         .  418 

.  362 

Henly,  Capt.  R.    .         376-7,  394 

.     28 

Hermes           .         .     338,  350,  409 

.  337 

Hicks,  Lieut.         .         .         .   382 

229, 

Highflyer            .          177,  219,  444 

251, 

Hilyar,  Capt.  J.,  291-2,  294-5. 

443  5 

300-1  ;    conduct    in    action 

.  282 

with  Essex,  296,  298  ;  letter 

,  43, 

concerning   defence  of  Es 

',  83, 

sex,  303-4  ;  breach  of  faith, 

108, 

305  ;  courteous  treatment  of 

189, 
440, 

prisoners     .          .          306,  308-9 
Hinn,  Lieut.           .         .         .   229 

and 

Hislop,  Lieut.  G.            .    127,  129 

t,  89- 

"  Historical   Register  of     the 

meri- 

United  States"            .          .  473 

>d  to 

Hoffman,     Lieut.,    91,     419, 

land- 

424-5 

with 

Hogue    285 

94  ; 

Holdup,  Lieut.  T.           158-9,  262 

stilu- 

Hollaway,  Capt.     .          .         .358 

-     95 

Holmes'  Hole         .         .         .171 

itime 

Hope,  Lieut.  D.    .         .    108,  3:1 

.   195  j  Hope,  Capt.  H.,         341,  401,  405 

532 


INDEX. 


Hornet,  40,  52,  61,  66,  68,  73, 
77,  106,  117-8,  129,  133, 
138,  163,  165-72,  178,  181, 

-  207,  209-10,  217-18,  220, 
276,  311,  352,  398.  401, 
410,  425.  424-35,  439-447  ; 
captures  a  privateer,  77  ; 
chased  by  Bonne  Citoyenne, 

165  ;    captures    Resolution, 

166  ;  engagement  with  Pea 
cock,     1 66  ;     captures    her, 

167  ;  comparative  loss,  168  ; 
diagram     of     action,     170 : 
comparative      force,      171  ; 
generous   treatment  to  offi 
cers   and  crew  of    Peacock, 
171;  captures  Penguin,  429; 
diagram     of     action,    430 ; 
comparative  force  and  loss, 
431  ;  a  creditable  action  for 
Americans,  431;  chased  by 
Cornwallis,  but  escapes        .  435 

Horn,  Cape  .          .          .    164 

Hotham,  Adm.       .          .    401,  404 
Hughes,  Sir  E        .         .         .   369 
Hull,   Capt.  J.,    25,   82-8,  92, 
94,  114,  132,  192,  213,  271, 
327,    370,  409 ;  his    letter, 
41  ;    foremost    ship-captain 
of  the   war,  88-9,  92  ;  exul 
tation     caused    by    victory 
over     Guerriere,     99 ;      his 
famous     cruise,     335  ;     de 
serves  palm  as   best  single- 
ship  captain         .          .         447-9 
Humble,  James      .         .   122,  124 
Hunt,  Hon.  W.  M.         .         .     vi 
Hunter,  142,  147,  171-2,   256, 

259,  260,  262-5,  267-70,  283 
Hunter's  Point  .  .  ,177 
Hurlburt,  Sailing-master  .  438 
Huron,  Lake  .  139,  144,  372 
Hutchinson,  Lieut.  W.  .  .  177 
Icarus  .  .  .  .127 

Impressment  of  American  sea 
men,   1-4,  33  ;  cases  on  rec 
ord  .         .         .         .42 
Indefatigable  .          .          .56 
Independence           .          .          .  439 
Indian  Ocean           .          .          .  435 
Inglis,  Lieut.  G.     .         .         .  265 
Ingraham,    E.    D.,    "Capture 
of  Washington  "  9 


Ingram,  Lieut.  W.  .  .  300 
Ireland  .  .  .176,  335 

Irish  Channel  .  .  .176 
Irvine,  Lieut.  .  156,  159,  264 
Isle  Aux  Noix  .  .  .  376 
Italians  .  -35 

Izard,  Gen.  .         .         .  366 

Jackson,   Gen.,   347,  410;    at 

New  Orleans       .         .         .174 
Jamaica  .         .         .  73 

Jamaica  fleet  .  .  335,  442 
James,  W.,  "Naval  History 
of  Great  Britain "  and 
"  Naval  Occurrences,"  iii, 
iv,  2,  4,  5,  36-42,  56,  61, 
63,  67,  74-6,  80-1,  85,  96-7, 
99-100,  108-9,  J14>  IJ8,  124, 
128,  142,  145-50,  160-1, 
166,  169,  171-2,  175-6,  183, 
187,  191,  194-6,  202,  206-7, 

208,   211,  213,   221-5,  230-r, 

234,  238,  242-4,  257-8,  262, 
275,  278-9,  286,  288,  290, 

298,  300,  303,  308,  312-15, 

317,   322,  327,  329,  331, 

337-9,  341-3,  355-6,  359, 
361,  377,  379-86,  396-7, 
402-7,  409,  415,  421,  426-7, 
431-4,  441,  449,  451  ;  his 
history  a  piece  of  special 
pleading,  iv  ;  most  valua 
ble  authority  on  British 
affairs,  hatred  toward  Ameri 
cans,  14 ;  misstatements, 
15-6 ;  basis  for  all  other 
English  histories  of  the  war, 
17  ;  unreliability,  146,  202  ; 
grossly  inaccurate,  inexcusa 
ble  garbling  of  reports, 
309  ;  wilful  perversion  of 
truth,  310  ;  endeavor  to 
prove  American  seamen 
cowards,  333  ;  wherein  his 
chief  value  for  reference  lies, 
333  ;  misstatements  re 
echoed  by  all  British  his 
torians,  408  ;  utterly  un 
trustworthy,  except  for 
things  purely  British  .  410 

Jasseur  ....  317 

Java,  41,  58,  61-2,  66-8,  99, 
113,  119-33,  137,  189,  191, 
193,  275,  288,  319,  439-40, 


INDEX. 


533 


447,  449  I   engagement  with 
Constitution,  119-123  :   cap 
tured  by  her,  123  ;  after  re 
ceiving  severe  injuries,  124  ; 
list  of  killed  and  wounded,  124-6 
Jefferson        .      353-355,  357,   3°3 
Jefferson,  Pres.  T.,  project  of 
having    navy   composed   of 
small  gun-boats  .    199,  445 

John,  Lieut. -Col.  .         .   337 

John  Adams,  48,  71  ,  curious 
tradition  about  her   sailing 
qualities      ....   336 
Johnson,  Lieut.  R.          .         .   340 
Johnston,  Sailing-master, 

343-4,  410 

Jones,  Lieut.  T.  C.  .  343-5,  347 
Jones,  Capt.  J.,  100-3,  105-6, 

177,  447 

Jones,  Surgeon  J.  C.  .  122,  127 
Jones  .  353,  355,  357,  363 
Julia,  146,  151,  154,  229,  231, 

236,  238,  240,  251,  283,  443 
Junon  .  172,  200,  203,  289 
Kearney,  Lieut.  L.  .  .  412 
Klaeson,  Capt.,  blowing  up 

his  ship  .         .         .  302 

Kerr,  Capt.  R.  423 

King,  Capt.  .         .         .158 

King,  Lieut.  .         .   158,  316 

Kingston,     143,     154-5,    222, 
228,    233,    235-6,   251,  353, 
357,  360,  362,  366-7  ;  block 
aded  by  Chauncy         .   155,  363 
Knox,  Pilot  .         .         .         .183 
Lady  Gore  .         .  250,  283 

Lady  of  Lake,  224,  229,  231, 

236  ;  captures  Lady  Murray  236 
Lady  Prevost,  142,147,259-60, 

262-4,  267,  270-280 
Lady  Mw  ray          .         .         .  236 
Lamb,  Midshipman,  killed     .   268 
Lambert,  Capt.,   119-20,  449; 
mortally  wounded  in  action 
with  Constitution         .         .124 
Landrail,   350  ;    captured   by 

Syren,  privateer  .         .  327 

Langhorne,  Capt.  T.  L.  O.  80 
Lang,  Jack  .  .38,  102 

"  L'audace,"  etc.  .  .  .  250 
Laurentinus  .  .  .  200 

Law,  Lieut.  .         .         .184 

Lawrence,   255-8,  260-6,  269- 


73,  3°4  I  reduced  to  a  wreck 
on  Lake  Erie,  268  ;  heroic 
courage  shown  in  the  de 
fence  .  .  .  .271 
Lawrence,  Capt.,  73,  118, 
163,  166.168,  169,  171,  178, 
181,  182,  191,  216,  218,  285, 
447  ;  fatally  wounded,  184-7; 
a  "Bayard  of  the  Seas," 

192,  194 

Leander,  321,  423-4,  427  ;  cap 
tures  Rattlesnake         .          .321 
Lee,  Midshipman  .  395,  397 

Leopard,  42  ;  attack  on  Chesa 
peake  ....       6 
Les  Petites  Coquilles      .         .   344. 
Levant,    53,    64-5,    176,    276, 
310,  417-22,  424-6,  439-441; 
engagement   with  Constitu 
tion,  418-22  ;  surrenders      .   420 
Linnet,    148,    376,    379,    380, 

389,  390,  394-8 

Finnis,  Capt.  R.,  262  ;  killed    264 
Little    Belt,    142,    147,    176, 
256,    260,  262-4,  267,  269, 

270,  277,  283,  436 
Livermore,  Chaplain  .  .  185 
Lockyer,  Capt.  .  343,  345-7 
Loire  .  .  .  386,  317,  318 
London  "Naval  Chronicle," 

20,  380,  382,  397,  417-8,  422 
Long  gun,  figure  of          .  ix 

Long  Island  Sound          .   161,  440 
Long  Island  .          .          .  402 

Losack,  Capt.  W.  .         .   107 

Losses  in  this  war  compared 
with  Anglo-French  naval 
struggle,  453,  and  Anglo- 
Danish,  453;  balance  of  loss 
against  Great  Britain  .  453 

Lossing,  "  Field-Book  of  War 
of  1812,"  12,  149,  156,  171, 

230,  231,  256-7,  282,  371,  381 
Lottery,   American    privateer, 
416  ;    captured   after   stub 
born  resistance,    by  British 
squadron  .          .          .    172-3 

Louis  XV    .         .         .         .373 
Louisiana   .         137,  343,  348,  410 
Low,  C.  R.,  "  History  of  In 
dian  Navy "      .         .  207,  435-7 
Ludlow,  Lieut.  A.,    178,  184, 
186-7  ;  mortally  wounded  .      81 


534 


INDEX. 


Liidlow  .         .         .  377,  401 

Lumley,  Capt.         .         .     72,  401 
Luudy's  Lane          .         .         .174 
•Lyman,  Midship.    .          .          .  310 
Lyman,  Master's  Mate   .         .  332 
L) nhaven  Bay          .          .          .  172 
Lynx      .         .          .          172-4,  349 
Macdonough,    Capt.     T.,     9, 
65,  225,  370  ;  force  on  Lake 
Champlain,     376-9,     381-4, 
386  ;     victor     against      de 
cided  odds,  274,  277,  281  ; 
assumes  command  of  Cham- 
plain,     281  ;     builds     three 
new  vessels,    282-3  I  prepa 
ration  for  engagement,  387  ; 
prays  before  the  battle,  387  ; 
description   of    the    action, 
389-98  ;  Macdonough's  gal 
lant  and  energetic  conduct, 
392-4 ;     his    victory,    398  ; 
courtesy   and    humanity   to 
prisoners  and  wounded,  398; 
his    character. — one  of   the 
greatest  of  our  sea-captains  399 
Macomb,     Gen.,    at     Platts- 

burgh          ....   376 
Macedonian,   vi,    n,    33,    43, 
55,  57v   58,  66-8,   106,  108, 
no,  112-5,  116,  128,  130-1, 
137,  177,  189,  193,301,378, 
421,    425,    434,    446;     en 
gagement    with    and     cap 
ture   by  United  States,  108- 
9 ;    severely  damaged    and 
with  great  loss  of  crew,  no; 
Americans  in  her  crew         .   no 
Machilimacinac       .         .         .  372 
Madeira  .          .          .    163,  417 

Madison,  153,  223-6,  231,  238, 
240,  244-9,  252,  354-5,  357, 

364,  376 

Magnet  .  .  355-7,  363,  397 
Maidstone  .  .  .  .172 
Maitland,  Capt.  .  .287 

Majestic       .         .         .401-2,  404 
Makanilla      ....   335 
Malheureux  Islands,  289-90,  383-4 
Man,  Isle  of  .         .         .         .  414 
Manly   .         .          .          .          .114 
Manners,    Capt.   W.,    35,   73, 
351,    352  ;    heroic    conduct 
in  action  with    Wasp,  323  ; 


mortally    wounded    leading 
the  attack,  324  ;  praise  due 

him 447 

Maples,  Capt.  J.  F.  .  205-7 
Maranham  ....  426 
Marquesas  ....  164 
Marryatt's  novels  .  .  .21 
Mars  .....  217 
Marshall's  "  Royal  Naval 
Biography,"  13,  33,  42,  82, 

85,  108,  ri2,  423,  425-7 
Marshall,  Capt.  .  .  .  124 
Martha's  Vineyard  .  .171 
Martin  ....  203 

Mary  ....  250,  283 
"Masters'-Com.  Letters,"  vi, 

163,  204,  374 

Matterface,  Lieut.  W.  .  .  340 
McCall,  Lieut.  E.  R.  .  213,  215 
McClintock,  Midship.  .  202-3 
McCreery,  Lieut.  D.  .  .  214 
McDonald,  Lieut.  .  .  429 

McGowan,  Midship.  .  .  366 
McHenry,  Fort,  attacked  un 
successfully  by  bomb  vessels  320 
McKeever,  Lieut.  J.  D.  .  345 
McKnight,  Lieut.  299,  310,  332 
McPherson,  Lieut.  .  154,  229 
Medusa  .  .  .  .217 

Medway         .         .         .    327,  428 
Melville,  224-5,  237,  243,  252,355 
Menelaus        .         .         .         .318 
Mensing,  Com.  A.          .         .    vii 
Merrimac       ....  440 
Meteor  ....    318,  320 
Milan    .          .          .          .         .117 
Militia  of  U.  S.,  as  a  rule,  use 
less  in   this  war,    but   gain 
splendid    victory    at     New 
Orleans,    10  ;    not   able    to 
withstand      much      smaller 
well-trained  force        .         .153 
Miller,  Capt.  .         .   318,  319 

Miller,  Lieut.  .  .  .38 
Mills,  Col.  .  .  .  233 

Mindham,  W.  .  .  182,  186 
Minerva  .  .  .73,  78-0 
Mississippi  ....  347 
Mitchell,  Col.  .  .358,  368 
Mix,  Sailing-master  .  154,  229 
Mobile  Point  .  .  .  338 

Alohawk,     141,     202,     354—5, 

357,   364 


INDEX. 


535 


Moira  .         .         .         -355 

Mcna  Passage  .  .  .287 
Monk,  Sailing-master  J.  .  174 
Montagu  .  .  .118,  165 
Montgomery  .  .  .283 

Montreal        .         355,  356-8,   368 
Montresor,  Capt.    .         .         .   343 
Morris,  Capt.    Charles   (Com 
modore),  "Autobiography," 

9°.  133,  334-8 

Morris,  Lieut.  C.  .  84,  91,  115 
Mount,  Cape  .  .  .  334 

Mulcaster,     Capt.      W.      H., 
245-8,   252-3,    358-9  ;  best 
British  officer  on  Ontario        247 
Murray,  Capt.  J.    .         282-3,  2^9 
Nancy  .         .         .   374,  444 

Nantucket      .          .        82,  177,  341 
Napoleon's   defeat    by   Well 
ington          ....  406 
Narcissus,   172,    196,    317-8  ; 

captures  Viper    .          .         .172 
Nattagawassa  Creek        .          .   372 
Nautilus,    38-9,    43,    72,    82, 
137,    207,    306,   409,  435-6, 
439 ;    captured    by    British 
squadron     .          .          .          .82 
Nayaden         .         .         ..          54-7 
Naval  archives        .          .          .   377 
"Naval  Chronicle,"  iv,  vi,  41, 

124,  127,  128,  148,   214 
Naval  monument  .         .   286 

Naval  War  of  1812,  no  satis 
factory  history  of  it,  iii,  iv  ; 
subject  deserving  attention, 
v  ;  authorities  referred  to, 
vi  ;  causes  of  the  war,  I  ; 
impossibility  of  avoiding  it, 
6  ;  declaration  of  war  June 
18,  1812,  7  ;  slight  prepara 
tions  made,  7  ;  opens  badly 
for  United  States,  8  ;  battles 
mere  skirmishes,  8  ;  battle 
at  Bladensburg,  burning  of 
public  buildings  at  Washing 
ton,  attack  on  Baltimore, 
battle  of  New  Orleans,  9  ; 
authorities  referred  to,  II  ; 
overwhelming  naval  suprem 
acy  of  Great  Britain,  22  ; 
practical  lessons  conveyed 
by  the  war,  25  ;  race  iden 
tity  of  combatants,  26  ;  prac 


tically  a  civil  war,  27  ; 
American  navy  at  beginning 
of  war,  27  ;  officers  well 
trained,  28  ;  efficiency  of 
seamen  and  its  causes,  29  ; 
similarity  between  British 
and  American  seamen,  31  ; 
American  vessels  manned 
chiefly  by  native  Americans, 
many  of  whom  had  formerly 
been  impressed  into  British 
navy,  32-43  ;  quotas  of  sea 
men  contributed  by  the  differ 
ent  States,  44  ;  navy  yards, 

46  ;  lists  of  officers  and  men, 

47  ;    tonnage    and    ratings, 
American      ships     properly 
rated,    49-60  ;     armaments, 
three  styles  of  guns  used,  62  ; 
difference  described,  63-65  ; 
short  weight   of    American 
shot,    66  ;     comparison    of 
British  and   American  frig 
ates,  67-71  ;  Belvidera  pur 
sued   by  Commodore    Rod- 
gers,    74  ;    engagement   be 
tween    Belvidera  and  Pres 
ident,   75  ;   Hornet  captures 
a   privateer,    77  ;   cruise   of 
Essex,  78-80  ;   Constitution 
captures       Guerriere,       92  ; 
marked    superiority    shown 
by    Americans,    96  ;     Wasp 
captures    Frolic    after    hot 
action,   103  ;  disproportion 
ate  loss  on  British  side,  [05  ; 
both    vessels    captured    by 
Poictiers,       1 06  ;        United 
States  captures  Macedonian, 
109  ;  slight  American,  and 
great     British,     loss,     no  ; 
comments  by  Lord  Douglass 
on  the  action,  113-15  ;   Con 
stitution      captures     Java, 
123  ;  slight  injuries  received 
by  Constitution,  123  ;  severe 
loss  on  Java,  124  ;  diagram 
of  action,  125  ;  comparative 
force   and   loss.    126  ;  com 
ments  by  various  authorities, 
127-129 ;       comments      by 
Adm.  de  la  Graviere  on  first 
three  battles  of  war,    129- 


536 


INDEX. 


132  ;  comments  by  the  au 
thor,  132-3  ;  Vixen  captured 
by  Southampton,  and  both 

-wrecked,  134;  Essex  cap 
tures  Nocton,  afterward  re 
captured,  135  ;  summary  of 
the  year's  fighting,  135-8  ; 
vessels  captured  or  de- 

|  stroyed,  and  vessels  built, 
137  ;  prizes  made,  138  ; 
war  on  the  lakes,  139  ;  com 
batants  on  nearly  equal  foot 
ing,  140  ;  difficulty  of  com 
paring  the  rival  squadrons, 
144  ;  unreliability  of  au 
thorities,  especially  James, 
146  ;  Earle's  feeble  attack 
on  Sackett's  Harbor,  151  ; 
pursuit  and  attack  on  Royal 
George  by  Chauncy,  1 54-5  ; 
Elliott  captures  Detroit  and 
Caledonia,  157  ;  attack  on 
Red  House  barracks  by 
Lieut.  Angus,  158  ;  disas 
trous  result,  159 ;  brutal 
sacking  of  Hampton,  161  ; 
on  the  ocean,  160  ;  block 
ade  of  American  coast,  161 ; 
Commodore  Porter's  cam 
paign  with  Essex  in  South 

•••  Pacific,  164  ;  Hornet  chased 
by  Bonne  Citoyenne,  165  ; 
Hornet  captures  Resolution, 
1 66  ;  Hornet  captures  Pea 
cock,  167  ;  diagram  of  ac 
tion,  170;  comparative  force 
and  loss,  171  ;  generous 
treatment  shown  by  victors, 
i  171  ;  captures  Narcissus, 

'  Viper  172  ;  Lottery,  Dol 
phin,  Racer,  Arab,  and 
Lynx,  American  privateers 
cut  out  by  British  boats,  172- 
174  ;  Norwich  captures 
British  privateer  Caledonia, 
174  ;  third  cruise  of  Corn- 
mod.  Rodgers,  174-7;  Unit 
ed  States,  Macedonia,  and 
Wasp  blockaded  in  New 
London,  177;  Broke's  chal 
lenge  to  Lawrence,  181;  en 
gagement  between  Shannon 
and  Chesapeake,  182-8 ; 


Chesapeake  captured  after 
desperate  fight,  187  ;  com 
ments  and  criticism  by 
Cooper,  189-190  ;  by  de  la 
Graviere,  192  ;  by  author, 
189-96 ;  by  British  historians, 
194  ;  Surveyor  captured  by 
Narcissus,  196-7  ;  futile 
gun-boat  actions,  200;  Brit 
ish  attack  on  Craney  Island, 

201  ;     repulsed    with   loss, 

202  ;  Asp   cut  out  by  boats 
from  Mohawk  and  Contest, 

203  ;     American    gun-boat 
cut  out  by  boats  from  Junon 
and  Martin,   204  ;  engage 
ment    between   Atgus   and 
Pelican,  205-6  ;   capture  of 
Argus,    206  ;     comparative 
force  and  loss,  and  diagram 
of  action,  207-8;  not  a  cred 
itable  action  for  Americans, 
208  ;    comments   and  com 
parison  with  similar  fights, 
208-12;  Enterprise  captures 
Boxer  after  very  severe  en 
gagement,  215  ;  British  pri 
vateer    Dart    captured     by 
Newport  flotilla,  217;  ocean 
warfare  of  1813  in  favor  of 
British,    217  ;    summary  of 
year,  217-220;  vessels  sunk, 
taken,  built  and  purchased, 
prizes   made,     218-20  ;     on 
the  lakes,    1813,  Chauncy's 
squadron     compared     with 
Yeo's,    223-227  ;  Yeo's   su 
perior,  227;    Chauncy  takes 
York,     229  ;      takes     Fort 
George,  inflicting  heavy  loss, 
231-2  ;  British  evacuate  Ni 
agara  frontier,   232  ;  British 
attack  on  Sackett's  Harbor 
is  repulsed  with  great  loss, 
234  ;  Lady  of  Lake  captures 
Lady  Murray,  236  ;  Hamil 
ton  and  Scourge  founder  in 
a  squall,  237  ;   evolution  of 
the  two  squadrons,  238  ;  di 
agram    showing  position  of 
vessels,    239 ;    British   gain 
advantage  in  action  ensuing, 
240  ;  but   the  result  not  de- 


INDEX. 


537 


cisive,  241  ;  nor  the  victory 
brilliant,  242  ;  Americans 
reinforced  by  Sylph,  243 ; 
engagement  near  Genesee 
River,  243  ;  in  York  Bay, 
245-7  !  diagram  of  action, 
246;  comments  and  criticism 
by  Brenton,  James,  and  the 
author,  247-50  ;  American 
force  superior,  240;  reported 
heavy  loss  on  the  Wolfe 
and  Royal  George,  251;  Yeo 
blockaded  in  Kingston,  251; 
summary  of  the  season  on 
Ontario,  251-4  ;  success 
in  favor  of  Americans, 
251  ;  Yeo  and  Chauncy 
compared,  252  ;  reason  for 
American  success,  254  ; 
campaign  on  Lake  Erie, 
255  ;  description  of  the 
squadrons,  256-262  ;  en 
gagement  with  heavy  loss  on 
both  sides,  262-8  ;  Ameri 
can  victory  and  its  import 
ance,  268-9;  "  gl°ry  "  °f  it 
overestimated,  271  ;  dia 
gram  of  action,  269-70  ; 
great  valor  displayed  on 
both  sides,  271  ;  injudicious 
praise  in  Cooper's  "Naval 
History,"  272-3  ;  comments 
and  criticism,  272-81  ;  vic 
tory  due  to  heavy  metal, 
274  ;  and  superior  equip 
ment  in  general,  278  ;  for 
which  credit  is  due  to  Per 
ry,  278  ;  men  forming  the 
crews,  278  ;  campaign  on 
Champlain,  281  ;  Growler 
a~>d  Eagle  captured  by  gun 
boat  attack,  282  ;  total  loss 
or  lakes  during  1813,  283  ; 
or  the  ocean,  1814,  284 ; 
destruction  of  coasters  and 
fis  ling-boats  at  Pettipauge, 
283  ;  cruise  of  Rodgers, 
280  ;  chased  into  Marble- 
herd,  290  ;  attempt  at  cut 
ting  out  the  Alligator  de 
feated,  290  ;  British  man 
oeuvres  to  capture  Essex, 
298  ;  fight  between  Phcebc 


and  Cherub  and  the  Essex, 
298-300  ;  Essex  captured 
after  great  loss,  300  ;  com 
ments  and  criticisms  on  the 
action,  301-10  ;  discrepan 
cies  in  official  accounts  of 
loss  on  Essex,  303  ;  com 
parative  force  on  the  three 
vessels,  307  ;  action  be 
tween  Peacock  and  Epervier, 
312-13  ;  Epervier  captured, 
313  ;  diagram  of  action, 
313  ;  comparative  force  and 
loss,  314  ;  comments,  315  ; 
Commod.  Barney's  flotilla 
attacks  Dragon  and  Albion, 

318  ;    attack   of   British    on 
Washington    by    land    and 
sea,  318  ;  capture  of  Wash 
ington  by  Gen.    Ross,   and 
burning  of  public  buildings, 

319  ;  Baltimore  threatened, 

320  ;     unsuccessful     attack 
on   Fort   McHenry  and  re 
tirement     of    British     fleet 
and      army,      320  ;       IVasp 
captures      Reindeer       after 
severe    engagement,   322-5  ; 
diagram  of  action,  325;  com 
ments,     326  ;       the      odds 
against  Reindeer,  320  ;  gal 
lantry  of  both  captains,  326  ; 
Eagle  tender  captured,  327  ; 
Syren    taken    by    Medway, 
Landrail  taken  by  privateer 
Syren,    327  ;     Wasp   chases 
Avon,    328  ;    captures    her 
after  brief  and   furious  en 


gagement,  330  ;  ^ 
331;  diagram  of  action  330  ; 
comparative  force  and  loss, 
comments,  331-2  ;  cruise  of 
the  Adams,  334  ;  chased  by 
Tigris  and  escapes,  335-6  ; 
curious  sailing  qualities  re 
sulting  from  being  built  by 
contract,  336  ;  attacked  on 
Penobscot,  337  ;  burned  by 
Capt.  Morris,  338  ;  priva 
teer  Gen.  Armstrong  at 
tacked  in  r-ayal  roads,  339  ; 
crew  compelled  to  scuttle 
and  burn  her,  340  ;  boats. 


538 


INDEX. 


from  Endymion  attack  pri 
vateer  Prince  de  Neufcha- 
tel,  341  ;  repulsed  after 
desperate  struggle,  342  ; 
American  gun-boats  on 
Lake  Borgne  taken,  346 ; 
serious  loss  of  British,  347  ; 
fighting  near  New  Orleans, 
348  ;  summary  of  year's 
fighting,  vessels  built,  lost, 
and  captured,  348-9  ;  gen 
eral  comments,  351  ;  prizes 
made,  352  ;  on  the  lakes, 
1814,  Ontario,  American 
schooners  converted  into 
transports,  352  ;  New  ves 
sels  launched  by  Americans, 
353  ;  by  British,  354  ;  sta 
tistics,  of  the  two  squad 
rons,  355-6  ;  serious  sick 
ness  among  the  Ameri 
cans,  354  ;  Yeo  takes  Os- 
weg°.  358  J  and  blockades 
Sackett's  Harbor,  360 ; 
raises  blockade,  362  ; 
Chauncy  blockades  King 
ston,  363  ;  refuses  to  co-op 
erate  with  General  Brown, 
364-7  ;  cautiousness  of  com 
manders  of  both  squadrons, 
365-71;  Capt.  Sinclair,  com 
mander  of  American  forces 
on  upper  lakes,  burns  St. 
Joseph,  372  ;  makes  unsuc 
cessful  expedition  against 
Mackinaw,  leaves  for  Lake 
Erie,  372  ;  daring  cutting- 
out  expedition  of  British 
on  Huron  and  Erie,  373-4  ; 
capture  of  Ohio  and  Somers, 
375  ;  Champlain,  descrip 
tion  of  Macdonough's  and 
Downie's  squadrons,  376- 
81  ;  James'  erroneous  state 
ments  in  regard  to  them, 
381-7;  description  of  action, 
389-98  ;  gallant  and  ener 
getic  conduct  of  Macdon- 
ough,  392  ;  inexperience  of 
the  crews,  loading  cannon 
without  powder,  393  ;  Mac 
donough's  victory,  398  ; 
extraordinary  damage  to 


vessels  on  both  sides,  397  ; 
comments  on  the  action, 
398  ;  Macdonough  one 
of  the  greatest  of  Ameri 
can  sea  captains,  398  ; 
his  character,  399  ;  on 
the  ocean,  1815,  400; 
President  chased  by  Capt. 
Hayes'  squadron,  401  ;  dis 
mantles  Endymion,  403,  but 
is  raked  by  Tenedos  and 
Pomona,  and  surrenders, 
404  ;  account  of  this  action 
taken  mainly  from  official 
reports,  405  ;  discussion  of 
various  misstatements  in  re 
gard  to  it,  405-10  ;  brilliant 
cutting-out  expeditions  by 
Americans,  411-13  ;  Ameri 
can  privateer  Chasseur  en 
gages  and  captures  Si  Law 
rence,  415-6  ;  ability  of 
several  privateer  captains, 

416  ;  cruise  of  Constitution, 

417  ;    engagement  with  Cy- 
ane    and    Levant,    418-22 ; 
captures       both,      419-20 ; 
comparative  force  and  loss, 
420-1  ;    brilliant    manoeuv 
ring  of  Constitution,  diagram 
of   action,   comments,  422  ; 
Constitution  chased  by  three 
frigates,      424 ;      successful 
escape,  425-7  ;  Hornet  cap 
tures  Penguin,  429-30  ;  dia 
gram  of  action,  430  ;    com 
parative  force,  greater  effec 
tiveness  of  Americans,  431  ; 
Hornet  escapes  from  pursuit 
of  Corntvallis,  435  ;  Peacock 
captures     East     Indiaman, 
Nautilus,  436  ;  Capt.  War- 
rington  acts  without  proper 
precautions,    437  ;    wanton 
attack   on    American    gun 
boat,  by  Capt.   Bartholow, 
after  declaration  of   peace, 
438  ;  summary  of  events  in 
1815,  439  ;    Americans   de 
serve  balance  of  praise,  439  ; 
list  of  ships  built  and   de 
stroyed,     439-41  ;      feeling 
about  use  of  torpedoes,  441  ; 


INDEX. 


539 


material  result  of  naval  part 
of  war  slight,  moral  benefit 
to  the  Americans  great, 
442  ;  total  loss  on  both  sides 
compared,  443  ;  comments 
and  criticisms  on  various 
actions  of  the  war  in  gen 
eral,  444-50  ;  best  criticism 
that  of  de  la  Graviere  in 
"Guerres  Maritimes,"  450 ; 
compared  with  results  of 
Anglo-French  struggle,  452- 
453  ;  tonnage  of  vessels  in 
1812,  how  estimated,  455- 
459  ;  twelve  single-ship 
actions  in  war,  459  ;  causes 
of  American  success,  460  ; 
previous  history  of  Amer 
ican  navy,  459-65  ;  Soley's 
"  Naval  Compaign  of 
1812"  ....  469 
Navigation  bureau  .  .  167 

Navy  of  Great  Britain  com 
pared  with  that  of  U.  S.  .  51 
Navy  of  U.  S.,  reputation 
gained  in  the  war,  6  ;  in 
creased  fourfold  in  numbers 
during  war,  8  ;  previous  his 
tory,  459;  American  superior 
to  French  in  1800,  462-3, 
but  slightly  inferior  to  Brit 
ish,  464,  but  in  1777-82 
much  inferior,  464  ;  reasons, 
464  ;  Troude's  blunders  .  464 
Navy  list  of  1816  .  .38 

Neale,  Lieut.          .         .         .   201 
Nelson,  Lord,  33,  150  ;"  pre 
sumptuous,"    196  ;    success 
against  heavy  odds      .         .   277 
Nereide  .         .         .      59,  421 

Nereyda          .          .          .          .164 

Netty     •         -         353,  356-7,  377 
Nettle  ....  377 

Neiifchatel     .          .         12,  69,  416 
Neutral  rights,  views  held  by 
United    States    and    Great 
Britain         .          .          .        I,  5,  6 
Newcastle       .         .         .         423-7 
New    England    furnished    44 
%  of  tonnage  U.    S.   Navy, 
45  ;  loyalty  doubted  .    160 

Newfoundland,    77,    88,    139, 

177,  335 


New  Jersey  ....  x6i 
New  London,  116,  117,  401  ; 

blockaded  by  Hardy  .   285 

New  Orleans,    174,   340,    343, 
348,  400,  410  :  battle  of,  9  ; 
a  useless  shedding  of  blood      10 
New  York,  48,  139,  177,  316, 

401,  413,  426,  427,  440 
Niagara,    255—64,  266-8,  270, 

272,  355-8,  364,  372,  376 
Niagara  Bay  .         .         .241 

Niagara  Falls  .  .  .  142 
Niagara,  Fort  .  236,  240,  363 
Niagara  River  .  .  .  363 
Niagara  frontier  evacuated  by 

British         ....   232 
Nicholson,  Lieut.  N.  J.    315,  327 
Nicholson,  Joseph,  letter        .  217 
Nile,  battle  of        ...   194 
Niles'     "Weekly    Register," 
iv,   20,    101,    127,  150,  171, 
173,  174,  187,  314,  330,  364, 
415,  438;  misstatements  and 
buncombe,   16;    utterly  un 
trustworthy,    excepting    for 
matters   purely   American  ; 
supplements  James      .         .410 
Nocton  .         .         .         134-5 

Nonsuch  .  .  .  .137 
Norse  .  .  .  .35 

North  Bergen  .  .  .175 
North  Edisco  .  .  290,  412 

North  Cape  .         .         .175 

Norwich    captures     privateer 

Caledonia  .          .          .174 

Nova  Scotia  ...     88 

>Nova  Scotia  privateers  .  .213 
Nymph  .  .  107,  217,  287 

O'Connor,  Capt.  .  .  .  358 
Odenheimer,  Lieut.,  knocked 

overboard  .          .          .   299 

"  Officers'  Letters,"  .  .  vi 
Ogdensburg  .  .  .151 

Ohio  .   ^       254-6,  374,  399 

Old  adage,  "  L'audace,"  etc.     250 
' '  Old     Ironsides  ' '     ( Constitu 
tion)  .     87,  335,  439,  447 
Oliver,  Capt.  R.  D.         .         .177 
Oneida  Lake  .          .          .    141 
Oneida  Indians       .          .          .   361 
Oneida,     150-1,     153-5,     223, 
225-6,  229,  231,  238,  244-5, 
248-9,  252,  353,  355,  357,  363 


540 


INDEX. 


Ontario,   153,  224,   229,  231, 

238,  244,  349 
Ontario  Lake,  139-44,  149-50, 

242,  255-6,  368,  443 
Onyz  ....   117 

Oporto  ....  205 

Ordronaux,  Capt.  .   341,  416 

L 'Orient     .  .    204,  327,  328 

Orders   in  Council  of    Great 

Britain        ....       7 
Orpheus  .          .          .      51,   311 

Ortegal,  Cape  .  .  .  316 
Osgood,  Lieut.  .  .  229 

Oswego,    357,  360,  363,  368  ; 

taken  by  Yeo  .         .   358 

Packenham,  Gen.,  343  ;  killed 

at  New  Orleans  .         .  410 

Packet,  Lieut.  J.  H.  .  .  262 
Paige,  Lieut.  .  .  .178 

Paine,       Sailing-master      T., 

great  gallantry  shown  .  341 

Palinure         .         .         .          .211 
Palmas,  Cape          .         .         .  334 
Palmer,  Capt.         .         .         .412 
Pamphlets  in  reply  to  Cooper's 
account  of  battle  of   Lake 
Erie  .         .         .         .275 

Park,  Lieut.  T.  340 

Parker,    Capt.    G.,    41,    123, 

129,  289-90,  327,  401,  404 
Parker,  Midshipman  G.  .  346 
Parker,  Sir  P.,  318  ;  killed,  319 
"  Parthian  "  mode  of  warfare  195 
Pasley  .  117 

Patterson,  Capt.  .  .  37,  347 
Patuxent  River  .  .  317-8 
Paulding,  Adm.  .  .  .  380 
Paulding,  Midshipman  .  391 

Peacock,  vii,  12,  40,  43,  51-2, 
130,  163,  166-72,  207-8, 
210-11,  217,  219,  311-16, 
322,  334,  349,  352,  401, 
427,  432-3.  436,  439.  446  ; 
engagement  with  Hornet, 
166  ;  surrenders  to  her  and 
.sinks  167  ;  generous  treat 
ment  of  crew  by  officers  of 
Hornet,  171  ;  captures 
Epervier,  313  ;  diagram  of 
action,  313  ;  comparative 
force  and  loss,  314  ;  com 
ments  on  the  action,  315  ; 
skilful  seamanship  and  ex 


cellent  gunnery  shown  by 
the  Americans,  315  ;  cap 
tures  East  Indiaman  Nau 
tilus  without  loss  or  dam 
age  436 

Peake,  Capt.  W. ,  166-7  I  neg 
lect  of  essentials   for  mere 
incidents  of  disdipline          .   100 
Pearce,   Capt.         .         .         .   336 
Pechell,  Capt.         .         .         .201 
Pelican,  12,  205-11,  315  ;  en 
gagement  with  Argus,  205  ; 
captures    her,    206  ;     com 
parative     loss    and      force, 
207-8  ;  diagram  of  action       208 
Pendleton,  Lieut.  T.  M.         .  338 
Penguin,    61,    66,    68,     118, 
181,  208,  276,  409-10,   428- 
33,  439,  441,445,447;  cap 
tured  by  Hornet,  429  ;  dia 
gram    of   action,  430 ;    de 
stroyed        ....  432 
Penguin  Point         .         .         .213 
Penobscot  River     .         .          .   336 
Percival,  Sailing-master,   cap 
tures  Eagle,  tender     .         .   327 
Perry,  Com.    O.   H.,   63,    68, 
159,    222,    231,    233,    236, 
245,  253-4,   370,  408  ;  com 
manding    American    forces 
on    Lake    Erie,   254-4  !  de 
scription  of  squadron,  256  ; 
and    crews,    267,     258-61  ; 
engagement    with    Barclay, 
262  ;  his  indomitable  spirit, 
266-7  I  his  humanity  to  the 
wounded  enemy,  268  ;  great 
reputation     gained    by    his 
victory,    271-2  ;  praised    by 
Cooper,    273-4,     277  ;     de 
serves  great  credit  for  effec 
tiveness    of    his    squadron, 
278-80  ;  his  methods  similar 
to  Blake       •         .          .          .281 
Perry     .  ...   316 

Pert,  152,  154,  224,  229,  238, 

244,  256 

Pettigrew,  Lieut.    .         .         .   229 
Pettipauge,      destruction      of 

fishing-boats        .         .         .   285 
Philadelphia  .          .          .32 

Phillot,  Capt.         .         .         -437 
Phoenix          .         .         .  98-9 


INDEX. 


541 


Phoebe,  55,  59,  64,  276,  291-6, 

298,  300-,!  305-10 
Philadelphia  .         .          .413 

Pictou  .          .          .     286-350 

Piednwntaise          .          .  98-9 

Pierce,  Lieut.         .  .179 

Pigot,  Capt.  .  •   3*1 

Pike x 

Pike,   Gen.,    229  ;    killed    by 

explosion  .  .  .  230,  234 
Pique  ....  287-8 
Plantagenet  .  286,  338-9 

Plattsburgh  .  .  282,  376,  421 
Plattsburgh  Bay  .  387-8,  397 
Plymouth  .  .  .  .413 
Pocock  ....  369 

Poic  tiers         .          .          .          105-6 
Polkinghorne,    Lieut.   J.,  cuts 
out    four   American    priva 
teers,    173  ;  a   brilliant    ex 
pedition      .          .  .    174 
Pomona           .          .                   4°i-7 
Popham,  Capt.        .     359,  361,  362 
Porcupine,  254,  256,  260,  262, 

264,  269-70,  374-5 
Port  Christian         .          .          .   343 
Porter,  Adm.,  15,    34,   50,   58, 
78,  118,   134-5,    164,   291-8, 
299,  301-7,  308-9   370,  406, 
408,  447  ;  thorough,  training 
of  his  crew  on    the  Essex, 
80  ;  cruise  in  South  Pacific, 
breaking  up  whaling   fleet, 
164-5,    J96,    217  ;    knocked 
down  by  shot       .         .         .   299 
Portland          .         .          .    213,  338 
Porto  Praya  .          .    423,  426 

Porto  Rico  ....  426 
Portsmouth  .  .  121,  175,  321 
Portugal,  417  ;  her  small 

navy  .  .  .  .  .61 
Portuguese  customs  under 

British  influence  .      35,  164 

11  Pot  calling  kettle  black  "  .  248 
Potomac  .  .  .  318,  343 
Pratt,  Lieut.  .  .  .  346 

Preble,  G.  H.         .         .        46,  52 
Preble,  283,  377-8,  388,  390-1,  397 
Presqu'  Isle         .          236,  254,  362 
President,    39,    54,    56,    73-4, 
106-7,    !38,    174,    176    218, 
220,  283,    286,  352,    401-8, 
410,    425,   427,    432,    436, 


439,  441,  443-5  ;  attack  on 
Little  Belt,  7  ;  engagement 
with  Belvidera,  74-76  ; 
chased  by  British  fleet,  401  ; 
attacked  by  Endymion  but 
dismantles  her,  403 ;  at 
tacked  by  Tenedos  and 
Pomona  and  surrenders  .  404 
Prevost,  Sir  G.,  9,  148,  222, 
233,  375,  379.  38o,  382-3  ; 
attacks  Sackett's  Harbor 
with  Yeo  and  is  repulsed, 
234  ;  returns  in  confusion 
to  Canada  .  .  .  398 

Primrose        ....  437 
Princess  Charlotte  354,  356-8,  364 
Prince    de    Neufchatel,    341, 
attacked  by  boats  of  Endy 
mion,    341  ;    repulses   them 
after  desperate  struggle  342 

Prince  Regent,  drunken  .  448 

Prince  Regent,  140,  233,  354-7,  364 
Pring,  Capt.,  382-3,  389,  396,    398 
Privateer,  American,  descrip 
tion  of          ...    413-415 
Prize-money   ($25,000)    voted 
by    Congress    to    crew     of 
Wasp,    106  ;    prizes    made 
by    American      vessels      in 
1812  .         .         .         .138 

Prometheus  .          .          .   349 

Prosperous  ....  280 
Prussian  .  .  .  .60 
Psycho  .  .  .  -59 

Put-in  Bay  ....  256 
Queen  Charlotte,  142,  147, 

259-60,  263-5,  267-70,  283 
Queenstown  .         .         .   374 

Race,  Cape  ...     88 

Racer  .  .  .  .  .173 
Race  characteristics  not  main 

cause  of  American  success      460 
Radcliffe,  Lieut.   .  34,  372-3 

Rainbow         .         .          .          .421 
R  ami  I  lies        .          .         .          .285 
Rattlesnake,     39,     220,     311, 
321,   350;  captured  by  Le- 
ander  .          .          .          .321 

Rawle,  Lieut.  R.  .         .  340 

Read,  Lieut.  G.  O.         .         .   134 
Reade,  Col.    ....  319 
Red   House  barracks  attacked 
by  Lieut.  Angus.          .          .158 


542 


INDEX. 


Reid,  Capt.  S.  C.  .        338-40,  416 
Reindeer,  35,  52,  73,  171,  208, 
J299,  304,  322-6,  350-1,  398, 
409,    445-8  ;     captured    by 
Hornet,     166 ,    engagement 
with  Wasp,  322-5  ;  severity 
of  action,  324  ;  diagram  and 
comparative  force  and  loss, 
325  ;   the  odds  against  the 
Reindeer     ....   326 
Renshaw,  Lieut. -Com.    .    216,  321 
Resolution      .         .         ,         .166 
Richer,  Lieut.         .          .         .96 
Rifleman        ....   336 
Rio  de  Janeiro        .         .          .432 
Riviere,  Lieut.  H.,  "La  Ma 
rine  Fran9aise,"          .       369-70 
Roach,  William      .         .         .297 
Roach,  Lieut.  J.    .         .          156-7 
Robert,  Capt.         .         .         343-4 
Robinson,  Batty     .         .          .   124 
Robinson,   Chaplain    H.         .  404 
Rock  of  Lisbon      .         .         .417 
Rodgers,    Commodore,  7,   38, 
72  ;    78,   83,  119,  286,   323, 
370,  442, 444  ;  chase  of  Bel- 
videra,  73;  fires  first  gun,  74; 
leaves  Boston,    106  ;  chases 
Nymphe,  107  ;  captures  Ja 
maica  packet  Swallow,  107  ; 
pursues  in  vain  Galatea        .   107 
Ross,  Gen.,  attack  on   Wash 
ington,    318  ;    captures   the 
city  and    burns    the   public 
buildings,    318  ;    unsuccess 
ful  attack  on  Baltimore,  320 
is  killed      ....   320 
Rota       ....       338-40 
Rowlette,  Lieut.     .     156,  264,  268 
Rouvier,  Lieut.,  "  Histoiredes 

Marins  Fra^ais "        .         .   194 
Royal  George,    140,   151,   154, 
224-5,    233,     245-9,    251-3, 
355  ;  attacked  by  Chauncy's 
squadron     .          .          .          .    154 
"  Ruff"          ....   299 
Sackett's     Harbor,    71,     143, 
150-1,    153,   155,   228,   230, 
233,  241,  251-2,   363,    366, 
368  ;    inadequate   defences, 
233  ;  attack  by  Prevost  re 
pulsed   with   great    loss    to 
him,  234-6  ;  slight  fortifica 


tions,  353,  357  ;  blockaded 
by  Yeo,  360;  blockade  raised  362 
St.  Augustine  .  .  .  286 
St.  Catharines  .  .  .  164 
St.  David's  Head  .  .  .205 
St.  George  .  .  .  .130 

i  St.  George's  Channel      .          .   204 

I  St.     Georges,    Bermuda,   Ad 
miralty  Court      .         .         .   404 
St.  Joseph's  fort  and  barracks 

burned  ....  372 
St.  Lawrence  Gulf  .  .  88 

I  St.  Lawrence  River         .         .139 

\  St.  Lawrence,  317,  366-7,  376, 

415-16 

j  St.  Leonard  Creek  .  .317 
St.  Louis  Bay  .  .  .  344 
St.  Mary's  .  .  315,  338,  340 
St.  Mary's  River  .  .  .  437 
St.  Mary's  Strait  .  .  .  372 
San  Domingo  .  .  168,  201 
San  Florenzo  .  .  .59,  96,  99 
San  Gallao  .  .  .  .164 
Sanjago  .  118,134,423 

San  Salvador,  118,  119,  128,  129 
Salem  .....  413 
Samuell,  Midshipman  .  .  185 
Sanders,  Capt.  .  .  200-3 
Sandy  Hook  .  .  161,  286,  401 
Sapolio  Bar  ....  338 
Saianac.  ....  349 
Saranac  River  .  .  283,  388 
Saratoga,  147,  276,  376,  378, 

387-90,  392-7 

Saunders,  Lieut.  J.  .  124,  201 
Savannah  .  .  316,  335,  340 
Sawyer,  Admiral  .  .  .82 
Scott,  Col.  .  .  231,  234,  236 
Scott  at  Lundy's  Lane  .  .174 
Scorpion,  202,  254,  256-7,  260 

262-5,  267-70,  317,  372-3,  399 
Scourge  .  153,  223,  229,  231,  237 
Sea  Horse  .  117,318,343,346 
Seamen  on  the  lakes,  their 

characteristics  .  .  .  279 
Second  year  of  war  to  advan 
tage  of  British  .  .  .  448 
Senhouse,  Capt.  .  .  .  203 
Seneca  ....  140,  233 
Seringapatam  .  .  .165 

Serrat,  Sailing-master  G.  .  262 
Severn  ....  320,  413 

Seybert's,  "Statistical  Annals"     47 


INDEX. 


543 


Shannon,  43,  55,  67,  69,  73, 
79,  81-7,  95,  178-85,  187-90, 
192-3,  195,  398,  445,  447, 
450,  452  ;  careful  training 
of  her  crew  described  by 
James,  179-80  ;  her  arma 
ment,  181;  engagement  with 
Chesapeake,!.  82-188;  captures 
her,  187;  diagram  of  action.  188 
Shannon  River  .  .  .  335 

Shaw,  Capt 37 

Sheafe,  Gen.  ....  229 
Shead  Sailing-master  .  203-4 
Shepard,  Sailing-master.  .  344 
Shelburne  .  .  .  .311 
Sherbrook,  Gen.  .  .  .  337 
Shields,  Purser  T.  .  .411 

Shubrick,  Lieut.  J.  T.    .    167,  201 
Shubrick,  Lieut.  W.  B.  .    418,  423 
Sigourney,  Lieut.   .          .          202-3 
Simco     ....    140,  233 
Simmons,  Capt.,  "  Heavy  Ord 
nance  "...      67,  115 
Sinclair,     Capt.     Arthur,    73, 
100  ;  commander  of  Ameri 
can  forces  on  upper  lakes, 
371-2  ;    burns    St.    Joseph, 
372  ;  unsuccessful  attack  on 
Mackinaw,  leaves  for  Lake 
Erie    .....  372 
Single-ship  actions  in  the  war, 

twelve  in  all        .          .          .   459 
Smith,  Midshipman         .          .    185 
Smitn,  Lieut.  S.,  in  command 
of      American      forces     on 
Champlain,  229,  281;  makes 
plucky  fight  when  attacked  .   281 
Smith,  Capt.  .         .         .174 

Smith,  Robert         .          .  50 

Soley,    Prof.   J.    R.,    "  Naval 
Campaign    of    1812,"   466  ; 
compared    with    other    au 
thorities      .          .          .       467-72 
Somers,  254,  256-7,  262-4,  268- 

70,  374,  399 

Somerville,  Capt.  P.  .  .  338 
Sophie  ....  338 

Sorel  River  .  .  281,  283 
Southampton,  73,  79,  134  ; 

captures  Vixen  ,          .134 

South  Africa  .          .          .   322 

Southcourt.  Capt.  J.,  172-3,  416) 
Spain,  "  Floating  Castles,"  .  303  j 


Spanish    countries    under   the 
British  influence          .•         .   164 

Spark 349 

Spedder,  Lieut.  R.  .  .  344 
Speedy  .  .  61,  117,  121 
Spitfire  .  .  .  .176 

Spithead         ....   119 
Spice  Islands          .         .         .  414 
Spilsbury,  Capt.     .          .          .   361 
Squaw  Island          .          .          -157, 
Stackpole        .          .          .          .    j  12 
Statira         .          .          57,  112,    172 
!  Stewart,  Capt.  C.,  36,  6r,  162, 
173,  287-9,417-19,421,423, 

425,  427 

Stevens,  Sailing-master  .  .  229 
Stony  Creek  .  ,  .  360 

Stone  River  .          .          .   290 

Stoddart  Sec.,  Benj.  .  .  47 
Stokes,  Lieut.  T.,  259  ;  killed 

264,   268 

j  Stuart,  Lord  .  .  .  .176 
Sunda  Straits  .  .  .  435 

Superb  ....   285 

Superior,  353,  355,  357,  360,  364 
Surprise  .  .  215,  377 

Surveyor        ,          .          .          196-7 

Sybil 98 

Sydney  Smith,  224-6,  235,  252,  355 
Sylph,  230,  243-47,  249,  353, 

355,  357,   363 
Syren,  39,  327,  350  ;  captured 

by  the  Medway 

STVO.UOIV  .  .  .  .107 
Swartout,  Midshipman  .  .  268 
Tarbell,  Capt.  .  .  200 

Tartarus  .  .  .  .  331 
Tatnall,  Lieut.,  201-2,  346  ; 

life  by  C.  C.  Jones,  jr.         447-& 
Taylor,  Capt.  J.  .    160- 

Taylor,  Gen.  .          .          281-2 

Taylor,  Master  .  .  268 
Tenedos,  79,  289,  327,  401-2,  404 
Terror  .  .  .  .320 

Teutonic  navies,  heroic  age  of,  303 
l^halia  .  .  .  -77 

Thorn  .          .          .          .167 

Thompson,  Midshipman  .  230 
Thornborough,  Adm.  .  .  205 
Ticonderoga,  376,  378-9,  382, 

388,  390-2,  397-8 
Tigt is,    254,    256,    260,    262, 

264,   269,   270,    336,    372-3,  399 


544 


INDEX. 


Tom  Bowline,  349,  401,  427,  432  '      clares    war   June,   1812,   7  , 


*'  Tom  Cringle's  Log  "  .         .21 
Tonnage  of  vessels  in    1812, 
"how  estimated,  455-9  ;  gen 
eral  uncertainty  and  differ 
ence   between    British  and 
American  methods      .         456-8 
Tonnant         ....  346 
Torch  .         .         .         .349 

Torpedo  ....  446 
Toussard,  Louis  de  .  .  xi 
Townsend,  Capt.  Lord  James,  82 
156,  157 


badly   worsted    at    first,   8  ; 
weakness  of  American  navy, 
23  ;    policy   of   government 
supported  ....   161 
Upton,  Capt.  .         .         .   28*3 

Valparaiso,    164,  291,  294,  305,  310 


Vashon,  Capt. 
Vaughan,   Sailing-master 


•     73 
.   362 


de  Verde,  Cape, 
Vengeance 
Vermont 


163,  334,  423 
28 
139 


Vessels    mentioned    (see    also     in 


proper  alphabetical  place):  A  bet  tie, 


Towsen,  Capt.  N. 
Trafalgar  .          .          23-4,     33 

Trant,  Sailing-master    .     154,   229  |  Acasta,   Achille,   Adams,    Adonis , 
Travis,  W.  S.          .          .          .    196    Aeolus,   ^Etna,    Africa,   Alacrity, 
Treaty  of  peace  signed  Dec. 
24,    1814,  ratified   Feb.  15, 


Albion,  Alert,  Alexandria,  Alfred, 
Allen,  Alligator,  Arab,    Argo,  Ar- 

1815  .          .         .          .          .   399  I  gus,  Ariel,  Armada,  Armide,Asp, 
Trippe,  254,  256-7,  260,   262,  Astrcea,    Atalanta,     Atlas,    Avon, 

264,  266-70  |  Aylwin,    Ballahou,    Ballard,   Ba- 

Tristan  d'Acunha  .         .         427-8  j  rossa,  Belvidera,  Beresford,  Black 
Tromp      .         .         .         277,   280  |  Snake,      Boston,     Boxer,     Bonne 


Troude,  O.,  "  Batailles  Na- 
vales,"97-8,  117,  195-6,242, 

422,  450 

Truxton          .          .          .          .28 
Tucker,  Capt.  T.  T.     .     291,  300 
Turner,  Lieut.  D.       226,  266,  372 
Tumbez          ....   164 
Tybee  Bar      .         .         .         .  438 
Tyler,  Adm.   .         .         .    327,  428 
Twin,  Sergeant      .         .         .   185 
Ulrich,  Sailing-master     .   344,  346 
United  States,  vi,  33,  42,  54-7, 
66,   70-1,   73,   95,   98,    106, 
108-10,  112,  114,  130-1,  138, 
177,  181,  204,  209,  211,  398, 
409,  434,  446  ;   engagement 
with  Macedonian,  108-9;  tne 
latter   strikes    in    i£  hours, 
109  ;    American  loss  slight, 
no;  comparative  force  and 
loss,   112;    struck    by  light 
ning   177 

United  States,  high  commer 
cial  importance,  4  ;  greatest 
injury  received  from  Great 
Britain,  5  ;  principle  con 
tended  for  now  universally 
accepted,  5;  passes  embargo 
net  in  retaliation  for  the 
Orders  in  Council,  7  ;  de- 


Citoyenne,  Brant,  Burrows,  Cale 
donia,  Carnation,  Carolina,  Car- 
ron,  Castilian,  Centipede,  Cha 
meleon,  Charwell,  Chasseur,  Cherub, 
Chesapeake,  Chippeway,  Ckilders, 
Chubb,  Cleopatra,  Clyde,  Columbia, 
Comus,  Confiance,  Congress,  Con 
quest,  Constellation,  Constitution, 
Contest,  Cornwallis,  Curlew,  Cy- 
ane,  Cyprus,  Dart,  Decatur,  De 
troit,  Devastation,  Diadem,  Dicta 
tor,  Dolphin,  Dominica,  Dover, 
Dragon,  Drummond,  Eagle,  Earl 
of  Moira,  Egyptian,  Endymion, 
Epervier,  Erebus,  Erie,  Espiegle, 
Essex,  Essez  Junior,  Eurotas, 
Euryalus,  Eurydice,  Fair  Ameri 
can,  Fairy,  Finch,  Firefly,  Flam 
beau,  Florida,  Fortune  of  War, 
Franklin,  Frolic,  Fulton,  Galatea, 
General  Armstrong,  General  Pike, 
Gladiator,  Gloucester,  Governor 
Tompkins,  Growler,  Guerriere, 
Hamilton,  Havannah,  Hebrus, 
Hermes,  Highflyer,  Hague,  Hor 
net,  Hunter,  Icarus,  Indefatiga 
ble,  Independence,  Jasseur,  Java, 
Jefferson,  John  Adams,  Jones, 
Julia,  Junon,  Lady  Gore,  Lady 
Miirray,  Lady  of  Lake,  Lady  Pre- 


INDEX. 


545 


vost,  Landrail,  Latirentinus ,  Law-  I 
rence,    Leander,    Leopard,  Levant,  \ 
Linnet,  Little  Belt,  Loire,  Lottery, 
Louisiana,   Liidlow,  Lynx,   Mace 
donian,    Madison,  Magnet,  Maid-  j 
stone,     Majestic,     Mars,    Martin,  \ 
Mary,  Medway,  Medusa,  Melville, 
Menelaus,       Merrimac,       Meteor, 
Minerva,   Mohawk,  Moira,  Mon 
tagu,       Montgomery,       Montreal, 
Nancy,       Narcissus,       Nautilus, 
Nereide,    Netly,    Nettle,  Neufcha- 
tel,  Newcastle,   New   York,  Niag 
ara,    Xocton,   Nonsuch,   Norwich, 
Nymphe,    Ohio,    Oneida,    Ontario, 
Onyx,   Orpheus,   Palinure,  Pasley, 
Peacock,  Pelican,  Penguin,  Perry, 
Pert,   Philadelphia,  Phcebe,    Phoe 
nix,    Pictou,    Pique,   Plantagenet, 
Poic  tiers,      Pomona,       Porcupine, 
Preble,  President,  Primrose,  Prin 
cess  Charlotte,  Prince  de  Neufcha- 
ul,     Pnnce    Regent,    Prometheus, 
Prosperous,    Psyche,   Queen  Char 
lotte,    Racer,   Rainbow,    Ramilles, 
Rattlesnake,  Reindeer,  Resolution, 
Rifleman,  Rota,  Royal  George,  St. 
Lawrence,     San     Domingo,     San 
Florenzo,  Saranac,  Saratoga,  Scor-  \ 
pion,  Scourge,    Sea-Horse,   Seneca, 
Seringapatam,    Severn,    Shannon, 
Shelburne,  Simco,  Somers,   Sophie, 
Southampton,  Spark,  Speedy,  Spit 
fire,  Star,  Stalera,  Superb,  Superi-  \ 
or,    Surprise,   Surveyor,    Swallow,  \ 
Sybil,  Sydney  Smith,  Sylph,  Syren,  j 
Tartarus,  Tenedos,  Terror,  Thalia,  '• 
Thorn,   Ticondet  oga ,  Tig)  is,    Tom  \ 
Bowline,  Tonnant,  Torpedo,  Torch, 
Ttippe,      United     States,      Viper, 
Vixen,       Volcano,        Washington, 
Wasp,   Williams,  Wilmer,   Wolfe, 
Woodbridge,   Young  Wasp. 
Ve stale  .         .         .         -59 

Victory  .          .          .     33 , 

Villeneuve,  M.  242  I 

Vincent,  Gen.         .         .  230,  232 
Viper,  39,  177,  219,  377  ;  cap 
tured  by  Narcissus 

Virgin 117 

Vixen,  39,  134,  137  ;  captures 

Southampton       .         .         .134 
Volcano          ....  320 


Wadsworth,  Col.  .         ,  318 

Wadsworth,   Lieut.         .         .  335 
Wales,  Capt.  .         .         .313 

War  of  1812:  Ward's  "Manual 
of  Naval  Tactics,"  149,  262,  380, 

447 

Wareham        ....   286 
Warren,  Adm.  Sir  J.      .     161,  243 
Warrington,  Capt.  L.,  311-6, 
370,401,427,436,437,447; 
his  attack  on  the  Nautilus, 
needless  cruelty,  306  ;  acted 
without  proper  humanity     .   437 
Washington,   burning  of  pub 
lic  buildings,  9,  319  ;  British 
advance  on         .          .          318-9 
Washington,  Fort,  3 1 8 ;  attacked 

by  Gordon,  and  abandoned  319 
Washington  .  .  .  -439 
Wasp,  14,  35,  38-40,  43,  53, 
66,  68,  73,  100-6,  137-8, 
166,  177,  180,  209-10,  275, 
310,  321-5,  328-34,  349, 
352,  398,  428,  445-7  ;  en 
gagement  with  Frolic,  101  ; 
captures  her  after  fight  of 
43  minutes,  103  ;  compara 
tive  force  and  loss,  103  ; 
diagram  of  action,  104  ; 
enormous  disparity  in  dam 
age  suffered  by  each  vessel, 
105  ;  fine  crew  and  daring 
commander,  321  ;  burns  and 
scuttles  many  ships  in  En 
glish  Channel,  322  ;  en 
gagement  with  and  capture 
of  Reindeer,  322-25  ;  de 
structive  cannonade,  323  ; 
diagram  of  action  and  com 
parative  force  and  loss,  325  ; 
chases  and  captures  Avon, 
after  furious  engagement, 
329  ;  Avon  sinks,  331  ;  cap 
tures  Atalanta,  332  ;  shortly 
after  never  heard  of  again, 
332  ;  comments  on  vessel, 
crew,  and  their  actions  333-4 
Waters,  Midship.  K.  .  .  216 
Watson,  Lieut.  .  .  205-6 
Watts,  Lieut.  .  .  .  185 
Watts,  Sailing-master  .  .157 
Webb's  "  Peninsula  ;  McClel- 
lan's  Campaign  of  1862  "  .  189 


546 


INDEX. 


Wells,  Lieut.  H.    .         .         .151 
Wellington     ....  406 
Welsh,  T.,  Jr.        .         .         .418 
Westphal,  Lieut.  P.       .         .   203 
West  Indies  .         .         .    163,  286 
Whaling    trade   of  British    in 
South  Pacific  broken  up  by 
Porter         ....   164 
Whinyates,  Capt.  T.       100-3,  106 
Williams,  Lieut.  A.  O.  .         .  340 
William         .          .         .          .11.9 
Wilme.r          .         .         .         .377 
Wilmer,  Lieut.,  knocked  over 
board  and  drowned     .         .   299 
Wilkinson,     Gen.,   expedition 

into  Canada  .  .  .  235 
Wintle,  Lieut.  .  .  .  IO2 
Wolfe,  224-5,  233,  237,  245-8, 

251-3,  354 
Woolsey,  Lieut.,      140,    150, 

154,  229,  360,  361 
Wood,  Lieut.  P.  W.  .  .124 
Woodbridge  .  .  .  -335 
Worsley,  Lieut.  .  .  372,  373 
Worth,  Lieut.  F.  A.  .  340  j 

Wragg,  Midship.  .  .  158-9  ! 
Wright,  Lieut.  F.  W.  168,  172  ' 
Yarnall,  Lieut.,  257  ;  badly 

wounded    .          .         .    265,  268 
Yeo,  Commod.  Sir  J.  L.,  com 
mander  of  British  squadron 
on  Lake  Ontario,  79,  134, 


144,  145,  237-8,  363,  365  : 
attacks  Sackett's  Harbor 
with  Prevost,  and  is  re 
pulsed,  222,  226,  233-5, 
237-8  ;  superiority  rf  his 
vessels,  226  ;  action  with 
Chauncy,  240  ;  captures 
two  schooners,  240-1  ;  his 
victory  neither  decisive  nor 
brilliant,  242-3 ;  gets  the 
worst  of  action  near  Gen- 
esee  River,  204-9  »  hig  force 
not  used  to  best  advantage, 
245-9  I  blockaded  in  King 
ston,  251-2  ;  criticised  and 
compared  with  Chauncy, 
252  ;  his  squadron  in  1814, 
356-7  ;  takes  Oswego,  358- 
9,  and  blockades  Sackett's 
Harbor,  360  ;  raises  block 
ade,  362  ;  declines  to  fi-ht 
against  odds,  362-4  ;  cau 
tiousness  amounting  to  timi 
dity,  366 ;  as  good  as  his 
opponent  .  .  371,  386 

Yeocomico  Creek  .         .         .  202 

Yonge,  C.  D. ,  "  History  of  the 
British  Navy,"  not  good,  242,  381 

York  (now  Toronto),  222,  228, 
229,  23],  234,  245,  251,  253,  444 
authority         .          .         242,  281 

Young  Wasf         .         .         .487 


INDEX   TO    CHAPTER   X. 


American     cannoneers,    their 
coolness,      steadiness,     and 
good    judgment     compared 
to    their    opponents,    472  ; 
superior    at  every   point    to 
the   British          .         .         .  486 
American  loss        .         .         .  486 
Badajos,  474  ;  instance  of  cru 
elty  of  British  troops  .          .  480 
Bathurst,  Earl        .         .         .  476 
Bladensburg,     cowardice      of 

American  militia  at    .         .  492 
Boyer,  Fort    ....   488 
British   cannoneers    compared 
with  the  American,  471-2  ; 
superiority  of  the  latter,  472,  492 


British    defeat,    its    thorough 
ness    .....   486 

British    infantry   the   best    in 
Europe        ....  491 

British  loss     .          .          .    483,  486 

British  soldiers,  cruelty  in  vic 
tory  .....  480 
|  British  tendency  to  underesti 
mate  their  own  and  magnify 
American  force,  477  ;  speci 
mens  of  their  wild  state 
ments  .  .  .  477-8 

Canal  cut  into  the  Mississippi, 
475  ;  it  caves  in  .         .  484 

Carolina,   American    schooner 
under  Jackson,  462  ;    com- 


INDEX. 


547 


manded  by  Com.  Patterson, 
465,  466  ;  is  shelled  by 
British  battery  and  blown 
up  .....  469 

Carroll,  Maj.-Gen.,  com 
manding  Tennessee  volun 
teers  .  .  .  463,  478,  484 

Chandeleur  Islands         .         .  459 

Ciudad  Rodrigo,  474  ;  British 
cruelty  at  .  .  .  .480 

Cochrane,  Admiral,  and  his 
fleet  ....  458,  476 

Coffee,  General,  commanding 
Tennessee  volunteers,  463,  465 

Creeks,  their  geographical  po 
sition,  457  ;  power  broken 
forever  at  battle  of  Horse 
shoe  Bend  .  .  .457 

Creole  militia  raised  by  Jack 
son,  462 ;  their  character,  and 
what  they  had  at  stake,  479,  480 

Cruelty  of  British  soldiers  in 
victory,  instance  given  .  480 

Dickson,  Colonel  .         .         .  485 

Doctrinaire  Democracy,  nerve 
less  reign  of  .  .  -455 

Dragoons  from  Mississippi     .  478 

English  trying  to  retard  the 
advance  of  supremacy  of 
their  race  ....  457 

Federal  Government  does 
nothing  for  defence  of  Lou 
isiana  ....  461 

Federalist  party  out  of  power 
in  1800  ....  455 

Franklin         ....  490 

Fredencksburg       .          .          .  490 

Free  colored  company  among 
the  New  Orleans  militia  .  462 

French  infantry,  next  to 
English,  best  in  Europe  .  491 

Generals  of  the  Americans  as 
inefficient  as  their  soldiers  456 

Gettysburg     ....  490 

Gibbs,    General,  under  Pack- 

enham,  476  ;  is  killed  .  482 
Harrison's  victory  in  1813  .  489 
Highlanders  led  by  General 

Keane  ....  482 
Horse-shoe  Bend,  fierce  battle 

at        .         .  .         .  457 

House  of  Virginia  and  its 
theories  .  .  .  .456 


Humbert,  famous  French 
general  under  Jackson  .  485 

Ignorance  of  officers  and  men 
in  American  army  .  .  456 

Jackson,  General  Andrew,  a 
backwoods  general,  457  ; 
his  campaign  against  the 
Creeks,  457  ;  attacks  the 
Spaniards  and  drives  them 
from  Pensacola,  458  ;  be 
comes  defender  of  Louisi 
ana,  458  ;  admirably  fitted 
for  the  position,  460  ;  his 
implacable  hatred  of  the 
British,  460  ;  his  vigilance, 
military  genius,  and  pa 
tience,  461  ;  arrives  in  New 
Orleans  Dec.  2d  and  forti 
fies  the  city,  461  ;  smallness 
of  his  forces,  462  ;  raises 
I.OOO  militiamen,  chiefly 
Creoles,  462  ;  his  principal 
reliance,  the  Tennessee 
volunteers,  463  ;  his  man 
agement  of  and  popularity 
with  them,  464  ;  learns  of 
arrival  of  Keane's  forces 
and  prepares  to  attack  him, 
465  ;  desperate  hand  to 
hand  night  engagement, 
467-8  ;  "  grizzled  old  bush- 
fighter,"  475  ;  disposition 
of  his  forces  in  waiting  for 
combined  British  attack, 
477-8  ;  prepares  to  receive 
trie  attack,  479  ;  opens  fire 
with  his  ariillery,  481  ; 
fierceness  of  the  ensuing 
engagement,  482  ;  defeats 
the  British  at  nearly  all 
points,  482-3  ;  sends  rein 
forcements  under  Humbert 
to  retake  position  lost  by 
Morgan,  485  ;  his  forces  in 
creasing  daily,  487  ;  his  un 
just  censure  of  garrison  of 
Fort  Boyer  for  surrendering 
quickly,  488  ;  the  most 
prominent  figure  in  the  war, 
489  ;  the  feat  performed  by 
him  almost  unparalleled, 
489  ;  his  success  due  not  to 
chance  or  errors  of  his  adver- 


548 


INDEX. 


saries,  490  ;  his  shrewdness 
in  confining  himself  almost 
entirely    to     the    defensive, 
-490  ;  tireless  care  in  drilling 
raw  troops,  492  ;  the  ablest 
American     general     up    to 
time  of  great  Rebellion       .   493 
Jefferson,  Thomas,  his  weak 
ness  as  an  Executive  455  ; 
without   prudence   or  fore 
thought  in  preparing  for  in 
evitable  war        .          .          .  456 
Jones,  Lieut. -Capt.  C.,    com 
manding     American      gun 
boats  in  the  bayous     .         .   459 
Keane,  Maj.-Gen.  John,  ad 
vances    on    New    Orleans, 
Dec.    23d,    460 ;  camps  on 
east  bank  of  Missisippi,  464; 
estimate   of   his   forces    by 
different    authorities,    464 ; 
leisurely     arrangement     of 
his   camp,    465  ;    surprised 
by  the  attack  of  Patterson 
in  the  Carolina,  466  ;  is  dis 
abled  .          .         .         .482 
Kenesaw  Mountains       .         .  490 
Kentucky   mounted   infantry, 

brilliant  charge  .          .          .  456 
Kentucky  militia  poorly  arm 
ed,  477  ;  of  little  use  .  492 
Lafitte,  French  privateersman  462 
Lambert,  General,  arrives  with 
reinforcement   for    Packen- 
ham,    476  ;    makes    skilful 
and  rapid  retreat,  Jan.  i8th, 
487  ;      reaches      transports 
safely,  488  ;  sails  for  Mobile 
and  captures  Fort  Boyer     .  488 
"  Latin  land  of  Florida  "         .   458 
Levees  cut  by  the  Americans  469 
Lockyer,  Capt.  Nicholas,  leads 
English       attack       against 
American    gun-boats,  459  : 
furious  fighting  and   heavy 

loss 460 

Louisiana,  newly  acquired 
French  province,  457  ;  the 
theatre  where  final  act  of 
the  war  was  played,  458  ; 
nothing  done  by  the  Fed 
eral  Government  for  its  de 
fence  .  .  .  461 


Louisiana,  newly  built  Ameri 
can  corvette,  462  ;  mixed 
character  of  her  crew,  but 
effective  handling  of  her 
guns  .....  462 

Louisiana  militia  behaved  ex 
cellently  ....  492 

Lower  Canada,  campaign  in  .  489 

Lundy's  Lane,  battle  of,  457  ; 
a  defeat,  not  a  victory,  for 
the  Americans  .  .  .  457 

MacDougal,  Major         .    476,  490 

Madison,  incapacity  as  Presi 
dent  455 

Maryland,  campaign  in,     458,  489 

Mexican  Gulf         .         .         .  458 

Militiamen,  a  partially  armed 
mob  .  456 

Mississippi,  458  ;  strength  of 
its  current  ....  459 

Mobile 488 

Morgan,  General,  his  bad 
generalship,  484  ;  and  thor 
ough  incompetency  .  .  490 

New  England  seamen  on  the 
Carolina  ....  462 

New  Orleans,  "  fair,  French 
city,"  458  ;  mixture  of  races 
in  its  citizens,  458  ;  little  in 
common  with  the  Americans, 
458  ;  but  fierce  defiance 
against  British,  460  ;  de 
spondency  of  its  inhabitants 
changed  to  enthusiasm  on 
arrival  of  Jackson,  461  ; 
martial  law  proclaimed,  462; 
militia  raised  .  .  .  462 

Niagara  frontier,  campaign 
of  1814  ....  457 

Packenham  Sir  Edward,  Well 
ington's  able  lieutenant,  459; 
leader  of  English  forces  at 
New  Orleans,  459  ;  takes 
command  at  New  Orleans, 
469 ;  throws  up  battery, 
and  shells,  and  destroys  the 
Carolina,  469  ;  marches  on 
New  Orleans,  470  ;  surpris 
ed  at  meeting  American 
force,  470 ;  is  repulsed  by 
the  batteries,  and  flank  fire 
from  the  Louisiana,  throws 
up  earthworks  in  the  night, 


INDEX. 


549 


471  ;  and  again  opens  at 
tack,  471  ;  after  stubborn 
cannonading  is  obliged  to 
withdraw,  473  :  remains  in 
active,  continually  harassed 
by  Americans,  473  ;  waits 
for  reinforcements,  474;  digs 
canal  to  the  river,  475  ;  rein 
forced  by  Lambert  with 
2,000  men,  476  ;  his  prepa 
rations  for  attack,  479  ;  bat 
tle  opened  by  American 
artillery,  482  ;  fierceness  of 
the  engagement,  482  ;  is 
killed,  482  ;  defeat  not  due 
to  error  on  his  part,  491 ;  his 
soldiers  veterans  of  Welling 
ton,  491  ;  and  their  conduct 
admirable  ....  491 

Patterson.  Com.  Daniel  G.,  in 
the  Carolina  prepares  to  at 
tack  the  British,  465  ;  sur 
prises  them  and  drives  them 
off  the  levees,  466  ;  lands 
guns  from  the  Louisiana  and 
makes  small  redoubt,  473  ; 
throws  up  water-battery, 
478  ;  spikes  his  guns  .  .  485 

Peninsular  War,  veterans  of,  in 
the  British  army  .  .  458 

Pensacola       ....  458 

Queenstown  Heights,  useless- 
ness  of  the  militia  .  .  492 

Rennie,  Col.,  attacks  the  Am 
erican  right  with  impetuous 
bravery  ;  but  is  killed,  483  ; 
the  number  killed  in  his 
attack  .  .  .  .486 

Results  of  campaign  to  Brit 
ish,  488  ;  to  United  States.  489 

Rigolets  .         .         .  459 

Salamanca,  Packenham's  at 
tack  at  ....  475 


Saint  Philip,  Fort  .         .         .488 

San  Sebastian,  474  ;  British 
cruelty  at  .  .  .  .  480 

Slaughter,  Col.       .         .         .  477 

Spaniards  driven  from  Pensa 
cola  by  Jackson  .  .  .  458 

Tennessee  volunteers  the 
chief  reliance  of  Jackson, 
463  ;  their  hasty  march  to 
New  Orleans,  463  ;  lawless 
ness  and  lack  of  discipline, 
463  ;  admiration  and  respect 
for  Jackson,  464  ;  unsurpass 
ed  in  their  way,  492  ;  their 
deadly  aim  .  .  .  493 

Thames,  battle  of  .         .         .  456 

Thornton,  Col.,  successful  at 
tack,  483  ;  and  defeat  of 
Morgan,  484-5  ;  danger 
ously  wounded  .  .  .  485 

Tonnant  anchors  off  Chande- 
leur  Islands,  Dec.  8th  .  459 

Toulouse,  battle  of,  success  of 
British  troops  .  .  .  474 

United  States,  what  it  was  in 
1815 455 

Victory  of  New  Orleans  a 
signal  one  ....  489 

Virginia,  success  of  British 
campaign  in  .  .  458,  489 

War  of  1812,  on  land  disas 
trous  for  the  U.  S.,  455  ;  its 
dual  aspect,  457  ;  what 
British  triumph  would  have 
meant  ....  457 

War  Department,  imbecility  of 
its  administration  .  .  456 

Wellington  "the  Iron  Duke," 
459  ;  his  defeat  of  Napo 
leon's  marshals  .  .  .  474 

Wellington's  soldiers,  uncon 
querable  troops  .  .  .  474 

Western  frontier  fighting        .  457 


HUNTING  TRIPS  OF  A  RANCHMAN.  Sketches 
of  Sport  in  the  Northern  Cattle  Plains,  together  with 
Personal  Experiences  of  Life  on  a  Cattle  Ranch  By 
Theodore  Roosevelt,  author  of  "  The  Naval  War  of  1812." 
Popular  edition.  With  thirty-five  illustrations  engraved 
on  wood,  from  designs  made  for  this  work,  by  Frost, 
Gifford,  Beard,  and  Sandham.  Octavo,  cloth  .  .  $3  50 

.<  *  *  *  jje  must  be  a  hopeless  reader  who  does  not  rise  from  this 
book  with  a  new  and  vivid  sense  of  the  '  fascination  of  the  vastness,  loneli 
ness,  and  monotony  of  the  prairies,'  and  of  '  the  sad  and  everlasting  unrest 
of  the  wilderness '  of  the  Big  Horn  Mountains,  in  addition  to  pleasant 
familiarity  with  their  flora  and  fauna.  *  *  *  As  already  said,  the 
charm  about  this  ranchman  as  author  is  that  he  is  every  inch  a  gentleman- 
sportsman.  Again,  he  is  a  careful  observer  of  the  characters  and  indi 
vidualities  of  animals,  and  he  is  a  pleasant  and  graphic  describer  of  them. 
*  *  *  We  believe  the  author  may  safely  reckon  on  a  wide  and  per 
manent  popularity  with  English  readers,  even  those  of  them  who,  like  the 
writer,  have  long  laid  aside  rod  and  gun,  and  learned  Wordsworth's  grand 
lesson." — London  Spectator. 

"One  of  those  distinctively  American  books  which  ought  to  be  wel 
comed  as  contributing  distinctly  to  raise  the  literary  prestige  of  the  country 
all  over  the  world.  *  *  *  Many  of  Mr.  Roosevelt's  narratives  are 
enriched  by  bits  of  realism  which  linger  in  the  memory  like  snatches  of 
poetry." — N.  Y.  Tribune. 

"  Mr.  Roosevelt  has  given  a  peculiar  charm  to  his  book  from  his  in 
tense  love  of  nature  and  his  capacity  to  communicate  to  others  his  own 
impressions.  A  great  debt  is  due  him  for  having  preserved  in  such  a 
charming  manner  one  of  the  most  important  chapters  in  the  long  history  of 
the  conquest  of  the  American  Wilderness." — Atlantic  Monthly. 

"  One  of  the  rare  books  which  sportsmen  will  be  glad  to  add  to  their 
libraries.  Nothing  so  good  of  the  sort  has  appeared  for  years.  *  *  * 
What  we  like  about  the  author  is  the  certainty  that  he  is  thoroughly  trust 
worthy,  and  we  feel  that  we  may  receive  his  sporting  experiences  for 
gospel." — Saturday  Review. 

"Mr.  Roosevelt's  volume  is  as  readable  as  it  is  handsome.  *  *  * 
The  author  is  an  eager  sportsman  and  a  good  writer.  His  pen  is  as  eloquent 
as  his  rifle  is  effective.  *  *  *" — London  At kenceum. 

G.  P.  PUTNAM'S  SONS, 
NEW  YORK  :  LONDON  : 

•27  AND  29  WEST  23D  STREET.  2"J  KING  WILLIAM  STREET,  STRAND* 


THE  WINNING  OF  THE  WEST,  from  the  Alle- 
ghanies  to  the  Mississippi,  1769-1783.  By  THEODORE 
ROOSEVELT,  author  of  "The  Naval  War  of  1812,"  "Hunt 
ing  Trips  of  a  Ranchman,"  etc.  Two  vols.,  octavo,  pp. 
xiv.  +  352,  427  •  •  $5-oo 

CONTENTS — Introductory — The  Spread  of  the  English-Speaking  Peoples — 
The  French  of  the  Ohio — The  Appalachian  Confederation — The 
Algonquins  of  the  Northwest — The  Backwoodsmen  of  the  Alleghanies, 
1769—1772 — Boon  and  the  Long  Hunters,  and  their  Hunting  in  No- 
Man's  Land,  1769-1773 — Sevier,  Robertson,  and  the  Watauga  Com 
monwealth,  1769-1774 — Lord  Dunmore's  War,  1774 — The  Battle  of 
the  Great  Kanawha  and  Logan's  Speech,  1774 — Boon  and  the  Settle 
ment  of  Kentucky,  1775 — In  the  Current  of  the  Revolution — The 
Southern  Backwoodsmen  Overwhelm  the  Cherokees,  1776 — The 
Struggle  for  Kentucky  and  the  War  in  the  Northwest,  1776-1779 — 
Clark's  Conquest  of  the  Illinois,  1778 — Clark's  Campaign  against 
Vincennes,  1779 — Continuance  of  the  War  in  Kentucky  and  the 
Northwest,  1779—1781 — The  Administration  of  the  Conquered  French 
Settlements,  1780-1783 — Moravian  Massacre  and  the  Vengeance  Taken 
Therefor,  1781-1782 — The  Final  Struggle  for  Kentucky,  1782,  1783 — 
The  Holston  Settlements,  1776-1779 — Robertson  Organizes  Middle 
Tennessee,  1778-1780 — King's  Mountain,  1780 — East  Tennessee,  till 
the  Close  of  the  Revolution,  1780-1783 — Middle  Tennessee  ;  the  End 
of  the  Revolution — A  Troubled  Lull  on  the  Frontier,  1781-1783. 

"It  is  an  exceedingly  interesting  work,  and  a  thorough  and  complete 
history  of  the  Western  border." — Minneapolis  Tribune. 

"  It  treats  of  a  subject  that  has  never  yet  been  dealt  with  in  a  thorough 
going  fashion,  or  with  a  full  appreciation  of  its  high  importance." — Phila. 
Telegraph. 

"  Written  in  a  free  and  flowing  style,  always  graceful,  but  never  turgid, 
that  makes  the  narrative  delightful  reading  from  the  first  page  to  the  end." — 
Chicago  Times. 

"  Has  had  the  advantage  of  much  hitherto  unused  material,  and  has  made 
painstaking,  and  evidently  successful,  efforts  to  render  his  history  accurate 
as  well  as  enjoyable." — Congregationalist. 

' '  For  the  first  time  the  whole  field  has  been  covered  in  one  work  by  one 
accomplished  and  thoroughly  equipped  writer,  whose  book  will  rank  among 
American  historical  writings  of  the  first  order." — The  Critic,  New  York. 

' '  There  is  no  one  who  could  have  described  Indian  warfare  and  frontier 
life  with  more  spirit  or  more  sympathy  than  Mr.  Roosevelt.  From  begin 
ning  to  end  these  volumes  are  interesting.  Yet  the  quality  of  interest  which 
the  narrative  possesses  in  such  a  pre-eminent  degree  does  not  give  to  it  its 
only  value.  The  historical  reflections  are  numerous,  original,  and  sensible." 
—  Christian  Union. 

"  It  will  at  once  take  rank  among  the  most  important  books  of  its  class 
that  have  been  produced  in  this  country." — Chicago  Journal. 

G.  P.  PUTNAM'S  SONS,  NEW  YORK  AND  LONDON 


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